It is not entirely unexpected that missile defense became a stumbling block at the U.S.-Russian new START negotiations. Russia, of course, wanted to somehow limit U.S. missile defense program from the very beginning, even though it agreed that the treaty will deal only with strategic offensive weapons at first - the April 1st, 2009 joint statement that stated the negotiations is quite clear about that:
The subject of the new agreement will be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms
It is not uncommon for Russia, though, to strike an agreement and then come back and ask for more - there were a few attempts to insert missile defense into the discussion since then (e.g. here, here). The U.S. decision not to deploy a radar and interceptors in Czech Republic and Poland helped to calm the waters a bit and for some time it looked like that the momentum generated by that decision would help carry the negotiations through.
Well, it didn't quite work that way. It probably couldn't have anyway, especially if the United States hoped that cancelling the third site would solve all the problems. It was, of course, the issue Russia complained about the most, but these complains had nothing to do with the specific configuration of the missile defense system. In fact, I wrote at the time that
any changes of the system configuration that would try to address Russia's concern in a narrowly defined technical way - e.g. changes in the deployment area or a move toward mobile or ship-based interceptors - are unlikely to change Russia's position on missile defense in a substantial way.
Unfortunately, this is more or less what happened - after a period of relative calm opposition to U.S. missile defense is back. This time it appears to be focused on the plans to deploy elements of missile defense in Romania, but I would argue that the specifics are again immaterial. As far as I can tell, what happened was that Russia found out that it again has no leverage over missile defense decisions - not even a sort-of-legitimate reason to complain about deployment in Poland and Czech Republic. This situation proved a fertile ground for a new mistrust and for all kind of statements about hidden U.S. motives. (We should also keep in mind that no one in Moscow ruined their career by insisting that the U.S. missile defense is directed against Russia.)
I have been long arguing that the only way to solve the missile defense debacle is to give Russia some stake in the process, probably by engaging it in a discussion of ballistic missile threats and possible responses and moving toward cooperation. In theory, the U.S. administration seems to understand it - it found the right words for the joint summit statement back in July 2009 and was generally supportive of the idea of cooperation. But something didn't work in practice, so we are where we are today.
I am still a bit puzzled why settling on the final treaty language is taking that long. As far as I can tell, missile defense is the only really difficult issue and a solution has been already found - Russia will make a unilateral statement stating that it would reserve a right to withdraw from the treaty if deployment of U.S. missile defense jeopardized its supreme national interests. The United States is expected to issue a counterstatement, saying that such a strong reaction would be unwarranted. Something like this was done at the time the START treaty was signed. Admittedly, the situation then was a bit different - there was the ABM Treaty to refer to. This time the reference to the link between offense and defense is supposed to be included in the treaty, which could potentially make the unilateral statement quite a bit stronger. (This already made some U.S. senators nervous about letting Russia to make any statements - Kingston Reif has a good summary of the controversy.) So, I guess it might be difficult to come up with precise language. But it should not be taking months.
The most frustrating part of this controversy is that it is about nothing - missile defense will never be able to counter any kind of missile threat, let alone give Russia any reason to worry about "strategic balance" or things like that. What we see is that missile defense proved again that it is good at poisoning everything.
The book
Comments
"missile defense will never be able to counter any kind of missile threat"
Never is a very long time.
Considering Russia's 21st Century nuclear posture, where the main mission is "war termination" by a limited ALCM strike on a half dozen key US/NATO military assets (Diego Garcia, aircraft carriers, an airbase or two), a missile defense system to stop subsonic, nonstealthy ALCMs is certainly plausible.
Secondly, in the old strategic calculus, a first strike against Russia 2010 would have to destroy "only" 4-500 targets, (367 missiles, 13 subs, a couple of heavy bomber airfields, and some SAM sites) compared to tens of thousands during the Cold War.
That sort of strike may or may not be within the capability of current or projected US forces, but it is close enough that a Russian planner writing a worst case scenario has to call it plausible. Russia would still have a few second-strike missiles left, but enough to defeat a US "thin" ABM defense? Pessimistic Russian defense officials would not guarantee it.
It's not about what US BMD can do now. It's about what it will be able to do 20 years from now, if it's allowed to continue to develop.
Well, technology will, of course, change in 20 years and certainly in the long run. But the fundamental problem with missile defense will remain - it's not about the limits of technology.
On May 1, 1960, an event occurred that radically changed US defense planning. An SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile destroyed an American U-2 “spy” aircraft, piloted by Francis Gary Powers, flying over Soviet territory. Any lingering Pentagon support for the the North American Aviation XB-70 Valkyrie strategic bomber ended and the mach-3, 70,000 ft ceiling aircraft was destined never to enter production to replace the “old” Boeing B-52. Think how much defense money could have been saved if the United States and the Soviet Union could have agreed by treaty to eliminate such “destabilizing” weapon systems? The US would not have had to develop the Nike-Ajax, Nike-Hercules, Nike-Zeus, Hawk, and Patriot systems. “SafeGuard” would never have been built. Think how much money the then Soviet Union, and Russia today, could have saved, or spent on other weapon systems, if its vast inventory of surface-to-air missile systems were never built?
Is the ballistic missile defense debate today any different?
Frank Shuler
USA
I disagree Pavel. It's very much about the fundamental capabilities of the technology, as well as the offense-defense balance. For nuclear deterrence to continue to remain viable, BMD development has to be kept in check, or at least it's widespread deployment. Hence why any arms-control treaties need to be tied to BMD treaties accompanying it. In my opinion the russian government should refuse any arms-limitation treaty, especially one that limits tactical warheads, if the treaty does not include BMD limitations.
Frank the difference is that I'm not American, and therefore not terribly concerned with US budget saved by eliminating BMD. I am however concerned with loss of credible nuclear deterrence.
Feanor
You missed my point.
The 1960‘s “Experts” believed the rise of surface-to-air (SAM) systems spelled the end of combat aircraft. Why build a million dollar fighter that could be destroyed at will by a $10,000 dollar missile? Bombers? The same. However as we now well know, that did not happen. The proliferation of SAM systems only created new offensive counter-measures and produced new battlefield tactics to suppress this defensive weapon system. I suspect BMD is no different. It’s just a weapon system; not some panacea that will make ICBMs and nuclear weapons obsolete.
The United States is going to build BMD systems. Period. Whether that is a good military-political-financial decision or not, no longer matters. Russia is just going to have to adjust. With that being said, is the new START+ agreement worthwhile for Moscow? It seems so to me. By treaty the Kremlin can limit the American nuclear arsenal to the size Russia can afford to match. Russia can continue to modernize its inventory of weapons without restrictions. Russia can continue to build “new” nuclear warheads without restrictions. The Bulava, SS-27, RS-24, and Kh-101/2 projects can continue. If she so wants, Russia can build a “heavy” liquid-fueled ICBM in the future. When developed and produced, these weapons will provide Russia with the most modern, capable nuclear arsenal on the planet.
How many nuclear weapons does Russia need for "deterrence"? Why does Russia with 10,000 nuclear warheads feel so threatened and China with 300 doesn’t?
Frank Shuler
USA
I will address you point by point as you're absolutely correct, if granted your assumptions. They're exactly the problem, however.
Frank wrote: The 1960‘s “Experts” believed the rise of surface-to-air (SAM) systems spelled the end of combat aircraft. Why build a million dollar fighter that could be destroyed at will by a $10,000 dollar missile? Bombers? The same. However as we now well know, that did not happen. The proliferation of SAM systems only created new offensive counter-measures and produced new battlefield tactics to suppress this defensive weapon system. I suspect BMD is no different. It’s just a weapon system; not some panacea that will make ICBMs and nuclear weapons obsolete.
Absolutely. Russia, however can't afford the arms race at this time. Which is why I think any existing diplomatic leverage should be used to try to preserve the status quo in regards to the offense defense balance in nuclear weapons.
Frank wrote: The United States is going to build BMD systems. Period. Whether that is a good military-political-financial decision or not, no longer matters. Russia is just going to have to adjust.
That's a big assumption. If faced with non-cooperation on Iran, and additional problems in the third world, are you sure the US won't be willing to concede that point?
Frank wrote: With that being said, is the new START+ agreement worthwhile for Moscow? It seems so to me. By treaty the Kremlin can limit the American nuclear arsenal to the size Russia can afford to match.
Russia doesn't need to match it. It just needs a credible and redundant second-strike capability. Let the US build nuclear weapons out of control. Who cares? As long as they know that using them isn't an option.
Frank wrote: How many nuclear weapons does Russia need for "deterrence"? Why does Russia with 10,000 nuclear warheads feel so threatened and China with 300 doesn’t?
Because China is an economic powerhouse on the rise, with huge economic leverage and very limited geo-political ambitions. Russia on the other hand is an oversized petro-state that has an ailing economy, with the geo-political ambitions of a super power. Hence why China's nuclear status is a question of prestige, and technological development of the capability rather then actual deployment of warheads. For Russia it's just the opposite.
Feanor
“To preserve the status quo in regards to the offense defense balance in nuclear weapons” is really the numbers question. For Russia, that seems to be 1500 deployed “strategic” nuclear weapons with the Bulava, SS-27, RS-24, and Kh-101/2 projects designed to give the Kremlin the redundant nuclear force necessary. Russia vast inventory of so called tactical warheads and their delivery systems are another story. Remember, other than re-pitting a handful of W-88 warheads a year, the United States is producing no “new” nuclear warheads, and has not for years, and farther fully intends on eliminating hundreds of reserve/surplus warheads in its existing inventory regardless of Russia’s position on START+. While Russia is frantically rebuilding its nuclear arsenal, the US seems indifferent. The simple truth is that the US doesn’t think of Russia as an enemy, an adversary at times certainly, but no enemy.
As to the “big” assumption and your quote [If faced with non-cooperation on Iran, and additional problems in the third world, are you sure the US won't be willing to concede that point?], threatening the United States by “encouraging” nuclear proliferation in the third-world is exactly what got the US in the BMD business in the first place. While it is not politically correct today to say so in American military-diplomatic-policy circles, the US absolutely blames Russia for the spread of nuclear proliferation in the world today. The saying goes, “Russia gave China the bomb, who gave North Korea the bomb, both China and North Korea gave Pakistan the bomb, and Russia, China, North Korea, and Pakistan gave Iran the bomb...” The fear here is Iran will give Al-Qaida the bomb and they’ll use it.
The United States will never concede the right to defend itself from all enemies. And so its BMD efforts, and the small role it plays in America’s defense, will continue. There’s nothing to negotiate.
Good exchange of views!
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank-
If the U.S. didn't think that Russia is an enemy why is it not only engaged in encircling Russia with missile defense bases by which it wants to project a non-existent fear in the surrounding states through propaganda, but also engaged in deliberately creating disturbances in almost all former Soviet satellite states through supporting dissidence. The news media funded by the West is constantly trying to promote anti-Soviet propaganda. The reason given about defending against Iran is too obviously an exaggerated claim which fails to satisfy anyone. The propaganda serves double purpose for U.S.- that of weakening Russia and setting up bases and selling its defensive weaponry.
I wonder if it is soooooo important a new Treaty. I’m afraid the answer is NOT.
As Frank says, the U.S.A wants a treaty on their own terms and nothing else (quote: “The United States is going to build BMD systems. Period. Whether that is a good military-political-financial decision or not, no longer matters. Russia is just going to have to adjust.”). So, let U.S.A builds their NMD, increase, if want, its offensive capability and over-spend, as is already over-spending. As far I see, Russia has a menu of asymmetrical options to assure the own security, also in a unilateral way, as i.e. MIRVing mobile ICBM, develop and deploy the 100 tn liquid fuelled ICBM and may be deploy FOBS on them, nuke some advanced SAM to give point them point-defense ABM potential. That’s according current Russian economic realities seems affordable.
Arming Iran with advanced SAM, heat-up Mid East and some other dirty asymmetrical answers seems unnecessary so far. I will not discard them but should be considered just in face of an aggressive NATO escalation of its anti-Russian phobias
In the END a cosmetically paper so save Mr. Obama face is no so bad. Arsenals will decline in irrespectively of a treaty.
And BMD is really not a problem of principle. It's a problem of including restrictions on the system, in regards to preventing a comprehensive BMD system capable of stopping the 1500 warhead arsenal from becoming too small. That's the problem. The offense-defense balance isn't static. It's dynamic, and with BMD proliferation and development the absolute offensive advantage offered by ICBMs is largely reduced. In the long run it may end up negated entirely. Hence why Russia is doing all it can to limit and stop the development of truly groundbreaking and strategic balance altering BMD systems. The problem isn't that BMD can stop Iran or North Korea. Nobody cares about them. The problem is that if BMD continues to develop, and the Russian arsenal continues to deteriorate, for political and financial reasons, then it simply wont' be enough.
By the way you keep talking about the X-101 and X-102 project. So far that missile has yet to reach final testing stages. It's a project that's been around for over a decade (closer to two decades actually). I'm not optimistic about service entry dates.
Additionally, I'm not sure why you would compare the US and Russia. Obviously their positions on nuclear weapons are incomparable. The US has absolute global dominance in conventional armed forces. No wonder they're pushing for nuclear disarmament. And if this push continues Russia will lose the last pretenses of parity with the US. Hence why Russia needs guaranteed nuclear deterrence both tactically and strategically.
K.A.Sharma
Kolokol
Feanor
Gentlemen, its just been announced here this morning that the new START agreement is complete. The limits are set at 700 launchers and 1550 deployed nuclear warheads. While there is a protocol agreement that mentions BMD systems and its linkage to offensive systems, there are no defined BMD limits in the treaty.
Comments?
Frank Shuler
USA
K.A.Sharma
The United States doesn’t fear Russia or consider her an enemy. However; the US seems to display constant frustration with how difficult Moscow is to work with on any issue. Any issue... In turn, Russia seems constantly frustrated in its relationship with Washington because its opinions are not “respected”. Russia is a world power and possesses the largest nuclear arsenal on the planet and, yet, the US seems indifferent. What Russia is learning is that having such a nuclear capability does not translate into real power. Threatening countries with nuclear weapons is meaningless if those weapons are destined never to be used. In August 2008, when Georgia made a play for South Ossetia, I don’t think Tbilisi feared the number of SS-27s the Kremlin possessed, did it?
your quote:
[The news media funded by the West is constantly trying to promote anti-Soviet propaganda.]
The Soviet Union is gone.
Frank Shuler
USA
Kolokol
Of course my friend, you are right. Arsenals will decline irrespectively of a treaty. However; I suspect you would agree with me that a new START agreement is useful for both Moscow and Washington. It will be good to keep military-to-military communications open and to share test results to ensure openness. Technical verifications only add to the benefits of such a treaty. Russia will face no restrictions on rebuilding its nuclear arsenal, such as missile warhead limits on mobile systems (the RS-24 for just an example) and the US faces no treaty limits on its BMD pursuits.
I’m not sure about your “asymmetrical options”. Russia itself is just as vulnerable to such.
Frank Shuler
USA
Feanor
Interesting thoughts and I’m inclined to agree with your conclusions. The 30 GBI interceptors in Alaska and California are no real threat to Russia’s ICBM arsenal. However, the SM-3 systems may well be procured in the thousands if all Aegis US Navy ships are converted and the land-based version is deployed in numbers. Yet, Russia’s only answer seems to be targeting such installations with theatre (tactical) nuclear weapons. Does Russia have anything politically to offer to prevent such from happening? Something to negotiate? Trade?
Agreed on the Kh-101/2 system. However, the Raduga Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent) is still a viable weapon system until finally replaced by the newer missile. I think this project has run into some major technical issues and has been long starved for funding in the Kremlin defense budgets.
I understand “the last pretenses of parity” statement as well. But, don’t place so much confidence in America’s ability to be this global power with unlimited ambition and capabilities. The US is positioning itself today for “global downsizing” in the next ten years or so.
It’s a changing world.
Frank Shuler
USA
There is no military response, other then increasing nuclear arsenals, both tactical and strategic. If the US goes for that option, Russia is essentially screwed. Militarily the US spends over 10 times as much. The US defense budget is roughly the Russian GDP. Hence why a diplomatic solution is necessary, and hence if I was Russian leadership I'd pull out all the stops to make it happen. I'd throw Iran, Latin America, Georgia, Afghan cooperation, anything and everything, on the table to make a BMD agreement happen that would for the next 10-15 years seriously slow down BMD development and deployment.
The US will remain the global power for the next 2-3 decades. So the only solution is to hope that the current economic "revival" that those in power are promising for Russia will turn out to be real. Then the diplomatic solution would buy the necessary time to rebuild Russia safely, continue to pursue interests in the near abroad, while cooperating with the west globally, and re-arming and upgrading the strategic nuclear arsenal, as well as pursuing the Russian BMD systems development.
The current administration seems to think that the US is genuine about not developing BMD to offset deterrence. But whether it's genuine or not, as long the development continues and arsenals continue to shrink, it will happen in the long run.
Frank noted:
“To preserve the status quo in regards to the offense defense balance in nuclear weapons” is really the numbers question. For Russia, that seems to be 1500 deployed “strategic” nuclear weapons with the Bulava, SS-27, RS-24, and Kh-101/2 projects designed to give the Kremlin the redundant nuclear force necessary. Russia vast inventory of so called tactical warheads and their delivery systems are another story. Remember, other than re-pitting a handful of W-88 warheads a year, the United States is producing no “new” nuclear warheads, and has not for years, and farther fully intends on eliminating hundreds of reserve/surplus warheads in its existing inventory regardless of Russia’s position on START+. While Russia is frantically rebuilding its nuclear arsenal, the US seems indifferent. The simple truth is that the US doesn’t think of Russia as an enemy, an adversary at times certainly, but no enemy.
As to the “big” assumption and your quote [If faced with non-cooperation on Iran, and additional problems in the third world, are you sure the US won't be willing to concede that point?], threatening the United States by “encouraging” nuclear proliferation in the third-world is exactly what got the US in the BMD business in the first place. While it is not politically correct today to say so in American military-diplomatic-policy circles, the US absolutely blames Russia for the spread of nuclear proliferation in the world today. The saying goes, “Russia gave China the bomb, who gave North Korea the bomb, both China and North Korea gave Pakistan the bomb, and Russia, China, North Korea, and Pakistan gave Iran the bomb...” The fear here is Iran will give Al-Qaida the bomb and they’ll use it.
All this is very true but most importantly the LAST SENTENCE.And without good nuclear forensics, attribution--who detonated a bomb in an American city--the Iranians will literally get away with murder.
As for missile defense always poisoning arms control, a mutual hostage reltionship (MAD) without defenses even between Russia and the US does not help you deal with NK, Iran et al who decide to have nuclear weapons in order to offset the US advantage in conventional cpability so they can commit terrorism and aggression at will; nukes for the mullahs are top cover to continue as the world's premier state sponsor of terrorism.