Two weeks ago, the United States and Russia signed an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, commonly known as a "123 agreement." It was immediately attacked from all sides. Some members of Congress urged the Bush administration not to submit the document to Congress and threatened to block it once they did. Meanwhile, nuclear skeptics in Russia raised concerns that the agreement could revitalize the idea of importing foreign spent nuclear fuel into Russia or strengthen the U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. For their part, U.S. nuclear enthusiasts suspected Russia of attempting to gain access to advanced U.S. nuclear technologies, which, they argued, Moscow could use to establish a competitive advantage in the international nuclear trade.
There are many good reasons why such a nuclear deal should receive scrutiny and raise questions, but in this case, the opponents of the U.S.-Russian agreement are wrong. Whatever their concerns, blocking the cooperation agreement is the worst way to address them.
The congressional arguments against U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation have a long history and are well-known. The deal breaker is Russia's nuclear assistance to Iran, which some members of Congress believe should disqualify Moscow from being able to sign a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. In September 2007, the House of Representatives passed a bill that directly prohibited signing a 123 agreement with Russia; a similar bill is now under consideration in the Senate. Although the agreement itself doesn't require explicit congressional consent, Congress could block it by passing a resolution of disapproval--a possible outcome given the strength of congressional support for these bills.
But Congress will be disappointed if it thinks this will hinder Iran's nuclear program. Russia is helping Tehran construct a nuclear reactor in Bushehr, which has nothing to do with uranium enrichment--the most serious proliferation danger. Theoretically, Russia could use Bushehr as leverage to influence Iran's position on enrichment, but there are limits to that type of pressure. And at this point, any attempt to stop the Bushehr reactor could harm nonproliferation not help it: The international community is trying to assure non-nuclear states that they will have reliable access to civilian nuclear power; to do so, it must prove that these commitments are safe from U.S. political pressure.
Moreover, by blocking the U.S.-Russian agreement, Congress would undermine those in Russia who are arguing that Moscow should position itself as a responsible supplier of nuclear services and help the international community limit the scale of Iran's nuclear program. In addition, it would reinforce an already popular view in Russia that Washington is an unreliable partner who is determined to limit Moscow's access to Western markets. In other words, congressional disapproval would weaken pro-U.S. forces in Russia and empower those who engage in confrontational anti-American rhetoric. This is hardly a smart policy.
As for the concerns of environmental groups that the 123 agreement could bolster the plan to import spent nuclear fuel to Russia, they're largely unwarranted. The plan calls for importing U.S.-origin spent fuel to Russia for storage and disposal. A few years ago, when the Russian nuclear industry strongly supported such a plan, the lack of a nuclear cooperation agreement between Moscow and Washington was a critical obstacle. But this is no longer the case. Initial enthusiasm for the plan has waned as customers aren't exactly lining up to send their spent fuel to Russia. And when the United States made clear that it would object to the reprocessing of U.S.-origin fuel, the Russian nuclear industry, which planned on reprocessing the fuel to recover plutonium, stopped supporting the arrangement.
The current 123 agreement won't change any of this. Washington specifically excluded reprocessing from the list of activities that it will allow, meaning that bringing U.S.-origin fuel into Russia will remain an unattractive option for Moscow. Whatever the industry may think about the economic merits of this arrangement, it can't ignore the opposition to the plan that has been generated by persistent pressure from Russian environmental groups. The Russian public may be sympathetic to using the spent fuel to recover plutonium and produce electricity--a grand vision promoted by the Russian nuclear industry--but it's not ready to accept the idea of permanently burying nuclear waste somewhere in Siberia. Russian officials already pledged not to bring foreign-origin spent fuel into the country, and it's unlikely that the cooperation agreement would change the situation.
Finally, the notion that Russia is trying to get access to the best U.S. nuclear technologies seems contrived. Certainly, Russia would benefit from the cooperation, but in many areas, the United States stands to benefit more. For instance, U.S. power utilities would have access to Russian uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication services. Besides, these days, most advanced nuclear technologies require close international cooperation anyway.
Overlooked by nearly all of its opponents is the fact that the cooperation agreement is mostly a political document that could create a framework for a normal working partnership between Moscow and Washington. There are certainly many unresolved issues in the U.S.-Russian relationship--Iran among them. Similarly, there are legitimate concerns about many nuclear projects that the 123 agreement might potentially facilitate--i.e., the push for reprocessing and a plutonium economy. But all of these issues and projects should be discussed individually and not bundled artificially into one politically charged issue linked to a long list of grievances that Washington has about Moscow. Politicizing the issue of civilian nuclear cooperation would only make a reasonable discussion of substantial issues much more difficult than it needs to be.
The book
Comments
Pavel:
Well written and thought out article. Nuclear proliferation is a genie “out of the bottle”. The sooner the United States accepts this reality, the sooner American foreign policy will change to accommodate this new world order view. Today, I honestly don’t think the US fears nuclear weapons in the hands of any national government, but such technology flowing from such emerging nuclear powers to non-governmental organizations (read terrorist) terrifies the American policy makers. It is against this threat; the United States still hasn’t articulated a formulated response. If “9/11” happened again in America, what would be the US response? What if the attack used nuclear weapons? What would we do?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank:
The U.S. has articulated what they want to do about proliferation. While it has been very controversial. Section V of both the 2002 and 2006 deal with this issue. They are both available on the NSC website.
Rich
Of course you are right. However we all know the gap between “public policy” and actual practice. For example, the United States doesn’t negotiate with terrorist is stated American public policy while at the same time we were in intense “private conversations” with Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi in an effort to turn Libya; an operation that today looks very successful.
Today, Brazil has stated public policy to acquire a national nuclear industry, complete with civilian nuclear power plants, uranium processing and potential nuclear arms production in the future. Brazil also intends to build or procure nuclear submarines to protect its recently discovered off-shore oil assets. How does the United States react to a nuclear armed Brazil? Do we care?
Internationally, the United States can’t condemn Iran for its nuclear ambitions without discussing Israel. How many new nuclear powers will there be in twenty years? Interesting question.
Frank Shuler
USA
It appears I lost some words in my above post. I was talking about the National Security Statement (NSS)
Pavel, with all due respect, there is no evidence that any modern Russian politician has ever acted or will ever act in good faith. This includes those with ostensibly pro-American views. Therefore, agreements with them should be limited to a small number of short-term practical issues, not long-term cooperation.
Frank, your assessment of the proliferation problem is completely wrong. Proliferation to any country is not acceptable in any form and will, should it become necessary, be prevented by force. This will be the policy of the Obama administration as much as it would be the policy of the McCain administration. In the case of Iran, should pre-emptive measures fail, it's government and military will be completely destroyed immediately following any declaration of possession of nuclear weapons.
As regards the response to another large-scale terrorist attack on American soil, it will be similar to the one in 2001, but will incorporate the lessons learned in military operations since. There will be a political ultimatum, followed, in case of non-compliance, by a large-scale attack against the country where the terrorist attack was planned. Since that country is overwhelmingly likely to be Pakistan, the possibility exists that a demonstrative thermonuclear strike will be required.
It's stated by Frank that,
"It is against this threat; the United States still hasn’t articulated a formulated response. If “9/11” happened again in America, what would be the US response? What if the attack used nuclear weapons? What would we do?"
That is incorrect. The US has formulated such a response (Feb 2008 guidance by Bush) and there are good grounds to infer that it leaves open attacking Russia with nuclear weapons even in the case of leakage.
John Burke
MarkoB
It is naive to think that any attack on our country by an enemy of the United States would be solely countered by American military policy. While I’m sure the Pentagon has a military plan to fit every occasion, even an invasion by Costa Rica, any attack on the United States will be met by a “political response” and not just a military one. Study the Cuban Missile Crisis as a historical example of how politics work “in crisis”. I respect your opinions; I just think the situation is far more complicated than you have stated.
Why do you think the next attack on America will be planned from Pakistan? Why not Barcelona or Nairobi? What is to say primitive nuclear weapons created from the A. Q. Khan network are not already “in play”. My point is the United States really doesn’t fear a national government nuclear power because those governments can loosely be held to MAD as a reasonable political strategy. However, an organization such as al-Qaeda is entirely a different question. America would like to see the existing “nuclear club” remain exclusive. This goal will be difficult over the next twenty years and it will be interesting to follow our progress.
Frank Shuler
USA
"it's government and military will be completely destroyed immediately following any declaration of possession of nuclear weapons."
Garbage. North Korea is an excellent test case. No immediate reprisals followed. Instead just more talks. To be honest you seem like a gung ho war hawk, somewhat detached from reality. By the way, for arguments sake, if no coalition emerges to confront Iran, to you suggest the US should do it alone? And if so where do you propose to get the troops for the operation? Don't forget annihilating the country is only the beginning.
Frank, I am forced to state that your thoughts are confused and cluttered. Any attack on the United States leads to military action against the attackers. The politics assist the military action, they do not substitute for it in whole or in part. The Cuban Missile Crisis is completely irrelevant to the question of a response to an attack, since no attack on the United States took place.
A major terrorist attack on the USA will be planned from Pakistan because that is where the senior leadership of Al Qaeda is located. As to the A.Q. Khan network, there is no reason to believe it ever contacted a single individual terrorist or terrorist organisation.
The question whether nuclear weapons are possessed by a government or a non-government group is irrelevant. What is relevant is the nature of the leadership. The government of Iran is too dangerous to be permitted to hold nuclear weapons. Therefore, all necessary measures will be taken against that government in order to prevent it from obtaining such weapons.
Feanor, North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons does not directly threaten the vital interests of the United Sates, unlike the case with Iran. North Korea cannot destroy any of its neighbours with a nuclear first strike and does not provide direct assistance to terrorist organisations.
Iran is a different. No coalition to confront will ever emerge, because it is an ally of both China and Russia and an important energy source for the EU. The United States will attempt to coerce Iran by economic and political sanctions and if these do not succeed, it will act as I have outlined above. There will not be any ground attack, because regime change in Iran is not possible. The goal of the war will be the destruction of Iran's government and military followed by the isolation of the remnants, not a change in government.
John Burke
“Cluttered thoughts” I’ll give you, but not confusion. (grin) The stated military policy of the United States from May 14, 1955 on was to hold the Soviet Union directly responsible for any Soviet nuclear weapons deployed outside of the recognized Warsaw Pact boundaries. When Cuba fell to the Castro revolution in 1959, and publicly embraced communism in 1960, Moscow was specifically warned that nuclear weapons based there would put the Soviet Union proper at risk. It would not be tolerated. When the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted in 1961, General Curtis Emerson LeMay was astonished that pre-existing military policy agreed on at the highest level of government was overturned by the Kennedy White House. There would be no nuclear strike, or any strike for that matter, on Cuba in response. LeMay called the peaceful resolution of the crisis "the greatest defeat in our history."
I too share your opinion that Iran is the greatest international threat to world peace today. The chance of war between Tehran and Washington is real; the chance of a simple misunderstanding boiling over into a shooting war genuine. What I don’t accept is that the American response to such an event is policy “written in stone”.
Good exchange of views.
Frank Shuler
USA
The so-called "interests" of any nation, regardless of how "vital" they may be, are never an excuse for pre-emptive war. It is immoral, pure and simple. The US has absolutely no moral authority whatsoever to prevent any other sovereign country from obtaining nuclear weapons. "It's OK for us to have them because we are benevolent, morally superior, and have the best interests of the world at heart(laugh), but we will not allow anyone else to have them, because it will compromise our military superiority over your country."
This kind of foreign policy reasoning makes me ashamed and embarrased to be a US citizen.
I [...] doubt Iran is pursuing nuclear capability. First, it is far from a U235 95% enrichment level and design of portable weapons is not a trivial task. Second, it has viable asymmetrical retaliation tools. American planers know, a USA military aggression against Iran will be met with a potent asymmetrical and multidimensional retaliation aimed at reaching the “economical meltdown” of the aggressors. With the current oil-price level, the Iranian target to push the oil over US$ 300/barrel during at least a month is not 100% but is a realistic target. So they can asymmetrically cause more damage than with one or two nukes.
Of course there are some hot minds in USA talking about the “those evil Iranians and bla bla bla” but current realities weight more than empty words.
One or two nukes at Iraqi or Saudi oil fields would fit within this assymetric response nicely. Not to mention that it's really not that easy to cause an oil spike. Blocking the straits is very difficult given the weakness of the Iranian Navy, and given the USAF assets already in theater, air strikes by Iran are out of the question. So nukes in reality would be a very useful asset to complement Iran's capabilities.
Jon Grams
I have always believed in my county, “my country right or wrong”. Your words sadden me and leave me reflective. On this day, a Memorial Day for the veterans who died defending our freedoms, I hope you find your peace. I hope one day you find the ability to change this American policy you disagree with so. You have this right.
Frank Shuler
USA