Dmitry Medvedev was sworn in as President of Russia and assumed responsibilities of the Supreme Commander of the Russian armed forces. In a separate ceremony in Kremlin he was handed over the so-called "nuclear suitcase" - a "Kazbek" terminal that provides communication with the Central Command Center of the General Staff in an event of a nuclear attack.
Russia and the United States signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation, usually referred to as a 123 agreement. The document was signed by the head of Rosatom Sergei Kiriyenko and U.S. ambassador to Moscow William Burns.
The agreement has a long history - it was reported to be "almost ready" more than a year ago. The delay was apparently caused by doubts about Russia's policy that existed in the U.S. administration. Although the administration agreed to proceed with the agreement, it would have to be submitted for approval to the U.S. congress, where it would have to overcome substantial opposition of many lawmakers.
Over all, signing of the agreement is a very positive development in the U.S.-Russian relations, since it would create numerous opportunities for cooperation and partnership.
In a ceremony at the Gorbunov Aviation Plant in Kazan, Russian strategic aviation received a new Tu-160 bomber, which then flew to its permanent base in Engels. The aircraft, named after Vitaly Kopylov, joined the 121st Guards Hevay Bomber Regiment of the 37th Air Army.
Construction of this aircraft was completed in the end of 2007 and it was reported to begin flight tests in December 2007. It became the 16th bomber in the 37th Air Army, although Russia reports only 15 bombers in START data (it appears that Vitaly Kopylov was already listed in the January 2008 START data exchange).
Here is an interesting data point for the discussion of the status of the Russian strategic submarine fleet. According to the most recent overview of Russia's nuclear forces published by Stan Norris and Hans Kristensen in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the number of patrols in 2007 was slightly down:
The [U.S. naval intelligence] information indicates that SSBN patrols decreased to only three in 2007, down from five in 2006 (and none at all in 2002), suggesting that Russia does not maintain continuous SSBN patrols like the United States, Britain, and France, but rather occasionally deploys a few SSBNs for training purposes.
Hans Kristensen has more details over at the FAS Strategic Security Blog. For example, now that we know that there were five patrols in 2006, it is clear that all five took place during a single excercise in September 2006.
The importance of the number of patrols in Russia's case, however, should not be overestimated. The Soviet Union never really relied on constant presence of its missile submarines at sea to the extent that the United States or Britain do.
Sean O'Connor published analysis of a Tatishchevo image in his excellent IMINT & Analysis blog. The blog is a must read for everyone interested in satellite imagery.
According to a report by Bellona, one of the three plutonium production reactors that are still operating in Russia, ADE-4 in Seversk/Tomsk-7, will be shut down on Sunday, April 20, 2008.
Another reactor in Seversk, ADE-5, is expected to be shut down later this year. The ADE-2 reactor in Zheleznogorsk/Krasnoyarsk-26 will operate until 2010. The three reactors have been producing about 1.2 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium a year. Since 1994 this plutonium is stored as plutonium dioxide. Russia pledged not to use this material for weapons.
UPDATE 04/20/08: The reactor was shut down at 11:00am on April 20, 2008. The second Seversk reactor, ADE-5, will be shut down in June 2008.
By Pavel Podvig | 18 April 2008
Virtually any discussion regarding the security implications of the spread of nuclear power involves the need to build a mechanism that would ensure a guaranteed, uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel for new nuclear power plants. The rationale behind such thinking is fairly solid: If countries that consider building these plants have guarantees of reliable access to fresh nuclear fuel, they could be convinced not to develop indigenous uranium enrichment facilities, decoupling the growth of nuclear power from the spread of uranium enrichment--a very proliferation-sensitive technology.
There are several specific proposals about how to implement this arrangement, some of which have substantial political and financial support behind them--mostly in the form of uranium or money for a nuclear fuel bank that would provide an emergency fuel supply when necessary. But it's unclear whether these proposals will work in practice. Countries may want to develop an indigenous uranium enrichment capability for myriad reasons, and the economic cost of developing such a capability may not be high relative to the cost of a fleet of nuclear reactors, potentially making an enrichment facility a sound investment for a country that's concerned about its fuel supply.
That said, in most cases, countries would probably find it convenient and economical to rely on external suppliers, provided there's an industry that can deliver the necessary services. Of course, the problem is that the nuclear fuel market is quite different from other fuel markets--namely, oil or coal--because it's more susceptible to disruption. Fuel bank arrangements might help in some circumstances, but they can be susceptible to pressure, too. For example, the trade in nuclear services, equipment, and materials is heavily regulated and subject to extensive oversight--rightfully so. More significant, however, is the inherent link with nuclear proliferation, which automatically shines a spotlight on almost every nuclear deal, making them a convenient target for all kinds of pressure, political or otherwise.
The most recent instance of political interference with the nuclear market was the U.S.-led effort to stop the construction and operation of the Bushehr nuclear power plant Russia is building in Iran. Eventually, Russia warded off Washington's interference, promising to supply the reactor with nuclear fuel despite the serious controversy surrounding Iran's effort to develop a capability to enrich uranium. In December, I wrote that this was a major milestone for the idea of a guaranteed fuel supply, even if it came too late to change the course of Iran's enrichment program.
Pressure comes in other forms as well. A March dispute between Russia and Ukraine demonstrated the difficulty of reconciling a supplier's commercial interests with the concept of a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply. Ukraine generates about 50 percent of its electricity at 15 nuclear reactors, all of which were built during the Soviet era. So it's natural that a Russian company, TVEL, supplies the fresh fuel for these reactors. But after a 2006 energy flap between the two countries--another Russian company, Gazprom, cut natural gas exports to Ukraine in a dispute that involved a good dose of economics and politics--Kiev apparently decided to explore ways of providing a safety net for its nuclear power industry, beginning an effort to create a fuel reserve by buying fresh fuel from another supplier: U.S.-based Westinghouse.
These were solid business decisions, but as should be expected, some politics inevitably intervened, as the United States stepped in, providing money for a program that would test Westinghouse fuel assemblies in one of the Ukrainian reactors. TVEL, rightly sensing that this program could undermine its position as a monopoly fuel supplier, threatened to withdraw the warranty from its fuel elements if they were irradiated in the reactor alongside U.S. fuel. When Ukraine officially signed a fuel supply contract with Westinghouse, which almost coincided with President George W. Bush's visit to Kiev last month, Russian pundits and politicians didn't hide their disapproval, portraying the deal as another U.S. attempt to gain a foothold close to the Russian border.
This time the political controversy didn't last long. TVEL eventually welcomed the new Ukrainian deal as a sign of market openness that would probably allow it to increase its prices. But the imbroglio did expose some issues that any attempt to build a workable arrangement for fuel supply guarantees will encounter. First, suppliers who maintain a monopoly in certain markets will resist their customers' attempts to diversify, and in the highly regulated, politically charged nuclear market, large suppliers can exert significant pressure.
Then there's the issue of reactor safety. While TVEL's concerns about operating its fuel assemblies together with the fuel assemblies produced by Westinghouse seemed petty at the time, these concerns cannot be ignored. Nuclear fuel has to go through a fairly long testing and certification process, and unless done in advance, this fuel certification process may seriously impact the ability to quickly substitute one fuel supplier for another. Lastly, it's clear that any workable fuel supply arrangement would have to deal with spent fuel as well. Moscow has been willing to take Ukrainian spent fuel back to Russia for reprocessing, but it's unlikely that any other supplier would be willing to do so. Kiev was able to avoid dealing with this issue in its contract with Westinghouse, since it is building a spent fuel storage facility in Ukraine. But other countries may not have this flexibility.
Overall, Ukraine's effort to protect its nuclear power industry from possible disruptions of its fuel supply deserves close attention. So far, the experience has been largely encouraging, demonstrating that a country concerned about the issue has many options to consider before thinking about building a uranium enrichment plant. But problems remain. It took a fair amount of political will and determination on Ukraine's part to have all the pieces in place. If nuclear suppliers want effective guaranteed fuel supply arrangements, they will need to find a way to make their customers' lives much easier.
I just returned from the American Physical Society meeting in St. Louis. I was there to receive the Leo Szilard Lectureship Award for 2008, which APS awarded this year "to Anatoli Diakov and Pavel Podvig,"
"For establishing a center for scientific study of arms control, for landmark analyses, and for courage in supporting open discussion of international security in Russia."
Anatoli Diakov, of course, deserves most of the credit for setting up the Center for Arms Control Studies in Moscow. I am honored that APS recognized my contribution to the Center's work as well.
On a practical note, APS asks the award recipients to give lectures "at educational institutions or research laboratories in the year following the award." The lectures "should be especially aimed at physicists early in their careers." I have some ideas, but certainly let me know if you are interested.
At the last Bush-Putin presidential summit that took place in Sochi, the presidents signed a "U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration." Both sides did their best to downplay expectations ahead of the meeting and as we can see now for a good reason - the declaration, while useful, does not contain anything new.
START treaty data that were publicly released a few days ago provide an update of the numbers of nuclear launchers and warheads that Russia had in its arsenal in January 2008. According to these data, the Russian strategic forces in January 2008 included 682 strategic launchers that can carry 3100 warheads. This is about 60 launchers and 180 warheads fewer than a year ago, in January 2007.
The main change is the decrease in the number of deployed ICBMs - the Strategic Rocket Forces continue to withdraw older UR-100NUTTH/SS-19 and Topol/SS-25 missiles. In 2007 they removed all Topol missiles from the Kansk division and began liquidation of the UR-100NUTTH division in Kozelsk. In addition, some Topol missiles were removed from the division in Teykovo, where some of them were replaced by new Topol-M/SS-27 missiles. Deployment of silo-based Topol-M missiles continued in Tatishchevo - 4 missiles were accepted for service there.
The status of the strategic fleet is somewhat difficult to assess. According to the START data, Russia has 196 deployed SLBMs. This number, however, includes 23 R-39/SS-N-20 missiles, associated with Project 941/Typhoon submarines. Since these submarines do not carry operational missiles, I traditionally do not count them in the total number of deployed SLBMs. Things are further complicated by the fact that some submarines of other types - Project 667BDR/Delta III and Project 667BDRM/Delta IV - also may not carry operational missiles. Some submarines are in overhaul and therefore should not be considered operational. It is possible, for example, that of the entire Project 667BDRM fleet, only one submarine - K-114 Tula - has a full complement of missiles. However, unless there is reliable information on the status of submarines, I will continue to follow the START numbers, which seriously overestimate the number of operational SLBMs.
The significant change in the strategic aviation was introduction of a new Tu-160 bomber. The bomber is still listed as located at the Kazan aviation plant, but it is now accounted for in the official START data.
The January 2008 data exchange for the first time contains information about the RS-24 missile. The MOU specifies that "1 (one) road-mobile test launcher for the prototype RS-24 ICBM is located at test range Plesetsk." The launcher is put in a category of its own, most likely deliberately - to avoid answering questions about the relation between RS-24 and Topol-M. No technical characteristics of the new "prototype missile" are listed.
The book
