The test launch of the Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile, conducted on December 23, 2008, ended in a failure after a malfunction of the third stage of the missile triggered its self-destruct mechanism. The launch was performed about 06:00 MSK (03:00 UTC) from submerged Dmitry Donskoy submarine of the Northern Fleet deployed in the White Sea. This was the tenth flight test of the missile (not counting two pop-up tests) and the sixth reported failure.
The problem appears to be related to the quality control during the assembly, rather than to problems with missile design - very similar to the problems that plagued the Bulava predecessor, Bark missile, and led to termination of that program. (The failure does not seem to be related in any way to the delay with the launch.)
Today's launch was supposed to complete the formal flight test program of the Bulava missile. Had it been successful, the missile would have gotten an approval of the State Commission that oversees the tests, allowing it to move to the serial production and deployment stage (although, as it was a normal Soviet practice, tests and work on the missile would have continued anyway). Now the Navy is planning to conduct at least five flight tests in 2009 instead of 3-4 that were planned before.
The continuing problems with the Bulava program will probably affect the deployment plans as well. At this point, the Russian Navy is planning to bring the first Project 955 submarine with Bulava missiles, Yuri Dolgoruky, into service in 2009. While this is still possible, it is likely that this date will now slip into at least 2010.
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Comments
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Does the Bulava is counted as a strategic asset ?
or is it counted as project ?
This is just a set back. The only organization in the world that can end the Bulava program is the rival of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT). Unless internal politics end the Bulava program, Russia will continue to test and develop this system to its ultimate success. 2009 or 2010, 2012, make little difference. Patience.
Frank Shuler
USA
its too early to comment about the intensity of its impact to Russia's projected modernization of its Strategic missile forces. But it’s hard to deny the embarrassment that resulted from its failure. What keeps me guessing was the missile’s persistent problem with its engines. It’s hard to believe that they still haven’t found a solution for this even when the previous failed test launches was caused by the same problem. Unless their production lines are being sabotaged by foreign spies to hamper the missile’s development and eventual procurement
So this makes 10 launches total, out of which 5 failed, 4 were partially successful, and only one fully succesful?
Feanor
I could give you my patented speech about how building a sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system is a complicated technical achievement and eventually Russia and the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) will get this right but the simple truth is that your statement is correct. I think the Kremlin tried to rush this design into production to have a missile to “fit” the already building Project 955 submarines. Now the Russian Navy has a submarine ready for operational trials without armaments. In fact with the current projected building cycle, the Russian Navy may have all three 955 boats ready for sea before the Bulava is fully operational. I still think the Bulava program will succeed unless sabotaged by internal Kremlin politics. However, I also think with every successful launch of a Sineva rebuilt R-29RM (SS-N-23), pressure builds to end the Bulava program. I guess we’ll see.
Frank Shuler
USA
The real problem is the entire SSBN program is at risk due to lack of industrial and intellectual
capacity. Is it really worth it to maintain a sea
based arm when the SSBN's rarely go to sea. I am sure there are those in the MOD arguing to put the money into road mobile and silo based Topol. I find it hard to believe three units of the new boomer will be ready by 2015 when the first unit
is still not ready. At the height of Soviet power
how often was a new submarine rolled out? All need to rethink how they are coming to their assessments. What about the ability to mass produce the missiles even if they were to field
a Bulava? Surely a road mobile is more difficult to target than a boomer. I challenge all to relook their projections and how the facts support such.
The "Bulava" and "Topol" are both manufactured at the same factory, if more Bulava's are made than fewer Topol's will be made as a result.
Bulava is wasting limited resources for pointless experiments to see if the Land Based Missile designer MITT can produce a Submarine Ballistic Missile similar to those designed by the Makeyev Design Bureau 30 years ago, when the last still exists and the only reason this program continues is because the head of MITT has friends in the Government.
The best their missile can do is "enter the area of the Kura target range".