The way the United States and Russia will be counting bombers in New START has raised some questions about the treaty - the change in counting rules in effect means that neither side would have to make any substantial cuts to comply with the new treaty. (See the projections I published earlier and Hans Kristensen's analysis.)
The United States said that it was ready to count bombers with their actual weapons load, but Russia objected to the transparency provisions that this arrangement would entail. This is not the first time Russia gets a bad rap for resisting transparency, but I don't think this is the case here. As Hans Kristensen noted, they could have counted each bomber as carrying, say, ten warheads. No transparency is needed for that.
Another possible reason for Russia's position on bombers is that if they were counted with their real weapons load, the United States would have to find some other place to cut 400 warheads. Most likely this would have been done primarily by "downloading" SLBMs. The problem with this, of course, is that it would increase the U.S. "upload potential" - the ability to quickly bring the warheads back.
Whether or not that was the real reason and regardless of whether the concerns about the upload potential are justified, Russia appears to have been consistent in pushing for lower number of launchers and, if that is not possible, for keeping the warhead limit relatively high to avoid increasing the upload potential. We know now, for example, that it was Russia that insisted on putting 1675 into the "1500-1675" range agreed in Moscow in July 2009.
Whatever the real Russia's reasons, I am sympathetic to its position - reducing the number of warheads just by offloading them from missiles and keeping the capability to bring them back intact is not real reductions. Nuclear weapon states have to be held accountable for their nuclear-capable launchers as well At the time, I suggested keeping the old START count in place to do just that and it looks like the New START treaty will be able to do it to some extent.
As for the bombers, I'm not sure that Russia gained anything in particular there. We get better accountability for launchers, but leave quite a few warheads unaccountable. One can argue that Russia may be more worried about SLBMs than about bombers - it may well be the case. In any event, I don't think that the trick with bomber count weakens the treaty.
The book
Comments
There is never going to be real “arms control” until both Russia and the United States agree to an absolute limit on all nuclear weapons. Deep limits on deployed, so called, strategic weapons is only a good first step. Does the New START go far enough? I guess that answer is up to the asker; proponents of nuclear disarmament and the pro-security lobby all can claim some success.
Yet, when all the dust settles, the United States will still have 4600 nuclear weapons in its inventory. Yes, there will be reductions. The number of Minuteman III launchers most probably will fall in the New START limits and those extra W-78 warheads in the “enduring inventory” supporting those missiles can be moved to “surplus pending dismantlement” (SPD). A large number of “tactical” B-61-3/4 bombs can also be moved to such a status. The W-80-0 nuclear warheads for the Tomahawk SLCMs likewise. Will the pending Nuclear Policy Review, a policy document by the Administration on America’s future nuclear weapon needs, suggest radical changes to America’s nuclear arsenal can be made? I doubt it.
The Obama Administration has asked for billions of new budget dollars for America’s nuclear weapons infrastructure. This will allow the US Department of Energy increased capacity to handle the disposal of surplus nuclear weapons and components; there is a backlog of four to five thousand warheads waiting dismantlement. Of course, this increase in capacity will also allow the US Department of Energy, and its nuclear labs such as Los Alamos National Laboratory, to possess the enhanced capability to build a new generation of future nuclear warheads, if so deemed needed.
Could a future arms agreement between Russia and the United States ever agree on an absolute, verified inventory of nuclear weapons?
Frank Shuler
USA
Absolute and completely verified? I certainly hope not. The level of bilateral penetration in terms of inspections that this would entail would be seriously threatening.
Given that despite all pretenses, Russia is the junior partner here, definitely not a desirable situation.