Hi Pavel, I'm something of a newcomer to this most informative site of yours, so apologies if this is a question that you have already answered at some point...

You state that designing and building an equivalent modern replacement for the SS-18 and SS-19 would be a poor investment for the Russian military; yet to this day, these missiles with their many high-yield MIRvs, still very much form the core of the RVSN's arsenal. Assuming that their operational lifetime cannot be extended too much longer, what do you feel could more wisely replace them as a delivery vehicle for the (nearly 1000!) heavy warheads they current account for?

Do you feel that one should stick to the RS-24 and ramp up its production? Although given its modest throwweight, an RS-24 would surely not be able to carry more than 2 or 3 of such MIRVs, meaning that no less than 300-350 such missiles would have to built in the coming 15 years.

Also, politically speaking, a modern ICBM with several tons throwweight - and, as the piece you linked states, able to evade defenses and packing 10 MIRVs with a megaton yield - would be viewed as *the ultimate* weapon in today's world. And which self-respecting army would pass up a chance to wield something like that? :)

You seem to assume that the more missiles/warheads is better. But there is no particular reason Russia wold need 1000 or so ICBM warheads or 350 missiles. Neither it needs RS-24 - single-warhead Topol-M would be perfectly fine. My point is that all these "ultimate weapons" are in fact pretty useless when it comes to the national security of the country.

Actually the Soviet approach was fairly thought out and systematic. Money was spent on assets with specific purposes, in most cases at least. This is a feature of the post-Soviet system where funding is scarce and the industry is in ruins. The result is that funding is fought over viciously, and not on the basis of what is necessary for a real conception of the modern battlefield, but for what happens to be available from the shambles of our defense industry.

There was nothing well though out or systematic about Soviet approach to funding the military. It was the same thing - resources would go to whoever could demonstrate that he could spend them. The only thing that is different today is that there are fewer organizations that could spend the money and produce something tangible.

Hi Pavel,

Fair enough, I see what you mean. Indeed, I guess that the economic and strategic value of any nuclear arsenal (or any other military investment for that matter) is always a matter of some debate - in my home country too, the UK, the whole 'Trident' issue persists as something of a highly politicised hot potato.

But in the hypothetical sense, if one were to assume that Russia would (for any number of reasons) not be prepared at this point to cut its number of strategic warheads below the 1550 permitted under 'START 2010', is it not possible that consolidating them under a new heavy liquid-fuelled ICBM (with as many MIRVs as it can carry) might actually be the cheapest option? Submarines with SLBMs would certainly cost more (and the Bulava hasn't done itself much justice...) and otherwise, you'd need a *lot* of those Topols...

But I understand your point - that Russia would probably be just as well-protected with a more 'symbolic' strategic arsenal, like China has.

I don't think there is any reason for Russia to try to reach the 1550 level of New START. What we see is the pressure to go to that level (at some considerable expense - development and deployment of the new missile will cost some money) simply because Russia is "allowed" to have that many warheads. Even if Russia would admit tomorrow that Bulava failed and scrap the program, Topol-M would be able to provide adequate deterrence.

There is a somewhat different point as well - I think it is wrong to believe that nuclear weapons have anything to do with security (whether in Russia or in the U.K.). Again, the Soviet Union had all nuclear weapons it wanted and some more - where is the Soviet Union today?

"Soviet Union had all nuclear weapons it wanted and some more - where is the Soviet Union today?"

Well Pavel, the same question can be easily reversed...
Where would be Russia today if not for those nuclear deterrent?
Russia would probably end as 2nd Yugoslavia!
Would West stop only in Chechen wars in dismembering Russia?
West would quickly bring "democracy" in Russian Caucasus...
Also what would stop West into going even further in NATO expansion, by taking Ukraine & Belarus in NATO (and all others CIS countries)?
You tend to be against expensive nukes but you don't give any suggestions of what is yours magic solution that is cheaper and equally efficient as powerful nuke deterrent to keep U.S. ,NATO (China?) and all other dangers away from threatening Russia

Or those Topol's are sooo good that Russia really need anything else to have credible nuke deterrent?!

Yes, I tend to agree in general with the comments of other people and not yours...

I actually believe that Russia might have been better off had it not had nuclear weapons. Yes, one can argue that Russia wouldn't have been able to wage the kind of war in Chechnya that it did, but that might have had to look instead for real solutions of the problems in the Caucasus - I'm not sure that the situation that exists there today is in any way sustainable. On NATO, the dangers of its expansion are very much exaggerated (this is not to say that the expansion is necessarily a positive process). On China, Russia might indeed have a security problem there, but it is a delusion to think that nuclear weapons would help with those.

Pavel,

I have to disagree as well. Although I understand your point that much more limited deterrent would still do the job, I don't agree. The question and argument whether, say 100 missiles would still penetrate any future missile defense is (IMO) the wrong question to ask. You have gone far away in thinking of all scenarios and concluded that it would happen in any case, so that concludes the story. But your thinking was too sane compared to whatever whoever in charge might think. The same industry which produced and markets these defenses might actually persuade people that they are much better than they really are. What happens after? Lets say a major crisis. Who guaranties you that someone in charge, who doesnt care too much about the philosophy of the value of each human life, but rather does statistics (e.g. similar to Dr. Strangelove), will not go for the option of all out attack counting on "acceptable" losses?

The whole question here is not what few individuals, or sane leadership believes, but what everyone involved are completely aware of. If all the generals on whatever side, are absolutely sure their country is going to be destroyed in any case of such an exchange, then this is credible deterrent. Otherwise, what value did the 100 missiles have? All get destroyed or one side gets destroyed, it doesn't matter anymore.

Also, theoretical and practical side are often different. You say, you are not sure nuclear weapons are helping at all. This is theoretical side. About practical, maybe I can give you some input, since I am from that U.S. bombed Yugoslavia who didn't have nuclear deterrent. Believing in diplomacy, democracy, absolutely free markets, self awareness of the people, justice etc. is contrary to the principles that really shape the world.

I am a pacifist, but I have to say, for everyones sake, I hope both U.S and Russia keep their credible nuclear deterrent

I understand the argument about someone being tempted to launch an attack having convinced himself that missile defense would allow to keep his own losses at some "acceptable" level. The problem with this argument is that that "acceptable level" is completely arbitrary - you could repeat this same argument with 100, 1000, or 10 warheads - at any point you would be able to say that your opponent might think that getting, say, one warhead in a response strike is "more acceptable" than getting ten, or 1,000 is "more acceptable" than 10,000. There is absolutely no rational basis for any of these numbers - they are made up to justify whatever level of forces countries have at any particular point.

I agree that one of the most serious dangers of missile defense is exactly this false sense of security that might make people believe that they are protected. But building up more missiles won't help reduce this particular danger - the only way to deal with it is to systematically demonstrate that missile defense does not offer any kind of reasonable protection.

Finally, on the Yugoslavia analogy. It's not a simple issue, of course. I'm not advocating pacifism (let alone "mention absolutely free markets"). As I said, it is quite possible that if Russia had no nuclear weapons it would have faced much more serious pressure regarding some of its policies - the wars in Chechnya are the obvious example. It would have been much more constrained in what it can and cannot do there. But what would make us think that this constraint would necessarily undermine Russia's national security? It well may be that without the capability to use unconstrained force, Russia would have found a better solution of the Chechnya problem than the one that it has now.

How may nuclear weapons are enough? This is always a thought provoking question; without an answer. If you asked Curtis LeMay, the commander of the USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1956, he would have answered 40,000. It was that number of nuclear weapons the Pentagon deemed necessary to destroy every military-industrial target in the Soviet Union. Not only were Soviet ballistic missile launch sites to be targeted but also every major Soviet army base, all ports and naval facilities, anti-aircraft defensive positions, military factories engaged in weapons production, communications facilities, command-and-control sites, all Soviet airbases, and the such. If fact, the USAF policy was adamant about not directly targeting Soviet cities and therefore placing millions of innocent Soviet civilians at nuclear risk. The irony of such a policy is apparent. It was later reported, Kiev was targeted with well over 100 nuclear weapons; attacking military targets with some such sites less than a kilometer apart in distance. A factory that rebuild aircraft engines next to a Soviet airbase would be counted as a individual target and the airbase yet another; both targeted by nuclear weapons. Insanity. Can we honestly imagine the horror of Kiev being stuck by a single American B-52 and its four Mark-15 nuclear bombs?

I would argue that numbers are an anachronism.

What Russia and the United States need are enough nuclear weapons and redundant delivery systems to ensure nuclear deterrence. The central argument is really not about absolute nuclear warhead numbers or the capabilities of individual weapon delivery systems but rather what politically defines the national concept of “nuclear deterrence”.

Today, the United States has just over 5000 total nuclear weapons. We could reduce our inventory of nuclear weapons to 1000 deployed warheads, with 500 held in operational reserve and still achieve nuclear deterrence. President Obama is committed to this policy regardless of what Russia does. It will be interesting to see his progress.

Frank Shuler
USA

Pavel, "acceptable" losses is so bad it'd be funny if it wasn't so damn serious. Sure, 5 million dead is preferable to 50 million dead, but how about nobody dead. It's a damn miracle millions haven't been killed! Perhaps the leadership in the east as well as the west got one thing right, they didn't push the button triggering the big one.

But all these small conflicts, police actions, liberations, enforcements, revolutions, well, the bodies are still piling up, aren't they? And I'm not blaming one side more than another, it seems their is more than enough blame to go around, way more than enough.

The Russian Topol seems to be a platform that works, the Bulava on it's way as well as best I can tell, so it's hard to see the need for anything else.
A new Russian liquid fuel "heavy" ICBM would almost certainly be a state of the art long lived precise and effective weapon system. Presumably without equal worldwide, but why? I think it's best to put the past far behind us, rather than trying to relive/refight/rethink it, as many of the generals of both sides seem to want to do.

It still seems to me that a global missile defense of limited but certain effectiveness would not be a bad thing given all the bad actors out there. Who would run it? Certainly not the generals, bankers, politicians, spies, but maybe "mothers against drunk driving"?

some arguments are hard to follow.
What we can see right now in the Arab world (and maybe tomorrow in China) is that despite any military might or pressure it is about what the people want for their region.
If tomorrow lets say Belgium will fall into three regions which wants to be states of its own who will stop them and by what? Always a massacre?
And one thing more to consider: no nation was ever forced to enter NATO - that is what I can tell you as a german who not used to live always in a democracy. It was the people on the roads of east-germany who want to get rid of a government which was never free elected and did not represent them any longer.
In my opinion Russia's problems are a lack of democracy, a dummy parliament of Putin cheer leaders, a lack of justice for your own people, a lack of free press (yes - other opinions hurts from time to time) and a lack of a efficiency in a CIVIL industrial base (who likes to buy a russian computer or camera?).
No one wants to "conquer" Russia. And why for?
The Russian problem in the Caucasus is that a region which the russian emire once occupied do not want to be member of an empire any longer which treat them as secondary citizen at best and ignoring their culture, their religion and their right for equal chances.
The problems of that century are not likely to get solved with the number of ICBMs or warheads...a simple "Twitter Revolution" or a multi-national terrorism can fool all of those Megaton thinkings in a couple of weeks.
Just my opinion and with great respect to the Russian Folk!
Cheers

bernd reuter

Agree; every word.

Frank Shuler
USA

Bernd the liberal fairytale cannot and will not work in Russia. At least not through direct implementation with Western support. If something along those lines is to exist in Russia it must appear there on its own, and without (in fact quite possible in opposition to) the West.

In other words Russia's problems are not the lack of democracy per se, but the fact that Russia is not a modern liberal capitalism society. No amount of institutional well-wishing will change that. Even Soviet social engineering was only able to change a limited number of things. It will take time, and I have strong reservations about its plausibility in the first place, given the absolute unpopularity of liberal politicians and political movements in Russia.

The largest political opposition to Putin and Co. comes from nationalists and communists. That alone should be a tell tale sign.

“Finally, on the Yugoslavia analogy. It's not a simple issue, of course. I'm not advocating pacifism (let alone "mention absolutely free markets"). As I said, it is quite possible that if Russia had no nuclear weapons it would have faced much more serious pressure regarding some of its policies - the wars in Chechnya are the obvious example. It would have been much more constrained in what it can and cannot do there. But what would make us think that this constraint would necessarily undermine Russia's national security?” - Pavel Podvig

Pavel, the issue of having ”big guns” is not constricted to destructive power anymore. Those days are long gone.
It’s a far more complex issue that affects far more aspects of a nation’s socio-political establishment.
As you mention, Russia would’ve faced far more pressure from around the world regarding its policies, but my conviction is that, at any time, in the absence of the aforementioned “big guns” , any pressure of any kind would’ve, upon meeting with resistance, eventually gain momentum turning itself into a forceful implementation of others decisions.
It isn’t just a case of risking territorial losses but also political and decision-making liberties. This, for me, represents a serious constraint aimed (possibly) at undermining Russia’s influence and even its national security.
Without the “big guns”, Russia would’ve risked to be the world’s biggest third-world country; the play-toy of ruthless market and banking policies of the powers to be.
Or this was not only unacceptable for Russia but in direct contradiction with the historical heritage of Russia and Russian people. It wasn’t a case of “do we or do we not want to be a recognized political and military power”, but rather an obligation to an existent state of facts derived from a historically rich and hard fought past.

“In my opinion Russia's problems are a lack of democracy, a dummy parliament of Putin cheer leaders, a lack of justice for your own people, a lack of free press (yes - other opinions hurts from time to time) and a lack of a efficiency in a CIVIL industrial base (who likes to buy a russian computer or camera?).
No one wants to "conquer" Russia. And why for?” - bernd reuter

Your opinion couldn’t be more far from the reality. The Russian reality, that is.
Don’t get me wrong; what you’re saying is the right formula to be presented to the average people. But not to Russian political heads whose eyes have to look far beyond democracy.
Not wanting to get into a time consuming debate about the ups and downs of a democracy practiced by a certain number of archetype states, your idealistic statement sounds to me more like one that defies the well known “look at your own glass-house before considering throwing stones” dictum and is rather based on an image offered by a single pair of glasses.

971: You seem to define national security as a lack of constraints that allows a country (or, rather, the state) to do very much what it wants. This is a terribly narrow and ultimately deeply flawed definition. I can see how ideas like this are popular in Russia - it is more or less clear what kind of institutional and political interests are behind this. I don't think this blog is a good place to discuss the merits of democracy ("sovereign" or otherwise), but Bernd has a very good point - ultimately, the weakness of democratic institutions in Russia is largely responsible for the "national security" policies that have little to do with security of the country. I should say that Russia is not alone - for example, U.S. view of national security is also quite distorted and, just as it is the case in Russia, it is the weakness of democratic institutions that is responsible.

Gentleman
I have to apologize if you are thinking that I want to chance this forum in to a political one or to tell the Russian People what they have to think for their state. That was not my intention.
Being a german I know that specially our folk should not do it!
The Russian Folk will decide what way they like to go.
I issued my opinion just because I felt that Pavel - whom I respect as a professional matter expert AND a Russian patriot - was in an unfair position.
The "Big gun thesis" or the "show me your number of aircraft carrier" thesis is not convincing in the nowadays world. Is Russia more respected - or should I say feared from the others - when having a SS-19 or SS-18 follow on instead of lets say "Minuteman" like Topol system? I think not.
Will countries like China, Libya, Venezuela, India respect or fear the US more when they would create something like an equivalent to SS-18 or a new class of SLBMs? I think not. Every of this countries are in the know that they could be destroyed by such super powers but no one really fears this or will chance its politics for that. They are marching forward in their own pattern...maybe inspired by new weapons to enter an new spiral of senseless effort like in the cold war, but this time shared by many new countries. If someone wants to continue with "big guns" the other ones will follow. That is simply the opposite to the effort to reduce Weapons of Mass Destruction to a "senseful" level. And it leads to more distrust!
I think that this is what Pavel wanted to say when he was writing that "Topols or RS-24" are a pretty fair element in deterrence. I'm sure he do not want to weaken Russia's ability to defend itself.
Your country went a hard way along and it deserve to be among the leading nations! But the elements to define a leading nation should not depend on "big gun" development.
Just my opinion. Please excuse me everybody and accept my great respect for your great country!
P.S.: BTW: I'm not a pacifist too...otherwise I wouldn't take interest in such forums ;-)

"No one wants to "conquer" Russia. And why for?" - bernd reuter

No one wants to conquer France, UK or US. And why for? Yet…

"...and a lack of a efficiency in a CIVIL industrial base (who likes to buy a russian computer or camera?)". - bernd reuter

But many DO like (or need) to buy millions of cubic meters of natural gases or megawatts of electric power…

Pavel, I see and understand what you’re saying.
But please bear with me when I’m trying to remind everyone that – as far as the Russian national security goes – the Russian socio-politico-military foundation isn’t one comparable with any of the NATO member countries or U.S. hence the natural diffrences in tackling diffrent situations.
On another note,if a threat (foreign or domestic) would develop toward Russia, Russia will have to stand alone. No NATO or other European country and no U.S. will stand by its side (at least that would be the apparent fact).
This alone dictates a series of measures that Russian internal and external policy making body has to seriously consider. To counter these measures with the lack of pro-capitalistic and democracy liberties and possibilities as Bernd does, is a moot point for Kremlin. And very much for me too, I may add.
What he’s actually saying (among other things) is that if Russia had a well established democracy and everything was hunky dory then Russia wouldn’t need a national-security issue or its mass-destruction arsenal? Referring to the uselessness of weapons of mass destruction in solving Caucasian or other occupied territories under the Tsarist Empire problems? I mean, what is that supposed to mean? What’s its relevance to the topic discussed? I fail to see the connection.

“Bernd has a very good point - ultimately, the weakness of democratic institutions in Russia is largely responsible for the "national security" policies that have little to do with security of the country.” – you say.

With all due respect, but I strongly disagree and that’s why I make this last response to this topic.

Okay, I would suggest that we stop this discussion here. I think very much everything has been said. One point I believe we would all agree is that security issues are highly politicized..

Pavel not to push this further, but could you then define national security?

I happen to like "absence of restraints on sovereign political action". It's not a perfect definition, and if I had to write an essay on it, I could probably improve on it. But you seem to disagree with the very fundamentals at work.

Feanor: First of all, there is always some restraint - there are international institutions, norms, etc. Even the United States, with its formidable military power, is restrained in what it can or cannot do, although admittedly it has a broader range of options than many other countries. In any event, as I said, the "absence of restraint" is a very narrow (and ultimately flawed) definition. From this point of view, a country like North Korea is pretty secure. However, I don't think that its population is particularly happy about this kind of security. My take is that national security of a country should have something to do with well-being of the people who live there. Yes, in the past this would often be linked to territorial sovereignty, but I'm not sure this is the case anymore.

I will have to disagree, rather sharply. Security and prosperity are two separate concepts. They should not be confused or conflated. And yes you're absolutely right. The DPRK is a fairly secure state. This is not to say that it's not an impoverished hell hole.

I'm still waiting on your definition.

Feanor: What's the point of being a "secure state" if this state is a hellhole? I don't have a brief definition of national security, but as I said already any definition that does not include well-being of the population is not it.

I'm not saying that security should be pursued at the expense of prosperity. What I am saying is that these are two separate concepts that should not be conflated. Your point in regards to security without prosperity is valid. But it does not follow that national security as a concept includes prosperity in it.

It is a separate question entirely that the presence of nuclear weapons is detrimental to Russian prosperity which you seem to imply.

To clarify, in my opinion prosperity should be pursued as the primary state objective, with security being a necessary prerequisite to it. I define for the purposes of this discussion, national security as the lack of major restrictions of sovereign state actions, with the premise that our (hypothetical) government is democratic and has our own best interests in mind. If it's not and does not, then we don't need to undermine it's security (i.e. limit its sovereign actions by disposing of nuclear weapons). What we then need to do is change the government and keep the nuclear weapons.

Again I apologize for this tangent, but it seems (to me at least) relevant and necessary to reach a logical conclusion in this discussion. The question raised are rather fundamental.

I think it's plain common sense that to make judgements about necessary numbers or types of weapons one must be aware of their usage scenarios. When did Russian military last brief you on their nuclear war plans, Pavel? If not very recently, why so much confidence in rebuking decisions of people whose whole job is nuclear war planning?

robin: We know enough about the history of the "nuclear war planning" to know that these "usage scenarios" are arbitrary at best.