This is a brief summary of the status of the Russian ballistic missile submarine fleet in the end of 2004 and of its prospects for 2005 and the next few years. The situation with se-based ballistic missiles warrants a separate post, which will follow shortly.
Right now Russia has only three submarines of the Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) class that can go to a patrol at sea. Three other submarines of this class, which are still considered to be active, are undergoing overhaul. These three are K-114 Tula, K-117 Bryansk, and K-18 Karelia. Tula was supposed to get back to active service in 2004, but because of delays will financing this date slipped to 2005. Bryansk is still in dock and is not expected to be launched before 2006. Karelia just entered the overhaul in September and, judging by the experience of its predecessors, will be back in service no earlier than 2008. The only submarine that has not been through an overhaul yet – K-407 Novomoskovsk – is expected to be placed in dock some time in 2006, when overhaul of Bryansk is completed. Two other submarines – K-51 Verkhoturie and K-84 Ekaterinburg – completed overhaul in December 1999 and April 2002 respectively.
The navy still has six submarines of the older class – Project 667BDR (Delta III). Two of these are with the Northern Fleet and four – with the Pacific Fleet. Although these submarines may still be counted as active for the purposes of the START treaty, they are being decommissioned and will most likely be taken out of service in 2005-2006.
Project 941 (Typhoon) submarines fared no better. Only one of the six ships of this class – TK-208 Dmitry Donskoy – remains in service and only as a test bed for the new Bulava missile. It is unlikely that Dmitry Donskoy will ever be deployed as a combat submarine with full missile load. All other Typhoon submarines are slated for elimination and the division that included them was disbanded in April 2004.
Russia is building two new submarines of the Project 955 class – Yuri Dolgorukiy and Aleksandr Nevskiy. It was reported that by the end of November 2004 construction of the hull of Yuri Dolgorukiy was completed and the ship will be ready by 2006.
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Comments
You think that Russia has only three SSBNs now? Did you escape from mental hospital, man ???
I would strongly encourage the readers to refrain from the "mental hospital"' kind of arguments and read posts more carefully (and, please, use your own IDs). There are indeed only three Project 667BDRM submarines that are not in overhaul at this moment.
I fully agree with Pindikov1! Russia with 3 SSBNs? It is a mockery! France and UK have more SSBN today! In 1991 USSR had 62 SSBNs! So, it is not a "mental hospital" here? What you did with Russian Navy, insanes ?
I can't belive that there are always some ungrateful human beings ruining every effort with their "comments", even on such a professional website as this one. Is the idea of Russia having only three SSBN's so painful or is it sth else (lack of anything worth mentioning?) that have people react that way. I hope things will get better with time.
As for the subject of this post, one thing comes to my mind. In Your previous works and analyses (I mean the entire staff on the project, as well as authors of a "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces", i.e. P. Podvig, O. Bukharin, E. Miasnikov, B. Zhelezov, T. Kadyshev and others), dating back to late 1990's, you expressed an opinion (quite convincing at that time), that the technical and mlitary means and requirements needed for constant tracking of all russian SSBN's were unavailable, or virtually out of reach of the then United States and it's navy. I'd like to know whether your opinion on that matter have changed, given that the number of operational SSBN's in the russian navy has since dramaticaly decreased, the protection provided for them by the surface navy and the attack submarine force is lesser than ever, if not nonexistant, whereas the number and abilities of US nuclear submarines (and the entire intelligence and reconnaissance system) is constantly increasing/improving. Do you stiil belive that this is the case? Is the reliability of the russian SSBN force and, as such, of the whole russian nuclear deterence still intact and assuerd? I would really appreciate your comment on that matter, for this is significant for all strategic balance and stablilty thinking.
It's a very good question. As the number of submarines on patrol is going down (in 2002 or 2003 there was not a single patrol for the whole year), it is not unimaginable that U.S. attack submarines can trail them msot of the time. But I still think that if Russia could keep two or three submarines at sea at any given time, its submarine fleet would be considered survivable. Requirements, in my view, have changed quite dramatically.
Of course by "requirements" I understand the number and technical abilities of US SSN's, not the weather conditions or procedures and other constraints that limit the submarines operations. Leaving those aside, only two factors matter (in assesing the feasibilty of continuus tracking of Russian SSBN's and potentially destroying them by US SSN's); a) the number of Russian strategic submarines and submarines protecting them and the waters the former operate in, and b) the capabilities and number of american attack subs available for that mission.
As far as I remember, the number of US SSN's found necessary for that task was more than 14 back in 1999. This assumed that Russian SSBN's operated from both the arctic and pacific bases, and were in the number of 5 to 7 at the minimum. The ultimate conclusion from that article (written by E.Miasnikov as I recall), was, that "even if one suggests that the enemy's subs were able to carry out secret tracking of all Russian SSBN's, he will not be in the position to provide a sufficient number for this." I think it is obvious that the 14 US submarines would be more than enough to follow the lone Russian SSBN on her patrol today or in the near future (it appears that there won't be more than one Russian SSBN's on patrol for some time). But assuming that the financial condition of Russian Navy will improve in a few years, enabling her to put more SSBN's to sea, perhaps some 2 or 3 at any given time, as You mentioned, together with some multipurpose submarines for assistance, would that be enough to bring the number of US SSN's needed for the task back above 10? (Since for a single Russian SSBN a half of the 14 would be enough I suppose).
And what number of subs needed can be assumed (for the US) as potentially exceeding her potential, so to make her consider the task (of constant tracking of all Russian SSBN's) as a "mission impossible", and thus keeping most of them (SSN's) far from Russia's shores? Would the 10 do?
I agree with these estimates, but I had different requirements in mind - the ones for effective deterrence. If Russia could successfully deploy a few submarines at sea on constant basis, there always be a chance that one could avoid being trailed. Even though U.S. could make this probability very small, it will never go to zero. My sense is that in the current circumstances this will be quite enough for deterrence.
Well, that matter is beyond question. I think that 9/11 have shown us that one does not need hundreds of missiles or warheads for deterrence anymore. My guess is that less than ten nuclear warheads would be considered as a credible threat to any country nowadays, and their use against even the wealthiest state in the world would be perceived as an unimaginable national calamity. So there’s no real need (as far as deterrence is concerned) for numerous delivery platforms (SSNB’s) anymore, since a sole strategic submarine would do the job. The damage potential of her 40 or so nuclear warheads could be even considered as excessive for the task today. Therefore I agree, the requirements for a credible deterrence have totally changed – decreased to a single SSBN virtually. The trick is only to assure her survivability, i.e. deny the US the conviction, that she can eliminate her preemptively.
I agree completely - one submarine is more than enough to deter. As for survivability of that one submarine, as long as its chances for survival are not exaclty zero it will do the job even if they are really small. All Russia needs to do is just to keep a sub on patrol.