The U.S. State Department released the 2015 Compliance Report. I don't think anyone was counting on the State Department to release more information about the substance of its claim of Russia's non-compliance with the INF treaty. The State fully met everyone's expectations - there are nothing specific there.
Having said that, a simple track change comparison with the 2014 Compliance Report shows some interesting changes. First of all, the report adds two more articles of the treaty to its "compliance analysis":
Paragraph 7 of Article VII provides that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLCM.Paragraph 8 of Article VII of the INF Treaty provides that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLCM.
This may not be very significant, but it does seem to support my guess that the violation is a technicality that involved a test from a "wrong" kind of a launcher:
the violation is largely a technicality having to do with the fact that the INF Treaty requires that any missile that is not a GLCM covered by the treaty should be test-launched from a "fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers." Strictly speaking, a test of a SLCM (with a range of more than 500 km) from a road-mobile launcher would mean that this SLCM would qualify as a GLCM and therefore will be a treaty violation.
The difference between a "fixed land-based" and "mobile" launcher is rather thin - for example, as far as I can tell, a cruise missile can be tested from some kind of a truck, but if that truck has its wheels taken off it could conceivably classified as a "fixed" launcher. But if the wheels are there, it would become mobile (even if it doesn't move much).
So, I think the evidence that we have still suggests that it was a sea-launched cruise missile that was tested from a truck that happened to have wheels. It is a violation of the letter of the treaty of course, but not a very dramatic one.
Politically, of course, it is a rather big deal, especially if it turns out that RS-26 is in fact an intermediate-range missile. Unlike the cruise missile, this one would be a clear violation of the spirit, but not the letter of the INF Treaty, making it is difficult to bring a formal complaint. But to leave these two developments without a response is not really an option for the United States. so it went after the truck.
The book
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Unless US publishes some evidence of the breach from National Technical Means, they lack any credibility of this issue.
I mean, let's consider US' ultimate goal in this matter. I assume it's not a roundabout pretext to leave INF themselves. so, to me, the goal must be to force Russia to admit to a technical breach. But since Russia continues to insist there is no breach, there is zero pressure on Russia to change course. Unless we see that evidence.
The only pressure US is exerting right now are empty threats to put some fabled GLBMs in Europe (what GLBMs, one might ask). This is not a credible threat and will lead nowhere.
As I understand, the U.S. goal is just the opposite - keep Russia from leaving the treaty. I don't think there should be any doubt that the violation is real (although it seems to be very minor), but now that there is a claim of noncompliance, it's very difficult for Russia to withdraw. Unless it can demonstrate that it is indeed in good standing. But by not releasing any details about the issue, the U.S. makes Russia's defense quite complicated.
Pavel, what is your opinion on the merits of the argument that Aegis Ashore represents a similar minor technical breach, since it is an exact copy of the Mk 41 VLS, which has been used previously to launch Tomahawk ASCM (a version of Gryphon GLCM)?
Aegis Ashore is most likely a violation of the treaty as well (I said it earlier). Since, as I understand, none of them have been deployed yet, there is no actual violation - only a potential one. It can be relatively easily corrected, though, if the AA launchers are made "distinguishable" from the ones that were used in SLCM tests. This can be done in a variety of ways - it well may be that just painting them in a different color may do the trick. This is more or less what Russia did with RS-24 to claim that it's not Topol-M - the only distinguishable feature was a red box on the launch canister. Here is the 2007 JCIC statement:
The launch canisters in which the prototype ICBM, and full-scale models of it, exit from the monitored facility have external and functional differences that will make it possible to distinguish these launch canisters from other items of continuous monitoring. These external and functional differences [...] consist of a removable technological section on the forward ed of the launch canister, which is painted red, and a four-digit number painted on the left side of the launch canister.
Just an opinion. I sincerely think the American protest of the “technical violation” of the INF Treaty by Russia is a gambit. Was this a naval cruise missile test from a "wrong" kind of a launcher just a mistake? Or, was Russia sending a message? If so, what was the “message”? The US doggedly pressing this issue is designed to gauge Russian interest in the INF Treaty itself. Is this agreement any longer important to Russia? What exactly is important to Russia? No one in NATO or the EU has a clue as to Russia’s ambitions or future goals. Ukraine has thrown trans-Atlantic relations into crisis. Let’s face it, there really isn’t a “West”. Only the Kremlin collectively thinks of the United States, NATO and the EU as the “West”. The “West” is a Russian invention. If Russia has problems, it’s the “West”; that’s who to blame. What the United States has learned in the last year or two is that our basic policy regarding Russia has failed. There can be no “re-set”. Russia’s Ukraine intervention, as however you define it, has upset the geo-strategic balance in Europe. Meddling in Ukraine’s internal affairs is one thing; annexing outright the Crimea is another. All this talk of “Novorossiya” has startled Europe. Just how big is “New Russia” anyway? What’s next? Another painful lesson the US has learned in the last year or so is there is no compromise with Vladimir Putin. President Putin sees compromise as a weakness to be exploited. He is a strong leader with great tactical skills; he has no equal on the international stage today. As far as the United States is concerned, Russia has moved from a peer competitor to an adversary; an adversary without compromise. These are fragile times.
Frank Shuler
USA
The INF rhetoric by US raised recently is just a bluff thats designed to take advantage of current EU-Russian crisis.
Neither EU nor Russia would want to see Nuclear Weapons getting deployed like IRBM or GLCM type weapons.
No one wants to go back to LOW posture once Intermediate Range Weapons gets deployed increasing the risk of Nuclear Threshold.
One can argue Russia deploying such weapons would make it easier for it to deal with China but then it will create its own problem.
Most likely the rhetoric will die a natural death as tension cools.
Frank: On the INF, I'm certain it's not a mistake. But it took the U.S. quite a while to make sure that there is a violation. My guess is the administration would be perfectly okay with handling it through a quiet exchange with Russia, but it had to go public once the Republicans got wind of it.
Pavel, not a mistake in the sense that Russia deliberately on purpose violated the INF Treaty with the test? Or, not a mistake as in the United States was wrong in the accusation in the first place?
Rose Gottemoeller, the State Department’s senior arms control official, first raised the possibility of a violation with Russian officials two years ago for a cruise missile that was first tested back in 2008. The Senate and House joint intelligence committee was notified soon after by the Obama Administration. This is way old news; I don’t think this can be placed on the Republicans. The discussion here is what to do next.
Frank Shuler
USA
It's not a mistake in the sense that there was a technical violation (although I believe it was not deliberate).
The Republicans are now part of the picture because the administration apparently had some suspicions and was conducting an investigation at the time New START was being ratified in 2010.
Technical violations or different interpretations of the treaty terms and requirements arise all the time and are handled through the Special Verification Commission. There are always complaints on both sides, but they are handled through appropriate channels.
The reason why this is getting such huge press now is purely political.
I do not for a single second believe that USG actually fears a Russian breakout. This is pure political pressure, a media campaign to gain leverage vis-a-vis Russia in international affairs and induce it to change policy on other matters (Ukraine, Iran, Syria, etc) as a quid pro quo.
Election campaign in US will only make it more difficult for USG to dial down the public rhetoric, even if Russian policy isn't a huge part of the election agenda in US.
artjomh
I think that is the issue. This is a two year old problem that hasn’t been resolved by the Special Verification Commission or by direct governmental peer-to-peer conversations. The US says it was a violation and Russia says it has no clue what the US is even talking about. It certainly is politics; on both sides.
I would argue that the “media campaign” to exert “political pressure” on Russia is way overblown. One thing the US has learned in the last year or two is that it has no ability to “leverage” the Kremlin on any topic. Russia is going to do what it wants to do; without fear of consequences. We just don’t have a clue what Russia “wants to do”. What it wants to do next. That is the danger in all of this.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank, is there any evidence that Russia wants out of INF?
I remember when US suspended participation in ABM treaty and Russia suspended participation in CFE treaty. Both actions were preceded by months of public campaign to win the "hearts and minds". There was a lot of internal effort expended on both sides to demonstrate the threats posed to both countries that cannot be hindered while within treaty limits, how "unfair" those treaties were, etc, etc.
GOR does not exist in some sort of Stalinist vacuum: if it wanted to exit INF treaty, it would need "buy in" from Russian people. And GOR is very good in terms of securing that buy in through media. But there is nothing like going on right now. There is no public anti-INF campaign.
Is US afraid of Russia leaving INF? I don't think there is any evidence it should be. Is US afraid of not being able to read Russia's "poker tell"? Well, that's just part of doing business, I am afraid.
artjomh
Again, I think that is the real purpose of the “cruise missile gambit”. The United States is trying to gauge Russian intentions regarding the INF Treaty. One thing is for certain, Russia will do what is in its nationalistic interest. If Russia stays in the INF; that takes us down one road. If Russia decides to legally end compliance in the Treaty, that takes us down another road. It’s really that simple.
Let’s face it, when “Aegis Ashore” goes operational at Deveselu, Romania this fall, many questions will be answered.
Frank Shuler
USA