Here is an interesting data point for the discussion of the status of the Russian strategic submarine fleet. According to the most recent overview of Russia's nuclear forces published by Stan Norris and Hans Kristensen in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the number of patrols in 2007 was slightly down:
The [U.S. naval intelligence] information indicates that SSBN patrols decreased to only three in 2007, down from five in 2006 (and none at all in 2002), suggesting that Russia does not maintain continuous SSBN patrols like the United States, Britain, and France, but rather occasionally deploys a few SSBNs for training purposes.
Hans Kristensen has more details over at the FAS Strategic Security Blog. For example, now that we know that there were five patrols in 2006, it is clear that all five took place during a single excercise in September 2006.
The importance of the number of patrols in Russia's case, however, should not be overestimated. The Soviet Union never really relied on constant presence of its missile submarines at sea to the extent that the United States or Britain do.
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So the submarines are not on any sort of regular deterrence patrol. It seems more like training exercises.
This does tend to support the conclusions I’ve reached from my research in the media and open governmental sources and long posted here on “russianforces.org”. Pavel, do you support the findings of Hans Kristensen as accurate information? Accurate conclusions?
Frank Shuler
USA
I think we should consider this a transitory drop. The minimum was reached around the year 2001 and a small positive tendency arises afterwards. Those who hope to bury the SSBN fleet should see the facts: the modernization of the 667 BRDM advanced steadily and is now almost complete. This will inject another 15 life-years to those boats. The
Yuri Dolgoruky is starting sea trials and the construction of two other Borey class is advancing. Let’s be honest: The Russian fleet never will return to the number of patrols of Soviet times but will also not return to a zero patrol/year rate. The overall picture is slightly optimistic. But this also indicates that Russia needs (as in the past) a strong Stategic Nuclear Force based on land. So the introduction of the RS-24 (a.k.a. MIRVed Topol-M) seems as the correct choice.
- Pavel, number of patrols is meaningless without knowledge of time SSBN spent at every patrol;
- Difference between 5 patrols and 3 patrols is practically in the 'margin of error'; anyway, even if these mumbers are correct, total trend since 2001 show only increase of Russian presense in the sea.
- Rich, I've moved our discussion from the previous topic here:
> Maybe your supposed Patrol of the Ryazan will affect the decreased patrol rates cited here:
- We've already read about this FAS report here (in Russian):
http://www.vz.ru/society/2008/4/29/163828.print.html
I can only say:
(a) FAS is not the ultimate source, so their 'decreased patrol rate' numbers may be erroneous or at least inaccurate;
(b) Rich, even if we will believe to FAS numbers, - you're not right about 'decreased patrol rates'; look here and feel the trend since 2001:
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/_images/ruspatrol.JPG
- By the way, Rich, - (2001 - 2004) timeframe was the peak of crysis at almost ALL Russian military infrastructures; but, now this peak of crysis is surely behind us.
Again, it's important: (2001 - 2004), - a peak of crysis; there's a lot of arguments to make such a conclusion (except my own life experience, - the last is not the argument for you, as I understand).
(c) In fact, Russia do not need constant SSBN 'deterrence patrols' 'right now', - we are not the US who rely in deterrence capabilities on the fleet. Russian deterrence capability lies on our land-based 'Satans', 'Topols' and 'Topol-Ms'; in fact, comparision of US and Russia is like a comparision of 'elephant' (most powerful land-based animal, most powerful land-based nuclear forces) and 'whale' (most powerful marine animal, most powerful marine nuclear forces).
Of course, - Russia will surely need an 'SSBN deterrence' in the future, when NMD program will progress. So, - think about repair of Delta IIIs, think about overhaul of Delta IVs, and think about Project 955 coming to complete the mission, - and you'll surely FEEL the trend in the next decade. By the way, - FAS data since 2001, only confirm this conclusion, and clearly tell to you: Russian deterrence capability on the sea will constantly grow.
> I am an American Submariner. When your boats go out to sea it is exciting for me. Gives us something to do besides tooling around.
- I hope our Boreys will surely prevent you and your colleagues from unemployment. (smile)
I think we should differentiate regular deterrence patrol from training exercises. If not, how to classify the Bulava launchings from the Donskoy. As a patrol?
Russian:
I missed this post before I responded to the other blog, but in addition to what I said over there. In 2003 one of your Delta IV went to sea for the first patrol in almost two years and they were only out of sea for about one month. That was the first patrol in awhile and is not long enough to maintain proficiency of the submariners.
The construction of all our boats are similar and the limiting factor is food. Your boats (like ours) don't pull into ports and this gives them about 3 months at sea unless they live on canned soup for longer!
This lack of training is a real hindrance to their capabilities in that the lack of time doesn't give them the ability to perfect their skills and they lose some of their stealth.
Of the Russian strategic triad, it is the SSBN force that reflects the greatest degree of deterioration. The Strategic Rocket Forces are developing the SS-25 (Topol), both silo-based and mobile. Long Range Aviation has a new Blackjack. But Northern Fleet SSBN's, the point of the SSBN "spear," are either at sea without operational missiles, or if boats are equipped, then it is a limited quanity, if not quality. The Russian navy has long been penned in the Barents Sea by American SSN's, prompting Russia to develop its strategic submarine force so it could operate in close proximity to the ice pack. It is interesting that the latest Google Earth image of Gadzhiyevo (SSBN base in Sayda Inlet), all the SSBN's seem to be at sea. Whether they deployed empty or not remains to be seen.
Let see the following assertion:
“In comparison, U.S. SSBNs conducted 54 patrols”.
So, considering that the American fleet consists of 14 Ohio vessels and considering the information provided by Rich in the sense that American patrol last for 90 day, we have the following data:
Patrols/vessels: 54/14 = 3.9 patrols = 351 days/years
So in average, each Ohio performed 3.9 patrols/years and this is equivalent to 350 day/years on patrol. Consequently, an American SSBN spent just 14 days/years docked… What an awesome performance!! Just 14 days/years implies no maintenance works at all and almost no time to change crews and to replenish of food the submarines.
So it is obvious that the article is not reliable and that presents a brutal over-estimation of American deterrence patrol numbers and/or patrol time.
It is clear that the American patrolling capability is bigger than the Russian capability, but is also clear that these numbers are not reliable. Off course, anyone is free to believe those fancy numbers, but the article is clearly biased with the aim of exaggerate the American patrolling capability while compared with the Russian one.
Kolokol:
Each SSBN has two crews assigned to it. A Blue and Gold crew. The typical crew will take the boat out to sea 1-2 patrols per year. So each boat will do on average 3-4 patrols per year. 3*14=42 and 4*14=56. If you average it at 3.5 then it is close to the number in the article.
Again...that is just a numbered estimate based on what I know about the general operation of the boats.
90 days is the maximum time they spend on patrol. They patrols are usually less.
As for maintenance of the boats when they pull into port, specialized mechanics and workers will descend onto the boat and along with the crew(s) quickly perform whatever maintenance is needed for the boat. It is am amazing process.
I can see where your doubts come from, but after decades of this process they have it down to an exact science. It is great for the crews since they can actually predict and plan for their underway times versus a SSN where the schedule is constantly training.
I will say again, as I have before I am not biased against the Russian fleet and unlike most people on this blog, I actually have first hand experience with SSNs and SSBNs. These numbers are accurate.
So Rich, waht is the average number of days spent on an American patrol? According your data (that I consider reliable because come from a submariner), should be around 60 days. That's lead to a more "logical" number of 240 days/year.
Kolokol:
It ranges from 60 up to 90 days. The average is closer to about 70.
240 days per year equals about 65% optempo. Which is the number of days out at sea versus in port. Last time I was on a sub we had a 70% optempo. That was a SSN though. The numbers are not unrealistic.
There is another question:
according to this data, how many operational SSBNs are in the russian navy?
From 3 to 5?
Victor:
See this post for data. http://russianforces.org/navy/
So about 6-7 operational subs?
Rich, may be I use incorrect term: the list of active(?) submarines is a well known, but how many can be used for patrol?
If any - why only 3 such events took place last year?
Hello, everyone, I;m retired US Navy Masterchief Missile Technician, Served on 5 US SSBN's from 1970 through 1996. Interesting discussion here.While here, and commneting I will offer any non classified discussion on US SLBM's. MY experience base is on all generation's of US missiles from Polaris A2, and A3, through Poseidon C3, Trident C4, and Trident D5. I have long had an interest in the Russian Submarine Launched missiles. This dicussion I am finding very informative and interesting, to say the least. Thanks for allowing my input.
Victor:
You have asked the million dollar question. Since we are not privy to actual Russian defense knowledge all we have is opinion. I believe the Delta III are useless. Although the Ryazan is on "patrol" we don't know to what purpose. I think that Pavel's assumption of a space platform is pretty close. And I also believe that the Delta III are "active" on paper for numbers only. By placing one of these on "patrol" it give legitimacy to their data.
The Delta IV's are better, but many are still being refurbished, the Typhoon is useless and the same goes for the 955 class.
Why did 3 take place? It is simple. The Russian Navy still employs their SSBN force. This once formidable force retains the knowledge that operational sea time is essential to proficiency and show of force. They need to go to sea or they are then completely useless. Both in practical deterrence (since they cannot properly operate equipment) and virtual deterrence (if they are not at sea, who is scared?)
Rich
Boomervet
Welcome Masterchief!
I look forward to you insights and comments. I’m sure your practical knowledge will bring a wealth of information to these discussions.
Frank Shuler
USA
Patrols could be expensive. Money may be an issue.
Money, money...
How many money need sub just on the patrol? Nothing.
Lot of the money need for maintenance between the patrols.
So, we return to the original question: how many Russin SSBN can be used for patrol?
Victor
Historically, the Soviet Navy (now Russian of course) has always needed five submarines in inventory to maintain one submarine on deterrent patrol. Each strategic submarine is usually accompanied by two nuclear fleet boats so an operational inventory of eight Victor (Project 671), Sierra (Project 945), or Akula (Project 971) is needed to protect one strategic ballistic missile submarine on patrol. I believe the lack of patrols by the Delta IV fleet, for example, has as much to do with the status of the Russian nuclear fleet boats as it does the Project 667BDRM, Del'fin themselves. The Admiralty simply won’t patrol the Delta submarines without escorts.
Just my opinion.
Frank Shuler
USA
> Historically, the Soviet Navy (now Russian of course) has always needed five submarines in inventory to maintain one submarine on deterrent patrol.
- What 'five submarines', Frank? SSNs, SSBNs or mix of both - please clarify.
- If your 'historical' 5 : 1 ratio is for SSBNs, - please note that modern Russia will surely migrate from 5 : 1 to 3 : 1 ratio.
> Each strategic submarine is usually accompanied by two nuclear fleet boats so an operational inventory of eight Victor (Project 671), Sierra (Project 945), or Akula (Project 971) is needed to protect one strategic ballistic missile submarine on patrol.
- Russian Navy has 12 (twelve) of Project 971 Akula attacking SSNs in it's inventory. Only 'Akulas'. Right now.
- In January, 2008, practically in the same time with Project 667BRDM 'Bryansk' SSBN, Russian Navy get also Project 971 'Pantera' SSN after repair. Soon after this event, it was reported that K-317 'Pantera' SSN has finished the sea trials and 'officially transferred to the fleet'.
- Anyway, I can't get your conclusion even if I believe your numbers... Look: (5 + 1) = 6 SSBNs in entire inventory, each SSBN require 2 SSNs on patrol; so, 6 SSBNs in inventory will require (6 * 2) = 12 operational SSNs in the fleet's inventory.
Not 'eight' anyway, but twelve, - and Fleet already has twelve 'Project 971' SSNs.
> The Admiralty simply won’t patrol the Delta submarines without escorts.
- You may be right here. But it just mean that there's something to do for Russia in this field till 2011 - 2013 timeframe.
- It seems that Russian Strategic Navy 'revival' program is the most expensive, challenging and long-term one among all the current 'strategic triad revival' programs; that explains why this program shows only moderate signs of progress (Delta IV overhaul, Delta III repair, Project 955 construction, 'Sineva' production restore - and 'Bulava' fail), while other programs (Topol-M, RS-24 and Kh-102 development and Tu-160 production restore), - looks quite succesfull.
In fact, so called 'number of patrols of Russian SSBNs' is the 'last bastion' of western criticism, - a bastion that surely will fall in the next following years.
I'll try to write about this a little bit more if my time permits.
Russian
Russia requires five submarines; let’s say the Delta IVs, to have one on deterrent patrol at all times. This ratio allows one boat to be undergoing shipyard repairs with one submarine actually on patrol, one getting ready for patrol, one just back from patrol and one in multi-year heavy shipyard repairs (dry-dock). If two fleet boats are required to deploy with the Delta’s, you need an inventory of 8 submarines to deploy at a 25% operational tempo for every strategic submarine at sea. That was my point. With only 12 Akula’s in the fleet and, if eight are committed to the strategic defense of the ballistic missile submarines, only one additional fleet submarine is available for sea duty in the entire Russian Navy. These conclusions are, of course, based on the fact the Delta IVs and the Akula submarines are all “operationally capable” something we all can all agree they are not. Indeed, Russia will benefit from new construction of the 955 class when delivered but the lengthily delay of both boat and Bulava missile are troubling. We’ll see.
By the way, the Russian Navy will never cut its ratio of strategic submarines in inventory to deployed boats as long as it relies on “single crews” to man the submarines. The “Achilles Heel” in the Russian submarine service today is qualified seamen.
Frank Shuler
USA
Russian, may be you can made a complete list of operational SSN as you did with SSBN.
According to www.warfare.ru, there are 4 Schuka (NATO Victor III), 3 Barrakuda (NATO Sierra) and 8 Schuka-B (NATO Akula) operational SSN. That’s 15 vessels. Quite a few. So one of the next priorities is to refurbish in-reserve vessels and to accelerate the construction of new ones.