The July 2008 START MOU data released recently indicate that there have been no major changes in the number of strategic launchers and nuclear warheads in the first half of 2008. The number of weapons carried by strategic submarines and bombers hadn't changed since January 2008 - 611 nuclear warheads are associated with strategic submarines and 884 with strategic bombers.
The number of ICBMs changed, but not dramatically. As of July 1, 2008 Russia had 415 missiles (15 fewer than in January), which could carry 1575 nuclear warheads. The change was due to continuing withdrawal from service of Topol/SS-25 and UR-100NUTTH/SS-19 missiles.
My estimate is that as a result of these changes the Russian strategic forces currently include 667 strategic delivery vehicles that can carry 3070 nuclear warheads.
As always, there is an issue of what is included into this count and what is not. The START treaty has very detailed and fairly complicated counting rules, which if applied strictly would give a different set of numbers. My approach is to give an upper bound estimate that would include systems that may not be operational at the moment but that could plausibly return into the active force (e.g. submarines in overhaul). At the same time, systems that are not yet ready for deployment (e.g. Bulava missile) are not included.
The book
Comments
Interesting background report (Reuters) on the recent SS-19 test launch from Baikonur. This operational test was to confirm the readiness of the SS-19 and extend its end-of-service life to 2010. Note the comment on deferring new ICBMs to free up funds for other, more pressing, state projects. These comments in the press release did not quote a Russian source. Do we have any farther details?
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20081022/wl_nm/us_russia_missile_test_1
Frank Shuler
USA
An AP article posted here in the US quoted Russia's Strategic Missile Force chief Col.-Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, that the RS-24 would be introduced later this year to the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and would supersede existing Russian ICBM deployments. Older Soviet designed missiles would be updated with decoys and such to preserve their usefulness and arrangements with Ukraine were in place to support such systems. I took this to mean that the RS-24 would replace the Topol-M SS-27 in production and that existing SS-25, SS-19, and SS-18 missiles would be retained in inventory past their anticipated end-of-service life.
Any thoughts?
Frank Shuler
USA
RS-24 is Topol-M, so it is hardly surprising that it would "replace" it. As for older missiles, some of them (R-36M2) are expected to be around until about 2016.
Pavel, let me ask the question a different way. Do you think the MIRV RS-24 will be the only version of the Topol-M missile to be build and deployed in the near future or do you think the RS-12M2 silo ICBM and the mobile version, the RS-12M1, will continue in production? Will there be a silo version of the RS-24?
Frank Shuler
USA
I think I discussed it somewhere. My guess is that all silo-based Topol-Ms will remain single-warhead.
Pavel, sorry for being so obtuse. My confusion was in Col.-Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov’s comments and I was attempting to gain clarity. His statement was that the RS-24 would supersede all Russian ICBMs deployments. Do we then draw the conclusion that the deployment of the single-warhead mobile and silo missile versions of the Topol-M has ended or will shortly end when the existing missiles in the production cycle have been delivered? Is this an accurate conclusion or is my Russian translation at fault? (that’s a real possibility)
Frank Shuler
USA
I wouldn't try to read too much into Solovtsov's words. It certainly would make sense to stop further deployment of single-warhead Topol-Ms once MIRVEd ones (RS-24) are available, but it's not the only option.
I don't understand this reasoning. Surely the 550 kt Marv warhead is more survivable against ABM defenses than 3 ~100kt Mirv's.
Jon
I think with Russia, it’s all about the numbers. Nuclear arms, at least between Russia and the United States, are more political tools than actual military weapons. Russia needs a nuclear inventory of warheads that is the equal or near-equal of America’s for domestic political consumption. Russia is no more “powerful” with 10,000 warheads than she is with 3,000. (or 1,000) The United States plays this “numbers game” too. I think that is why we spend billions of defense dollars a year maintaining aging nuclear weapons we have no intention of ever using. The argument is the vast numbers of surplus American warheads serve as a hedge against a changing future and its uncertainty. That’s an argument; just not a good one.
Frank Shuler
USA
Jon Grams,
I suppose RS-24 should be a missile that carries 3 independently controlled Marv warheads and not ballistic warheads that follow a ballistic trajectory. Otherwise, there would be nothing new in development of this missile.
K.A.Sharma,
That would be ideal, but can the RS-24 carry the extra weight and still maintain the Topol-M's boost-phase acceleration capabilities?
Jon Grams,
The weight of warheads will definitely increase, but relative to the Topol-M missile's own wt. with single warhead of 500 kt. an RS-24 with 3 warheads of 100 kt each will only increase marginally 'cause the weight of the missile with its solid fuel is relatively much heigher than its warheads. I suppose this increase would've been factored into its design. It is also reported that RS-24 is slightly heavier but within the acceptable limits.