At 22:10 MSK (18:10 UTC) on March 4, 2014 the Strategic Rocket Forces conducted a launch of a Topol/SS-25 ICBM from the Kapustin Yar test site toward Sary Shagan. According to a representative of the ministry of defense, the launch was used to test a new type of combat payload ("for the Rocket Forces and the Navy") and the test warhead successfully reached its target.
Tests of new warheads in Topol launches from Kapustin Yar to Sary Shagan have became fairly common - this is the third such test since October 2013 (the second one took place in December 2013). This suggests that the development of a new warhead (or warheads) is a fairly active program.
Although the test took place at the time of increased tensions caused by Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, the launch was definitely not related to these developments as these tests are normally scheduled some time in advance. At the same time, the timing of the test could serve as an illustration of an unpredictable and potentially dangerous interaction between nominally unrelated events.
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Pavel;
Does this test represent a new warhead design or rather a new reentry vehicle design? Also curious as to whether this rv would be for the single warhead Topol-M or possibly the Sarmat. I am going to hazard a guess that this is a new reentry vehicle for the 550 KT warhead used on Topol-M as the smaller ~100 KT warheads for the RS-24 Yars use a simpler/bare-bones rv design because of their smaller size.
Hard to tell. As far as I know, Russia develops new warheads as well as new RVs.
By "new warheads" do you mean a new physics package? How is it tested though? Purely through simulation?
Yes, it is a new physics package. I was told that the warhead for Bulava is a design that was tested before 1991. Overall, this doesn't seem to be a very big deal (see my old post).
I thought you meant a completely new one.
A newly _built_ physical package that is an old tested design is not a big deal indeed.
Yes, but my sense is that a completely new one is not out of question. If necessary, of course - it is understandable that designers would work with a tested design if they have choice.
Pavel,
Trajectories from KY to SS hardly can produce reentry conditions hard enough put a new RV to test (especially in terms of reentry heating, RV material ablation - especially possible un-symmetrical ablation which produces lateral aerodynamic lift and hence impacts terminal accuracy ; and gliding / maneuver capability if the said RV has any maneuver capability).
KY to SS trajectories are mostly suitable for initial tests (not under max reentry velocity conditions, even possibly mild ones) and for max axial reentry deceleration & mechanical stress.
But my guess is that they mostly like this KY to SS scheme because it is out of reach of US (and possibly chinese) radar observation (both trajectory and signature measurement) assets... But several of the signature characteristics of a "combat" RV may be altered on a "flight test" RV so that "observers" may not get them right.
These tests may hence also - if not mainly - involve experimenting with penetration aids deployment and behavior, beside RVs.
Do you agree or what reasons do you see to the repeated choice of this trajectory for these "payload" tests?
Best regards
Yes, the fact that KY-SS trajectory is out of reach of U.S. radar is certainly a factor. However, my guess is that they could simulate a reasonably realistic reentry there if necessary.
SS-25 'Topol' ICBM as false target -- inflatable mock-up:
http://мультимедиа.минобороны.рф/images/military/military/photo/080IMG_9254-900.jpg
Photo is from Teykovo (2014/03) by Russian MoD Official Site:
http://мультимедиа.минобороны.рф/multimedia/photo/gallery.htm?id=15205@cmsPhotoGallery
Yes, these are very good.
How Russian designers can develop a new nuclear payload of reentry vehicle without nuclear tests (bans or moratorium) or without computer simulations? Does Russian nuclear industry have enough computing power to run computer simulations of thermonuclear explosion?