I have a brief column on Russia and the INF violation at the European Leadership Network - Don't help Russia destroy the INF Treaty. I don't think the main point I'm trying to make there is particularly controversial - while the United States appears to have reasons to call Russia's noncompliance, the infraction does not seem to be serious enough to press the case too forcefully. Indeed, leaning too hard would only help Russia slam the door and leave the treaty. For what it's worth, the U.S. administration made a smart move - now that the accusation has been made, Russia will find it more difficult to leave the treaty, even if it has been the idea all along. Not impossible, of course, but still.
A couple of points that are probably worth emphasizing. First, as I suspected, the alleged violation is not about the R-500 cruise missile or the Iskander system - U.S. officials were said to informally confirm that. Russian sources also say that the deployed Iskander/R-500 cruise missiles are treaty-compliant.
Second, the evidence presented by the United States to Russia is apparently rather thin - in fact, one Russian official said scornfully that they have to deal with Twitter messages and photos. Some sources say that the United States did not even tell Russia what particular cruise missile this is about. This is somewhat hard to believe, especially since Anatoly Antonov said (my apologies for a link to RT) that the issue was discussed at the end of 2013 and his understanding is that the United States accepted Russia's explanations. So, Russia must know what the issue is. As for the Twitter evidence, I wouldn't be surprised if the United States did not show all its cards - it is quite careful about protecting methods and sources.
In any event, it appears that Russia took the issue seriously and agreed to discuss it at what appears to be a fairly high-level meeting in September. We will see what that meeting produces. But as I understand, Russia is not in the mood to make any corrective actions - it wants the United States to take the accusations back and is perfectly prepared to leave the treaty if this doesn't happen.
Indeed, I was told that quite a few programs that are under development today in Russia simply assume that there are no INF Treaty constraints. And long-range cruise missiles seem to be among those programs. These include various modifications of the 3M14 missile (such as 3M14S, where "S" apparently stands for "strategic", meaning long-range and possibly nuclear). While the 3M14 we have seen is a 6-meter missile, there are 8-meter long modifications as well, which would take us to the SS-N-21 and SSC-X-4 territory. The INF Treaty, of course, does not prohibit development or deployment of SLCMs and we should keep in mind that the difference between an SLCM and GLCM is not particularly big.
One final point. In response to the non-compliance finding, Russia, of course, made some counter-accusation. What's interesting, these seem to have some merit.
First, Russia says that armed drones qualify as GLCM - a literal reading of the treaty seems to suggest that that's the case. Let me copy part of the discussion over at Armscontrolwonk.com, where Thomas Moore tried to rebuff Russia's claims (not very convincingly, as far as I'm concerned):
The INF treaty defines "ground-launched cruise missile" as follows (Article II.2):
The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.
It depends on the definition of cruise missile, but it is provided right there:
The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path.
Thomas argued that Russia didn't provide a definition of the term "weapon-delivery vehicle," but it didn't have to - the United States provided one in a note exchange:
In this connection, it is also the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that the term 'weapon-delivery vehicle' in the Treaty means any ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile in the 500 kilometer to 5500 kilometer range that has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon -- that is, any warhead, mechanism or device, which, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it.
I don't see how one could make an argument that armed drones are not GLCMs. [UPDATE: Well, maybe there is a way - see the discussion in comments.]
Also, Russia is arguing that deployment of Mk-41 launchers as part of the missile defense sites in Poland and Romania would violate the treaty. This case is not quite clear cut, but Russia seems to have a point.
The Mk-41 Vertical Launch System is capable of launching a range of missiles, including Tomahawk SLCM. There is nothing wrong with that - the INF Treaty does not limit SLCMs and, indeed, allows testing SLCMs from a ground-based launcher as long as this launcher is fixed and located at a designated test site. Unless the United States tested a GLCM from an Mk-41, these launchers are not considered GLCM launchers for the purposes of the INF treaty and, strictly speaking, the treaty does not limit them in any way. But deploying these launchers on land does seem to go against the spirit of the treaty - deployment of a bunch of SLCM launchers on land would be a way to deploy a bunch of GLCMs. And yes, fixed launchers are GLCM launchers in the INF Treaty (Article II.4):
The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.
One can argue (as Thomas Moore did) that since the particular launchers that will be deployed in Poland and Romania have not been used to launch SLCMs, they don't qualify as SLCM launchers, but that's not a strong argument. Even though the INF Treaty does not explicitly define SLCM launchers, the common practice in arms control treaties is that if you test a SLCM from a launcher (Mk-41 in this case), all launchers of this type would be considered SLCM launchers. So, I would say that it's reasonable to argue that deployment of Mk-41 anywhere on land outside of agreed test ranges would not be exactly treaty compliant. This would not be an issue if the missile-defense Mk-41 were "distinguishable" from those that were used in SLCM tests, but as I understand, they are not.
So, it looks like the United States and Russia are in for an interesting INF discussion in September. Let's hope we'll learn more about the U.S. accusations and about Russia's response.
The book
Comments
Meanwhile, the second Iskander cruise missile is found.
Earlier only one cruise missile under designation 9M728 appeared -- see here biography of Pavel Kamnev, the Novator chief designer: http://www.midural.ru/100034/100086/
However now the second missile 9M729 appeared on the official site of one important Russian research institute: http://госниип.рф/present-time
I think all this goes to the heart of trust; not weapons. Perhaps the meeting in September will be an opportunity for a frank and broad discussion on Russo-American relations; where we are, where we’re headed. Perhaps it will be the first step to Russia withdrawing from the INF Treaty. Perhaps it will simply be “political theater” with joint accusations, finger pointing and little else. There may have been little trust between the Kremlin and Washington lately; but, after Crimea, there is none. Perhaps that trust can be rebuilt or not. However, if Russia walks away from the INF Treaty or “is perceived” to simply ignores its Treaty obligations, it means the end of arms control agreements between Russia and the United States.
I don’t think New START would survive.
Lots at stake.
Frank Shuler
USA
Armed drones are not GLCMs because the word "missile" has always been understood to mean a type of expendable munition, whereas armed drones are meant to (optionally) carry and launch munitions, then fly home and be reused.
It is true that some types of missiles are remotely guided all the way to target and can be diverted to abort an attack, but this has not been true of IR GLCMs and no type of missile has ever before had the option to return home unexploded.
Armed drones did not exist when the INF Treaty was negotiated so one has to ask what categories of weapon system that did exist at that time. Manned aircraft did exist. Armed drones are at least as similar to manned aircraft as they are to cruise missiles. They are unmanned, but remotely piloted, they launch munitions optionally and they return to base. So one can argue at least as convincingly that they are like manned aircraft as that they are like cruise missiles. More honestly, one must admit that they are another category entirely.
Mark: Thank you. These are good arguments, but I'm not sure that that they are correct in a narrow legal sense. The treaty clearly defines a cruise missile as "an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle" - it doesn't matter if it's expendable or piloted. On the other hand, this definition would probably cover manned aircraft as well, so there is a case to be made that aircraft-type vehicles should not be covered.
Someone suggested another approach - GLCM is a "ground-launched" cruise missile. "Launched" is the key word here - aircraft are not launched, they take off. But I guess one could argue that drones are more like missiles in this regard.
Actually, Cruise Missiles have been turned round and "sent home" - though this has always been into the sea, nearby to something that can recover the warheads (well the remains of the missile containing the warhead)
They fly them to a location where they orbit, run out of fuel and stall,crashing into the sea
Cruise Missiles can also attack multiple targets, which I'm sure you're all aware of, so in "theory" the likening of UAVs to GLCMs is correct, though I find it very dubious myself
High-level INF meeting will take place in Moscow tomorrow:
http://www.interfax.ru/world/395526
Following the results of the first day of consultations the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs got off with very strong statements:
http://www.militarynews.ru/Story.asp?rid=1&nid=352371
http://ria.ru/world/20140911/1023692789.html
Consultations will proceed tomorrow...
If I understand the situation correctly, U.S. accusations are very hard to prove.
It's interesting to see some progress on Mk-41 - looks like the U.S. promised some "distinguishable" features.
[It's interesting to see some progress on Mk-41 - looks like the U.S. promised some "distinguishable" features.]
It sounds like progress is being made. At least both sides are “talking” and if the US is offering some “concessions” on the MK-41s that’s a plus.
The INF Treaty is important; the lynchpin of arms agreements between Russia and the US. This dialog between the Kremlin and Washington is essential if trust is to be restored.
Frank Shuler
USA
Actually ineffectual conversation took place:
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2567310
Alexander Stukalin
Pavel Podvig
Any conclusions on this meeting?
Frank Shuler
USA
Nothing that hasn't been reported already.
Two good photos of the Iskander cruise missile:
http://мультимедиа.минобороны.рф/images/military/military/photo/vostok2014_iskander-m-900_8.jpg
http://мультимедиа.минобороны.рф/images/military/military/photo/vostok2014_iskander-m-900_7.jpg
This missile was launched on September 20 in the Far East during Vostok-2014 military exercises:
http://мультимедиа.минобороны.рф/multimedia/photo/gallery.htm?id=18310@cmsPhotoGallery
http://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201409201039-73er.htm
Meanwhile, in 2015 the Russian Army will have seven Iskander brigades. Five of these will be deployed in the European zone of Russia:
http://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201410010942-uw7x.htm
Pavel,
really someone wanted to return to the past and to live in conditions of 1979-1985 a little?
"...The Pentagon options, Mr. McKeon said, include deploying new defenses against cruise missiles; exploring whether to deploy American ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe...":
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/us/politics/pentagon-to-press-russia-on-arms-pact-violation.html?smid=fb-share&_r=1
"...The Pentagon is considering the re-deployment of nuclear cruise missiles in Europe in response to a new Russian cruise missile that the United States has charged violates a 1987 nuclear treaty, a senior Pentagon official told Congress on Wednesday...":
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/pentagon-considering-deployment-of-nuclear-missiles-in-europe/
I actually watched the whole thing (the video is here). These options were hypotheticals in response to rather aggressive questions - both McKeon and Gottemoeller emphasized that the U.S. is interested in keeping the treaty in force. They put the blame on Russia, of course, and were puzzled why Russia would want to go back to the situation of the 1980s, when it was facing Pershing missiles etc. Which would be a legitimate question if it were an actual violation of the treaty. I don't think it is - more likely it was a technical oversight. But we still don't know all the details.
1) I see this situation so that the INF Treaty was written in specific political conditions nearly 30 years ago (as "eliminating" only), and in present conditions it is so bad that doesn't allow to check the new "suspicious" missiles of other party.
2) Anyway the Pentagon shouldn't make such statements. As in this case the Pentagon threatened just that Putin wanted to hear. And tomorrow I will hear on TV that "the American mongers of war again threaten Russia with Tomahawks" and we have to strengthen defense.
3) The USA after all have to publish accurate claims to Russia: what "forbidden" missile mean. For very many experts it is clear for a long time what is the missile, but why the USA publicly don't call it is not clearly... (???)
The Pentagon has its own internal political pressure to deal with. They simply said that they if Russia deploys GLCMs in violation of the INF Treaty, the U.S. will have to consider doing the same. Which is not unreasonable. The politics of this could get ugly pretty quickly, but unfortunately the thing now has its own momentum and it would be difficult for anyone involved, whether Russia or the United States, to put it back into the bottle.
As for No.3, I don't think it is clear what is the cruise missile in question. We know it on very good authority that it is not R-500 Iskander. As far as I can tell, the U.S. never told Russia what is the missile that is involved, although Rose said at the hearings that the U.S. gave Russia "key pieces of information."
As for No.3...
Pavel, You really believe that Iskander cruise missiles fly only to 500 km?
I gave right there in topics references to statements of the Russian Navy admiral and Ural engineers that there is at the Novator company missile with range of 2.800 km...
I pointed even directly to two Iskander missiles (9M728 and 9M729)... And now compare to Tomahawks - nuclear and not nuclear
Whether Iskander could fly over 500 km is not the issue here. We know it's not the missile that triggered the complaint - there is a different one. Of course, building a cruise missile with 500+ km range is not a big deal - it's been done before.
Then for the U.S. all this would be very strange: not to notice Iskander cruise missile with range of 2800 km, and to complain of the "different оne".
I guess this means that Iskander has not been tested on more than 500 km range.
But except the Novator's we have no other ground-based cruise missiles and it isn't expected... :-)
As I understand, Novator has quite a few missiles under development. Whether they are ground-based or not is not really relevant here.
It is notable that Russians (in some sense) just swapped their US partners in this "INF compliance&violation game". The following points are cited by the 1988 Document "The INF Treaty: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate" (see page 60). They seem to be interesting in current context:
1. The possibility of circumvention through SLCM's arises because SLCM's are virtually identical to GLCM's.
2. The possibility exists for THE SOVIET UNION to produce a large number of SLCM's and test them in a ground-based mode rendering them very similar to GLCM's.
3. Soviet deployment of a large covert force would be unlikely because the exception is designed for testing purposes and the difference between preparing a large force of fixed land-based SLCM's and merely testing SLCM's in a land-based mode would be "readily undersatndable".
4. Unlike current GLCM's which are mobile, such a force would have to be a fixed system.
5. This exception was a result of a U.S. requirement to test SLCM's in a ground-based mode.
6. "Article II,2 clearly excludes GLCMs that are not "weapon-delivery vehicles," such as reconnaissance drones". Concerns were raised that the SOVIET UNION could exploit this exception by producing, testing, and deploying GLCM's designed as drones.
7. the Treaty allows reconnaissance (!) drones.