One of the satellites of the Russian space-based early-warning system, Cosmos-2440, has most likely completed its operations. The geostationary satellite launched in June 2008 has been drifting off its station at 80 degrees East since February 2010, when it failed to perform an orbit correction. The satellite is currently at the point of about 75 degrees East. The drift does not appear to be a transfer to a different station - this kind of maneuvers are done differently.

With the loss of Cosmos-2440, Russia's space-based early-warning system is down to two satellites on highly-elliptical orbits - Cosmos-2430 (launched 23 October 2007, NORAD catalog number 32268) and Cosmos-2446 (HEO, 2 December 2008, 33447). These satellites appear to be functioning normally - they performed their regular orbit-correction maneuvers around 15 July 2010 and 18 August 2010 respectively.

On September 2, 2010 at 04:53:50 MSK (00:53:50 UTC) the Space Forces conducted a successful launch of a Proton-M launcher from the Baykonur launch site. The launch took place from the launch pad No. 24 of the launch complex No. 81. The launcher, equipped with a DM-2 booster stage, successfully delivered into orbit three new Glonass-M satellites.

The satellites were deployed in the second orbital plane of the Glonass constellation. They are likely to receive designations Cosmos-2464, Cosmos-2465, and Cosmos-2466. NORAD catalog numbers and international designations of the satellites are 37137/2010-041A, 37138?/2010-041B, and 37139?/2010-041C. The spacecraft joined the Glonass constellation that at the time of the launch consisted of 21 operational satellites.

The Space Forces and Roskosmos plan to bring the number of Glonass satellites to 27 (of which 24 should be operational) in 2010. The next launch of three Glonass-M satellites is currently scheduled for November 10, 2010. Also, Russia will launch the Glonass-K modification of the satellite in 2010 or in 2011. This launch will use a Soyuz-2-1A launcher with a Fregat booster stage.

One of the Tu-160 strategic bombers, No. 04 Ivan Yarygin, returned to service after an overhaul at the Kazan Aviation Plant. The bomber was counted as deployed during overhaul, so this move does not affect the total number of operational Tu-160 bombers - Russia has 16 bombers of this type based in Engels.

K-51 Verkhoturie submarine of the Project 667BDRM/Delta IV class arrived to the Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk for a scheduled repair and overhaul. K-51 Verkhoturie was the first ship of its class to undergo an overhaul - it was completed in December 1999.

It is possible that the current round of overhaul will include installation of Sineva missiles on the submarine - in 1999 these missiles were simply not available for deployment, so K-51 probably carries older R-29RM missiles.

On August 6, 2010 at 19:15 MSK (15:15 UTC), the K-114 Tula submarine of the Project 667BDRM class of the Northern Fleet successfully conducted a salvo launch of two R-29RM Sineva missiles. The launch was conducted from a submerged submarine deployed in the Barents Sea. Missiles' warheads reached their targets at the Kura test site at Kamchatka.

Previous Sineva launch, in March 2010, was also conducted by the crew of the Tula submarine.

Submarines of the Project 667BDR/Delta III class are fairly old - most of them began their service in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the subs seem to be operational - two submarines conducted successful launches of their missiles in October 2009. Still, the START numbers indicated that one of the subs has been in the decommissioning process for some time - it had some missiles unloaded. Now it is reported that the oldest submarine of the Project 667BDR class - K-506 Zelenograd, built in 1975 - has indeed been removed from service and will be dismantled. Last time the K-506 submarine launched a missile was in October 2008. It was based in Vilyuchinsk.

Cosmos-2462, a photo-reconnaissance satellite of the Kobalt-M class, launched on April 16, 2010, completed its mission and reentered on July 21, 2010. The satellite worked about three month, which is normal for these satellites - its predecessor, Cosmos-2450, worked from April to July 2009.

It has arrived indeed. The long-awaited news about RS-24 deployment came today from Farnborough, where Vladimir Popovkin, the first deputy minister of defense, was speaking to the press (the news caught me in my French class, hence the title). Although reports about RS-24 deployment surfaced before - earlier this month and in April, this is the first time it was officially confirmed.

The RS-24 "Yars" is a MIRVed version of the mobile Topol-M missile. The first three missiles were apparently deployed at Teykovo, as it was originally planned.

It is still not clear how many warheads the missile carries - the press reports mention four, but I'm not sure if this is what Popovkin said. It may well be that they repeat a last-year eport. There were also reports about RS-24 carrying three warheads. My analysis also suggests that RS-24 will have three warheads - in this case the warheads are similar to 400-kt warheads deployed on SS-24/RT-23UTTH missiles. I'll count RS-24 missiles as carrying three for the moment, but we'll have the correct number once the New START treaty is ratified.

Russian press reports quote a source in the Russian Navy as saying that flight tests of the Bulava missile will resume in August 2010. Earlier it was reported that the tests will resume in the fall. The navy are planning to conduct three flight tests of Bulava in 2010. One missile may be launched from the Yuri Dolgorukiy submarine, the lead ship of the Project 955 Borey class, which has been undergoing sea trials since June 2009.

Since the beginning of the New START Treaty deliberations and hearings in the U.S. Senate a couple of months ago, the Republicans appear to have settled on a set of objections and talking points that they hope could help defeat the treaty. Neither of the issues raised by the Republicans is really a "killer flaw" (to use Steven Pifer's term) and very much all the questions have been answered by the administration officials during the hearings - Kingston Reif has a particularly detailed message with all the relevant quotes (this is part of his excellent New START coverage at Nukes of Hazard).

There is really not much to add to what others have said. However, I thought that Mitt Romney's op-ed in today's Washington Post, "Obama's worst foreign-policy mistake", which seems to position itself as an anti-New START manifesto, makes a few incorrect and misleading statements that should not be left unanswered.

First of all, Romney goes after the alleged limit on U.S. missile defense - in order to "preserve the treaty's restrictions on Russia," he asserts, "America must effectively get Russia's permission for any missile defense expansion." We all know, of course, that this is not true. But, in addition, I am not sure I understand the logic of the argument. How exactly the treaty gives Russia a leverage? If Russia eventually decides to leave the treaty in response to U.S. missile defense expansion, everybody would find themselves roughly where Mr. Romney and his colleagues want them to be - with no treaty and with an expanded U.S. missile defense. This is hardly a leverage.

The op-ed reiterates the ridiculous "rail-road launcher loophole" charge. This has been already looked at in this blog and elsewhere (CRS report by Amy Woolf is particularly good for this and other issues), so I don't think it is worth talking about again. However, I should note that when Romney says about "reports of growing interest in rail-mobile ICBMs" he is simply making things up - there is no interest in reviving the rail-mobile ICBM program in Russia and there are no reports that would suggest that there is.

Another gem in Mitt Romney's collection is the idea of ICBMs deployed on bombers. This is, of course, technically possible, but even during the cold war the United States and the Soviet Union found this idea quite unreasonable. Should they change their minds, the treaty provides a mechanism for counting and limiting those - according to Article V.2 of the treaty the Bilateral Consultative Commission would consider any "new kind of strategic offensive arm," which it definitely would be. In any event, in the treaty as it stands today, there is no loophole that would exempt those hypothetical bomber-deployed MIRVed ICBMs from treaty limits - a bomber that would carry an ICBM would not be a "heavy bomber" under the treaty definition (it applies only to airplanes that can carry ALCMs and bombs), so it cannot be counted as having just one warhead.

The next point is a bit more serious - the op-ed argues that the treaty would not require Russia to eliminate any existing launchers and that it would even permit Russia to deploy new systems, including a new "heavy-load" MIRVed ICBM. Technically, he has a point - Russia's numbers are already very much below the treaty limits. Then, Russia has indeed been looking into developing a new ICBM, the Rocket Forces issued a call for proposals and the current plan is to have the new missile by around 2016 (which is unrealistic, in my view). All options appear to open at this point, but it is likely that the new missile, if developed, would strongly resemble UR-100NUTTH/SS-19 - its designers have been lobbying for this project for some time now.

But the new ICBM is where Romney gets is exactly backwards. Not having an arms control treaty is the best strategy for making sure that this new ICBM will be developed and deployed. At the same time, the New START Treaty constrains, even though they may appear modest, are very likely to kill the program - if we look at the numbers, at the 1550 warhead level Russia already does not have much room for a MIRVed ICBM. If the arms control process continues, as it should, then we mere prospect of having a ceiling of, say, 1000 warheads, would almost certainly put a lid on any new ICBM development.

Now to tactical nuclear weapons. Romney argues that "Russia outnumbers us by as much as 10 to 1." This is a point that is often repeated in Washington, but it is quite a bit of an overstatement, to put it mildly. Russia does have more deployed tactical nuclear warheads than the United States, but the difference is less dramatic - Russia is estimated to have about 2,000 deployed non-strategic warheads with another about 3,300 being in reserve or awaiting dismantlement. The United States has 500 deployed non-strategic warheads, which means that as far as the deployed weapons are concerned, the ratio is more like 4 to 1. The United States also has some reserve warheads and warheads that are scheduled to be dismantled - the numbers are 2,500 and 3,500-4,300 respectively (these, however, include strategic warheads as well).

I have no idea where Mitt Romney got a number of "more than 10,000 nuclear warheads that are categorized as tactical." Then, whatever the number, contrary to what Romney believes, none of these warheads are" mounted on missiles" that "can reach [U.S.] allies" - a large number of these are warheads for air and missile defense and others are nuclear torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. Most of these weapons are removed to storage and are not operationally deployed.

This is not to say that the issue of tactical weapons should not be addressed. But it is certain that by engaging Russia in arms control process the administration will have a better shot at resolving it than those who argue that the issue should somehow solve itself before any talks with Russia can begin.

Interestingly enough, when talking about tactical warheads, Romney makes a point that underscores importance of the treaty - he asks, "[W]ho can know how those tactical nuclear warheads might be reconfigured?" This is a legitimate question. This is why the treaty, in fact, addresses it - its explicit limit on the the number of strategic launchers, which serves to ensure that "those tactical nuclear warheads" cannot be reconfigured into anything that they are not.

I think at this point it is clear that any opposition to the New START is very much a result of partisan politics. This certainly complicates the issue quite a bit for the administration, since partisan arguments are usually impervious to reason (as the issue of the "rail-mobile launcher loophole" clearly demonstrates). Having an agreement with Russia is only part of the deal, and probably the easier one. Senate could be a tougher challenge. Well, the administration managed the first part very successfully, let's hope it will manage the second one as well.