For the START Plus treaty to have any chance to come into force before December, the United States and Russia would probably have to agree on the basic outline of the treaty during the upcoming visit of President Obama to Moscow. I think it is quite possible, especially if Russia does not try insist on a formal U.S. commitment to forgo missile defense deployment in Eastern Europe (this is not to say that missile defense is a good idea, it's just that there are better ways of dealing with the issue).
At this point it looks like both sides would be happy with the new treaty setting a limit of 1500 operationally deployed warheads - that would be a more than 30 percent reduction from the 2200 level specified in the Moscow treaty. Hardly a breakthrough, but still a reasonably low number.
Getting an agreement on the number of launchers would be somewhat more difficult. For Russia, the limit on launchers is quite important, because it sees it as a way to limit U.S. "upload potential". Whether it is the best way of dealing with the issue is somewhat debatable, but this is an important part of Russia's official position.
The United States apparently suggested setting the limit at 1100 strategic launchers. Russia reportedly wants to go significantly lower, probably to 500 launchers. These proposals, of course, reflect the current status of strategic forces - by the last START count the United States has 1198 launchers, while Russia has 814. Here is how these numbers break down:
U.S. START data (January 1, 2009)
| Minuteman III | 550 | 451 deployed ICBMs |
| MX/Peacekeeper | 0 | |
| Trident I | 96 | 0 deployed SLBMs |
| Trident II | 336 | |
| B-1 | 56 | |
| B-2 | 19 | |
| B-52 | 141 | 94 with ALCMs + 47 with bombs |
| Total | 1198 |
The four submarines that are listed in START as carrying Trident I missiles have, in fact, been converted to SLCM carriers. The missiles are still listed as deployed, but the listings are accompanied by footnotes that say "TRIDENT I SLBMS CONSIDERED DEPLOYED HERE ARE LOCATED AT OTHER FACILITIES AND REPORTED AS NON-DEPLOYED".
As we can see, there is not a lot of room for reductions here. If the new treaty preserves the START definition of a deployed launcher, then the United States could eliminate the 99 empty ICBM silos to get to the 1100 level. Which, as I understand, is exactly the plan. Getting lower than that would require either liquidating more ICBM silos (I don't think the U.S. would be ready to touch other legs of the triad) or changing the definition.
The smart thing to do in this situation would be to get rid of the ICBM force (isn't it what Reagan wanted - to get rid of ballistic missiles?), but the U.S. administration could not realistically do it before the results of the Nuclear Posture Review are available (and, unfortunately, NPR is unlikely to endorse this option anyway).
Russia, of course, is already way below the suggested 1100 level:
Russia START data (January 1, 2009)
| SS-18 | 104 | 68 deployed ICBMs |
| SS-19 | 120 | 72 deployed ICBMs |
| SS-25 | 180 | |
| SS-27 silo | 50 | |
| SS-27 mobile | 15 | |
| SS-N-18 | 96 | 76 deployed SLBMs |
| SS-N-20 | 40 | 21 deployed SLBMs |
| SS-N-23 | 96 | |
| RSM-56/Bulava | 36 | 0 deployed SLBMs |
| Bear/Tu-95MS | 63 | |
| Blackjack/Tu-160 | 14 | |
| Total | 814 |
Even though the total number of launchers listed in START is 814, if we don't count the empty silos and launch tubes (as well as the SS-N-20 SLBMs on Typhoon submarines) the number would be 634. Given that the Project 667BDR submarines with SS-N-18 missiles are being liquidated, as are SS-19 and some of SS-18 ICBMs, 500 launchers is indeed a reasonable number for Russia to suggest. In fact, the current plan is to have a 400-launchers force.
The number of launchers may emerge as a major contentious point at the talks, but I hope that it won't. It would still be possible to get to the lower launcher count, but only if Russia agrees to a new definition of a deployed launcher, for example, the one that would exclude launchers that are not "operationally deployed" - Trident I submarines, non-nuclear B-1 bombers, Trident II submarines that are in overhaul. That would add up to another 200 launchers (96+56+48), bringing the U.S. total down to 899, but I don't think that would be worth it - it is much better to keep launchers on the books, even though the number would be somewhat higher. After all, compared to the START ceiling of 1600 launchers, getting to 1100 would be a reduction of more than 30 percent - again, hardly a breakthrough, but not bad either.
The main point, of course, is that it would be much better to have a treaty with somewhat higher numbers and to keep the transparency and verification structure in place than to have no treaty at all. I believe that if the presidents announce in Moscow that they agreed to have the START-Plus treaty that would set the limits of 1500 warheads and 1100 launchers, there is a reasonably good chance to have the treaty done by December.
The book
Comments
However, if the United States continues to store W-76 and W-88 warheads for Trident that can be "uploaded" at any future date, what advantage for Russia does this bring?
If the US Navy Trident submarine fleet has 12 "operational submarines" at any give time and each boat is armed with 24 Trident II missiles, equipped with, say, three warheads each, only 864 deployed warheads under START-Plus will be "counted" against the Treaty. The same submarines could actually re-deploy in the future with up to 2304 warheads unless START-Plus limited the actual number of warheads the United States is allowed to inventory.
Hard to see where a limit on deployed warheads and launchers makes more sense than an actual limit on warheads themselves.
This is Russia's fight to win. The US will accept 1500/1100 tomorrow because the practical result is meaningless to the Pentagon.
Frank Shuler
USA
How about the Russian Upload capacity? It is stated that the R-29RM was tested with 10 warheads and that the R-29RMU can carry 10 as well, although they are just listed with 4 in the START data. Does that mean the ones listed now have a MIRV-Bus supporting only four warheads and a different Bus would be needed to upload them?
Martin
You bring up an interesting point. It was reported the Soviet Union indeed tested the R-29RM (SS-N-23) with a ten warhead package. For whatever reason, perhaps technical, only the four warhead SS-N-23 went to sea. One thing stands out. Russia always seems to struggles to adapt or modify existing nuclear systems to changing situations. I suspect for the Admiralty to update the Delta IV fleet to support more than the standard four-warhead package, would require extensive re-working on the third stage and BUS, the integrated guidance systems, and, I suspect, even require new nuclear warheads. If during the Sineva remanufacturing process, the decision was made not to increase the number of warheads, I don’t think it would be done now.
By contrast, the US Navy went to sea with the W-76 warhead in the late 1970‘s on the old Lafayette Class submarines (Polaris) modified to carry the Trident C-4 SLBMs (Trident I). The same W-76 warhead deployed on the USS Ohio in 1981 and was later modified to accommodate the new Trident D-5 missile (Trident II) in 1990. The W-76 has been extensively modified and remanufactured with new fuzes and guidance packages to the point , the previous only airburst weapon, today has GPS accuracy and can hold “hard targets” at risk. In fact, the W-76 is scheduled to be the main armament in the new Trident E-3 (Trident III) scheduled for introduction in the late 2020’s before a replacement submarine and strategic missile are build in the 2030s.
Trident has been tested with up to 12 W-76 warheads and adding or reducing the “package” doesn't seem to be much of an issue.
Good to see you post again!
Frank Shuler
USA
Cheers mate! I think it would be good to see a limit of 4 warheads per missile and a limitation of inactive stockpile as well. But I guess thats a bit too optimistic.
Martin
Perhaps it’s a time for cautious optimism, my friend.
It was released here in a story carried by AP that the framework agreement just signed in Moscow also calls for farther “negotiations aimed at future agreements” on a wide range of common issues; nuclear warhead inventories, tactical nuclear weapons, “joint Russian-American” missile defense opportunities, limiting nuclear proliferation such as working on an international ban on fissile material transfers and cooperation on global anti-terrorism to name a few. Perhaps some good will come from these talks. Both sides have much to gain.
Frank Shuler
USA