Persistent problems encountered by the Bulava missile during its flight test program raise a an interesting question - Is this experience is any different from the "good old" Soviet days? From archival documents we now have a good record of the flight test program of the R-39/SS-N-20 missile (or, rather, of the D-19 missile system), so we can compare the two.
The decision to begin development of the D-19 system was made by the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers on 21 December 1976. Almost three years later, on 21 August 1979 the Military Industrial Commission formed a State Commission that oversaw the flight test program.
The program began with a series of pop-up tests - from a submerged platform and then from a test-bed Project 619 submarine (according to data published earlier, there were 9 and 7 tests respectively).
In January 1980, the missile was first tested from a land-based launcher at the 21 Navy test range (21 GTsNP, Nenoksa test range). There were 18 launches from the test range in 1980-1982 and then one more - in June 1983. Between these, there were 15 launches from the TK-208 submarine of the Project 941 class - today this boat is known as Dmitry Donskoy and is used for tests of the Bulava missile. The missile was accepted for service in May 1983.
| Missile number | Date | Comment | |
| 1 | 12/28/80 | Failure | Caused by a serious error in technical documentation |
| 2 | 04/04/80 | Failure | Failure of the 2nd stage engine nozzle |
| 3 | 06/17/80 | Failure | Failure of the flight control system |
| 5 | 10/03/80 | Failure | Failure of an on-board power source |
| 6 | 12/03/80 | Failure | 59.5 sec into flight. Failure of the flight control system |
| 7 | 12/27/80 | Success | 5 RVs |
| 21 | 01/27/81 | Success | 5 RVs, one RV not found |
| 9 | 04/01/81 | Failure | Explosion of the 2nd stage engine at ignition, 81.3 sec |
| 8 | 04/22/81 | Failure | Missile veered off-course, self-destructed on 62.7 sec |
| 10 | 11/27/81 | Success | 5 RVs, one RV not found |
| 13 | 12/21/81 | Success | |
| 15 | 12/27/81 | Success | 4 RVs |
| 16 | 01/28/82 | Success | 5 RVs |
| 17 | 02/12/82 | Success | 3 or 4 RVs |
| 23 | 03/03/82 | Failure | Failure of the 2nd stage motor, 148-150 sec |
| 14 | 04/11/82 | Success | 5 RVs |
| 18 | 04/23/82 | Success | 2 RVs |
| 20 | 06/09/82 | Success | 4 RVs |
| 30 | 06/29/82 | Success | From submarine. 3 RVs |
| 27 | 07/21/82 | Success | From submarine. 4 RVs |
| 31 | 07/22/82 | Success | From submarine, no telemetry |
| 24 | 08/12/82 | Success | Two-missile salvo from submarine. 2 RVs |
| 33 | 08/12/82 | Success | Two-missile salvo from submarine. 3 RVs |
| 19 | 09/01/82 | Success | From a surfaced submarine |
| 22 | 09/01/82 | Success | 2-missile salvo from submarine |
| 29 | 09/01/82 | Success | 2-missile salvo from submarine |
| 26 | 10/14/82 | Success | 4-missile salvo from submarine. 4 RV |
| 28 | 10/14/82 | Success | 4-missile salvo from submarine. 1 RV. Full-range (9572 km) |
| 32 | 10/14/82 | Success | 4-missile salvo from submarine. 4 RV |
| 25 | 10/14/82 | 4-missile salvo from submarine. Missile not fired. | |
| 34 | 12/02/82 | Success | From submarine. Full-range. 2 RVs. |
| 35 | 12/12/82 | Success | 3-missile salvo from submarine. 5 RVs |
| 36 | 12/12/82 | Success | 3-missile salvo from submarine. 2 RVs |
| 37 | 12/12/82 | Success | 3-missile salvo from submarine. 4 RVs |
| 12 | 07/27/83 | Success | 4 RVs |
(Two more missiles produced for the flight tests - No. 4 and No. 11 - were disassembled as part of the test program. Missile No. 25, which was not fired during the 4-missile salvo on 14 October 1982, was later placed on combat duty.)
As we can see, the beginning of the R-39 flight test program was quite rocky - only three of the first ten flight tests were successful. Bulava, in fact, has a somewhat better record at this point - four of its ten flight tests are believed to be successful (although only one was declared "full success"). On the other hand, these were the Soviet times when the defense industry did not really counted the money, so any flight test program was almost expected to take tens of missiles. Nobody expects today that the Bulava program will have the luxury of expending 37 missiles during tests as the R-39 program did.
The book
Comments
Very nice detailed list!
Could you also provide launch lists of other missile types, like R-29 ?
Tobias
Unfortunately, there is nothing like this for R-29 or other missiles.
I think it is completely incomparable situation:
- first, R-39 missile was at last successfully tested almost 30 years ago! It was also solid propelled SLBM so it means this technology was matured during Soviet era (also take into account previous R-31 missile program). Present problems with Bulava clearly suggest Russia lost ability to develop and produce solid propelled SLBMs or even new SLBMs at all.
- second, you cannot state number of R-39 tests was too high. In fact amount of Bulava scheduled test launches is ridiculously low! All nuclear powers possessing SLBM missiles always conduct twenty to thirty test launches of new SLBM type and that is widely accepted standard. If Russia announced 14 Bulava tests are enough and only one of ten conducted tests was so far fully successful it shows this program is a complete failure.
- third, in fact R-39 failures during early testing stage were caused by some engine problems. This bug was quickly addressed and as we can see later tests were all positive. In contrast Bulava tests proved this missile almost always has various malfunctions which suggests its overall construction is flawed. Note R-39 felicitous testing program took three years and Bulava tests have been conducting for five years without success.
All in all I am sure Russian military chose the worst new SLBM's development path! They could continue R-39M Bark program or select Sineva missile as a future Borey-class SSBNs armament. Yet they fixed on risky Bulava project which ended as washout...I think Russian deterrence capability is more and more questionable if based on old Soviets ICBMs with threefold extended lifetime period and new very bogus SLBMs on future boomers!
I don't think they looked at the Bulava as being risky. They looked at the Bulava to be an extension of the SS-27 program. The missiles are made in the same factory in Votkinsk and, according to about a kajillion press reports, they share components. I suspect that they looked at the Bulava as a sure thing and easy to produce since the SS-25 and the SS-27 have proved to be such reliable designs.
I think the big problem is that Votkinsk is finding out that you just cant take a successful land based design and navalize it.
Quite a few people were skeptical about the "navalization" claim from the very beginning, but MITT won that round anyway.
I believe another reason for choosing the Bulava over old soviet SLBMs was its unique ability to evade and penetrate existing and future ABM systems. its also smaller and more compact which means it requires lesser materials to build and can fit in smaller subs that has less chance for detection.
Except the Borei class was designed with the R-39 missile in mind, so there is nothing small about this boat. Compare the throw weight vs displacement of the Ohio/Trident II system with that of Borei/Peashooter. Doesn't sound like good value for money to me. When the R-39 was cancelled thanks to MIT lobbying, they promised that Bulava would be both cheap and quick. Only later did they start hyping anti-BMD features, when the program started running into problems.
actually I was comparing Borei to its predecessor the Typhoon class SSBN which was more costlier to build and maintain. I believe Russian submarine designs will remain a bit expensive than their American counterparts because of some pressing requirements like double hull etc.. And as far as defense experts are concerned they are convinced that the Bulava missile was exclusively designed to evade ABM systems since the beginning of the project.
"And as far as defense experts are concerned they are convinced that the Bulava missile was exclusively designed to evade ABM systems since the beginning of the project."
It can't even launch without exploding 100 seconds later, not very useful to "evade" anything.
What makes you think its tiny throw-weight(about 1 ton) makes it effective in penetrating ABM systems? For this you need a larger throw-weight(nearly 3 tons) like on the R-29RMU2 "Sineva", because the "Sineva" can carry decoy warheads together with the standard 3-4 warheads.
And the Bulava's limited "maximum range"(shorter than Sineva's average range of about 9000km with full load) will force the Project 955 Submarine to sail into hostile territory to launch, where more than likely it will be sunk by waiting US Submarines.
The Sineva missile needs to be adapted to the Project 955 submarines before Corrupt Bureaucracy destroys Russia's Deterrence capability.
I don’t think that the missile’s temporary engine misfortunes have a connection with its anti ABM properties. The missile would have been intentionally designed to have a small size to make it less detectable and less vulnerable to anti ballistic missile attacks. The smaller the target, the smaller the chance to hit it. The Bulava is also stated to carry no less than 10 warheads so it excels against the Sineva in terms of destructive power.
Besides, there is no logical reason to engage in a costly project if it would produce less effective and reliable systems.
Nakajima
Agree; disagree.
I agree that Bulava misfortunes are temporary. I sincerely believe that the MOD will get this right in time and Bulava will be a successful Russian SLBM. (Unless Russian politics intervene) At this point, I think the success of the Bulava project is 50% at best.
I disagree the size (the “size”?) of a RV warhead has anything to do with counter ABM abilities. How much smaller is a 50 kt warhead from a 1 mt device? The greatest advantage in the silo SS-27 project was “launch speed”; the ability to get off the ground quick to avoid a “first strike”. This ability alone makes the silo SS-27 a valuable nuclear asset. If the, so called, “maneuverable warhead” works at all, it’s a bonus. Russia has built far too few of these missiles; silo and road mobile. (TEL)
[Besides, there is no logical reason to engage in a costly project if it would produce less effective and reliable systems.] History is filled with “military industrial complex” decisions having little to do with “military” and everything to do with politics.
Frank Shuler
USA
"I don’t think that the missile’s temporary engine misfortunes have a connection with its anti ABM properties."
Yes of course, if you launch 16 missiles from 1 Submarine and 8 explode or fly in the wrong direction, 6 fail to reach the target area, and only 2 are able to place the Warheads in the right area(but not all) this will no doubt be a success?
"The missile would have been intentionally designed to have a small size to make it less detectable and less vulnerable to anti ballistic missile attacks."
Anything that is 12 meters long and 2 meters wide won't remain invisible to any modern Radar. By your logic Russia should abandon Ballistic Missiles completely and start using submarine launched Sub-sonic low altitude Stealth Cruise Missiles to avoid the limited and ineffective ABM systems US has.
The "Sineva" missile is only slightly larger than a "Bulava", but the difference in throw weight is about 3 times more(destructive power is greater) for the "Sineva".
"The Bulava is also stated to carry no less than 10 warheads so it excels against the Sineva in terms of destructive power."
This claim is nonsense. The R-30 "Bulava" has a throw weight of about 1000kg(+/- 100-200kg). This is enough for maximum 3 "normal" Warheads of Soviet/Russian design.
The RT-23/RS-22, a solid fuel ICBM, had a throw weight of 4050kg and it carried 10 Warheads. "Bulava" carries 4 times less.
These 10 Warheads would have to be extremely small size of low yield from 10-50 Kilotons. Not particularly effective as a deterrent.(Especially if most won't reach their target)
"Besides, there is no logical reason to engage in a costly project if it would produce less effective and reliable systems."
But if it produces some Expensive Houses and BMWs it is worth the expense(not like those who make the deals pay for it). Especially when the Defense Minister is a former Furniture Salesman whose proximity to Military matters is equal to the distance of the Andromeda Galaxy from Earth.
The "Bulava" project is an (expensive) mistake. MITT Designers are like Chemistry students playing with things they don't understand.
The more "Bulavas" are made the fewer "Topol-Ms" are made, and the greater the negative tendencies in Russia's Strategic Missile Forces.
If the MITT is having serious problems in designing ballistic missiles then what other alternative science institutes within Russia can be assigned to perform such task?
And what alternative ballistic missile project could they pursue just in case the bulava program is shelved?
Could you also provide launch lists of other missile types, like R-29 ?
Tobias
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R-29 or RSM-54 was tested more than 30 times.
There were 17 ground launches (more than half were unsuccessful),from a submerged submarine - 13 (11-successful).
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If the MITT is having serious problems in designing ballistic missiles then what other alternative science institutes within Russia can be assigned to perform such task?
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The best disigner of all submarine missiles is the disign bureau KB Mashinostroenia (Makeev center)in Miass. The one has been for a long time to work up Soviet and Rus. all sea based missiales. In fact the Bulava substitution exsists. This is BARK or Bulava-45.
Just wanted to note that this:
"Anything that is 12 meters long and 2 meters wide won't remain invisible to any modern Radar. By your logic Russia should abandon Ballistic Missiles completely and start using submarine launched Sub-sonic low altitude Stealth Cruise Missiles to avoid the limited and ineffective ABM systems US has."
is garbage. First off RCS reduction techniques have evolved to the point where much larger objects can effectively reduce detection, tracking, and engagement ranges (and consequently engagement envelopes of the defensive systems). Second off there is a huge difference between DETECTION data, and TARGETTING data which is what you need to vector an intercept. Just because something is DETECTED by a modern radar (i.e. not invisible) doesn't meant that it can intercept it effectively. Finally if it has less time to detect it, and consequently less time in which to intercept, it's less likely to do so. Especially on the system-wide level.
Finally the low-altitude stealth cruise missiles are an excellent option. I just don't see why you think it's an option that reaplces SLBMs. They're complimentary.
Well, additionally Iskander SRBM is to be produced also in Votkinsk plant. Thus in theory one factory will build three different missiles (Topol-M, Bulava, Iskander) simultaneusly. Current Russian missile production capability is well known so I suppose they will get one missile of each type annually in extreme!
Besides Bulava's real throw weight is about 700 kg not 1200 kg because remaining weight is needed for PBV fuel, guidance section etc. Read several articles about Bulava project at NVO. So it seems very low-cost SLBM means no SLBM in this example.
Last but not least, I am afraid other Russian missile design beauros are now in a very bad situation due to lack of pending design programs. In sum they can die and Russian Army will remain with unhealthly MITT monopoly. Yet the worse is that MITT seems not to be capable to become sole ballistic missile designer because of decreasing of its intellectual potential and lack of needed knowlegde in some crucial areas like naval missiles technology.
Yeah, and if rumors about canceling INF will come true, there maybe will the Pioneer as the fourth production line in Votkinsk :-)
But maybe Makeev is now successful in lobbying about the proposed new liquid ICBM and offers a terralised (whats the english opposite of navalise ?) of the Sineva?
Instead of "lobbying" design beauros they need an efficient MIC working under KGB control to finish this mess-up! Otherwise situation won't improve...