Russia's position on the link between missile defense is getting harder with each new statement on the U.S.-Russia arms control talks. In the March 2009 official statement missile defense was mentioned, but it was not included in the part of the address that was attributed to the president. When President Medvedev mentioned it in his speech in Helsinki in April, he did say that missile defense would complicate disarmament efforts, but he seemed to be making a general point, rather than referring to the U.S.-Russia negotiations currently underway. An official statement made in May made the connection more direct, suggesting that Russia would want to use the new treaty to deal with the issue of missile defense in Europe. And finally, speaking in Amsterdam on June 20, 2009, Medvedev explicitly said that "the he reductions we are suggesting are possible only if the United States addresses Russian concerns [about missile defense]".
It may seem that Medvedev was talking about the next round of talks - the statement was billed as a new bold arms reduction offer, so many assumed that it goes beyond of what is being discussed today. It is hard to say if that was indeed the case, for the statement is extremely thin on details, so it is quite possible that the "new offer" is in fact the current negotiating position.
Medvedev said that Russia is ready to reduce "the number of strategic delivery vehicles by a significant factor" relative to START ceiling of 1600 launchers. But this is hardly anything new or bold - Russia already has 814 accountable launchers and fewer than 600 "real" ones. With the warheads, Medvedev promised to reduce their number below the Moscow treaty level. This is hardly anything new or bold - I don't think anyone expected the number to be higher than that of the Moscow treaty (as I understand, it will be 1500).
I still hope that Russia will not torpedo the current talks by linking reductions with missile defense. But it may well decide that this is the right moment and try to get the United States to make some concessions on missile defense. That would be unfortunate, because it is highly unlikely that the United States would be ready to negotiate away its missile defense system. Even though the U.S. administration is fairly skeptical about missile defenses in general and the system in Europe in particular, it would find it much harder to kill the program if it would look like it is done under a pressure from Russia. I understand how Russia feels about missile defense, but trying to insert this issue into the current round of arms control talks is the best way to fail on both counts - Russia may find itself without a treaty and with U.S. missile defense in Eastern Europe.
The book
Comments
As far as I understand, the position ties reductions to missile defense in general (not only in the 3rd region/Eastern Europe). Also feel it would be not entirely correct to always nod at US public opinion as a pretext for not engaging in compromises. The Obama administration surely can do better than just doggedly following op-eds in the media.
After 2001 the Russian position was always consistent. It strategic forces will have 1.500 warheads plus an insurance against western ABM systems. It didn’t changed and hardly will change. Like it or not, is time to assume that the age of unilateral Russian concessions is buried.
The follow-up treaty to START is drawing little real media interest here in the United States. The only direct comment by the Administration was made by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who publicly stated he would “feel uncomfortable in today’s security world having the deployed American arsenal below 1500 weapons”. I agree the United States will not give up missile defense as a concept in this treaty on any other. But, I do feel the European System is negotiable. (I think it always has been so) So, the question is, what does Russia have to trade? If the US is willing, perhaps unilaterally, to reduce its nuclear inventory to 1500 deployed weapons, is that important to Russia? What about the “up-load” factor? If an absolute overall inventory of strategic nuclear warheads could be negotiated, deployed weapons and those “held in reserve”, would that interest Russia? Would Russia be willing to include all nuclear weapons in such limits; including the so-called tactical weapons?
What is the Kremlin willing to give up in exchange for US not building the proposed GBI system in Poland and the Czech Republic?
Frank Shuler
USA
Kolokol
... the age of unilateral Russian concessions is buried ...
Curious to your thoughts. What were the “unilateral concessions” made in the SALT and START treaties? Granted, I felt the START II treaty clearly favored American needs but it was never ratified. The Moscow Treaty (SORT) is hardly a “treaty” and clearly favors no one; or perhaps, Russia since the deployed limit on American nuclear warheads limits Trident.
What do you think Russia wants in a new follow-up START treaty? What does she have to trade?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
The Kremlin could give up Iranian nuclear reactor and stop blocking Central Asian states from cooperating with United States.
This is the thing with negotiation and leverage: US improved its negotiating position dramatically by developing the option of stationing US military installation on Polish soil. The Russians are trying the same thing with Iranian and Afganistan options.
I still do not understand how the security of Russian Federation is imporoved if United States were to reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads or delivery vehicles. US has overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons, at least for now and means to sustain and improve nuclear capability. I would argue that RF has to gain more by eliminating inspections and basically focusing on reducing US ability to track mobile and naval launch platforms. Whether US reduces its arcenal to 1500 or 1000 is not really relevant: US still will have first strike potential (between nuclear and conventional forces) that can only be offset by nuclear force of RF.
Perhaps the treaty discussion will be just that, a discussion. I think both sides want to keep up the appearances but ultimately, each side has diverging interests.
Why should the Kremlin exchange for something that the US should not have built at the first place.
That is like let the US negotiate with Russia at gun point.
START 3 or no START 3 the Poland system should not be constructed at all.
If US does go ahead with Europe site then reaction is just logical.
But if US drops the idea of European site then a Strategic reduction of 1,500 on both sides are a possibility.
There is no need to bring in tactical weapons as they have no place in strategic arm reduction , if at all they should be negotiated separately.
Sergey
I agree completely if Russia could somehow take the long-term Iranian nuclear threat off the table, the need to construct the American GBI system proposed for Poland and the Czech Republic goes away.
Let me propose a novel idea just for our discussions. Do you think Russia would be willing to base an American Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) mobile system in South Russia that could be used to both defend American interest and Russia herself in the event of a future Iranian threat? Such a theater system would not endanger Russia’s strategic weapons in the least. Crazy idea, maybe. Thoughts?
America’s dominance in conventional weapons is relative. Very useful for an Iraq type of war but hardly useful in some confrontation with Russia. What scenario could anyone imagine where Russia and the United States start shooting at each other and nuclear weapons remain in the silos? Once the “dogs of war” are released, there is no “plan”. Events take a life of their own. The snowball becomes an avalanche.
I can’t see eliminating inspections as being in Russia’s interest but I agree completely that Russia and the US suffer from “diverging interests” in a START follow-up treaty.
Good conversation.
Frank Shuler
USA
Austin Joseph
[...Why should the Kremlin exchange for something that the US should not have built at the first place...]
I’m assuming you mean the US-GBI system installed in Alaska and California; but only proposed for Poland. That's like asking the United States why negotiate with Russia after the Kremlin developed the RS-24 mobile multiple warhead ballistic missile system. Perhaps both the GBI system in Poland and the not yet deployed RS-24 can be negotiated away.
The US is going to drop its operational inventory of deployed nuclear warheads to 1500 regardless of what Russia does. I think the real argument is how many warheads are left in “operational reserve” that could potentially be “reloaded” in the future. This is an issue that greatly troubles Russia.
[...There is no need to bring in tactical weapons as they have no place in strategic arm reduction , if at all they should be negotiated separately...]
I disagree. I think these talks are about reducing nuclear weapons in general. If the United States announced tomorrow all B-83 and B-61-mod 7 & 11 nuclear gravity bombs that today are tasked to the USAF B-2 and B-52 bomber fleets are no longer “strategic” but “tactical” weapons and thus won’t be counted in any new START agreement, I doubt this would sit well with the generals in the Kremlin.
Frank Shuler
USA
"America’s dominance in conventional weapons is relative. Very useful for an Iraq type of war but hardly useful in some confrontation with Russia. What scenario could anyone imagine where Russia and the United States start shooting at each other and nuclear weapons remain in the silos?"
How about an air war, Yugoslavian-style? It's only a non-option for the US as long as Russia can escalate to nuclear level and have some kind of "draw" with the US.
reko
You’re talking about something in the abstract.
But, you also just made my point. No matter how great America’s superiority in conventional weapons, NATO would never have launched an “air war” against Serbia if Belgrade had 10,000 nuclear weapons. (like Russia today)
Or 1000.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank Shuler
[..That's like asking the United States why negotiate with Russia after the Kremlin developed the RS-24 mobile multiple warhead ballistic missile system..]
If Russia continues producing only small numbers of single warhead Topol-Ms its Nuclear Arsenal will be on the level of France(200-400 deployed warheads) by 2018(if the situation does not change), with all the heavy MIRV ICBMs removed from service by then.
If this happens Russia's opinion will likely be ignored as a "2nd class" Nuclear Power. For this reason future Russian ICBMs must have multiple warheads to maintain numerical(warhead) superiority over countries like France or China(if not US).
Second point, the RS-24 is a modified Topol-M. Which does not have very much room for MIRV warheads. Even if they fit 10 warheads on it, they will be at best Hiroshima level 20 Kilotons. My point - US has little to worry about from the RS-24. They won't be "mobile", mobility in the age of Thermal Imaging satellites is useless. At any moment a Tomahawk missile launched from a Submarine in the Barents Sea could destroy this "mobile" RS-24. They have to be below ground(silo) protected by reinforced blast doors, against such a scenario.
[..Perhaps both the GBI system in Poland and the not yet deployed RS-24 can be negotiated away..]
RS-24 is supposed to replace all of the R-36(SS-18) and UR-100(SS-20) ICBMs(not a very adequate replacement actually). Russia will never agree to suspending the program, for the reason I wrote earlier.
[..If the United States announced tomorrow all B-83 and B-61-mod 7 & 11 nuclear gravity bombs that today are tasked to the USAF B-2 and B-52 bomber fleets are no longer “strategic” but “tactical” weapons and thus won’t be counted in any new START agreement, I doubt this would sit well with the generals in the Kremlin..]
It is highly unlikely that the bureaucrats, lawyers, investment bankers, and the furniture salesman currently acting as Defense Minister in the Russian Government would even understand what you wrote above.
Nikolai K.
I completely understand your position regarding the RS-24. I only drew this inference to illustrate that all options must be “on the table” if there is going to be any real practical START-plus treaty negotiations between Moscow and Washington.
What Russia wants in a new START-Plus treaty seems obvious. Moscow wants to limit “strategic” warheads to 1500 deployed warheads and 500 launch vehicles. The Kremlin wants to reach this strategic inventory of 1500/500 by completing all its new nuclear weapons programs: the Yuri Dolgorukiy (Project 955) class submarines, the new Kh-102 strategic nuclear cruise missile, the SS-27 ICBM; both the silo-based Topol-M (RS-12M2) and the mobile version (RS-12M1), before moving production to the new version of the Topol-M, the multiple warhead, mobile, RS-24. All the while, building new nuclear warheads to arm its nuclear arsenal. Russia wants the American GBI system proposed in Poland and the Czech Republic to end; and, in fact, would like to tie their opposition to the proposed US GBI system in Europe to the entire US GBI effort being built in the United States. While Russia has more nuclear weapons than the rest of the world combined, Moscow has no interest in discussing “tactical” nuclear weapons in this treaty. These are clear aims and easily understood.
But, what does the United States want in such a START-Plus treaty?
If the Russians want to limit the number of deployed warheads to 1500, the US will agree. If the Russians want to limit the number of delivery vehicles to 500 and the American position is 1100, I’m sure a compromise of 800 can be arranged. But, what then? The United States seems contented to simply modernize and update its aging inventory of nuclear weapons. The United States has no new strategic nuclear systems under construction; with the exception of some Trident missiles it continues to buy from Lockheed for testing. The last B-52 manufactured was delivered to the USAF in 1961. The last Minuteman III ICBM was delivered to the USAF in 1970. The last Trident submarine, the USS Louisiana went to sea in 1997. The last of only twenty B-2 bombers was delivered in 1997. The last American nuclear ICBM warhead, a Trident W-88, was delivered in 1989. While all these systems have be heavily modernized and continue to be updated, the most capable ICBM in the American arsenal, the MX Peacekeeper, has been removed from service as well as the most capable air-launched nuclear cruise missile, the stealthy ACM. Since 1992 and the presidency of Bill Clinton, the American focus has not been on offensive nuclear systems but on ballistic missile defense. That’s where the American dollars have gone. Why? The simple answer is that the United States believes maned bombers, nuclear cruise missiles, and land based ICBMs are archaic weapons that have little place in the 21st century. The future is space.
Russia wants ballistic missile defense on the negotiation table; America does not. Frankly, Russia has nothing to offer to make Washington change its mind.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank, I think Russia will have to do nothing to reduce their arsenals to 1500 and 500 level as their launchers will automatically be reduced to that agreed level, you know the reasons. But how the US reduce their arsenals? How they combine this 1500 and 1100 level? What will be the best combination for 1100 launchers and 1500 warheads?
Parimal Debnath
My best guess is that the American nuclear arsenal in the future will be built around a 1500/800 combination. The twelve deployed Trident submarines will have a total of 228 missiles and, with each armed with three warheads, provide 864 nuclear warheads against the START-plus treaty. The 450 Minuteman III will hold single warheads, leaving 62 bombers to carry 186 air weapons. This is consistent with the US position today. The only need of the START-Plus treaty to address any more than 800 launchers on the American side will depend on Russian “counting rules”. For example, the US only wants to count the twelve operational Trident boats available at any given time, discounting the two submarines that are always in shipyard long-tern maintenance (nuclear refueling) and, thus, unavailable to the fleet. Russia wants to farther count the first four Trident submarines that have long been out of the US strategic fleet and now are armed with Tomahawk conventional cruise missiles. The US only wants to count 16 B-2 bombers and 46 B-52H bombers that are tasked (coded) with a nuclear mission. Russia wants to count all 20 B-2s in inventory and the total number of B-52H bombers, 76 (or perhaps 93 depending if “maintained but non-flying” aircraft are counted by the “rules”). Russia also wants to count the B-1 bombers, some 67 in USAF inventory that have long given up a nuclear mission.
If Missile Defense isn’t a “deal breaker” in these negations, I’m sure a compromise can be reached whereby each side doesn’t have to give up anything and the START-Plus treaty will be a big success.
Frank Shuler
USA
Thanks Frank, what could be combination for Russia? Any guess? I think Russia would have about 500 DV and 1500 warheads by the end of 2016.
Parimal Debnath
I honestly think Russia will reach the 1500/500+ inventory by simply completing all its “new” nuclear weapon programs. Russia will have the most modern nuclear arsenal of any nation on earth when START-Plus is initiated.
Frank Shuler
USA