In all these five "threats" there are no news absolutely.
All it was realized or planned by Russia already throughout many years.

What about new hypersonic warhead ?

Russian new hypersonic warhead has been tested.

Aren't all warheads hypersonic, by design? 8)

Hypersonic velocity, by common definition, is anything above 5 Mach. ICBM RVs have a reentry velocity in excess of 25 Mach (7-8 km/s).

The loss of the INF treaty, that would be a pretty disastrous outcome for all concerned?

It seems like there will always be a turnover of nuclear weapons. Yet any event which increases the pace or scale of modernisation should be viewed very negatively.

Missile defense is such an obstacle I fear that other issues and the opportunities for further reductions will always be relegated to the sidelines.

The question we should ask is not how will missile defense affect this strategic buildup but why is it happening in the first place.

Pavel-

In the Russian case, is it all about prestige and domestic politics, or does the RVSN seriously believe that heavily MIRVed, silo-based missiles are the most sensible way to deter the US? Is there some political reason for emphasizing the fantasy threat of missile defense as opposed to the real threat of US counterforce capabilities, or does the military actually believe the former is the bigger threat?

-Tariq

It is an unusual planning warhead. All will be surprised. :-)

You mean gliding? I've heard it has a problem - it so big it doesn't fit into a standard silo.

Gentlemen:

I agree that missile defense is a divisive issue in Russo-American politics. I also think if the issue wasn’t “ballistic missile defense”, it would be something else. The rational need for a “divisive issue” I can’t quite understand. I completely agree with Pavel that the “military industrial complex” in both Russia and the United States campaign for military budgets and the “generals” are always looking to fight the last war.

I have two questions that beg an answer.

The first, do the Russians honestly believe that ballistic missile defense, in the context of this discussion, will work and Russia is at risk?

Two, what military/political issues divide Russia and the United States today that make us adversaries? What could make us “enemies”?

Frank Shuler
USA

There is another important question, related to Frank's first.

Many Russians deeply believe that Americans deploy missile defense in order to intercept remaining Russian missiles that would be launched after the first, disarming attack by US forces, thus the MD is a part of American first strike capability. Read this (http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2011-11-25/1_mistakes.html) newest story for example.

So the question goes like this:

Do Russians REALLY believe that the United States may actually decide to conduct full scale, sudden, nuclear and conventional attack against Russian strategic deterrence capabilities?

I don't think the planners in Moscow actually fear that MD would be able to cripple their arsenal. The consideration runs a bit deeper, in my opinion.

For various reasons, there is obsession in Moscow with quantitative parity with the West, which is manifesting itself in the continued MIRVing of existing and future missiles. I am not going into the reasons for this obsession, but needless to say it exists.

Missile defence introduces a variable into this numerical parity goal. Even if MD is useless and will never shoot down any Russian missile, the planners in Moscow have to consider the threat to be credible because it is coming from the United States. As Postol/Butt argued in their recent MD paper, even if the Pk of a counter-missile is just 5%, planners in Moscow and Beijing are forced to consider the possibility of a Pk=100% and discount their arsenals by an equal number of offensive missiles.

e.g. if Russia has 1000 missiles, while US has 1000 missiles and 100 counter-missiles, Russian planners have to take into account that their effective offensive potential is reduced to 900 (even if it's actually 995, when Pk=5%). At least, that's how the thinking in Moscow goes.

Going back to the obsession with quantitative parity (even thought qualitatively US and Russia are at nuclear parity at all times), this imbalance of numbers, fictional as it is, is creating an anxiety in Moscow, which leads to all sorts of pronouncements.

At the same time, just because Moscow is paranoid and repeating the old threats, doesn't mean they won't follow through. They did threaten to withdraw from CFE for years, and nobody believed them. Until the moment that they did.

artjomh nails the issue. The report is here:

http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf

There is a separate and *additional* issue that Russia does not really fancy its near abroad being absorbed into NATO, when it is clear as day that e.g. Iran is not about to attack Poland...so suspicions are naturally raised....see:

http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/29/polish_foreign_minister_we_re_not_actually_worried_about_iranian_missile_threat

So if Iran is not about to attack Bulgaria, then it is very interesting for Russians to see Bulgarians so eager to join the non-shield.

To be honest, can't blame the Bulgarians: lots of free money coming their way from US taxpayers.

Let us hope the supercommittee cuts will now stick and EPAA abandoned. About time to end this perfect storm of stupidity. if nothing else, budget will do it.

A missile defence does not need to be able to stop each and every missile to be very useful to the US.

All it needs to do is reduce efficiency of Russian nuclear arsenal so that it no longer makes military sense for Russia to escalate a conventional conflict with NATO to the nuclear level. Losing a conventional war is always preferable to losing a nuclear one.

Military pressure can then be applied to force Russia out of Georgia, Moldova, or even Chechnia.

I should add that although parity is a fictional idea -- it is nonetheless, for better or worse, enshrined in New START.

If we (US) did not want parity, we ought not have signed and ratified New START. The whole POINT of New START is parity. Although I agree it is useless and misleading concept.

mareczek

May I ask a question I find intriguing? Forget for the moment the war planners in the Kremlin who are paid to worry about nuclear war and such. Does the average Russian go to sleep at night worrying about an American nuclear attack on Russia? Outside of the Pentagon here, no American is afraid of Russia. The thought of some kind of nuclear war with Russia is viewed as impossible; a relic of Cold War thinking. What issues could even create such a conflict? It is just something that is not in the mainstream of American thought. I’m speaking in generalities of course, but I hope you see my point. Do the Russian people have such fears?

Frank Shuler
USA

artjomh

I sincerely believe your statement is one of the best, concise rationals I have read. Historical Russia is a nation with no allies, few friends, and the largest border to defend in the world. Perhaps Moscow’s “paranoia” is somewhat justified.

How does Russia achieve this “balance” with the West it so desperately needs; both from an internationally and domestic perspective? Russia has every right to abrogate the CEF Treaty as long as she abides by the Treaty’s rule to do so. However, Russia out of the CEF only keeps American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. If Russia pulls out of New START, the United States will only up-load its nuclear delivery systems in response and still builds whatever ABM systems it wants. If Russia puts nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, would this lead to the US agreeing to provide a NATO nuclear option (read B-61s) to Poland in response?

What does Russia really gain from such actions?

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank,

The lack of budget progress in US Congress will surely kill EPAA much faster than Russian threats.

But politically, it was important for Russia to draw a line in the sand and establish a negotiating position. This doesn't mean that US is going to accept it right now. But years down the line, when US is more amenable to compromise, the talking points that will used in negotiations are going to be based on the position established by Moscow today. And if US never becomes any more amenable to compromise, Moscow doesn't lose anything anyway. If Washington declines to negotiate, Moscow will look tough and resolute. If Washington agrees to negotiate, Moscow would have already established the agenda. There is no downside.

As for Russian man-on-the-street, nobody actually believes an armed confrontation is possible. But the mood is that people are prepared to butt heads with Washington if it benefits Russia or prevents Russia from appearing to be screwed geopolitically.

Yousaf Butt

I completely agree that the American ballistic missile “shield” in Europe is political. I also agree because of geography Eastern European politics play a greater role in the overall debate on NATO ballistic missile defense. What do Poland, the Czech republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all have in common? They lived under Soviet occupation from the end of the Second World War until the Berlin Wall fell. At this point, each of these countries are hungry for any American base that would create a sense of security; a sense of commitment. When the US moved a Patriot air defense battery to Poland and its 99-man crew, you would have thought an entire American army had been deployed by the response in Warsaw. Poland wanted US troops “in harms way” in the event of any “future attack”. Rational? No, but that’s the reality.

I realize you and Ted Postol work very closely on ABM policy issues. Do you support Ted’s opinion on boost phase “killer” drone systems?

The way Washington works, the European ABM system will probably get funded and a hundred more needed project won’t. For whatever reason, the SM-3 European system has the full backing of President Obama in a way not shared by any other American weapon system. It’s his project.

I grant you this, the American fy2013 defense budget will sure be interesting to watch; if you like train wrecks. However we all need to remember this, if the US Defense Budget was cut in half, it would still be the largest in the world. Staggering, isn’t it?

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank, In this forum and in other forums as well, most people are saying that American Missile Defense in Europe is political and Russian response is also political. Few people like Yousuf and Ted from America and some Pundits in Russia are saying that ABM system in Europe could be a big threat for Russia when the system becomes fully operational few years later say around 2020. Who is correct is a matter of big debate and serious military technical analysis.

I like to make some points here:

1. Bush era ABM system was consisted GBI and Radar system in two countries Czech and Poland! But Obama ABM system is involved almost all the East European countries and Turkey and sea based system. That seems a greater and serious military build up for America around Russia (even if not targeted Russia as claimed by America and NATO) against non existing threats.

2. Russia considers it's a threat and wants Legally binding written assurance from America, if not done then they will take necessary measures to counter. If the Missile Defense has real military potential and if it's a real threat then what is the value of some written piece of paper. If tension escalates and war like situation arises then even written assurance has no value. In war, anything can happen.

3. The possible counter measures mentioned by Russian President seem for more dialogues not for real new credible military counter measures. These measures if implemented will only escalate more tensions. I think Russia will feel psychologically safe if she can maintain a real parity with American (NATO combined) strategic and non strategic nuclear weapons in all respects.

I cannot understand one thing, America spends almost same amount of money that all the other countries of the world combined spend every year for military purpose, America has military bases (even many people in America don't know how many military bases they have abroad)and presence in almost all the corners of the world, about 90% countries of the world are aligning with America, there is no ghost of Communism and Fascism, then why America still feels unsafe? Why they need more strategic military buildup and protection?

I certainly understand the political ramifications of “drawing a line in the sand” to establish a negotiating position. Regarding European ballistic missile defense, what exactly are the negotiating positions? The US continues to say the system isn’t “aimed at Russia” and Moscow says it will not “approve” any system that might interfere with its ability to defend Russia today, or in the future. Russia wants a “formal agreement” that the NATO system will “never” be used against them. The US will agree to such a “declaration” paper but not to a formal treaty that would need Senate approval. (wouldn’t pass the Senate in any form) Where do we go from here?

Gen. Nikolai Makarov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, made news here in the last week or so when in an interview with the Associated Press warned that Russia risked being pulled into armed conflicts on its boarders that might well include the use of nuclear weapons by NATO's expansion eastward. The details were somewhat unclear. Was General Makarov referring to the past historical NATO expansion into the former Warsaw Pact countries and the Baltic States or was he referring to Georgia and Ukraine? Not much evidence here that Ukraine is even interested in NATO or that Georgia would have much member support for entry into NATO. Any thoughts?

“Butting heads” with Washington is certainly understood. Every citizen is a patriot and only wants their country to be respected. Here we are obsessed with “butting heads” with China for exactly the same reasons.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank,

I am not certain there is any particular Grand Strategy in Moscow on this issue. Many of the actions appear to be ad hoc, following a general mood, rather than a long-term step-by-step plan of action. That being said, in my opinion, an outcome that many in Moscow would consider to be "moderate success" would be a resurrection of some variant of the ABM Treaty. Not verbatim in its old form, but certainly a document that enumerates WHAT can be put WHERE and HOW MUCH. Not a ban or hard limit on missile defense, but something that establishes a control mechanism over MD proliferation.

Unfortunately for Moscow, it doesn't have as many cards to play as it did in 1972. Its offensive and defensive potentials are not expanding to a degree where this rate of expansion can be traded away in exchange for such a treaty. However, one tactic that appears to be working for Moscow is PsyOps. Creating anxiety among Europeans, who complain to United States, which then amends its plans is how GBI mutated into EPAA. As a lateral negotiating tactic it works just fine (HINT-HINT: Moscow is being abrasive and threatening for a reason, not just because they enjoy being mean).

How long a term plan is this, I cannot say? Perhaps Moscow is looking for a future where US Congress is McCain-less and Kyl-less and hence more amenable to binding ABM treaty. Perhaps Moscow is just shooting in the sky, hoping to hit something, get a better play in a situation where they have little leverage. But one thing I am certain of is we should never take political dialogue between Moscow and Washington literally, as a straightforward exchange of threats or niceties. There is always something else going on under the carpet.

igor

South Ossetia and Abkhazia seem “lost” to Georgia forever. Granted, “forever” is a relative term but at this point I don’t see Russo-Georgian politics an issue for NATO. The situation in Transnistria doesn’t seem any clearer. Perhaps if Moldovia moved from the “Partnership for Peace Program” into full NATO membership, the Transnistria issue might become a flash point. Doesn’t seem likely. Why would you think NATO would want Russia out of Chechnya?

What points of conflict do you see between NATO and Russia that might become a conventional war; might escalate into a nuclear exchange?

Frank Shuler
USA

artjomh

Certainly any Grand Strategy by either Moscow or Washington is subject to local politics. There is a feeling here that with the American and Russian presidential elections slated for next year, both governments will move to the right. I think that will make future treaties in the short term harder to make and certainly ratify. (at least in the US Senate)

I think the change in ballistic missile systems proposed for Europe had two focal points. First, the President George Bush GBI system for Poland and the Czech Republic was a political tool all the way; it really wasn’t about providing a military solution. It was more of a deterrence, something to introduce limited risk, some geo-political uncertainty to any ballistic missile launch. President Obama demanded a different perspective. The Obama European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) project with the SM-3 is designed to indeed deliver a battlefield weapon. The SM-3 enjoys the support of Congress, a clear upgrade path, and the best test results on any American ABM system. (for what that’s worth) This is also a twenty year project. I think this is what Russia fears the most. In 1961, President John Kennedy said to the Nation, we will go to the moon and we’ll do so in ten years. At the time, landing on the moon seemed like a near impossibility, yet, this was accomplished in 1969, with time to spare. It is that “Man on the Moon” technological breakthrough that Russia fears.

Creating anxiety among European only keeps America in the game.

One thing, my friend, we will always agree on is that there is “always something else going on under the carpet”. Indeed!

Frank Shuler
USA

Parimal Debnath

Back in 2007, then Russian president Vladimir Putin was bitterly opposed to the GBI system proposed for Europe and suggested the joint use of the Russian Gabala radar in Azerbaijan in place of the Czech Republic and placing interceptor missiles in Turkey rather than Poland. Farther, President Putin suggested such interceptor missiles could be based at sea even if it meant American warships would be patrolling the Black Sea and potentially home-ported at Constanta, Romania. Or, on patrol in the Baltic. Times have changed, haven't they?

The legal binding agreement the Russians want, a treaty, won’t pass in the US Senate.

[“What is the value of some written piece of paper”]

I remember the Imperial German Army thinking the treaty to respect the neutrality of Belgium in 1914 was only a “scrap of paper”. Our world today is still trying to recover from the effects of the Great War.

Why does America think she has to be the “protector to the entire world”? Great question and I’ll try to state my opinion in a concise response. In 1946, then US President Harry Truman in a White House meeting asked his policy planners, the war planners if you will, what was the greatest threat to world peace. Their reply wasn’t the threat of a divided Europe under Soviet rule. Or, the breakup of the British Empire. Nor, was it the potential fall of the Republic of China to the communist let by Mao Tse-tung. The greatest threat to peace was deemed the military rearming of Germany and Japan. The American “Grand Strategy” created that day was to develop a long term, lasting geo-political military relationship with Germany and Japan resulting in the United States becoming the military surrogate for both Berlin and Tokyo. So many times in the last 65 years American foreign policy decisions have been made with German or Japanese interest in mind and not directly for American needs. It has been a mutual relationship that has benefited all three nations. The great question today is, “Is this still necessary?” Has the need for this strategy come to an end. Intriguing question. Is it time for the United States to “go home”? If the US pulled out of Europe and Germany decided to directly acquire nuclear weapons would the world situation really change? If the US pulled out of Asia, how soon before Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan developed “the bomb”. Yet, would the world be any different? How would Russia react if Germany and Japan went nuclear?

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank-

In the German case, that may have been plausible during the Cold War, but why would they do so now? To deter a Russia that's now hundreds of miles away, with no interest in expanding into Central Europe, and whose army is outnumbered and outclassed by European conventional forces without any American help?

I'll concede the Asian countries, other than Japan. They have a bit of a hangup about nuclear weapons for whatever reason.

Just my opinion you understand but the theory goes that if the United States pulled its “nuclear umbrella” from Germany and Japan, the governments there would move to the right; perhaps the far right. Such a shift in politics might not be immediate but it would be inevitable. Nuclear weapons for the legitimate defense of their countries would be a logical security conclusion. Doesn’t North Korea and Iran want nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems for the same reason? India and Pakistan? Syria? Israel? How long before Turkey would make a similar decision?

How would Russia react if the Americans “went home” and in its place Germany and Japan acquired nuclear weapons? Would Russia react at all? Would anything change?

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank,

it is not the details of a particular disagreement that are important here, be it Georgia, Moldova or Chechnya. Or EU gas supply interruption which, as US senator Lugar once suggested, NATO should be able to deal with militarily, as with an "energy threat".

What is important is that there are and will be geopolitical clashes of interests between Russia and US/NATO. And that overall balance of power between them would change dramatically should Russia loose its ability to deter NATO from conventional conflict.

Given NATO's conventional superiority, there would be no other viable options for Russia than settline thes kind of disputes on US terms.

As one famous American used to say, you can get a lot more done with a good word and a gun than with a good word alone.

There was a bit of a bruhaha about a year ago when US decided to retire TLAM-N. Some Republican in Congress raised a ruckus saying Obama is betraying Japanese interest and that Japan is asking for that tactical nuclear umbrella back. The official... OFFICIAL, mind you, Japanese response has been that not only didn't Japan ask US not to retire its tactical nuclear warheads in Asia, but that Japan is vehemently opposed to nuclear weapons and applauds the eradication of TLAM-N.

So, no, I don't believe in nuclear Japan.

And Germany is so thoroughly de-fanged, as a matter of national psyche, that I fail to see them going there. Remember, the rise of Imperial Germany was pre-dated by Bismarck and the Franco-Prussian war. There was considerable build-up to an aggressive, expansionist Germany. There is no such build-up today. If anything, there is a continuous build-DOWN of German armed forces.

artjomh

If Japan applauded “the eradication of TLAM-N” just think how excited they would be if China sent the DF-21s to surplus! (grin) Don’t think the “American Nuclear Umbrella” isn’t important. American security guarantees have been there so long that such is taken for granted; it has fallen into the sub-conscience of world geo-political politics. The question is simple. Is this a role the United States needs to continue or has that time passed in history.

Frank Shuler
USA

The arguments in favour of the US missile shield protecting US allies are based on the argument that Iran and North Korea are no rational regimes and would readily commit national suicide.

Even if you accept that irrationality argument, nobody disputes that China and Russia are NOT irrational powers and are very unlikely to use their nuclear arsenals for anything other than deterrence. And since US strategic triad deters Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals, I fail to see how US missile defence ought to provide reassurance to Germany against Russia or Japan against China.

And if Germany and Japan don't need that reassurance, then the rationale for the US umbrella disappears. Perhaps there is a measure of psychological ossification from the Cold War in some political circles, but it seems unreasonable to me today that Germany as a nation would fear a nuclear strike from Russia and would need US missile shield or else they would arm themselves. That just makes no sense today.

artjomh

If the need for the United States to provide a “Security Umbrella” for Germany and Japan has ended; been superseded by changing times, there is no need for American bases in those countries. If there is no need for American bases in Germany or Japan, there is no need to deploy US ballistic missile defense systems to protect such. That is the substance of my argument.

Of course, the Japanese today have a Aegis destroyer equipped with SM-3 missiles on patrol in the Sea of Japan to keep a watch on the North Koreans. That failed DPRK space booster launch that sailed over Japan a few years ago really shook up the Defense Ministry.

By the way, I consider North Korea to be one of the most “rational” nations on earth. Iran is another matter.

Frank Shuler
USA

I don't really know why US keeps thousands of troops in Germany or Japan or Korea. Using Japanese ports or airbases for resupply points, sure, but tens of thousands of US soldiers and marines on permanent readiness is kinda 1960.

But, I also don't think the European BMD is meant to protect Europe. That's just a smokescreen to make the deployment more palatable to Europeans. The main goal, bogus as it is, has always have been to protect CONUS.

artjomh

I think the US continues to have forces in Germany, Japan and South Korea for two reasons. The first is inertia. For example as of June 2011, the US Army has 38,625 soldiers in Germany and the force has been in steady decline since 1991. Two additional brigades are scheduled to return to the US but it will take years to work out the contractual logistics to close the bases and return the property to German governmental control. It just takes time. The second reason is practical. They want us there. For example, when the US announced a draw down of total American forces in Korea to 25,000 troops, Seoul petitioned the US to stop the numbers at 27,500. It sits at 27,500 today. Do 2500 soldiers and airman really make a difference? It must have to South Korea. Japan and Okinawa are another issue entirely.

The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) system is a battlefield weapon designed to defend American interest (read: bases) in Europe. The NATO Ballistic Missile Defense Plan is another animal entirely. If fact, the French are pushing NATO to adapt the Astor missile system for any European ABM role. Of course, the Astor is made in France.

Frank Shuler
USA

To Frank & Artjomh

Frank I agree with Artjomh
Being a German I can tell you the following:
1. Even the transport of nuclear waste create a "local civil war" in Germany! It is unthinkable that any political party could even open a debate to re-arm with nuclear weapons
2. The 20 B-61 are only accepted to ensure the presence of some staff officers in some NATO Boards. If you would ask the population, guess what they would say?
3. The German Forces are object of several "experiments" in the last 20 years which simply means: in the face of the re-unification of totally different economic systems we need every Euro which we can save. The Forces declined to complete ineffectiveness. Several Re-Structuring, obsolete or inadequate equipment and political restrictions are the consequence.
For example: every sort of attack in Afghanistan leads to a debate in the parliament and in the medias. Every field commander who loves his further career knows that.
This leads to a situation that they can not use Tiger Helicopter equipped with anti tank missiles but without a large calibre gun in Afghanistan and that they do not want to use artillery support by sending PZH-2000.
3. The Political Parties not even considered to send Tornado ECR to attack some of the Libyan SAMs because they know what would happened in the next election.
4. It seems that the Germans learnt some lessons of their past - the population simply want to dream from a peaceful world and refuse from fight...only to find out that some nations which sent us down this path are now displeased. The population opposed Pershing II, Neutron Bomb, GBI in Europe (although not involved) and they refused to heat up a new European Conflict
5. The contribution of German Forces to International Conflicts is just done to be considered as "responsible nation" worthwhile to become a full member of the security council.
6. The vast majority do not consider the Russian as our enemies but as our partners in economic. They understood the history: we started the war against the then allied Russia! We were guilty for 28 Million killed Russians. And we had to pay a bitter price in loosing 25% of our country for ever and having 9 Million which had to leave from there. We have simply enough from war! Moreover we lost every important war ! And we have enough problems here in Europe. No one thinks that after US withdrawal (which would be only regretted by local people because they will loose some jobs) Russia will become crazy and attack us...marching through Ukraine (which meanwhile like to be an independent nation), through Poland and then into Germany...why? To care for our problems? To help us in financing the whole EU?
Frank: the cold war is over and missile defence is not the major problem of the people over here!

Greetings and respect to you both

bernd reuter

I had hoped you would see our exchanges and comment. Insofar as any of us can speak from experience, your insights and opinions on the issue of German rearming is the most honest and sincere. I will accept your conclusions.

Take care my friend.

Frank Shuler
USA

Thank you very much Frank!
One last thought about missile defence. You mentioned Germany and Japan. This thinking is coming from the late 40ties. I think it is now about North Korea and Iran!
It seems that every US President had it’s own Star Wars Hobby.
Nixon with Safeguard (flop)
Reagan with „Star Wars“ (flop)
Bush with GBI (flop – almost)
Obama with SM-3 land version (...)
At best (and that would be at least some rational) to boost defense industry and long term technology. Reckless what political damage may result.
The first two approaches mentioned above made partly sense in the cold war era.
Now they are gonna tell us that it is about „evil states“ like North Korea and Iran.
The key to a political solution for Korea is China. As long as the US not accept a „Hongkong like” approach for a long term integration of Taiwan into China, China in turn will keep the Korean Question open and support North Korea. To solve that problem a political vision (e.g. united Korea under South Korean control and soft integration of Taiwan into China) to gain a new stability for Asia is necessary.
Until this will happened (if ever) a limited ABM make sense like GBI for US West Coast and shipborne SM-3 for Japan.
Europe on the other hand has not to fear Iran – except UK which always practice politics saying „Führer befiehl, wir folgen“ (NS slogan „leader just order – we will follow“ in regard to follow everything the US want them to do).
The problem with Iran is that the US congress (under great influence of the Israel Lobby) is not willing to understand why Iran want to have missiles that reaches out to Israel and a few nuclear warheads....if you consider their point of view you would find out why: because Israel has (widely unnoticed by western Media) about 150 Jericho II/III and about 200 nuclear warheads. Moreover Israel boost a campaign to force US/UK to attack Iran. Of course the Iranian Regime is not amused by that. Their thinking is much like the North Koreans: if I would have a few warheads they will stop daily twaddling whether to attack my country tomorrow or maybe next week!
Also for that problem there is need to find a political solution and that starts with some pressure to Israel to negotiate in honest about the rights of the Palestinian People to live in an own country. On and on Israel confronted the UN with an ongoing expansion of settlements. And no one is willing to consider any embargo for Israel.
The second is: if Iran should be convinced to give up the Idea for nuclear weapons, what about an openness for the Israelis to lay out their true potential – or do you believe their thesis „we don’t have any, but could quickly assemble some“????
An appropriate reduction of the Israeli potential could release the situation significantly.
So my thesis is that the Iranian arsenal is not aimed at Europe but a counter balance for Israel.
No one in Europe needs a missile defense for Iran. It would be ridiculous to assume that Iran – all of a sudden – is willing to attack NATO and thus giving them a reason to fight back (and by that to fulfill Israeli planning).

To say it short: nowadays US Plans of SM-3 in Europe means:
1. money for the industry (which we simply do not have – and this counts also for the US) and
2. politics which ensure further pressure to Iran on behalf of the Israel Lobby in the USA!

As a consequence the political tension between Russia and the rest of Europe will raise!

bernd reuter

Many points to respond to in your remarks. I’ll even try and tie some of the conversation back to Russian security needs.

I don’t think Germany or Japan factor into the American thinking about ballistic missile defense (BMD) per se. It’s just where we have military bases 60 some years after the end of the Second World War. Think of it this way. Generals are “programed to defend”. If the United States is going to have bases in Germany or Japan, “the Generals” want them defended against all threats. It is just programmed into the military DNA of the Pentagon. I suspect the Kremlin is certainly no different. Remove the bases and the rational need to defend them goes away. For example, why would the United States want to provide a BDM military solution to Germany that Berlin didn’t want, wouldn’t pay for, and complained about all the time if America had no interest there? That is really the crux of the matter.

American foreign policy is going through a subtle, but definite, change. Some of this change is due to budget and resource issues going forward. Some of this change is the result of a dynamic shift of interest to Asia from Europe. Some of this change will occur because there is no perceived threat to European security. No NATO country fears Russian ICBMs. Not even a nuclear short range 9K720 Iskander gets any real attention. However, what some NATO countries do fear is Russian tanks. That something we all will need to remember.

Israel? The United States has no control over Israel and actually little practical influence. We can’t even get West Bank Settlements stopped. We certainly support Jerusalem with arms and so does Germany. The Merkava MKIV tank is full of “Leopard” parts and the entire Israeli submarine force is “German Made”.

Iran is the most volatile geo-political issue for the United States and the one of greatest risk. We haven’t had diplomatic relations with Tehran since the fall of our embassy there in 1979. There is little dialog between our two countries and the most opportunity for misadventure. In 30 days, the airspace over Iraq will be “open” to any country that wants to overfly. I can only fear there will be challenging times ahead.

Taiwan is interesting. A generalization of course, but it sees like one-third of the people of Taiwan want independence, one-third want reunification with the Mainland and one-third want things to stay just the way they are now. If a national plebiscite was held today; the vote would be two-thirds against anything on the ballot. I honestly think the US welcomes any political solution as long as force is not used. That is the key.

For what its worth, I continue to have my doubts that the SM-3 (EPAA) will ever be built. I guess we’ll see.

Frank Shuler
USA

Hello Frank

I was out a while, so finally my remark on Your question.
Well, it is exactly what I wanted to know, it was my question, too. What do Russians think of such scenarios as the one mentioned in the article that I quoted? But the discussion started on grand and various dilemmas with just one, small statement on the issue we both wanted to follow.
I think that it is in fact very difficult to assess what average people think of such extreme events. If not pressed by some really great forces or stunning situations people would actually think pink, brushing greatest worries and existential threats under the bed. That is why I wanted our Russian friends to give some more detailed and deep assessment on the question, that would go beyond the numbers of public opinion surveys.

Yours
m

USA don´t want to China to achieve parity in their nuclear status and always question the China real intentions when developing their strategic weapons. USA politics always denounce the strategic risk of China getting nuclear parity with USA military power.

So why it is so strange for Russia not wanting to loose its strategic nuclear parity with USA?

Even if that loss is only theoretical, Russian military believe its real, but even if it is only theorical, why it is so difficult for people to understand that?

Russia wants to keep its nuclear parity with USA as much as USA don´t want China to get nuclear parity with them.
That is simple, for me.

André Luis

I don’t think the United States limits itself just to the nuclear arena when concerned about China as a rising power. Unlike our relationship with Russia, which has been based on negotiated arms treaties going back to the 1960’s and SALT, China is an enigma. Today, Russia has far more nuclear weapons than any country on earth and is in every way a peer nuclear equal to the United States. In fact, the recently ratified New START agreement on strategic systems only confirm that situation. I don’t think even President Hu Jintao really knows how many nuclear weapons China possesses. I think that lack of transparency is what concerns American policy planners the most.

Frank Shuler
USA

If you are wondering how much interest Japan has in BMD all you have to do is look at the level of funding they are providing for SM-3 Block IIA.

Also, recent articles in the press have indicated that one reason Japan maintains Nuclear Power Plans is to have a supply of weapons ready material. Both Japan and Germany are considered to be "latent" nuclear powers - both have the technological means and the materials to quickly build nuclear weapons. When former Generals in the JDF start talking about maintaining the capability to build nuclear weapons you have to take the possibility seriously.

Second thought:

For the entire US BMD to be considered a success it really only has to stop 1 attack that would otherwise take out a city. Look at all the money spent on BMD over its history and compare that to the amount of damage a single warhead hitting LA, NY, or Seattle would cause. If a nation like Iran or NK were to launch an attack it would probably be on the order of 3 - 5 warheads against a single US city. The odds of taking them all out with the current system are not good but they are certainly better than the odds of taking them out with no system at all!

Russia doesn't really care about our current BMD system. They are making the argument to prevent us from getting a toe hold in case we do actually develop a fully effective system. (The man on the moon in less than 10 years was a great example)

I have to admit getting a lecture from a country that maintains the ability to fire a nuclear weapon into the air and detonate it over their own country in the hopes of destroying an incoming US warhead is a bit strange. While the US system might not work it at least would not irradiate anyone or knock out half the satellites in orbit right now!

Is there any possibility that the "wartime surge" of Aegis destroyers with SM-3 Block IIa's could involve a surge from Norwegian waters to intercept SLBM's from the Barents bastion during their boost phase ? Or likewise to the Kuriles to cover the Okhotsk bastion ? Or even during the summer ice-free period into the Kara Sea to intercept ground-based missles during their boost phase ? (If from the Kara, of course, then also from the Barents.) If the SM-3's could do this, the Russian would have much more to worry about than terminal-phase attenuation of their missile capability. I can't tell from the SM-3 specs if this is even possible or not; but with 43 Aegis vessels planned, six or so could be spared for close-in deployments.

The boost phase of an ICBM lasts less than 5 minutes. It is impossible to surge anyone into position in time to nail it. Even if the ship is already there the chances of actually intercepting in such a short amount of time is close to zero.

Also 43 ships are nowhere near enough to deploy 6 constantly off the coast of Russia. Remember 1 ship deployed means 1 ship in maintenance getting ready to deploy and in most cases 1 additional ship transiting to or from deployment. This would require 18 of 43 vessels whose only duty is to park off the coast of Russia and hope they are in the right spot to pick off the outbound ICBM.

igor

I’ve tried to research your post regarding the quote on US Senator Lugar suggesting NATO should use force to deal with a Russian gas supply interruption but fail to find any such opinion. I honestly think this is a misstatement. There is probably no US Senator with a greater track record on reconciliation between Russia and the West, than Senator Lugar. Of course, Russia and the United States will have an adversarial relationship on certain issues and agree on far more. This is the nature of great nations. (“great” not in the moral sense but political)

It’s always amusing to me to hear of the vast conventional superiority of NATO over Russia. I would agree that NATO seems to possess greater conventional warfare technology, but little of that translates as a threat to Moscow. Today for example, the French are selling some of that advance technology, the Mistral amphibious assault ship, to the Russian Navy.

I think you have little worry of NATO gathering a “Grande Armée” and marching on Moscow.

Frank Shuler
USA

artjomh

Just a postscript to our previous conversation regarding the decision by President Obama to retire the TLAM/N.

The final report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States from May 2009 emphasized the importance of maintaining the TLAM/N for extended deterrence in Asia by referring to private conversations with specifically “one particularly important ally” (read: Japan) that “would be very concerned by TLAM/N retirement.”

Hans Kristensen, and others, reported the Japanese government had officially rejected claims made by some that Japan is opposed to the United States retiring the nuclear Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile (TLAM/N) weapon system. In fact when asked for a comment, Admiral Timothy J. Keating, who was Commander of U.S. Pacific Command at the time, said he was “unaware of any specific Japanese interests in the nuclear-armed Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile”.

Later in a letter back on December 24, 2009, to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, then Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada explicitly says that the Japanese government has expressed no such views and had no opinion on the TLAM/N at all.

Sounds like the making of a good rightwing conspiracy, don’t you think? However, what if the “Key Unnamed Western Pacific Ally” was not Japan at all. Remember, Japan was never mentioned in the Congressional Commission’s report, directly or indirectly. It was just “assumed” Japan was the ally in question. I would wager the American assurances that removing the nuclear land attack version of Tomahawk wouldn't change the strategic balance in Asia wasn’t asked for or given to Tokyo. Or, Seoul.

My money is on Taipei. Then the “conspiracy” makes complete sense. Just an opinion.

Frank Shuler
USA

[...Is there any possibility that the "wartime surge" of Aegis destroyers with SM-3 Block IIa's could involve a surge from Norwegian waters to intercept SLBM's from the Barents bastion during their boost phase?...]

The SM-3 Block IIA (21”) system is simply too far in the future for an intelligent conversation today on its capabilities. After all, the Block II is now just in basic R&D funding. Also, the US Navy is just now beginning to operationally buy the RIM-161C SM-3 Block IB system for its Aegis fleet; the current SM-3 Block IA and Aegis 3.6.1 firm/software is the weapon system of the day.

Whether the existing Block IA or IB system could hit your SLBM in boost phase is a question I would refer to someone like Yousaf Butt for an educated answer. read: (http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs 2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf)

Remember the IB is designed as a mid-course interceptor and I’m not sure the new seeker and kinetic warhead could effect such a boost phase intercept. (my thought: might be technically possible from an academic standpoint but not practical from a military point of view)

The Pentagon has made the decision to update all US Navy Aegis ships to “SM-3 standards”. This is very significant. It means all 22 Ticonderoga-class cruisers and some 65+ Burke-class destroyers, the class is still building, will be capable of missile defense.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank, I was referring to the same exchange.

As for whether it was Seoul, Tokyo or Taipei seems irrelevant to me. If US allies feel that USN is unable to defend them against but with the threat of nuclear weapons then things are much worse than I thought with regard to perception of US sea-power.

However, my personal opinion is that the whole "Commission" was a thinly-veiled attempt by Republicans to attack Obama's national security credentials. The whole thing smells like a politically-motivated conjured illusion to me.

artjomh

Of course, I was only referencing the TLAM/N system as a theoretical deterrent. The only practical deterrent ability of the nuclear tomahawks in the Pacific might have been their “potential use” in the Strait’s to check a pending invasion. Of course, my opinion on the use of, so called, tactical nuclear weapons has been well documented. I can not imagine any “little war” that starts out using nuclear weapons staying “little”. Wars have too many unintended consequences.

However, this episode does illustrate an important issue. When the US Government decides to eliminate a nuclear weapon system, there is controversy; many, many opinions. If the Pentagon recommends sending the Minuteman IIIs to surplus, there will be some lively debate for sure!

Frank Shuler
USA

The main problem that by 2018 US would have 400 Minuteman III ( pot. -1,200 W-87-s( upgraded to W-87-1 (475-600kt)) and 240 upgraded Trident II (pot.-1,920 W-88-s).Plus new ALCM, plus -i'm not believe that only 650 B-83 were build,original plan was 1,300.This is a very potent weapon.

This is very unlikely that Russia would have 120 RS-24 and 96 Bulavas by this time.

Sorry, i'm mean a 1993 year plan,not 3,000-4,000 for a 100 B-1B and 132 B-2 bombers that were considered initially (these plans were cancelled after 1991).