Speaking at a plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on March 7, 2009, Sergey Lavrov read President Medvedev's statement that outlined Russia's position on the new U.S.-Russian arms control treaty (the Russian text of the remarks is available at the MID web site, the English text - at the web site of the Reaching Critical Will).
There is not much new there - Russia wants a legally binding agreement, which would limit delivery systems and not just deployed warheads. These are old (and quite reasonable) positions, although getting an agreement like that would be very difficult. I wrote about it back in December.
Some statements are quite peculiar, though. According to Medvedev's part of the address, "the numbers of delivery vehicles and their warheads are considerably lower [than the limits established by START 1]". This is, actually, not the case - according to the July 2008 MOU, the United States has 5951 START-accountable warheads - not much lower than the 6000 ceiling established by the treaty.
The number of "operationally deployed nuclear warheads" is indeed lower than that - according to Hans Kristensen, by that count the United States reached the Moscow treaty limit of 2200 warheads earlier this year. Since Russia, officially at least, rejects the U.S. definition of "operationally deployed nuclear warheads", it is not quite clear how exactly President Medvedev's words should be interpreted. Does Russia accept this count now?
Then, there was a strange idea of "excluding possible deployment of strategic offensive arms outside of national territories". This is not particularly new - the START treaty has this provision (Article V.28 and commentary), but I'm not quite sure why it was prominent again. Especially since Lavrov later clarified that this provision would not apply to submarine deployment. Is this an attempt to limit ICBM-derived missile defense interceptors? Hard to tell. In any event, I doubt that this is an issue that should be in this presumably high-profile statement. (Another similar ban - on deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons outside of national territories - makes much more sense and would have been completely appropriate, but it was not included.)
The overall impression of the statement is that it is quite sloppy and does not leave an impression that Russia is serious about that new agreement. I don't see how a meaningful treaty could be negotiated by the end of the year.
The book
Comments
Pavel, if the United States moves to the 1000 deployed warhead number that is being bantered around Washington today, what do you think Russia’s response will be? What if that move is unilateral? Does Moscow have anything to gain/lose if the US moves alone on nuclear arms reductions?
I found one of your statements interesting in particular:
[The number of "operationally deployed nuclear warheads" is indeed lower than that - according to Hans Kristensen, by that count the United States reached the Moscow treaty limit of 2200 warheads earlier this year. Since Russia, officially at least, rejects the U.S. definition of "operationally deployed nuclear warheads", it is not quite clear how exactly President Medvedev's words should be interpreted. Does Russia accept this count now?]
Does this mean Russia isn’t in agreement on the terms of the 2012 Moscow Treaty (SORT)?
I am not sure there was a great deal of “clarification” here. I guess we wait on farther news from President Medvedev.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank: I don't think there would be any particular reaction from Russia should the U.S. declare that it reduced its force to 1000 operationally deployed warheads. Russia could always point at the U.S. "upload potential" and say that it should be taken into account (which it, in fact, should).
As for the Moscow treaty, Russia has almost three years to bring its forces to the level of 1700-2200. I see no problem there.
In your opinion, would Russia agree to an absolute, verifiable limit on all nuclear weapons at the 1000 warhead level?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank, Pavel
Eхсuse me for my interference into your discussion.
Frank, maybe numbers of modern conventional weapons and USA/Russia CW ratio is the most important key to the understanding why the answer for now is 'No, thanks'. It is not a question of crafty trading or presenting boxes with red buttons [BTW, this is slightly unnerving symbol, because there is well known conception of 'red button'. You know, in the suitcase. Maybe blue next time? :)]. It's question of utmost caution and pure self-defense - production and supply rates of CW is still unimaginable slow and I don't see any effective means to speed things up. 'Nuclear way' is the only way to go - for now. Slow bilateral downgrading near such levels is possible only then USA and Russia will be more or less comparable in 'non-nuclear' military spheres - on the earth, in the air, on the sea, on the orbit. All other scenarios involving from one to five years mass cuts is not in Russia's national interests. We're have too weak CW now and in addition there is not only US plans and decisions, but also Chinese plans and decisions to think about.
It's a long-term question to discuss in ten or even twenty years...
Shrike
So, what does exactly Russia want in a new START nuclear arms agreement? What level of nuclear weapons does Moscow feel is prudent for her self-defense? What do you think would be the numbers and composition of such a Kremlin nuclear arsenal? How many ICBM, bombers, submarines etc.?
Given that, what if the US decides unilaterally to reduce its inventory lower? Far lower?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
It's only my personal opinion.
Firstly, must be banned storing of delivery systems and nuclear warheads in any condition, parts of both or even empty silos in case of ICBMs. There will be no 'appropriate occasion' of using them sometimes in the future according to new agreement and thus absolutely no necessity of storing. Verifiable recycling programs without delays or exceptions on both sides is a must. Pavel's suggestion about deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons outside of national territories is also important one. Maybe it's time to redefine long list of terms like 'ally', 'bloc member', 'defense of national territory', 'threat to the national interests', 'treat to the lives of the citizens', 'bilateral military agreements of Russia and USA with other countries or blocs' 'economic interests and use of military' and the massive cornerstone: 'ensuring own security at the expense of the others and to the detriment of others security'. Maybe it will be good addition to the agreement if roles of 'big twenty' (or rather 'big eighteen') and their relations to the USA and Russia in modern world is defined as non-threatening to both countries with mention about them like guarantors of fulfillment and non-violation of this agreement.
In case of numbers I see limit of 2000 warheads is like acceptable and reliable level for today and 1700 warheads as an absolute low for next ten years. Then, with slowly increasing numbers of modern CW in Russian Army and introduction of new systems of defense, further downgrading to 1300-1500 warheads is highly possible in around 2020 year. Сomposition of triad will be traditional for Russia - mobile and silo based ICBM, then long behind everything else.
"Given that, what if the US decides unilaterally to reduce its inventory lower? Far lower?"
Russia and USA have two different approaches based on their present capabilities and production capacity of military complexes. US have enough ultra-modern conventional weapons for reshaping nuclear component into something that must taken into consideration, but not fundamental for national security or safety-critical. Going down on levels like 400-500 warheads tomorrow will not change anything for US.
Russia is another case. Long and hazy way ahead to lose this type of dependency on nuclear triad and acquire something equally reliable for maintenance of security. Excessive pressing of the new US administration or US media results only in suspicion. Tech of 70s-80s is utterly outdated and important research programs is underfunded as compared with US or China or India or EU (even taking into account absence of the joint European military complex)- all major players in Eurasia. So, Russian government, society and military community surely will both be surprised to some degree by such a decision but take it as a decision of the country with wider choice of options, not a ground-shaking one. Russia maybe take this as good example of military development - strong Navy and Army first, massive nuclear reduction immediately after but not vice versa. After all, US did the same.
Shrike
Your opinion is well thought out and logical. I would only add the obvious point.
[In case of numbers I see limit of 2000 warheads is like acceptable and reliable level for today and 1700 warheads as an absolute low for next ten years.]
Do you think anyone would attack Russia today if she had 2000 nuclear warheads? Do you think anyone would attack Russia today if she had 1000 nuclear warheads? Russia today is a paradox. On one hand, the Kremlin has more nuclear warheads than the rest of the world combined and yet is “perceived” weak because of her lack of a “modern” military. There is a huge financial cost associated with the maintenance, storage, modernization, and deployment of nuclear weapons. Doesn’t it make more sense militarily for Russia to negotiated a much smaller inventory of such nuclear weapons with the US while she can and spend the “saved” monies on the type of new-technology conventional weapons that actually can make Russia’s military relevant in today’s world? Please understand I mean no disrespect here; just placing my thoughts out for comment.
I appreciate and respect your point of view.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank, I think all of the people who claim Russia is "weak" militarily should have second thoughts. You would be VERY hard pressed to find a country able to slug it out with Russia on the ground in a conventional confrontation.
Russias military is not suited for expeditionary policing actions, or counter terror (although that has changed for the better lately due to the Chechen campaigns are the associated lessons). But in a straight up fight against a conventional opponent, a fight for which the Russian army was designed, they would be hard to beat.
Having said that, it might be more prudent to scale back that capability in favour of a better expeditionary and counter terror capability, since any large scale conventional conflict for which the Russian army was designed would turn nuclear anyway.
Frank, I've been following your posts on this board for a long time. And you've been, in my opinion, a great contributor.
But what I think you need to understand is that, even in peaceful times, and even in the nuclear dimension, power balances matter. They are crucial as to how far a country can go in pursuit of its national interests - which can, and often do, interfere with interests of other countries.
Making the nuclear arcenal smaller than it's necessary to obliterate the US will probably not make an attack on Russian sovereignity more likely.
What I think it will do, however, is make US less reluctant to confront Russia in conventional conflicts beyond its borders - such as recent war in Georgia, for example. And that's no what the Kremlin, perfectly understandably, wants.
Oleg
Actually, I could not agree with you more. Notice I inferred the perception that Russia is weak and in her lack of a modern military. That “weakness” is the central argument for the retention of vast numbers of nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, and the building of new delivery systems. In fact, the only country on the face of the earth that seems to really think Russia is “weak” is Russia herself. Granted, the Russian military has suffered through fifteen years of budget neglect that has resulted in many weapon systems in disrepair. But, the Russian military today is uniquely designed to fight the types of adversaries the Kremlin expects to be called on to fight in any future war. However, when the Russian military needs so much, I only question the priorities. I would have built the single warhead SS-27 in silo and road-mobile versions in numbers that would have been relevant; at the expense of all other strategic systems. I would negotiate a follow-on START treaty with the United States and plowed all extra defense monies into high-tech conventional systems that Russia will need in the next twenty years. And, I would keep my eye on China, Russia’s biggest threat in the future. Just my opinion.
Good exchange of views.
Frank Shuler
USA
reko
I agree on the need to balance power in the world; both in regional and in world relations. No nation on this earth can move unilaterally politically, and by politically I really mean as Carl von Clausewitz would say, militarily, without consequences. However, I am beginning to question just how nuclear weapons maintain this balance and where is the “tipping point”. How many nuclear weapons does Russia need to protect herself? That is the magical number in question. One conclusion I have reached is that whatever that number is; 5000, 2000, 1000 etc., the United States needs less. (Perhaps far less.) The fear of British nuclear weapons did not prevent Argentina from taking the Falkland Islands by storm and fighting a short, brutal war with Great Britain in 1982. Tbilisi didn’t seem to take the present day Russian nuclear arsenal into account when Georgia pushed its territorial claims in the Caucasus last year. Russian tanks made a difference in Georgia, not SS-27s. Where is that “tipping point”? How many nuclear weapons are enough?
I too enjoy our conversations here and always appreciate the opportunity to exchange views and gain a greater perspective.
Frank Shuler
USA
To Frank Shuler
In Georgian war in 2008 SS-27 and other Russian nuclear weapons successfully performed very important mission - preventing USA from attacking Russia to support Georgia.
Russian Patriot
While I respect your opinion, I disagree. If the United States really “supported” Georgia in her territory dispute with Russia, the Georgian military would have been equipped with modern weapons and had been better trained in their use. I fear while the war was a tactical victory for Russia, it will prove to be a strategic failure. The result has been only to push the Georgian government and people closer to the United States and American political influence has only grown.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
"protecting itself" isn't the only goal Russia tries to accomplish with its nuclear deterrent. What I think it also wants to do is to deter the US/NATO from ANY direct confrontation whatsoever - even a conventional one, and even beyond Russia's borders.
Given current balance of conventional power, Russia's only chance to avoid defeat in a hypothetical war against US/NATO is nuclear escalation. Everyone knows that and it works as a deterrent.
Without a nuclear arsenal capable of destroying the US, in a hypothetical war Russia would have to choose between conventional defeat and nuclear defeat. The choice is so obvious that deterrence stops working, giving the US/NATO the option of prssuring Russia out of anywhere but its own soil.
Which isn't the end of the World for Russia as a country, but as a World-class power - I'm afraid it is.
reko
Russia needs enough nuclear weapons, and the assurance they can be delivered, to prevent a nuclear attack. How many weapons and what mix of delivery systems are the central questions of these discussions. Invest too much budget in building and maintaining nuclear systems and you deny the Russian military the type of new 21st Century weaponry that is really needed in “power projection”. Ukraine does not fear Russian SS-27 missiles because Kiev knows they won’t be used. T-90 tanks are entirely a different matter.
I know in theory Russia must have a “war plan” for a NATO invasion or a Chinese move on Vladivostok, but do you really see that as possible?
What argument between Russia and the United States is worth the destruction of twenty American cities in victory? I just don’t see it.
Russia is just as much a “world power” with 1000 nuclear weapons as she is with 5000. That’s my point.
Good discussion.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
take any war, and you'll have no problem finding good logical arguments against it. However, wars do happen, so reasons for them are obviously not entirely rational.
As for Russia having to choose between investing into power projection weapons versus strategical ones, my point is that without MAD with the US the power projection option for Russia is mostly closed. In most (not all, but most) plausible scenarios, it won't be in Washington interests to allow Russia to win in military conflicts. And without MAD the US can easily find a way to make it go their way.
reko.
reko
I guess the assumption of MAD needs to be clarified. Today, what is Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)? Does this really assume the “total destruction” of an attacking nuclear power? Does it perhaps mean the economic destruction of such an attacker? Does holding 20 cities hostage qualify as MAD? As I have said, would the US ever contemplate a “first strike” on Russia and accept the loss of twenty American cities in victory? Isn’t MAD really about making the cost of a first strike so painful to an attacker that it is politically, militarily, and economically impossible?
Do the United States and Russia have an adversarial relationship? Yes. However, where is the single issue that would drive our two countries to war? I don’t see it.
Frank Shuler
USA
The aggregate number of 5951 START-accountable warheads for the United States in the Memorandum of Understanding of 1 July 2008 reflects only the specific START counting rules. The number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads is lower because START I counts launchers which have been deactivated or removed from service as remaining deployed with their associated warheads until their launchers have been eliminated in accordance with the specific procedures in the START I Treaty.
According to the last Memorandum of Understanding data of 1 January 2009 the United States has 1198 deployed launchers (ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers) with 5576 "START-accountable" warheads. This deployed launchers includes 1003 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) consisting of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers with 4803 deployed warheads. But under consideration of the counting rules of the START II Treaty "Memorandum of Understanding on warhead attribution and heavy bomber data" (the START II Treaty officially entered not into force), the United States has 7353 deployed warheads. If we count all "START-accountable" ICBM and SLBM warheads (4514) as well as all "START II-accountable" heavy bomber warheads (3612) then the United States has 8126 deployed warheads. But if we count all 7380 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads (only missiles not launchers) and the 3612 heavy bomber warheads we have a total number of 10992 strategic warheads. In this case we count for the Russian Federation 2674 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads and 856 heavy bomber warheads with a total number of 3530 strategic nuclear warheads.
According to the 2008 Annual Implementation Report of the Moscow Treaty (SORT Treaty) "the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads was 2871 as of December 31, 2007." On 31 December 2006 the United States has 3696 and on 31 December 2005 3878 "operationally deployed warheads." The 2009 Annual Implementation Report maybe will released in May 2009 with the warhead number of 31 December 2008. This listing represents more the actual warhead ceiling, all other numbers shows either the so-called uploading capability or theoretical stockpiles.