Now that we have some firm information about key provisions of the New START treaty, we can estimate what kind of reductions we can expect. One should be cautious, of course, about predicting the future, but the broad picture is unlikely to change significantly once we see the text of the treaty (the definition of an "operationally deployed launcher" is probably the most important factor there) and know more about the U.S. plans regarding its strategic triad that will emerge from the Nuclear Posture Review process.

The broad picture is that in terms of numbers the reductions of the New START treaty will be, to put it mildly, extremely modest. In fact, Russia would not have to do anything at all - it is already in compliance with the new treaty (this is not to say that the treaty will not limit Russia - it will). The United States would probably have to do some real reductions, but nothing really dramatic is expected there as well - mostly it will be removing some ICBMs from silos. (It is interesting, in fact, how the treaty will deal with empty silos - both sides have some and they will probably reluctant to blow them up. UPDATE 03/29/10: It appears that the treaty indeed will not require elimination of silos.)

The tables below summarize the current status of the U.S. and Russian forces and the possible composition of the forces by the time the New START treaty is set to end - about 2020. The first column show the data from the last "old" START data exchange - these show how many launchers the parties had at the time. Since the old START counts every nuclear capable launcher, whether they operational or not, this column is very much an absolute ceiling. For example, START requires counting SS-N-20 and Bulava SLBMs, although the former have long gone and the latter is yet to fly reliably. The actual state of affairs is in the second column - it shows the actual operationally deployed launchers and the total number of launchers available - the latter number includes, for example, submarines that are in overhaul but that are expected return to service.

The next column show how a New START force may look like - again, there is a separate count of "operationally deployed" launchers and the total number of launchers. The treaty will set separate limits for those - 700 and 800 respectively. It looks like only the United States would use this gap between the two categories - it would need it for the two Trident II submarines that will be in overhaul. Depending of how the treaty deals with empty ICBM silos, the United States could also use it for some of those. Russia, in fact, will also have some empty ICBM silos, so it is possible that it would make use of that provision as well.

The last column shows the New START count of warheads. Since every bomber will be counted as a single warhead, the total count would seriously underestimate the number of nuclear warheads in active service. For example, Russian 76 bombers are technically capable of carrying more than 800 warheads. The U.S. strategic bomber force has about 500 nuclear warheads assigned to it. So, the actual number of operationally deployed warheads will probably be closer to 2000 on each side, which is not much of a reduction compared to the Moscow Treaty.

Creative accounting notwithstanding, the New START treaty is a significant positive development - if only because it preserves some openness and accountability in nuclear affairs. Then, if everything works right, the treaty could probably provide the legal and institutional framework for deeper nuclear reductions. At least it should.

 

Russia

  July 2009 Old START 2010
Actual
operationally deployed launches (total launchers)
ca. 2020
New START
operationally deployed launchers (total launchers)
[estimate]
ca. 2020
New START warheads
[estimate]
ICBMs        
  SS-25 176 171    
  SS-27 silo 50 50 60 60
  SS-27 road 15 18 27 27
  RS-24     85 255
  SS-19 120 70    
  SS-18 104 59 20 200
  Total ICBMs 465 367 192 542 
SLBMs        
  Delta III/SS-N-18 6/96 4/64    
  Delta IV/SS-N-23 6/96 4/64 (6/96) 4/64 256
  Typhoon/SS-N-20 2/40 0/0    
  Borey/Bulava 2/36 0/0 4/64 384
  Total SLBMs 268 128 (164) 128 640
Bombers        
  Tu-160 13 13 13 13
  Tu-95MS 63 63 63 63
  Total bombers 76 76 76 76
TOTAL 809 571 (603) 396 (396) 1258

 

The United States (UPDATED 02/29/10)

  July 2009 Old START 2010
Actual
operationally deployed launches (total launchers)
ca. 2020
New START
operationally deployed launchers (total launchers) [estimate]
ca. 2020
New START warheads
[estimate]
ICBMs        
  Minuteman III 500 450 350 350
  MX 50 0    
  Total ICBMs 550 450 350 350 
SLBMs        
  Trident I/C-4 4/96      
  Trident II/D-5 14/336 12/288 (14/336) 12/288 (14/336) 1152
  Total SLBMs 268 288 (336) 288 (336) 1152 
Bombers        
  B-1 47 0    
  B-2 18 16 (18) 16 (18) 16
  B-52 141 44 (93) 32 (93) 32
  Total bombers 206 60 (111) 48 (111) 48 
TOTAL 1188 798 (897) 686 (797) 1550

UPDATE 03/29/10: The U.S. table is updated to reflect the fact that only 60 of the 111 nuclear-capable bombers would likely be considered operationally deployed. Then, since ICBM silos won't be eliminated, there would be no need to keep them in the "not operationally deployed" category.