The Russian ministry of defense published presentation slides from the missile defense conference that was held in Moscow on May 3-4, 2012 (thanks to Eugene Miasnikov for the link). No big surprises there - Russia's position on missile defense has been well known. This slide, however (from the presentation by the Chief of General Staff), does look interesting - it shows how Russia sees its "sectoral defense" proposal.

As can be seen from the slide, the idea of the proposal is to make sure that Russian ICBMs are out of reach of NATO missile defense interceptors. According to Russia's estimates, this would mean that NATO won't be able to protect some of its territory - the Baltic states, parts of Poland, most of Norway. These would fall in Russia's "sector" of responsibility. Most of Sweden and Finland (which are not in NATO) would be protected by Russia.

As much as I don't like the New START data exchange rules that keep almost all the data secret, on some level the uncertainty feels right. Indeed, why would anybody seriously care if there are, say, 55 or 50 SS-18 missiles? There is no military significance in these numbers anymore. They do matter, of course, but only from the point of view of accountability - it is a good idea to know how many missiles and nuclear warheads are out there.

As a result of the New START lack of transparency, the only data on the Russian strategic forces that we have is the aggregate number of deployed launchers and warheads associated with them. We also know the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers. Not much, but it's better than nothing.

Parsing these numbers is somewhat difficult, since there are quite a few unknown parameters - for example, some missiles could be deployed with fewer warheads than their maximum load, throwing off any attempt to reconstruct the original data. But an estimate can be made nonetheless, even though an imperfect one. Below is what I believe is a reasonable fit.

First, the numbers. According to the most recent data exchange, as of March 1, 2012 Russia had 494 deployed launchers that carried 1492 warheads. The total number of launchers, deployed and non-deployed, was 881.

One possible fit for these numbers is the following breakdown by services - 332 ICBMs with 1092 warheads, 96 SLBMs with 336 warheads, and 66 bombers counted as one warhead each. These numbers produce the correct number of deployed launchers, but two extra warheads - 1494, indicating that there is a problem somewhere. But it's probably close enough.

In this estimate, the Strategic Rocket Forces have 55 R-36M2 missiles with 10 warheads each, 35 UR-100NUTTH with six warheads, 150 Topol missiles, 74 single-warhead Topol-M (56 in silos and 18 road-mobile), and 18 RS-24 missiles that carry six warheads each. It appears that the number of RS-24 launchers that are counted as deployed is actually higher than 18 - at least 18 are in Teykovo and probably three more have been already delivered to Novosibirsk. But since only 18 appear to be on combat duty, I'll keep that number for the moment.

There is a bit more certainty with submarines - out of six Project 667BDRM submarines three - Novomoskovsk, Verkhoturie, and Ekaterinburg - are in overhaul. None of the two Project 955 submarines has missiles on board, so their tubes would be counted as non-deployed launchers. If we count three Project 667BDR submarines and their missiles as deployed, we'll get 96 SLBMs and 336 warheads.

Finally, I estimate that 55 Tu-95MS and 11 Tu-160 bombers are counted as deployed - this adds another 66 warheads.

There are also 387 non-deployed launchers. At first, this number seems a bit high, but it is not - it includes almost 90 UR-100NUTTH silos, about 50 R-36M2 silos, 60 launchers on three Project 941 submarines, 32 Bulava launchers on two Project 955 submarines, and 48 tubes on Project 667BDRM submarines in overhaul. There are also test and training launchers, test bombers, etc. It all adds up to about the right number.

Still, this is only an estimate and should be taken as such. I hope that a few more bits of information and maybe a better analysis of the data could produce a better picture, but I don't think the difference would matter very much.

U.S. State Department released New START aggregate data from the last information exchange. The numbers are current as of 1 March 2012.

According to the release, in March 2012 Russia had 494 deployed launchers, 881 total launchers, and 1492 operationally deployed warheads. In the previous data exchange, current as of 4 September 2011, these numbers were 516, 871, and 1566 respectively.

Most of the drop in the number of deployed launchers and warheads is explained by the Ekaterinburg submarine's entering overhaul in November-December 2011. Some ICBMs were probably decommissioned as well.

The increase in the total number of launchers is a bit harder to explain. Most likely, these are new mobile RS-24 Yars launchers - at least nine in Teykovo (six began service in December 2011 and three more launchers wer expected to enter service shortly thereafter) and probably some in Novosibirsk, where they are expected to begin service later this year.

One of my readers (thank you, SL) pointed out that someone identified the location of the Voronezh-M radar at Mishelevka and posted a photo of the radar there.

Construction of the radar was first reported in December 2010. It appears to be located in front of the site of the Daryal-U transmitter building (which may have no longer be there - the reciever was demolished in June 2011). In March 2012, the minister of defense said that the Voronezh-M radar in Mishelevka is undergoing trials.

At 09:49 MSK on March 30, 2012 (05:49 UTC) the Space Forces conducted a launch of a Proton-K launcher (with DM-2 booster stage) from the Baykonur site (launch pad No. 24 of the launch complex No. 81).

The satellite, designated Cosmos-2479, received NORAD number 38101 and international designation 2012-012A. According to NORAD orbital data, the satellite was deployed on a nearly geosyncronous orbit at about 90E and is drifting eastward. Cosmos-2479 is a spacecraft of the 71Kh6 type - these satellites are stabilized at the point of 80E before they are moved to their permanent positions.

It was the last launch of the Proton-K launcher and the last early-warning satellite of the 71Kh6 type (in 2009 the Ministry of Defense had two satellites left - an HEO satellite was launched in September 2010). 71Kh6 satellites work as part of the US-KMO system that provides "look-down" coverage of potential missile launch areas.

Cosmos-2479 will be the only GEO early-warning satellite - its predecessor, Cosmos-2440, launched in June 2008, stopped working around February 2010.

UPDATE 04/02/12: The correct type of the satellite - 71Kh6 of the US-KMO system - was added.

UPDATE 04/012/12: As expected, the satellite has been positioned at the point 80E.

K-51 Verkhoturie submarine of the Project 667BDRM class has been launched ("left covered slipway") on March 24, 2012 after a scheduled repair and overhaul that began in August 2010. The submarine is expected to return to service in the fall of 2012.

According to Russian minister of defense Anatoly Serdyukov, who spoke at a meeting at the ministry on March 20, 2012, the new early-warning radar in Mishelevka has entered trials.

The radar, Voronezh-M, is similar to the one deployed in Lekhtusi, near St.-Petersburg. It will replace one of the two old Dnepr radars that have been built at the site int he 1970s. The second Dnepr will also be replaced by a new Voronezh-M.

On February 3, 2012, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy announced that the Russian strategic submarines will resume regular patrols "on the 1st of July or a bit later." According to Vysotskiy, the Navy was awaiting this "for 26 years."

What this probably means is that Russia will try to keep at least one strategic submarine at sea at any given time. I'm not sure what will change in June 2012 that would allow the navy to do that - the only significant development is that Novomoskovsk will probably return to service by then - it has been in overhaul since May 2011. But then there is Ekaterinburg, which is unlikely to be back after the fire until at least 2014. Also, another submarine, Karelia is in the dry dock right now, although this seems to be a brief repair work (let's hope they removed missiles this time).

Maybe the plan is to rely on the first Project 955 class submarine, Yuri Dolgorukiy, which is expected to begin service some time in June-July 2012. That's a possibility, I guess.

It's interesting to look back 26 years to see why Vysotskiy believes it was such a remarkable year. It wasn't in fact - according to the U.S. naval intelligence data (posted by Hans Kristensen), in 1986 Soviet strategic submarines conducted about 80 patrols. But the patrol rate was higher before and did not drop significantly until much later - there were still 60 patrols in 1990.

In 2008, Russian strategic submarines conducted ten patrols, but as Hans notes in his post, these were probably clustered together rather than spread over the course of the year. Still, that rate seems to indicate that the Russian Navy could keep continuous deterrence patrols with five or six submarines.

In the last couple of months there was a flurry of statements on the future of Russian strategic forces. Most of them were part of the presidential election campaign - the "strong defense" rhetoric was an important part of the message coming from the current leadership. There wasn't much that was really new, but some developments are worth noting.

The most interesting changes are coming to the Russian strategic fleet. First of all, with the series of successful tests of the Bulava missile, it is now expected that the first two submarines of the Project 955 Borey class - K-535 Yuri Dolgorukiy and K-550 Aleksandr Nevskiy - will be accepted for service this summer. Other sources report that Aleksandr Nevskiy will be accepted for service somewhat later, in December 2012 - this sounds more plausible.

Project 955 submarines will be eventually transferred to the Pacific Fleet base at Vilyuchinsk in Kamchatka, but they might stay with the Northern Fleet for a while - some reports suggest that the base is not quite ready to accept the new submarines. That won't be long, though. (It's interesting to note that the Vilyuchinsk base was almost closed down in 2002 - it was saved by an intervention of the government that asked two private companies, Surgutneftegaz and TNK, to "step up" and provide the funds for its reconstruction.)

The third Project 955 class submarine, Vladimir Monomakh, is currently under construction. It is expected to enter service in 2013. Vladimir Monomakh is the first submarine that was built as a Project 955 class from the beginning - the first two ships used components of two unfinished attack submarines of the Project 971 class.

The status of the fourth submarine is somewhat unclear. It was supposed to begin in 2009, but it didn't, then it was postponed again in 2010. When the government signed contracts with the shipbuilding industry on November 9, 2011, one of them went to the Rubin Design Bureau - "39 billion rubles for development of a strategic submarine of the Project 955A class." The construction contract for this submarine has not been signed, but Sevmash says that it already has about 80% of the strong hull of the new ship ready. This strong hull would need some work, though - the main difference between Project 955A and its predecessor is that the new submarines will carry 20 missiles instead of 16.

At some point there was a discussion of increasing the Project 955 submarines order from the currently planned eight to ten, but it looks like that discussion didn't go anywhere. It is, in fact, not clear if Russia will be able to stay within the New START limits with the increase of the number of SLBMs (and their warheads). The number of SLBM warheads will also increase if the missiles on Project 667BDRM submarines will be upgraded from Sineva to Liner - the latter can carry up to ten warheads. But maybe it won't be a problem - Russia could always "download" its missiles if necessary. It could also create Russia's own "upload potential" - something that it never had in the past.

The fire on the Ekaterinburg submarine in December 2011 was, as it turns out, a very serious incident - the submarine had full complement of torpedos and missiles on board. Reports in the Russian press - Novaya Gazeta and Kommersant-Vlast - provide a detailed analysis of the situation quoting sources at the Northern Fleet and the Main Staff of the Russian Navy.

The torpedos were in an immediate danger - they were quite close to the fire. Missiles, however - various sources say the submarine had 16 or fewer missiles - were where the real danger was. The R-29RM missiles carried by Project 667BDRM submarines are liquid fuel missiles that are very vulnerable to a fire. Also, the missiles apparently carried nuclear warheads - the submarine was getting ready to go on patrol.