A story about Russia's working on a new heavy MIRVed ICBM is definitely not the kind of news that supporters of the New START treaty would like to land in the U.S. Senate in the middle of the treaty ratification debate. But since the story is out there it is worth taking a closer look at what's behind it.
First of all, it is hardly a news - the Rocket Forces issued a call for proposals for a new missile more than a year ago. The original idea was heavily lobbied for by the NPOMash design bureau that developed the UR-100NUTTH/SS-19 missile back in the 1970s and that seems to be eager to get back into the missile business. Naturally, NPOMash suggested that Russia needs "a new powerful liquid-fuel missile, with a launch mass of about 100 tonnes" - very similar to the UR-100NUTTH. It is hardly surprising that proponents of the project emphasized that the large throw-weight of the missile would allow it to carry a lot of missile defense penetration aids. Throw-weight of UR-100NUTTH is more than three times larger than that of the Topol-M/RS-24 line of solid-propellant missiles. Also, UR-100NUTTH-class missile would be able to carry the "magic" hypersonic maneuverable warhead, which was also billed as an answer to the U.S. missile defense plans (it was tested with it back in 2004).
Second, it should be noted that despite the lobbying, the project was not universally supported. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), which produces Topol-Ms, argued that there is not much future in liquid-fueled missiles and that its Topol-Ms (single-warhead and MIRVed) are completely adequate, missile defense or not.
As far as I understand, after some internal discussion the Ministry of Defense announced a call for proposals for a new heavy missile without specifying that it has to be a liquid-fuel missile. Although the announcement suggested that the missile will be ready for deployment in 2016, this timeline is definitely not realistic. In fact, it is not clear if the project will be approved at all - even if we assume that Russia might need a MIRVed missile (which it doesn't), the heavy R-36M2/SS-18 could be it - the Rocket Forces just announced that they will try keep it in service until 2026.
If the New START treaty enters into force, the idea of building a new ICBM would probably be quietly buried as making little sense. But if the treaty fails in the U.S. Senate, we would probably see it going forward in some shape or form. It would still make no sense, of course, but its proponents would have a chance to argue again that Russia needs something "to counter U.S. missile defense." Not to mention that without New START there will be no need to reduce the number of missiles and warheads.
This is of course, just one of the many reasons why New START should be ratified. But I believe it is an important reason - nobody, Russia included, needs a new heavy MIRVed ICBM.
The book
Comments
Liquid-fuel missiles are cheaper and with higher specific impulse than solid-fuel ones. It is wiser to silo deploy liquid-fuel missiles than small solid-fuel Topol-M. They should just be deployed on TELs to assure a retaliatory capability. From a cost-efficiency point of view, liquid-fuel ICBM are highly desirable.
Pavel ,The new START treaty does not forbid the development of new ICBM and that point has been stressed by Russian official.
The development of new ICBM will depend on the size and sophistication of US ABM development in years ahead , chances are any republican in power would accelerate its development.
In yesterdays press conference Yuri Solomonov mentioned that active ICBM will get new nuclear warhead by 2016 can you throw light on what does this exactly mean ?
http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/12/20/37280236.html
Pavel are you arguing that the R-36 does not need an analogous replacement, and that this class of missile should be eliminated entirely? If so I disagree. Shrinking nuclear arsenals, amid BMD proliferation in the long term (decades long term) would combined to undermine the value of the deterrent. In order for a deterrent to have long term stability and efficiency, it needs to be redundant. That way the nuclear arsenal will be large enough that even an economic repeat of what happened in the last 20 years combined with a pan-NATO BMD of strategic level won't erode it to a point below guaranteed nuclear annihilation.
There sure seems to be a lot of political pressure to implement this new treaty.
Flawed is certainly the way I would describe START, at least in respect to the failure to cover significant areas, and without serious changes I could never support it.
I feel that tactical warheads should be included in any nuclear arms treaty, as well as missile defense.
How can we allow limitations on conventional arms delivery systems and a "ban" on missile defense but no limitations on tactical nuclear weapons?
One person commented (on a blog) that as soon as the treaty is ratified, Russia will roll out thousands (!!!) of "legal" rail mobile mirved "heavy" ICBMs from underneath Yamantou mountain.
Another post commented that Reagan's particle beam SDI system rendered such weapons "impudent" years ago. Yet another said USAF HARRP developements would settle the arms race of the future.
Clearly what is needed is more honesty, and clarity, something that is in short supply these days.
Hi,
If the case is liquid fueled missiles have this edge over the solid fueled ones, why did the Russians insisted on developing the Bulava? Why didn't they just stick to the Sineva which proved over the years to be a very effective deterrent missile?
AWM
I don’t disagree with any of your conclusions. However, New START taken in the historical context is just “what it is”. New START only continues the process of limiting the numbers of intercontinental-ranged weapons; with the added benefit of for the first time addressing conventional armed ICBMs. Russia has nothing to loose by signing the treaty and much to gain. If fact, both Russia and the United States benefit by the enhanced inspection provisions in the new agreement. Mostly this is a political agreement, rather than military, but a useful tool nevertheless between Moscow and Washington.
Taken in the larger picture, New START without any farther agreements on, say, weaponization of space, missile defense, or tactical nuclear weapons makes the New treaty far less than it could have been.
Frank Shuler
USA
Just a few general comments about the prospects of a new Russian “heavy” liquid-fueled silo ICBM. I have no idea if such a weapon system is “needed” by the Kremlin or if this is a political issue between design bureaus attempting to secure budget (RUB). I have no idea if liquid-fueled vs. solid is a real technological issue in 2010 perhaps like is was thirty years ago. I have no idea if such a weapon system is perceived as a “first strike” system or not. Historically, multi-warhead silo ICBMs were always targeted against the opposition’s silo ICBMs. Thus, you have returned to the Cold War classical situation, “use them or loose them” in a nuclear exchange. (or the perception of a potential nuclear exchange)
I do think the American position is that Russia is entitled to build what ever weapon systems it needs to provide for the common defense, within the New START provisions. However, I do expect such a missile development by Russia will only aid the pro-ABM community in the United States by providing yet another excuse for more monies plowed into the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) program and its successor. However a more practical conclusion to reach is numbers. Does Russia really want to start yet another missile development program when struggling to deploy Topol-Ms, Bulava, and RS-24s in numbers? It’s taken 13 years to get the inventory of Topol-Ms to less than 70. Doesn’t it make more sense to maximize the production and deployment of the RS-24s in certain numbers than start another project?
Frank Shuler
USA
A top Russian senator said on Friday.
"If one reads the text of the document carefully then it becomes clear that Americans will really have to reduce the number of [nuclear] warheads, while if we [Russia] want to reach the levels defined by the document, will actually have to increase the amount of warheads," Mikhail Margelov, the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council, said in an interview with TVTc television channel.
I don't really understand this, I though both sides have equal amounts of warheads as they agreed on in START 1 which is 2200.
Can anyone explain please?
It's a question of production capacity. If the rubles are available, then to facilitate a new ICBM production a new factory would need to be built. This means that its production would not compete with the existing ICBM programs.
The limit in the New START is, in fact, 1550. Russia indeed will be able to deploy some new systems, mostly because it has been removing old ones from service. I published some estimates at the time when treaty was signed.
Is it true that according to the new treaty the russian mobile systems are free now to move out of their sliding roof garages and may be deployed out in the nowhere? And is it allowed to recreate rail-mobile systems?
If this is true the tactical danger of this mobile systems would be far extended - back to the "good" old times of SS-20. We would have a tactical situation like in the 80ties when the US was at the edge to create their own mobile systems in an effort to counter missiles available "everywhere in the nowhere". In so far the Russians did a good deal this time. So why to worry about GBI and ABM anymore?
Thanks
bernd reuter
I doubt rail-mobile systems will be recreated. It's expensive, and as is a new heavy ICBM will require additional production facilities. Even resources for proper dispersion of the cross-country mobile systems are sparse. I doubt they will go far beyond established bases.
Especially with the given re-organization of the military bases into 182 centralized facilities, located near urban centers.
bernd reuter
Reading all the New START protocols, Russia can build whatever kind of ICBM (SLBM) it wants and use any delivery system necessary as long as the overall limit of 1550 “deployed” warheads and 700 “deployed” launchers are not exceeded. Each side can have up to 100 launchers that are deployable but not in current active service; such as submarines that are in dry-dock or nuclear capable bombers held in reserve.
From the US perspective, Russia having road or rail mobile systems aren’t “difference makers”.
Frank Shuler
USA
koko
To reach the treaty provisions of New START, the United States has announced the following changes to its nuclear arsenal.
1. The number of ICBMs is being reduced from 450 to 420 with each carrying a single warhead -- the thought here is that the US has 500 nuclear warheads deployed on its existing 450 Minuteman III ICBMs so this represents a net loss of 130 nuclear warheads or perhaps 150 if twenty ICBMs are retained for only conventional warfare missions
2. The number of launch tubes on a Trident submarine is being reduced from 24 to 20 -- with each Trident D5 missile carrying on average four warheads resulting in a net loss of 192 warheads
3. The US has declared 60 nuclear capable bombers that will count as only one warhead against the counting rules -- big change from START rules that would have counted each cruise missile bomber as having ten warheads
The US only has to reduce warheads and launchers to make the New START numbers. However, with the declining inventory of Soviet-era multi-warhead ICBMs and SLBMs, Russia will need to build new missile systems in numbers to achieve the New START agreement’s limits in the next seven years. (assuming the Duma ratifies the agreement)
[Note the SS-18 has recently been re-certified to end-of-life in 2026.]
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank:
>From the US perspective, Russia having road or rail mobile systems aren’t “difference makers”.
That's amazing! The mobile systems (especially the SS-24 rail version) was the reason of much concern back in the 80ties, which leads to the deal to practically freeze them at their bases (not like SS-20 and SS-16) or to face similar US Systems.
I have read that the US estimates to need dozens of satellites to monitor SS-24 trains alone, in order to pinpoint their position at any given time and not to "loose" them out of sight. The Russians agreed to freeze them because they could not afford and realize a similar effort e.g. to control rail-mobile systems on the huge US railway system at any given time by satellite.
And now you are basically saying the US thinks it is of no concern...so why to have an uproar about that systems 15 years ago :-)
koko
[Note the SS-18 has recently been re-certified to end-of-life in 2026.]*
*Updated to reflect Pavel’s comments that a new re-certification program will soon be put into place by the Kremlin with the goal of extending the end-of-life for the SS-18 until 2026.
Frank Shuler
USA
bernd reuter
I think much has changed in the last thirty years. First and foremost, Russia is not an enemy as in the old Soviet days; an adversary for sure, but certainly not an enemy. Second, mobile missile systems are not as accurate as silo ICBMs, and thus, not a first strike weapon. An interesting historical note, START II was all about ending multiple warhead land-based silo missile; read SS-18. At one time it was feared that a first strike by the 308 SS-18 missiles and their 3080 warheads would destroy 90% of the American Minuteman III force. I suspect the American war planners lost considerable sleep worried about this missile and its capabilities. America would have bargained away anything to have this threat eliminated and all silo missiles reduced to a single warhead configuration. We build the Peacekeeper to bargain in response and studied a rail mobile system and a road mobile ICBM nicknamed the “Midgetman”. START II was never approved. Yet, the United States removed the Peacekeeper missile system and abandoned any new ICBMs electing to refurbish the older Minuteman IIIs. Interestingly, the US lost its concern about the SS-18 missile and its ability to threaten our land-based Minuteman III fleet. Why? The only conclusion I can reach is that we learned something about the SS-18 during the Soviet fall that changed our minds. I suspect the US gathered some human intelligence on the SS-18 system that made the Pentagon realize it simply just wasn’t accurate enough to strategically threatened the Minuteman III in their silo. Road mobile and rail system can not win a nuclear war and thus aren’t a “difference maker”; just that simple.
Another point to make. I suspect the US has space based assets that can track Russian mobile systems, 24/7. That’s another thing that has changed in the last thirty years.
Frank Shuler
USA
US space based assets can track Russian TELs as far as these TELs area in their respective patrolling areas. Lacrosse reconnaissance satellites capabilities and orbits are already well known. They even can be disabled from land. Furthermore, anyone knows TELs wartime patrols will follow a (unknown) different pattern than peacetime patrols. In fact, one of the main aims the American negotiation team showed during the discussion of the last START treaty was to further constraint the TELs mobility. In fact, a desert storm lesson was the extremely high difficult to track and engage mobile missile launchers.
Anonymous
While this is only my opinion, I stand by my conclusions. Much has changed since 1991 and Desert Storm. Think beyond the capabilities of the Lacrosse and Onyx systems and their Synthetic-aperture radar (SAR). Think video.
Frank Shuler
USA
Dear Mr. Schuler, assertions should be supported by evidence. It is widely known that tracking TELs is an extremely difficult task, even with the most sophisticated information gathering net. Let alone engage them. Desert Storm and Allied force are evidence supporting this assertion. In addition, B-2 hunting down Topol-M launchers will be flying in a hostile airspace, i.e. in a very risky position. I very doubt on the NATO capability to engage just a few of them.
Anonymous
So, what is your imperial evidence that tracking TELs is an “extremely difficult task”? Or is that just your opinion? An opinion you are completely entitled to, by the way. Nevertheless, I do agree with your assertion that engaging mobile missile systems is an uncertain business at best. Of course, then again, you could even engage such “soft targets” with conventional weapons such as warship/bomber/submarine launched tactical cruise missiles if you knew where they were. Just an opinion...
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank the numbers of mobile launchers combined with the very large space make it difficult. If the RVSN units are able to break down into individual launcher detachments, you would need dozens of satellites. If they don't go hot, there's very few ways you can track them by ELINT methods. Separating their comms, from many other units would be pretty hard.
Attacking them with conventional weapons becomes an even bigger issue, when we consider that you'd be dealing with a very sophisticated IADS. Your cruise missiles and bombers would at best be operating in contested airspace. In short the degree of uncertainty is high enough that they currently provide a more then reliable, strategically relevant, second strike capability.
It is an illusion to assume enough cruise missiles and moreover platforms ready on the right positions and at the right time to hunt down those mobile systems.
It was (and is) of concern to freeze the systems more or less at their base.
To follow those systems was a nightmare at the times of SS-16 / SS-20 which travel hundreds of miles in the wildernis. And it was a very hard taks for the overwhelming capabilities of the US even to find some Scuds in the open terrain of Irak.
Maybe you are right and those things are "easy" with todays means but if this is no matter then imagine the following:
Also the US are free now to develop mobile systems. You would opt to do so by exchanging 300 Minuteman III to a new "Midgetman" concept which could be depolyed either on TELs or on Railcars. And you do not restrict them to their bases but allow the full coverage on the vast US Highway and Railroad Net. Would the Russians just say, Oh US is not our enemy, let them do what they want, we are able to control that? I think they would and have to counter.
But don't misunderstand me. I'm pleased with the situation. I was just wondering that the new treaty includes now a degree of freedom which was indeed of major concern when mobile systems were deployed.
Cheers and happy new year to all in the forum
Feanor
Please understand my comments were only academic and not in any way suggesting policy. I do believe the US has the ability to track mobile systems; but, engaging such nuclear systems on the battlefield is beyond any known certainty. It is this “uncertainty” regarding the mobile systems that proves their deterrent ability. Reflect back to my earlier post and my opinion regarding any new Russian multi-warhead silo ICBM. Right now the RS-24s build in numbers is much more valuable to the Kremlin than such a project. Again, just my opinion.
Frank Shuler
USA
bernd reuter
I completely agree. Tracking mobile systems is one thing; engaging such on a nuclear battlefield is entirely another. It is the “uncertainty” of such that make mobile systems an excellent nuclear deterrent weapon. There is just too much risk.
I do find it interesting the United States doesn’t seem too concerned about Russian mobile systems like they were during the START II negotiations; regarding TEL housing, garrison deployment areas and the such. It’s like the SS-18; a system we were once “terrified” of and now seem indifferent. The only conclusion I can reach is that we know something now we didn’t know back in 1993.
The US seems very comfortable with the Minuteman III and its silos. I once thought the Pentagon might abandon plans for a MMIII successor and rely solely on Trident but it now looks like a new land-based ICBM will be build and use the existing silos. Ironically, it is treaties like New START that will keep the US in the ICBM business.
The best of New Year’s to you too!
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank, with respect, I think both are necessary. The heavier ICBMs would be more capable of penetrating BMD shields, and most importantly would keep the development and production of heavy ICBMs alive for the future. With continued BMD proliferation I'm extremely wary of "we have more then enough as is" attitudes.
Feanor
You made two key points that swayed my opinion.
The first was a new liquid-fueled ICBM program would maintain the industrial base necessary for the continuing development of such future technology; technology you consider a national asset. This I understand.
Second, if you meant that this new “heavy” ICBM (SS-19 type) would have greater capabilities to penetrate BMD shields because of its ability to carry varied & larger numbers of such pen-aids, I agree. I think that in itself is probably more important than the actual number of warheads such a system potentially could carry.
I will also concede your inference. It is a changing world, impossible to predict.
The best of New Year’s to you!
Frank Shuler
USA
Happy New Years to you too Frank.
In terms of real life outcomes it will come down to the following factors. Money permitting, if the production can be arranged (i.e. a new plant built or Votkinsk expanded to accommodate a second main assembly conveyor) then the program will go ahead. If the production issues can not be resolved it will not.
It's very sad in my mind that the decision making processes in today's Russia run along those lines, but the sad reality is that national security and long term development policies are governed more by immediate and real restrictions on implementation, then they are by actual policy making. The new aircraft carrier program is a perfect example of this, as is this new liquid-fueled heavy ICBM.
Naturally the political factor plays a role, but the truth is that with the current climate anything that involves potential procurement funds being allocated (i.e. a potential income sources, whether legal or otherwise) the decision will be yes.
Happy new year to all in the Forum!
Feonor & Frank:
Just a stupid question because I don't know much about these things:
Never mind whether the SS-18 is still feared nowadays like 20 years ago it is a truly impressive weapon system. Like it was the SS-24. Yeah I know it: those were coming from Ukraine but wouldn't it be possible on base of design drawings and maybe tools bought from the former factory to re-open the production line in a new Factory Plant in Russia? If it was possible back in 1941 in a truly remarkable achievment to transfer complete production lines hundereds of Kilometers away and re-open production within month why should it impossible when doing this in a couple of years ahead?
Would this be feasible for a future liquid heavy ICBM to avoid design risks like with Bulava?
Cheers
bernd reuter
Very interesting question. On one hand, Russia has never in history build a liquid-fueled ICBM from scratch. The Sineva project seems to have been more of Russification of parts for the R-29RM (SS-N-23) system. (yet, a very impressive program no doubt) Nevertheless, I would think that Russia because it has some of the world’s best “rocket engineers” and can draw technology from civilian booster space program, building a SS-19 replacement, from scratch, would not only be possible but practical. Given that, would such a program not suffer from the Bulava “learning curve”? Not sure.
Frank Shuler
USA
Bernd I think this is quite possible, but not particularly likely. There are plenty domestic actors in Russia who will want to receive the budget funds allocated for said program, to prevent them from being given to a Ukrainian firm.
Of course if the project faces high risk, and low returns, then the Ukrainians may get it after all (and they will take it, because they need any funding they can get). Of course there are security issues to work out. But I strongly suspect the question of funding in that respect will be key. If the structure of budget funds allocated is such that it allows significant graft, then the Ukrainians won't get contract.
Frank, if the proposed heavy-liquid fuel ICBM is going to be designed and manufactured in Russia, it will most likely be designed by NPO Mashinostroyeniya and manufactured by Khrunichev Center.
No need to involve MITT/Votkinsk or Makeyev/Krasmash in this, they have no experience with liquid land missiles, while Khrunichev has extensive experience building such items. They are still manufacturing Proton SLVs on a regular basis, which is after all an ICBM writ large.
Older UR-100-MR ICBM was indeed a Ukrainian design, but a completely unrelated UR-100 and UR-500 (Proton) were manufactured and designed in Russia.
Well, if the main strategic target is making an ICBM enough powerful to deliver sophisticated, and consequently much heavier than conventional ones,self manoeuvrable warheads, it could have been argued by Russian strategic officers that required throw-weight should be actually impossible to reach by solid-fueled missiles
Anonymous
Completely realize that the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology would not be involved in any Russian liquid-fueled missile project. Also agree, Russia has extensive resources in such liquid-fueled rocket technology; world’s best.
However, one thing the Bulava project has taught is developing a new ballistic missile system comes with risks and technological uncertainties. For example, even though MITT/VMBP (Votkinsk Machine Building Plant) has an extensive history developing the SS-25-27-RS-24 systems and has leveraged that knowledge on the Bulava program, there have been serious technical/manufacturing setbacks. Actually, this is to be expected. The United States will run into the same issues if we ever get around to replacing Minuteman.
I did draw a question from your post. Do you think the decision might be make to rebuild the existing SS-19s? A type of “Sineva” refurbishing project? Or, do you think a “clear sheet” new ICBM design is the path Russia will choose?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
if by "refurbished SS-19" you mean the dry missiles which were repatriated from Kazakhstan (I think there were around 20 of those), then I am pretty sure Russia is going to use them, either as spare parts or by refuelling them and making them operational, if only to prolong the service life of this type of missile. This would give the heavy missile force additional years before any new type of missile would come on line. I realize that SS-19 isn't classed as "heavy" by START rules, but in today's world, SS-18 and SS-19 are approaching dinosaur status, so if there is a replacement, this future missile will likely replace both of them.
Whether that replacement is going to be a SS-19 Mod, or a completely new design is pretty much anyone's guess. During the late 80's, NPO Mash was working on a new missile called Albatross with a boost-glide MaRV designed to defeat SDI, but the design was eventually abbandoned as too complicated in favour of MITT's Topol-M. So, if they were to be given a go ahead, they would have somewhere to start.
As for Bulava, I think the problem was indeed with experience, or lack thereof. Giving MITT an SLBM project was a political mistake, but, paraphrasing Don Rumsfeld, you go to war with the missile you have.
It's more likely to be a clean sheet design then a refurb, in my opinion.
Anonymous
By "refurbished” I meant a remanufacturing process by which the existing 70 operational SS-19s would be pulled from their silos and rebuilt. Kinda like what was done here with the Minuteman III system. I do seem to remember some 20 or so Ukrainian SS-19s that were built but never fueled that were acquired by Russia several years ago from Kiev. I agree any such missiles were probably used for parts or as a support inventory for the active SS-19 fleet. Working under the assumption a new designed liquid-fueled ICBM will be built to replace the SS-18 and 19’s, another question. So, again only assuming this new ICBM will be silo based; how many do you think will be produced? Or, my question better put is, exactly how many SS-19 silos are available for such a missile system? I seem to remember only 130 SS-19/24 silos on Russian soil exist. Is this correct? Assuming the SS-27 silo missile project ends with the 60 to be installed at Tatishchevo, that leaves only the 70 silos at Kozelsk (and perhaps a few additional at Tatishchevo) for the new system. It has long been discussed that the existing SS-18 silos might be somehow adaptable to a solid-fueled missile using some kind of silo missile liner but the unique needs of venting a liquid-fueled systems and the priority construction of the SS-18 silo, again unique to that particular missile, would make rebuilding the silo for another missile cost prohibitive. Of course, I’m assuming Russia has no intentions in building new silos.
Any thoughts?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
as I understand it, there is currently a somewhat political struggle between design bureaus regarding the make-up of the future missile system.
People from MITT (in particular, the general designer Solomonov) are pushing for any future land system to be exclusively solid-fuelled, based on the argument of human and environmental safety (the old argument about toxicity, etc.) People from NPO Mash are pushing for a future system to be liquid-fuelled, based on the argument that higher throw-weight requires more energetic fuels.
The military's mind, in my limited understanding, is somewhat in a state of flux. It want something comparable to replace SS-18 and SS-19, but it also wants something cheap and assured and MITT has been the military's safety zone until the Bulava debacle.
Whichever side "wins" the political argument (and no doubt that it is political, with technology playing a distant second fiddle) will determine the path of development. As far as I understand regarding SS-19 silos, they are adapted for Topol-M use by simply taking out the gas exhaust system from the bottom and then pouring concrete there. Whether the same is easily accomplished with SS-18 silos remains to be seen. So, if the "liquid" people win, the new missile would just reuse existing SS-18 and SS-19 silos, perhaps with updated "plumbing" to save on expenses of building new silos. If the "solid" people win, the new missile will reuse whichever silos are reusable by the same method (excising machinery and pouring concrete).
- "Deanonymized"
Given Russia's extremely limited budget (relatively) I would suggest another alternative. A direct SS-18 liquid fuel replacement with a single (high-yield) MARV (maneuverable) warhead Fractional Orbit Bombardment System capability. Given the US abrogation of the ABM treaty I see no problem with deploying a single warhead FOBS system. A new SS-18 sized missile could deliver a single ~12 MT "clean" MARV warhead in a FOBS package from over the south pole (or any direction, for that matter). ~150 of these would be worth many hundreds of TOPOL-M's and Bulava's in terms of survivability and viability against any ABM system. Current SS-18 silos could be used. Russia could drastically reduce the number of deployed weapons without compromising deterrent viability, and put the onus on the US to further reduce its number of deployed weapons. Use of a "clean" (95%+ fusion) device would also put pressure on the US as its current arsenal is made up of weapons with 80%+ fission yields (extremely dirty). Combine this with a serious ASAT program (since most current ABM systems rely on space assets) and you can get away with ~150 deployed warheads total.
artjomh
Completely understand the conflicting goals of the “military industrial complex”. It will be interesting to see how Russia unravels all this. The “silo count” is interesting to me. With some 58 SS-18 deployed missiles; how may surviving SS-18 silos? There were 130 SS-19/24 silos on Russian soil; how may are left for future deployments? With the 60 planned SS-27 missiles; are there the only the 70, now-deployed, SS-19 silos available for future systems or are my numbers incorrect? The same is true for Minutemen here. It seems there is no interest in new silo construction in either Washington or Moscow.
Frank Shuler
USA
Jon Grams
Given, your proposed system would be technically impressive. However, how would such an investment by Russia be practical? A SS-18 FOBS would not be capable of “first strike” and yet be a “use it or lose it” nuclear weapon system in any confrontation. How would this system “win a nuclear war” or provide deterrence to stop such a war from happening in the first place?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank
The purpose of such a system would purely be to have a credible (high probability of penetrating defenses) deterrent for far less cost than maintaining a fleet of SSBN's, strategic bombers, and many hundreds of silos/launch sites. Yes, overhead would be somewhat higher initially, but the savings by dropping the SSBN fleet and drastically reducing the number of ICBM launchers would more than compensate, I believe. It's merely a possible way for Russia to lever technology it has already tested and developed to make a realistically affordable deterrent.