Between the "strong" Yeltsin and the "weak" Putin I choose the last one. No doubt. Someone want to live like Russians did it during the "free, prosperous and strong" 90s? Let's keep us on the Real World.
PD: I'am afraid Dima the "soft boy" can be a really weak one.

Pavel:

[previous post]
Of course all this is opinion but let’s take a look at the American position now and interpolate the future. Today, the US deploys 500 silo Minuteman III ICBMs. (to fall to 450 if our Congress approves) These missiles deployed since 1970 are now expected to remain in service until replacement in 2028. (where they will be 58 years in service). Our strategic bomber force is composed of 76 B-52 (to fall to 56 if our Congress approves) bombers (the last entered service in 1962) and 16 B-2 Spirit stealth aircraft. The United States Air Force wants a new bomber in 2018 but it remains to be seen if this new aircraft will be designed to carry nuclear weapons (the prevailing opinion today is that this platform will be unmanned and not certified to carry nuclear weapons). The Trident fleet is 14 boats with 12 deployable and armed with the only new missile now being purchased, the Lockheed Trident D5. To recap, the United States Air Force (USAF) wants a new bomber in 2018, a new ICBM in 2028, and Trident is expected to be replaced in 2038 when the newest submarine, the USS Louisiana (SSBN 743), will be 41 years old. I’ll let you draw your conclusions how this affects Russian security in the future
[conclusion]

It will be even more interesting to follow the American response to the current Russian "grandiose resurgence". In fact, reviewing the current published US time-line to modernize its strategic systems, these Russian weapons; the SS-27 & RS-24s, the Project 955 submarines, and the new Kh-102 cruise missile will all need replacing as well. It is possible a whole generation of Russian strategic weapons will serve their life before the United States replaces its present arsenal.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank: The U.S., of course, is no better. And even worse in many ways. Eisenhower had a good point when he talked about the military-industrial complex.

Frank: Hasn´t the deactivation of 50 Minuteman at Malmstrom AFB allready begun? According to this article, deactivation startet in 2007: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Missile_Deactivation_Begins_At_Malmstrom_999.html

> the "strong" Yeltsin and the "weak" Putin...

- Very funny. Here the typical western understanding of the "weak" Putin:

http://img0.liveinternet.ru/images/attach/b/0/16304/16304270_putinbear.jpg

> In fact, reviewing the current published US time-line to modernize its strategic systems, these Russian weapons; the SS-27 & RS-24s, the Project 955 submarines, and the new Kh-102 cruise missile will all need replacing as well.

- Frank, this comparision is not quite correct - please look:

- US has already made it's turn in 1990s - it deployed in the beginning of 1990s, great amounts of the most powerful, precision, reliable and effective strategic system in the world - I mean Trident II SLBMs with 120 - 170 m CEP;

- Also, please note that 'these old' Minuteman IIIs - are not 'old' in reality, - because MMMIIIs are under the permanent modernizations; for example, all the sofisticated guidance systems from LGM-118A Peacekeeper, were completely transferred to the LGM-030G Minuteman IIIs, - that makes the MMMIIIs now, the most precise ICBM in the world, with near (70 - 120 m) CEP.

- Also, it's a routine procedure when ALL the MMMIIIs gets periodically a newly-manufactured 1st and 2nd stage engines, etc. - so, again, most of the strategic weapons of the US are not old, - but, rather, they are 'brand new'.

- Look, Frank, US made all these massive military preparations in the beginning of 1990s, - exactly at the time when Russia was at the deepest economical crysis and only scrap it's strategic arsenals...

- So, I do believe that US has already made it's own turn of 'strategic re-arming' in 1990s; and now is Russia's turn, - just to keep the strategic balance in the world.

The warning President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave in his farewell address as president in 1961, warning against the rise of the military-industrial complex, may be historically the best advice any president has ever given America.

Sad so few understood then or now.

Frank Shuler
USA

Martin:

Was this restriction removed in the 2007 annual defense budget? If so, Congress mandated the missiles should be “kept in readiness” (it left it up to the USAF to define readiness) if needed sometime in the future. Curious if this “restriction” was removed in FY2007. Crazy as it seems there are still 18 B-52H bombers being kept in “hanger conditions” in New York by Congressional mandate until so released and the current FY2008 bill required the USAF to hold the operational B-52 fleet at 76 bombers when the Air Force wants the number reduced to 56. Supposedly only 36 are combat coded for nuclear weapons. Do you have any information to the contrary? I would be interested in clarification. Thanks!

Frank Shuler
USA

Russian:

AGM-129A Advance Cruise Missile (ACM) & the LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM.

Frank Shuler
USA

> AGM-129A Advance Cruise Missile (ACM) & the LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM.

- I am sorry, Frank, - but where is 'AGM-129A Advance Cruise Missile' in my previous post?

- In my post, I told about intercontinental ballistic missiles both land- (ICBMs) and sea- (SLBMs) based...

- Again: the above post was not about the cruise missiles, - only about ballistic ones!

Russian:

You missed my subtle point. If the US “made all these massive military preparations in the beginning of 1990s”, we would have kept the AGM-129A Advance Cruise Missile (ACM) & the LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM. The Minuteman III ICBM re-manufacturing project was a poor substitute to the Peacekeeper. Very poor.

Frank Shuler
USA

As I see it the concentration on the nuclear side of the defense equation in Russia grows out the realization that a serious conventional force would cost far more than a nuclear force. Nukes create a far larger bang for you buck in the strategic sense.

One needs to do a full grand strategy analysis to appreciate the Kremlin's perspective. Given the state of things conventional threats to Russian sovereignty do not exist at present. An invasion from NATO is impossible for a host of reasons, but such a threat can never be discounted entirely. A thoroughly disarmed Russia would be easy prey. An invasion or incursion from China is improbable. Nukes are seen as the cheapest way to ensure that these improbable situations stay improbable.

Islamic radicalism in the N.Caucuses is a problem the Kremlin today feels it has under control and it is seen as a policing problem, not a strategic a strategic problem. There is certainly no one like Basayev able to march 5,000 men up against the Russian army today. That entire movement is a shadow of what it once was.

Pipeline politics define relations with the CIS and the EU more so than anything else and for that the stick that is Gazprom is much more effective than any number of motorized rifle divisions. So the Kremlin sees no reason to reallocate money from the nuclear to the conventional. Nukes ensure non interference at a minimal cost. The risk they pose is seen as being smaller than the economic risk posed by a conventional rearmament.

The current approach is actually not what the military industrial complex would prefer to see happen. They would like to see a massive buildup in conventional arms and that is not happening.

Demographics also places a serious limit on conventional Russian military power more so even than money. The shortage of skilled labor is already felt acutely by manufacturers like Sukhoi. This means there are no intelligent men of any sort to spare for the ranks. Given this why are nukes not the best and cheapest way to ensure non interference? The dangers they pose seem far more distant than the economic dangers a serious conventional rearmament poses when one considers the demographic realities of Russia.

I think we can all agree there is no serious conventional rearmament in the works, right?

The Kremlin is thinking very logically. I dont see it as weak leadership, but rather as an acknowledgment that serious conventional rearmament is far beyond reach and that for now this is the best that can be hoped for.

If you want to see steps towards disarmament, as all rational people do, those steps have to come from America which enjoys absolute conventional superiority. Even China should play a role, by limiting the scale of their own conventional buildup. But to expect anything other than what you have seen from Russia is to expect Russia to stop thinking logically. Russia is the much weaker power. Unilateral calls for disarmament from Russia would smell of weakness.

Strong leadership may well involve not being afraid to be called weak, but that is in the domestic context. In the international context things are different.

Excuse any grammar and typing error, I don't feel like proofreading.

"Buildup that concerns the West"? That's news! Russian military forces (both conventional and strategic) were still shrinking just like in 90's, last I checked.

Pavel, how many Topol-M will Russia deploy in 2008?

"From the time of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, Russian rulers have felt that it was up to them to unite society by promoting state patriotism - namely, people's unity around the tsar (or the communist party leadership) thanks to their pride in belonging to and serving a strong state."
-Vera Tolz

The Soviet Union achieved superpower status through its ability to generate "enormous military power." It continues this tradition and echoing previous posts, they cannot afford a massive conventional force...

Pavel,

Your ideas about the military-industrial complex smack of a conspiracy theory. You are ignoring the fact that the modern VPK commission is stuffed full of Putin's creatures. It's Putin who has the narrow view, hence the results.

Furthermore, you are missing the key point. Russia wants to destroy the West, far more than the USSR ever did. It's that simple. It's ridiculous, but that's what the Russian government is like. Without understanding that, you won't be able to understand any of Putin's policies.

With the continually shrinking Russian population, the West won't have to fear much from Russia in 50 years. If the trends continue, it is likely that Russia will be unable to control much of its vast territory. What then? A breakdown into feudal states? An interesting concept for a paper I think.

> With the continually shrinking Russian population...

- Russian Minister of Health and Social Development Tatyana Golikova has informed us recently, that parameters of 'death rate' and 'birth rate' in Russia should become equal by 2011. After that, Russian population will cease to be 'shrinking'.

> The Minuteman III ICBM re-manufacturing project was a poor substitute to the Peacekeeper. Very poor.

- Sorry, but I have to disagree: I don't think that the most-precise-in-the-world ICBM is a 'poor substitute' to anything!

> If the US “made all these massive military preparations in the beginning of 1990s”, we would have kept the AGM-129A Advance Cruise Missile (ACM) & the LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM.

- Yes, these preparations has been made by US. But, before we will proceed to a final conclusion, I would like to ask some information from you: Frank, - would you please to told us, how many UGM-133A Trident II D5s were deployed since the 1990, when Russia only scrap it's strategic potential?

- I think, the number of Trident II's deployed was somewhere between (18 subs x 24 missiles) = 432 SLBMs and (13 subs x 24 missiles) = 312 SLBMs.

- Considering Trident II D5's fourteen warheads maximal capacity (14 W76 100 kt or 8 W88 250 kt), it's from (312 missiles x 14 warheads) = 4368 warheads to (432 missiles x 14 warheads) = 6048 warheads; what's the exact number?

- Again: can you tell us the exact numbers of D5s missiles and their warheads, deployed at the peak time / now?

Pavel:
"Russia completed construction of a strategic submarine of a new class" - it's just moved to _dry_ doc, no more...

"Despite a string of unsuccessful flight tests, the military has continued to develop a new sea-launched missile" - no comments

"Russia has been upgrading its network of early warning radars" - Lakhta(?) radar still in experimental operational mode, Armavir radar not operational yet...

"plans to resume producing strategic bombers, and is considering developing another new ICBM" - just promises...

"President Vladimir Putin made a point to personally announce that he ordered strategic bombers to return to the Cold-War practice of conducting regular long-range patrol flights" - it's USSR heritage...

"the Rocket Forces tested a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) equipped with multiple warheads" - yes, it's success, but only success!

OK, plans is "grandiose", but results...

About MIII - deactivation of the 564th misile squadron (Malmstrom AFB) started in last July. All 50 ICBMs of the squadron will be removed from their silos by the end of this June.

http://www.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?id=123060711

Russian:

The refurbishing process for the Minuteman III ICBM actually produced a missile far less accurate than the Peacekeeper and, according to some published reports, less accurate than the original missile itself. Given that, the MMIII is a very reliable and adequately accurate weapon system. Great interest in its replacement in the 2028 time-line; many studies coming out of the Pentagon today even question the need for a replacement land-based ICBM system at all. It’ll be ten years in the future before this issue is even addressed.

The Lockheed Trident II D5 (UGM-133A) is carried on 12 of the US Navy’s 14 ballistic missile submarines; the other two boats will convert this year and next. The current D5 Life Extension (D5LE) Program will extend the operational life of the D5 to 2042. The particular RV associated with the D5 has been tested to accommodate up to 8 W-76 or W-88 warheads. It is unclear if the new D5LE program will allow a mix of warheads on the D5 but it is assumed today that only one type or the other can be supported on each missile. The US has agreed as part of the SORT agreement to limit the load on each Trident missile to 4 warheads. The re-manufactured W-76-1 warhead has a yield of 60 kt and the W-88 a yield of 475.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank: Sorry, I don´t have any further information on the B-52 and MMIII issue. Unfurtunetely, there isn´t something like Pavels blog for the US. Are there any news on how many W-76 will be upgraded. Is 2000 still the actual number?

Martin:

It seems indeed 2000 is the magic number for the W-76-1 program. W76 refurbishment, scheduled to begin in FY’07, will include requalifying the pit, replacing the primary high-explosive, secondary refurbishment, a new arming, fusing and firing (AF&F) system, and a new gas transfer system. Additional shielding will make the warhead more stable from a maintenance perspective and reduce the yield to 60 kt from 100. The only thing that would interfere in the W-76-1 program might be a move to the RRW, if it’s ever funded. The initial RRW weapon is a submarine warhead to replace the 76s.

Frank Shuler
USA

I don't see there is any significant resurgence of Russia's military. Russia is still relying on old (but good) Soviet made weapons. But most of the old Soviet made weapons will have to be withdrawn from service within next eight to ten years. So if today's condition is worse, then after 2015 Russian armed forces will be in the worst situation. Russia hardly produces new weaponry systems. A force with mere 100+ Topol-M is too little to counter any nuclear assault. Conventional forces condition will be pathetic after 2015. Everyone is blaming Soviet evils but in the last 17 years democratic Russia could hardly do anything to save its great armed forces. All the democratic countries of the world have very strong armed forces whereas Russia is letting down its armed forces.

Russia needs a strong armed forces (not necessarily nuclear only) not to attack any country but to safeguard it's own sovereignty and integrity. Shrinking population is also a great concern but I don't agree that it would have any significant impact on the integration of Russia. Vast countries like Canada and Australia are very much exist with very small population. What Russia needs is educated and highly skilled workforce. It's really shame for Russia that it couldn't produce few engineers who can build a launch pad for a new rocket. Russia should already have a manned spaceport on its own. But they are only planning to have one after 10 years when few countries would have their people in the moon. This one thing shows the incompetence of present Russia's system. Even a democratic and free economy country shouldn't do everything for earning profit, should do something for national pride!

Frank, do you have any idea what will be the composition of the US strategic forces after 2012 considering the upper limit of 2200 warhead?

P.Debnath

Here are some information on the plans for US stockpile:
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/05/estimates_of_us_nuclear_weapon.php
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/12/white_house_announces_secret_n.php#more

Parimal Debnath:

Most of the published information on the post-2012 US nuclear arsenal breakdown the inventory as follows:

450 Minutemen III ICBMs with 150 armed with two W-78 warheads and 300 singularly armed with the W-87. Total warheads: 600

14 Trident Submarines (only 12 deployable at any given time) armed with the D5 missile and 4 warheads each, either the W-76 or W-88. Total warheads: 1152

B-83 and B-61 gravity bombs for the B-2 stealth bomber and Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM) with the W-80 warhead for the B-52 fleet. Total warheads: up to 448

The total American inventory of nuclear weapons will be approximately 5000 weapons; the 2200 operational warheads as discussed above, 2400 in various states of reserve, and 400 tactical B-61 bombs for fighter aircraft. The tactical weapons are not covered by SORT.

Interestingly, it has been reported that President George W. Bush ordered the US Strategic Command (the Unified Combat Command that oversees the US nuclear arsenal) to move to 2012 numbers next year, 2009; three years early.

While these numbers are only an educated guess, I think this is a fair estimate.

Frank Shuler
USA

Thanks Frank and Martin. How about new warhead W-88? I think it is one of the most powerful and accurate nuclear warhead!

Parimal Debnath:

The W88 was designed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1970s and last produced in 1989, but it is indeed the most capable of the US warheads. I think the Trident D-5 submarine launched ballistic missile, equipped with four of these warheads, would a frightening weapon; destructive beyond any imagination.

Frank Shuler
USA

Good point, Mr. Debnath!
Clearly, present Russian military policy is no policy or some pacifistic one. There could be a lot to speak about this ridiculous situation, so I'll try to make it in the shortest way possible.
Note that USSR was able to build every type of modern weapon system known in a huge quantities with still improving quality. Now after 20 years lasting "new" Russian military policy it seems Russia finally lost capabilities to produce many important arms types. It was triggered by dramatically low weapon acquisitions at level of 1% of Soviet arms purchases. It lead directly to the shrinking R&D base, lack of researches in the new weapons area and so forth. Old Sovet military-industrial cadre disappeared and now a huge technological and intellectual gap exists there. Even export contacts can't reverse this thread.
That is why now Russia can't introduce next generation aircrafts, surface ships, various kinds of missiles, radars and C3I systems. As you correctly stated in ten years all Russian military equipment will be withdrawn and nothing new will be accessible. Also Russian production capabilities dropped dramatically. Several bigger export contracts can't be finalized because weapon factories have already lost their production lines, technical background and qualified workforce.

I don't know if present Russian lidership can't see these basic facts but in decade from now Russia will come to bad end as some Latin-American country without normal conventional forces except internal security troops. It is really a cloudy situation!

Thanks Frank! I can't predict about the composition of Russian strategic forces! Can you?

Yes Detector, you are absolutely right. It is really a cloudy situation! Russia herself to blame for this pathetic condition of armed forces.

Parimal Debnath:

Russia’s plans for the 2012 are a little muddled at best. Here’s my best guess.

ICBM:
Russia will have 60 single warhead SS-27 Topol-M ICBMs.
Perhaps there will be 9 or so SS-27-A1 road mobile single warhead ICBMs.
I think the SS-18 fleet will fall to 40 of the R36-M2-class weapons with 400 warheads
Perhaps the RS-24 will be in production in 2010 and there will be 16 in inventory by 2012 each armed with between three and six warheads- I think 3 is the number, 48 warheads.
I think the SS-19 inventory fall to 30 with six warheads, 180 warheads.
I think by 2012 there will still be 60 SS-25s single warheads in the fleet, 60 warheads.

SLBM:
Russia will have all 6 Delta IVs (Project 667BDRM) in the fleet with Sineva SS-N-23s and 576 warheads
Perhaps two Project 955s will be at sea, lead boat the Yuri Dolgorukiy, with 32 R-39 Bulava missiles and 192 warheads.
I think there will still be two Delta III in the fleet with 96 warheads.

Bombers:

For the Tu-160 and 95MS bombers I think Russia will maintain an inventory of 500 cruise missiles as they migrate from the older Kh-55 series to the new Kh-102 weapons.

So, by my calculations Russia will have approximately 2121 weapons available.

Frank Shuler
USA

Thanks Frank, I think this is the best guess indeed. But how about Topol (SS-25)? Will their service life be extended?

Martin:
Max:

Thanks for helping me clear this up.

It appears the reduction of the Minuteman III and B-52 fleets were authorized by Congress as part of the June 1, 2003 ratification of the Moscow Treaty (SORT). I had been looking at the various House Resolution bills (laws), the US Defense Budgets, for insights into these reductions. Congress did have restrictions for several years on the 50 Minuteman III ICBMs the USAF wanted long removed and also on the size of the B-52 fleet (76 aircraft) and the number of B-52 bases. (2) Apparently, these restrictions were removed and the United States declared in SORT a strategic inventory of 14 Trident submarines, with only 12 in service and armed at any one time, 450 land based Minuteman III ICBMs, 21 B-2 Stealth and 56 B-52 bombers.

Interestingly, the US State Department is required by US law to report to the Senate on the status and compliance of the SORT. In the “2007 Annual Report on Implementation of the Moscow Treaty” the American arsenal is documented but information provided by Russian on their implementation of SORT is deemed “classified”. Wonder why?

Frank Shuler
USA

Parimal Debnath:

I think the SS-25 has been a very successful missile for Russia and has exceeded its planned life-expectancy by many years. My conclusion that 60 will remain in the Russian arsenal post-2012 is purely subjective; but reasonable.

For the Kremlin, the problems begin not in 2013 when the Moscow Treaty concludes but around 2018 when the old legacy Soviet systems come to an abrupt end. In 2018, the SS-19, SS-20, & SS-25 ICBMs, the Delta III submarines and most of the Delta IVs will all be at the end of their service lives. A few of each may be active in 2018-20 but mostly “on paper”. Replacing these systems will be the six or so Project 955 Bulava-equipped submarines, the RS-24 multiple-warhead road mobile ICBM and, perhaps, a new liquid fueled “heavy” ICBM that hasn’t been designed (developed) yet. Even the “heavy” ICBM is problematic as its development and production would come at the expense of building the RS-24s needed to place “numbers” in the Russian strategic inventory. The Russian strategic arsenal will fall to 1500 or so weapons by the 2018 timeframe.

Frank Shuler
USA

Let's hope it doesn't and the 200B $ weapons program prevents that.

Dear All,

Russia's government is not seeking a strong conventional military, or a substantive improvement in demographics. It considers the combination of a nuclear deterrent and several natural resource monopolies to be sufficient for the attainment of its foreign policy goals. These goals are to decisivey weaken the west by precipitating or, alternatively, taking advantage of an economic crisis, and then extorting the EU into becoming an adjunct of Russia.

Yakov:

I bet the simpler answer will be Russia attempting to negotiate a follow-on treaty to SORT after 2012. President Putin always wanted the number of nuclear weapons limited to 1500 operational warheads from the very beginning of negotiations with the US on SORT. I believe that 1500-level is where President Putin thought the Russian strategic force would fall to in any event. I think the United States would be very amenable to a lower number but it will be interesting to see what Russia has to trade in return. I guess that political intrigue will have to wait until 2012.

By the way, Russia could spend $200 billion on replacing its tactical air force by itself.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank

You said
"SLBM:....
I think there will still be two Delta III in the fleet with 96 warheads."

I counter that with I think the Delta III are operationally defunct NOW (2008). Their missiles are way past their service life, cannot support the Sineva, and no word of extending the life. (please correct me if I am wrong).

I believe they are being still kept "operational" to supplement their numbers on paper. Last I read was in 2000 that the minimum SSBN force structure was set at 12. That is what they have now (excluding the Typhoon and Borey).

Rich

Rich: That would be my assumption about Delta IIIs too. But one of these submarines has just returned from overhaul. Apparently they have some plans for them.

Frank,
How can we be sure American SLBM's will carry 4 warheads? Will Russian inspectors have some kind of access?

Rich:

My 2012 assumption on the Delta IIIs was based on the return of K-44 Ryazan from overhaul and the general thought that Russia will need numbers in the SORT declaration on December 31st 2012. Two boats in the fleet seemed reasonable but I admit this is only an educated guess.

The greatest need in the Russian Navy is sailors. There is a dearth of trained, qualified ratings for many jobs in the fleet and keeping the Delta III crews together will provide an excellent pool of talent for the future “Yuri Dolgorukiy” (Borey-class) boats. Russia doesn’t need submarines; it needs crews. Building six of the Yuri Dolgorukiy’s and providing two crews each as done in the US and French navies will allow Russia to keep at least one submarine on deterrent patrol at any given time and surge one or two additional boats in an emergency. I think that is the national goal.

Frank Shuler
USA

Thanks Frank. I think 1500 level is suitable for Russia after 2012. And that's why they are talking about this kind of figure for post SORT agreement. Russia can easily increase their number if they increase production of SS-27 and RS-24. Eight Borey by 2020 will be sufficient for Russia but Bulava is not seen yet.

Frank : Why do you think the U.S. would be amenable to a lower level with people like McCain?Is it because they are broke like Ron Paul says? Or is it genuine desire for peace?

Pavel & Frank:

I understand about the K-44, but goes back to the initial statement on what missiles are they using? A strategic submarine that throws rocks is just a number on paper. I think your guess about the space launcher is a great assumption.

Also Frank here is a good article (don't know if you've seen it) on the U.S. Forces and recommendations: http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20071104_Drell_Goodby_07_new.pdf

Rich

Anonymous:

There is no provision in the SORT for on-sight inspections. I guess the Americans have the same problem with Russia. How can we be sure there are only 6 warheads on the Bulava missile?

You bring up a great point. I think military-to-military inspections as called for in START, due to expire in 2009, are essential to transparency between Russia and the United States. Perhaps, some form of a post-START agreement with this provision can be negotiated. Both sides will gain, so I think it’s possible.

Frank Shuler
USA

Parimal Debnath:

It seems to me President Putin has a strategic plan and Russia seems to be carrying out that plan in good order. Priorities have been set; industrial production has been budgeted and resources set aside to rebuild the modern Russian nuclear inventory in place of the old, obsolescing Soviet systems. President Putin has publicly stated to local and Western press his intentions and those intentions have been restated in private to American policy makers. Russia seems committed to a building rate of eight or so ICBMs per year for the next decade or so. You may not like the plan, but it seems to be, “the plan”. The number of strategic Russian nuclear weapon delivery systems will drop perceptibly in the near future. (2018-20)

I completely agree the before mentioned 1500 weapons will be a strong and adequate deterrent. I honestly think 1000 would do.

By the way, I think only six Project 995 submarines will be constructed and a follow-on class will then be introduced. Just a guess.

Frank Shuler
USA

Yakov:

I think it has little to do with economics or “world peace” but political perception. What Russia does have to trade with the United States in some kind of post-SORT agreement is important to America. Russia is the largest nuclear power in the world; she has more nuclear weapons that the rest of the world combined. If Russia would agree to reduce their total number of nuclear weapons, strategic as well as tactical, the US would be very interested. The political perception with the American policy makers is that these small, tactical systems are a greater danger to American security than any SS-27. A move by Russia to limit the number of strategic systems to, say, 1800 operationally deployed warheads in an overall inventory of 3500 nuclear devices each, complete with on-site inspections, is a real treaty worth the pursuit.

Good exchange of views.

Frank Shuler
USA

Rich:

Interesting article and, no, I hadn’t seen it. Thanks!

Every post-SORT position paper I’ve read all agrees the US nuclear strategy is due for a 21st century update. Most of these papers present solutions that only decrease the number of warheads or delivery systems or reduce alert times and don’t really take into consideration “that 21st century look” they promise.

In the next twenty years or so, we’re going to learn whether the Global Anti-Ballistic Missile System (GABMS) we’re building will actually work. Not work in the sense that every missile can be intercepted or every warhead can be stopped but work in the sense that systematically these warheads can be targeted and destroyed in a military engagement, under military battlefield conditions. By that time the GABMS will be integrated with satellites for secure communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting. If this really works, and I think at some point in time it will, a paradigm shift in American defense planning will occur. Given that feasibility, it might be practical to build an American nuclear deterrent around a land-based missile system composed of, say, 300 road-mobile ICBMs with three warheads each; with a survivability rate of 80%. The US could reduce its nuclear inventory to 900 deployed and 100 spare warheads with an additional 500 weapons for our bomber force. The new ICBM warhead would be safer than today’s weapons, have GPS accuracy, and be far more powerful than any warhead known today. The 5000 nuclear weapons the US has today could fall to 1500 in this scenario and America would not have to go to the expense of replacing its Trident fleet and could plow those funds back into the “exotic bomber” planned for post-2035, various space assets and our general purpose military.

For the United States, the good news is that we’re going to know if the GABMS pans out before we need to replace Minuteman and Trident. It’s an enviable place to be in today’s geo-political world.

Enjoy the conversations!

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank,
While we are discussing how many warheads Bulava and D-5 will have, might as well ask how many will Sineva have? Some say 3 or 4. Various Russian sources mention up to 10 warheads.
....How many will there be?

> That would be my assumption about Delta IIIs too. But one of these submarines has just returned from overhaul.

- Here the current state of Delta IIIs and IVs in Navy:

http://img217.imageshack.us/my.php?image=navyq108vj4.png

- Sorry, only one error at the table: number of missiles at 'Borey / Kasatka' Project 955 class, should be drawn as 16, and, for future Project 955A - should be drawn as 16 or 20.

Russian: As I understand, K-407 Novomoskovsk has not yet been in overhaul.

Anonymous:

Only a guess but because the Sineva still uses the old SS-N-23 reentry vehicle (RV) I would think it would hold the same inventory of warheads, four.

I don’t remember an amended START declaration that would suggest differently but I would certainly defer to Pavel for a definitive answer.

Frank Shuler
USA

R-29RM Sineva/SS-N-23 is still listed in START as carrying four warheads.

> Russian: As I understand, K-407 Novomoskovsk has not yet been in overhaul.

http://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/nbrs/667BDRM/K-407/K-407.htm

- It's a 'question of terms', should we consider 'podderzhivauyshiy remont' as an overhaul:

"2003 год январь - июль
Прошел поддерживающий ремонт в Северодвинске".

> Only a guess but because the Sineva still uses the old SS-N-23 reentry vehicle (RV) I would think it would hold the same inventory of warheads, four.

- Frank, 'Sineva' bus has enough internal space to carry up to ten 100-kt warheads:

http://img88.imageshack.us/my.php?image=navyrursm54sinevabusq10fb4.jpg

Russian: It's a matter of consistency. "Podderzhivayuschii remont" is clearly different from overhaul other subs went through.

As for ten warheads on Sineva, I don't see how the photo that you refer to tells anything about it.

The original SS-N-23 (Soviet) was designed to support a 10-warhead RV but that version was never deployed. The current SS-N-23 (Soviet) and its successor the SS-N-23 Sineva (Russian) deploys with a 4-warhead package. Do we have any idea why the Soviet Union made the decision to deploy only the 4-warhead version? Was there a technical reason? Range, perhaps?

Frank Shuler
USA

> Do we have any idea why the Soviet Union made the decision to deploy only the 4-warhead version?

- Heavier warheads at '4-warhead version'.

> As for ten warheads on Sineva, I don't see how the photo that you refer to tells anything about it.

'The D-9RM system provided simultaneous (or separate) launch of missiles from one submarine, with the missiles being armed with a four-RV OR ten-RV warhead. Pursuant to SALT-1, the R-9RM mount only four-RV warheads'.

http://rd.foto.radikal.ru/0708/64/8bdd6f867a33.jpg

http://rd.foto.radikal.ru/0708/8f/379d52190748.jpg

> Do we have any idea why the Soviet Union made the decision to deploy only the 4-warhead version?

- space for dummy warheads perhaps and other decoys?

Russian:
Kubo:

I suspect the reason for the 4-warhead package on the SS-N-23 is all of the above. The original RV for Trident I was initially tested with a 12-warhead configuration but only deployed with eight nuclear warheads for similar reasons. When the Trident D5 was downloaded to five warheads, it only improved the range and accuracy of the package but I think that had as much to do with the RV as the number of warheads actually deployed.

Frank Shuler
USA

I think Russia needs more launcher than warhead. If we consider the time when all the Soviet made ICBM will be removed from service, Russia would have roughly 150 Topol-M based ICBM providing production rate is 8 per year. In that time the US would have around 450 ICBM. Number of launcher will make a big difference and Russia will be under tremendous pressure. In any emergency situation a preemptive attack from the US can easily destroy all the land based ICBM in a flash. Whatever the measure they take to protect their ground forces they won't be able to survive at all. 12 Trident subs won't be needed to eliminate the naval and air forces.

If Russia wants to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, they should have more delivery systems and I think land based system will be more appropriate. Mounting ten-RV on Siniva will increase the number of warhead but Russia needs more SLBMs than warheads.

I think post SORT agreement should not be based only on warheads but also on the number of delivery systems. I think both the US and Russia should have similar number of launchers and warheads. And only then there will be a sense of trust and security prevail on their minds. If the US consider Russia as friend then the US doesn't need larger number of delivery systems and warheads and vice-versa.

Parimal Debnath:

I think another issue on the number of launchers and warheads also depends on MIRV equipped ICBMs. The US will, in most likely, keep 150 of the Minuteman III ICBMs armed with two warheads, W-78s, as long as the SS-18 remains in the Russian inventory. When the last R-36M2 are removed and, if the existing silo-Topol-Ms aren’t rearmed with multiple warheads, I strongly suspect the number of MMIII missiles will fall regardless of any other changes Russia makes to its arsenal. The perception is that only silo-based, multi-warhead ICBMs are capable of hitting other silo-based missiles and, thus, are considered a first-strike weapon. With the end of the SS-18s, I think you’ll see the American Minuteman III inventory fall to 300 single-warhead missiles. I also think that Russia could negotiate a post-SORT agreement that could see that number fall to 150.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank: Do you know if the W-87 moved to MMIII are keeping the 300kt yield or are they upgraded to 475kt?

Frank, I like your assessment. I guess Russia won't have any silo base MIRV equipped ICBMs after removal of all the Soviet made ICBM. In that time Russia would have some MIRV version of Topol-M mobile ICBM. Most of the silo based single warhead Topol-M will end their service life by that time. As I know all the MMIII are silo based at this moment. Will the US build few mobile MMIII? Any plan there? I think even with 150 two warheads MMIII, America will still have first strike capabilities.

Martin:

The only yield I have seen in general Pentagon publications or Department of Energy and/or Congressional reports is the standard 300 kt payload. I think the “dial-up option” to 470 is only a myth. Just my opinion.

I would be very interested if your opinion if different.

Frank Shuler
USA

Parimal Debnath:

I think the only ICBM in the Russian inventory today that concerns US nuclear policy makers is the SS-18. The perception here is that the SS-19 isn’t as accurate and doesn’t constitute a first-strike capability. Both will be gone from the Russian inventory in the 2018-20 time-frame. I think if we can keep all future silo-based ICBMs armed with only a single warhead, both Russia and the United States will benefit. I think the replacements for Minuteman III and Trident are well into the future.

It will be interesting to watch the post-SORT negotiating for 2013.

Frank Shuler
USA

> The US will, in most likely, keep 150 of the Minuteman III ICBMs armed with two warheads, W-78s, as long as the SS-18 remains in the Russian inventory. When the last R-36M2 are removed and, if the existing silo-Topol-Ms arenТt rearmed with multiple warheads, I strongly suspect the number of MMIII missiles will fall regardless of any other changes Russia makes to its arsenal.

- Frank, all these predictions are wrong, - just because you're unable (or simply you do not want) to understand the modern Russia's considerations.

- I want you to clearly understand: in the situation, when NATO comes to the Russian borders, and with approaching of US NMD facilities there, the scenario that SS-18's 'Satan' / R-36M2 'Voevoda' will be replaced with a new, improved silo-based heavy missile, become more and more possible.

- The main idea: Russia _do not_ need, - and _do not_ want a 'single-warhead with a limited number of missiles' configuration of it's strategic forces, - imagine why, Frank?

- Right, because this '150 single-warhead Topol-M' configuration will be _too vulnerable_ for the future US NMD facilities, both ground-based (GBI, THAAD and it's improved mods) and air-based (Boeing ABL and future improved mods).

- In fact, this '150 single-warhead Topol-M' configuration of RSF, - is an _ideal target_ for the NMD, - because even future NMD will have a serious problems with R-36M2s, due to it's great throw-weight (read great number of heavy decoys etc.) and enough accuracy.

- Again, I'll tell that there's a point of view in Russia that strategic balance will be kept, until 30+ SS-18s / R-36M2s will stay at their silos, together with certain amount of mobile SS-25, SS-27, and a 'marine leg' of Russian nuclear triad.

> The perception is that only silo-based, multi-warhead ICBMs are capable of hitting other silo-based missiles and, thus, are considered a first-strike weapon. With the end of the SS-18s, I think you'll see the American Minuteman III inventory fall to 300 single-warhead missiles. I also think that Russia could negotiate a post-SORT agreement that could see that number fall to 150.

- It's useless to agitate Russia for keeping our arsenals at low levels, in the conditions described above (approaching of NATO to Russian borders, progress of US NMD deployment, greatest in the world military budget, endless agressions against the independent states, programs of new weapons including hypersonic and space-based ones, rapid enlargement of 'quasi-conventional' forces, intensive anti-russian rhetoric of political elites etc.).

> If Russia wants to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, they should have more delivery systems... Mounting ten-RV on Siniva will increase the number of warhead but Russia needs more SLBMs than warheads.

- Parimal Debnath, - thank you, - that's exactly my point of view.

- I think we will see that 'balance of first-strike delivery platforms' (I mean ICBMs and SLBMs) will be kept at the present level until 2012: if US won't to scrap their delivery platforms (14 x 24 = 336 SLBMs + 450 ICBMs = 786 'first-strike' delivery platforms), Russia will try to keep their first-strike inventory at the 'almost present' level (near 600 'first-strike' delivery platforms - both ICBMs and SLBMs).

- We can understand the Russia's consideration of it's own needs from the ratio (2200 / 1700 = 1.3); I _do_ think that this is the _ratio not for 'warheads arsenals' only_, but it is _also a 'delivery platforms' ratio_;

- In other words, if US will keep it's arsenal of first-strike delivery platforms at '786 missiles level', Russia will answer with 'near 600 missiles' arsenal (786 / 600 = 1.3).

>The only yield I have seen in general Pentagon publications or Department of Energy and/or Congressional reports is the standard 300 kt payload. I think the “dial-up option” to 470 is only a myth. Just my opinion.

>I would be very interested if your opinion if different.

So I´m no expert, but I don´t think the upgrade option is a myth. The W87 and W88 are very similar designs acording to http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Wpngall.html . The upgrade process would be changing the DU rings around the secondary of the W87 against HEU rings. So the question is if such rings are on storage or if they have to be manufactured first and if it makes sense to do such an upgrade. A 300kt MMIII is still something for creating big holes in the ground.

Russian:

In 2018-20, the existing Russian inventory of strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems will fall from 2000(+) weapons to 1500(-) regardless of any American response. You have ten years to replace the SS-19, SS-18, SS-25 ICBMs, the Delta III submarines, the early Delta IVs and replace your inventory of existing cruise missiles. Deny this if you will but it won’t go away. Russia can begin a massive “Cold War style” building program to replace these weapons or negotiate a lower number that is both affordable and practical. Russia has many defense needs; the tactical air force is facing obsolescence, tanker aircraft and airlift is minimal, the army is lacking in mobility and logistics, and the navy struggles to put ships to sea or build replacements. These are the facts.

Frank Shuler
USA

Martin:

I would think any interest in updating the W-87 yield might depend on the accuracy of the new Minuteman III-RV-W-87 package. If you’re trying to strike a hardened target, it makes sense.

I agree, a 300 kt warhead must make “one big hole” when it lands.

Frank Shuler
USA

@Parimal
"In any emergency situation a preemptive attack from the US can easily destroy all the land based ICBM in a flash."

Oh man, is this some kind of joke? You really mean 'All land based ICBM's in a flash'?

You are aware that the US didn't destroy a single Scud launcher during Operation Desert Storm,right?

@Parimal
"Whatever the measure they take to protect their ground forces they won't be able to survive at all."

3 mobile SS-25/27, dispersed over Siberia would easily survive, without much difficulty whatsoever.

These three alone could provide Russia with enough deterrent.Sounds very little but these three could wipe out NY,LA and Wash DC from the map. inflicting uninmaginable damage to the US.

And the US missile defence is no threat at all. Not today or in 20 years,let's be realistic here. The Boeing ABL has encountered massive problems it's been postponed many times. And won't be in service for a very long time(If ever). It's range should have been 400km..well it's been downgraded to 200km now, b/c the laser is not powerful enough.

THAAD/PAC-3 have problems shooting down Scud's from the 80's. Not to mention an ICBM.

Seriously some comments posted here by a few Russian's seem to be full of paranoia. Nobody is going to touch Russia today or in 20-30 years.

Regards,
Norwegian

> In 2018-20, the existing Russian inventory of strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems will fall from 2000(+) weapons to 1500(-) regardless of any American response.

- Wrong. Frank, when you deal with Russia, - you must, first of all, always remember that Russia is unpredictable... ;-)

- The considerations you draw here is just a 'mechanical' considerations of 'missiles and their lives'; but, we need no a primitive 'mechanical' understanding here, - but we really need 'dialectical' one.

- There are many ways to keep Russian strategic inventory near the level of 600 missiles / 2200 warheads, and prolongation of missile lives, - is the most affordable and cheapest one.

> You have ten years to replace the SS-19, SS-18, SS-25 ICBMs...
> the Delta III submarines, the early Delta IVs...

- Let's count - facts and considerations:

(a) Russia will have the same amounts of strategic subs like US (12 Delta's against 12 Ohio's today), - or, alternatively, we will have in 1.3 times less subs than US: (12 Ohios / 1.3 = 9 Russian strategic subs; or 14 Ohios / 1.3 = 11 Russian subs). So, the 'permanent amount' of Russian strategic subs, should be considered as 'somewhere between 9 and 12'.

(b) Various Russian officials often says that 'we plan to build 8 - 10 Boreys at all' - these numbers are also in good correlation with the above numbers (9 - 12), isn't it?

(c) So, we can conclude, that Russia will surely maintain it's amount of strategic subs at the level somewhere between 8 (minimal Boreys amount scheduled to produce) and 12 (present amount of Deltas). It's 8 - 12 subs, Frank... Let's consider 10 subs finally with 16 SLBMs onboard each = 160 SLBMs TOTAL.

(d) To maintain the level of 600 'first-strike' strategic delivery platforms, we need to produce only (600 minus 160 SLBMs minus 60 Topol-Ms presently) = 380 ICBMs... In TEN YEARS, as you told, - that gives (380 / 10) = 38 Topol-Ms / RS-24 per year production rate...

(e) How this production rate will affect the Russia's economy? Let's consider the price of single Topol-M as 900 mln. roubles (36 mln. US dollars); let's consider the price of mobile Topol-M (together with MAZ TEL) as 50 mln. US dollars...

(f) Then, for the program of 'Topol-M' mass production in ten years, we will need (380 * 50 mln.) = 19 billion US dollars (near 2 billion US dollars in a year); please note that presently, Russia already has 470 billion US dollars only in additional ('unplanned') revenue from it's international trade (it's so called 'Russian Gold and Currency Reserve Fund').

- Look, Frank, - 2 billion dollars per year to produce ICBMs with the same rate as US do (let's say, 30 - 40 Topol-Ms per year); and 470 billions NOW, - just 'IN RESERVE'!

??? So why Russian government is so stingy ??? ;-)

... to be continued on 'conventional weapons obsolescence'...

Bye till tomorrow... It's 1:11 AM... Moscow never slips... ;-)

@Frank
"I agree, a 300 kt warhead must make “one big hole” when it lands."

Just out of curiosity, what's the minimum altitude burst for Minuteman III ?

As far as I know D5 had 200 meters as minimum burst(I could be wrong here). Both are effective against hard/fixed targets(Surface). Though I'm very doubtful if they would be effective on really hard & deeply buried targets(Sub-surface),like Yamantau and Kosvinsky in the Ural mountains.

Norwegian:

There is so much confusion as to the American anti-missile systems; their purpose and capabilities. The Boeing ABL project is just that, a research project. It will be next year, 2009, before any attempt is made to test the laser system against a “live” target. Again, this is a theater system designed to shoot down tactical missiles in boost phase. The technology is gaining favor also as a potential system against cruise missiles in a battlefield situation not in some kind of national defense system. The THAAD is also a theater systems, a weapon designed to provide terminal missile defense to troops in the field and supplement/replace the Patriot PACIII system. Neither system is in any way a threat to Russia; unless Russia agrees to let us base such systems a few hundred miles from her ICBM fields…

Interesting question on the minimum air burst capability of the W-87 warhead on the Minuteman III. I have never run across this data in my research. I still presume the W-87 is only an air burst weapon as I have never read the warhead has been re-fused when integrated with the MMIII. However, the new rebuilt W-76-1 warhead will have the capacity to target hard targets, ground strike, as part of its new fusing system. Previously it was an air burst warhead all the way.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank:
I couldn't agree with you more on the anti-missile subject.
BTW thank's for replying on MMIII.

The reason why I quoted and replied to Parimal's
comment is simple because there is no basic
knowledge behind it.I must say it is very childish,unprofessional and ignorant to make these kinds of claims without any basic evidence.Claiming that the US could conduct a first strike on Russia without fearing retaliation, is nonsense. As I have said before let's be realistic.

There's a lot more then just warheads and missiles that need to be taken into account when you're about to launch a first strike.
Operational uncertainties like timing of attack,
system reliability, and effects of other warheads (fratricide). Not to mention(i.e. gravitational field variations,atmospheric drag variations,density of the atmosphere etc..)
And there so much more...

Regards,
Norwegian

Frank/Norwegian:
I cannot judge how accurate these informations are, but the nuclearweaponarchive states the following fuzing options for the W87:
>Primary fuze is inertial (i.e. dead reckoning using guidance information)
Secondary dual mode S-band radar fuze (4 antennas) for airburst and surface/proximity fuzing
Fuzing options:
* High altitude airburst
* Medium altitude airburst
* Low altitude airburst
* Surface/proximity burst
* Surface/contact burst

How big is the influence of the weather on the CEP of a warhead? If there is a thunderstorm above the target area with strong winds, is there still a chance to make a hard kill?

Martin:
It depends and there is really no accurate information out there.
Atmospheric drag affects the missile the most I would assume.Jet stream,pressure fronts and surface winds all need to be seriously taken into account.
For example various sources say a 30 mph surface wind introduces a bias(systematic error) of 90m.(Though I think it's much less)
We also need to keep in mind that CEP can be much larger if there is significant bias.
The total miss distance I would assume is classified material,however it would be quiet interesting to know how the distribution of RV impact points are affected by all these different variations.

The US military is well aware of this, back in the cold war days US military weather satellites used to update US warheads regurlarly.
A thunderstorm can't stop the US from making a hard kill.That's a certain fact.
However all of these 'problems' need to be taken into account when you're discussing 'first strike'.
These few examples I mentioned show that many factors other than just the number of warheads and missile's are very important.

Norwegian:

I think you missed my point. I never said that the US could conduct a first strike on Russia at all. I was talking about a hypothetical situation when Russia would have roughly 300 delivery systems including 150 ICBM whereas the US would have around 800 delivery systems. You can calculate yourself how many delivery systems Russia would have after the withdrawal of Soviet made delivery systems. At that time Russian nuclear arsenals will be in vulnerable condition and there will be a great risk of elimination of all the arsenals in case of preemptive attack, again hypothetical. Yes it is true that if Russia increases the number of regular patrols of their mobile ICBM then it is not quite easy to detect all the mobile ICBM at a specific moment but not impossible. And you know Russia would have very small number of mobile ICBM then!

You have to consider other factors as well. Russian early warning system, combat readiness of their nuclear delivery systems, air defense system, command and control system etc and American ABM system should also be taken into consideration. I don't think ABM system will be effective very soon but it will at least give them a psychological edge over Russia. Above all Russian military will be under tremendous pressure because of the poor condition of their strategic forces after withdrawal of Soviet made delivery systems.

Let me clear once again, I am talking about a hypothetical situation when Russia would have very small number of nuclear delivery systems.

P.S. You know Mr. Lieber and Mr. Press have already talked about nuclear primacy when Russia still have large number of delivery systems. I don't agree with them though!

Thanks Norwegian.

Parimal:
I do consider those factors, but it still doesn't change the picture.The US ABM won't have any psychological edge over Russia.
It might as well work the other way around.

P.S. I know very well what Mr. Lieber and Mr. Press have talked about, And I can tell you without going into details,they missed and simply don't know some very important facts. They don't seem to be able to fully comprehend how a first nuclear strike would work.

All this recent talk about 'American nuclear supremacy' Basically has no substance, no truth in it whatsoever. Just pretending and empty words with no significance.

Regards,
Norwegian

Martin:

Useful information on the W-87 indeed.

I think “environmentals” play a big role in nuclear weapon accuracy and destructive force. Both the terrain of the target itself and natural variables such as wind and rain. My feeling is that a missile with four small warheads probably causes more damage to a city that a missile with a single, but much more powerful warhead. The concussion effect from four such warheads released at slightly different heights and at a variable distance would create horrific destruction. Simply horrific…

Frank Shuler
USA

The version of the W-87 that was intended for the "Midgetman" mobile ICBM had a yield of 475 kt. This was supposedly accomplished by adding an enriched uranium sleeve to the secondary, exactly the same as the W-88. I don't believe there is any intention to upgrade the 300kt W-87's to this configuration.
However, the recent "re-engineing/propulsion upgrade" program for the Minuteman III has resulted in a DECREASE in missile performance due to the use of more environmentally safe propellants. (test launches of propulsion upgraded MM III's have shown significant range reductions)
I don't think the Russian's have much to worry about from the this "upgraded/modernized" force of 450 single warhead MM III's vs. the Topol-M. Also, MM III replacement plans are currently in dissarray, the biggest threat continues to be the Trident II D-5.

Jon:

I agree completely with your opinions. (With the exception on your comments about the Minuteman III replacement being in disarray.) But, this does bring up an interesting conversation point. Do we really need a Minuteman III replacement? Does the United States really need a land-based component of the Triad? Should we put our efforts into the Trident program, improving its capabilities and planning for its replacement? If the “magical switch” to the Minuteman III ICBM fleet was turned off today, would America be in peril? Or, at least in “greater” peril than normal? I would be interested in your opinion.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank;
In all honesty, I think that if the US eliminated all the MM III's, we would not be in peril, simply because of the Trident II's. HOWEVER, If we, or Russia, for that matter, were to eliminate any element(s) of the strategic triad, I would eliminate SLBM's and bomber launched weapons. This is because, in my opinion, a silo or mobile based land system is still more survivable than an SSBN, which can be found and destroyed without the use of nuclear weapons. That is why I favor Russia dropping the costly SSBN programs and building more Topol-m's. I honestly don't believe that SSBN's are a first strike weapon, not against centrally located or mobile ICBM's. There is still plenty of time to launch any land based ICBM before it's silo can be taken out, especially in a country as large as Russia.

Jon:

I invite you to read this article by Eugene Miasnikov promoting the SSBN force. While this is written by a Russian, as I am a submarine officer I can attest that many of his arguments are accurate and on the right track.
http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/snf0322.htm

This article is many years old, but still holds true in many of its theories.

So, Rich, may you can comment about how difficult (or easy) is to track a Russian sub from a practical point of view. The Evgeny’s article is very didactical but, anyway is a theoretical paper. If you are free to relate some stories about the subject, please let us know them.

Frank, what about the exact plan to replace MM III? Is that plan working?

Rich,

Thanks for the informative article, it's very interesting. The conclusions seem reasonable. My biggest question is what is the likelihood of a first strike against SRF before they can launch? I should think it would come down to SRF reaction time, and as long as that reaction time is shorter than the flight time of a SLBM or ICBM, then there is no way to stop the SRF missiles. (assuming you can park an Ohio right off the coast of Russia, there would in most cases be 3000 nm or more flight distance required to hit centrally located silos, to say nothing of road mobile ICBM's. I would think the flight time over that distance, even with a depressed trajectory profile and a distance of only 2000nm, how a D-5 RV package can get to those silos before the missiles are up and away as long as the D-5 is detected on launch, which should not be an issue.)

Jon:

Let me give you a couple of quotes-
"At present, our strategic nuclear forces are the only factor of deterrence... Strategic intelligence assets ¾ SPRN, OTH radar, satellite, electronic and radio equipment, and so on ¾ are called upon to give us time to assess the situation. Today, not all of the aforementioned types and assets of intelligence gathering are capable of fulfilling their mission ¾ giving our leaders a timely warning of underhanded intentions of enemies. The reasons are well known ¾ they are either outdated, or there are just not enough of them, or they are simply not yet in place"
-Excerpts from book edited by Yu.A. Yashin, V.M. Kraskovskiy, V.A. Chobanyan, A.N. Sorokin, K.A. Pupkov, N.D. Yegupov and S.N. Lyutikov: "Sword and Shield of Russia: Nuclear Missile Weapons and ABM Defense Systems in 2007.

And the US Air Force provided this one (albeit a little older):
As with many of Russia's satellite systems, the early warning constellation is not fully operational. In 1999, only three of the nine Oko slots were filled. These three satellites orbit the Earth every 12 hours in highly elliptical orbits, but are unable to see the U.S. missile sites for about seven hours during each orbit. One Oko and one Prognoz are currently in geostationary orbit to cover the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean.

In 2006, Podvig reported that another Oko may have been launched http://russianforces.org/blog/2006/07/successful_launch_of_a_new_ear.shtml

Now I am not saying that they have horrible coverage and will not detect any launches, the SSBN can launch its entire salvo in minutes...that will take out a hefty amount of silos.

Also, supposedly all missiles do not have targets preloaded anymore, so if that is true, how long would it take them to load the target then fire? That is information I don't have.

But, yes it would be nice to take all of them out on first strike, but it will not happen. The SSBNs provide a deterrent force and their inherent survivability is the key to their survival. The SSBN is the cornerstone of the US, UK, and France nuclear programs and for many good reasons.

Parimal Debnath:

It will be sometime around 2018-2020 before a plan to replace the Minuteman III ICBM is developed. The Minuteman will soldier on.

Frank Shuler
USA

Jon:
Rich:

Interesting. I think these types of conversations are making the rounds of the nuclear policy makers even today. Do we build a new strategic submarine or land based ICBM? Both? Neither? I do think the relative success or failure of the ABM system in the next twenty years will help frame the answer. If you ask the Air Force today to make a choice between a new bomber and an ICBM replacement, the bomber wins hands down. There are a growing number of “blue-suiters” that think the strategic deterrent mission should be turned over to the US Navy and, thus, allow the Air Force to concentrate on the Global Strike Mission. Giving up land-based nuclear missiles will make it far easier for the USAF to deploy and launch intercontinental ranged missiles from the United States armed with a variety of conventional payloads. The term floating around the Pentagon today is “relevancy”. How do we face our enemies of the future? What is really important in this new security world? I think the Air Force wants to invest in weapons & systems that actually will be used in this new 21st Century security world. Being “relevant” also mean controlling the budgets for future UAVs, new satellite constellations, and intelligence processing. In the Pentagon, it’s all about the budget…

Frank Shuler
USA

Rich:

I must confess, I’m just as interested as Kolokol in your answer. If it is appropriate for you to provide general comments.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank:
Kolokol:

As you know most of that information is classified. I will try to give some information the best I can. The article is correct, the Akula submarine is a very quiet submarine and is a very difficult target. But, the U.S. does not conduct these missions alone. Not only are our submarines conducting their missions, we utilize data provided from allied boats also on missions and SOSUS data. All of this data is transmitted to the submarine engaged to help in the process.

Some of the boats are extremely loud and can't remain hidden if they try. One in particular is pretty much a pig. In the low background noise of the Barents she can be heard for at least 80K yards.

Every year the US sub fleet upgrades its SONAR suite some way or another making it easier to hear things. The background noise in the Barents area is so quiet that my sonarman tapped his clipboard on the deck and heard it through Sonar. This also makes it very difficult for us to remain hidden.

There are so many variables in the situation that it is hard to predict the outcome. I was last on a sub in 2004 and won't be back for another year, so the current policy on how many boats are designated to the area is unknown to me. But there exists the possibility of a gap in the deployment which allows a mission we need to fulfill go unanswered.

Basically what I am trying to say it yes and no. In my personal opinion and experience, the US submarines are the best out there and if we wanted to we can find the SSBNs as it has been done before. But...on the same note, it is practically impossible to take out the fleet before they shoot. While I am not privy to every submarines location and mission, I am pretty confident that we are not actively tailing all the SSBNs.

Again (I could go on for hours), the rarity of the SSBN patrols makes it easier. Satellite reconnaissance informs us when they have left and then we can do our job of finding them if desired, but if they were out more often, then it would be more difficult.

I am sorry if I didn't answer your question directly, but I cannot give you all the information you desire.

But to sum it up, yes we could find the enemy submarines, but it may take awhile giving them time to launch their missiles.

Rich:

Thanks for the share. It’s a treat to have access to an expert who doesn’t “sit in a chair”. I sincerely appreciate all your posts and your service to our country.

Frank Shuler
USA

You are very clear Rich. I didn't expect you to be allowed to share such interesting and REAL information. By the way, the “noisy pig” is the Kalmar (aka Delta-III), right?
On the other hand it would be interesting to know about how effective will be the noise reduction measured incorporated into the refurbished Dolphins (aka Delta-IV).

Many thanks in advance.

> The Boeing ABL project is just that, a research project.
> Again, this is a theater system designed to shoot down tactical missiles in boost phase.

- Frank, I want to belive this - but I can't, - because of the following reasons:

(a) A 'Global Ballistic Missile Defense Planning 2017' video presentation, made by 'US Army Space and Missile Defence Command' (i.e., - by Pentagon) clearly shows that Pentagon aiming Boeing ABL system to work against ICBMs. Please see the following video at episode from 04:10 to 06:10:

http://youtube.com/watch?v=hZ5e1PuCZEc

(b) Can't see any fundamental difference between hitting with a laser an ICBM in boost phase and a tactical missile in boost phase... Laser is anyway much faster than a missile...

(c) Any 'research projects' now could be a 'fully-operational' system tomorrow, - and could gain additional properties, - such as possibility to hit SLBMs and ICBMs, for example.

> The THAAD is also a theater systems, a weapon designed to provide terminal missile defense to troops in the field and supplement/replace the Patriot PACIII system.

- Again, - nobody knows, - what properties, for example, 'THAAD Advanced Capabilities', - will gain in the nearest future.

> In my personal opinion and experience, the US submarines are the best out there and if we wanted to we can find the SSBNs as it has been done before. But... on the same note, it is practically impossible to take out the fleet before they shoot. While I am not privy to every submarines location and mission, I am pretty confident that we are not actively tailing all the SSBNs.

- That's why Russian Navy starts in this year testing a new class of submarine, with a boat named B-90 Sarov... ;-)

- In short, 'B-90 Sarov' may be the most classified sub in our Navy today... Guess why?

- Well, it's a small 'diesel-electric' ;-) sub, similar to low-noise 'Kilo' class (I would say, it's simply 'Improved Kilo' or 'Post-Kilo' class)... As some people say, the name 'Kilo' was given to the subs of previous serie for their extremely low noise, and this name was derived from the words 'Kill-Low' - a 'low-noise killer', 'quiet killer'. Another name for this class, was 'A Black Hole' (given again, for the extremely low noise).

- B-90 Sarov should have even less noise then the Kilo-class, from what B-90 was derived...

- When go with electric engine, especially at low speeds (near 4 knots, for example), - diesel-electric subs usually the much quieter then the SSNs; but, a serious limit for diesel subs in this 'ultra-quiet' mode, is their limited range - energy in electric accumulation cells needs to be restored soon.

- And, to restore an energy in the cells:

(a) 'classic' 'diesel-electric' subs, needs to use their loud, atmosphere-dependent diesel engine;

(b) 'new gen' 'atmosphere-independent' 'diesel-electric subs', such as German U33 Type 212A, may use it's onboard 'fuel-cells' as well as the great amounts of hydrogen and oxygen in internal hi-pressure onboard tanks:

http://submarine.id.ru/uss/u56.shtml

(c) according to few independent sources, - it seems that 'B-90 Sarov' will use NOT 'chemical' 'fuel cells', but an ultracompact and rather quiet onboard nuclear reactor, to produce enough electric power for accumulators recharge; that's, probably, will give to 'Sarov' class two unical properties, - an extremely low noise, as a legacy of Kilo-class, and energy independence, great submerged-state time and great operational range, - as a key features of SSBN.

- Two interesting facts:

(a) German sub U33 Type 212A is 'owner' of the 'world record' of submerged-state time for the 'diesel-electric' subs - near one month (30 days) in the submerged state.

(b) Even chinese 'Song' class diesel-electric subs may be quiet enough to hunt the orders of US ships, including aircraft-carrier orders, - a citation:

"10.11.07 - WTF Is Your Sonar Tech Smoking? Chinese Sub Pops Up Amidst US Fleet - Source

Somebody needs to slap a few Sonar Techs around.

When the U.S. Navy deploys a battle fleet on exercises, it takes the security of its aircraft carriers very seriously indeed.

At least a dozen warships provide a physical guard while the technical wizardry of the world’s only military superpower offers an invisible shield to detect and deter any intruders.

That is the theory. Or, rather, was the theory.

American military chiefs have been left dumbstruck by an undetected Chinese submarine popping up at the heart of a recent Pacific exercise and close to the vast U.S.S. Kitty Hawk - a 1,000ft supercarrier with 4,500 personnel on board.

By the time it surfaced the 160ft Song Class diesel-electric attack submarine is understood to have sailed within viable range for launching torpedoes or missiles at the carrier".

Russian:

Range.

The Boeing ABL project and the near-operational THAAD are both “short range weapons”. Using your logic, the United States needs to fear the Iskander (SS-26) because it could have a nuclear payload and target Washington DC.

Frank Shuler
USA

> Range.
> The Boeing ABL project and the near-operational THAAD are both “short range weapons”.

- Boeing ABL should have the 'shoot range' near 600 km... quite enough to control, - let's say, - with 10 or 20 ABL aircrafts, - practically all the launches of Russian Northern Fleet SLBMs.

- F-22A Raptor is good enough system to convoy and guard ABL aircrafts (and may be ABL aircrafts will be good enough in 'self-defending' from the hostile aircrafts with the built-in lasers).

- NATO airbases may come close to the west, east and especially, - south borders of Russia at any moment in 10-years timeframe, - please don't forget it.

Russian:

Considering the new five-year military agreement between the US and Kazakhstan to bring the level of the Kazakhstan military up to NATO standards and provide joint training and equipment, you may be right.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank:

re: the 475kt W87. According to Chuck Hansen's nuke book the 475 kt yield is achieved by adding another layer around the secondary. (Don't recall of what, tuballoy, oralloy, U-235. . .something). Don't know how many (if any) were produced of that yield but it definitely isn't "dial-a-nuke" like some.

Russian:

1) As for the Song surfacing near the Kitty Hawk: Aircraft carriers have limited Sonar suites and unless they are conducting ASW ops they will not be fully manned and operational. We are not threatened right now by any enemy that will kill us with torpedoes, so we don't focus on that. I admit, if someone wanted to start war they could get one of our ships, but trust me, it will be game on after that and there will be very active persecution of any potential USW threat. Journalists like to stretch and exaggerate that they do not know much about....

2) > In my personal opinion and experience, the US submarines are the best out there and if we wanted to we can find the SSBNs as it has been done before. But... on the same note, it is practically impossible to take out the fleet before they shoot. While I am not privy to every submarines location and mission, I am pretty confident that we are not actively tailing all the SSBNs.

- That's why Russian Navy starts in this year testing a new class of submarine, with a boat named B-90 Sarov... ;-)

What does the Sarov have to do with this conversation?

3) I know all about AIP diesel boats and I currently work with a German submariner that just had command of an AIP boat. We have talked extensively about it and while they are quiet when they run on batteries, their speed is extremely limited and cannot fully function like their nuclear counterparts.

- In short, 'B-90 Sarov' may be the most classified sub in our Navy today.

You don't think they say the same thing about their other submarines that we may (or may not) know more about than you think? You don't think that the US will conduct operations to find out everything sound related and other information about this boat and the Borey for that matter?

If you want to go into a comparison of nuclear subs versus diesel, we can do that. If you want to compare US and Russian submarine operations we can do that to.

I understand, as a Russian, you have extreme confidence in your equipment. I, as an American, feel the same way about mine. But I have had the benefit of playing war games of sub on sub with many countries and real world with other countries.

Rich:

Is it possible for a new conventionel sub like U33 to follow a SSBN on a deterent patrol? What is the typical speed of a patroling SSBN?
And can you maybe tell how good the french and british SSBN are compared to Ohio class and where their patrol areas are?

As far I know the “hunt of US-hunters” game is conducted by vessels like Schuka-b and conventional ASW from the surface and the air.
I was not aware that conventional subs were dedicated to such a task.

Martin,

Unfortunately, I do not know where the British and French spend their time on patrol.

As for a conventional sub following an SSBN:
The boomer guys like to say they always go 5 knots to nowhere. Making fun of the fact that they go slow and just stay in their patrol area. So based on speed, the U33 could trail one, but remember even with the theoretical 30 days submerged on the battery they will need to snorkel eventually and they will be given away. A nuclear SSBN usually stays submerged for their entire patrol. Remember, the only thing that limits the patrol time of a SSN or SSBN is the food. We make our own air and water and obviously we don't need any fuel.

Rich:

[If you want to go into a comparison of nuclear subs versus diesel, we can do that. If you want to compare US and Russian submarine operations we can do that to.]

I’d love to hear the scenarios; tactics and strategy.

Frank Shuler
USA