The first submarine of the Project 955 Borey class, Yury Dolgoruky, was finally launched today at the Sevmash plant in Severodvinsk. One launch ceremony has already taken place - on April 15, 2007 - but the submarine was left in a dry dock after that.
According to the START treaty data, the submarine will carry 16 Bulava missiles (with six warheads each). The missile, however, is not ready yet, so it is unclear when the Yuri Dolgoruky submarine will be able to begin service.
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And you have to factor in at least 6 months in sea trials, but those will most likely be completed prior to missile anyway.
A good new after all. Yes, Bulava is not ready yet but the Dolgoruky can wait a few years while the crew is in the training process. It is also a slap to those who claimed (hoped?) that the vessel will never leave the docks.
Could Yuri use Sineva SLBM instead?
No, to use a different missile it would need an entirely new missile compartment. At this point it would probably be easier to build a new submarine.
> It is also a slap to those who claimed (hoped?) that the vessel will never leave the docks.
- Bravo, Kolokol! I completely agree with you.
- I, also, can add that at today's press-conference, president Putin told that Russia 'need to build more fleet - both surface ships and submarines'. Some citations from the press-conference:
"We have a plan of building of both Armed Forces and Fleet. I do not think, that this is 'the most optimal plan', - on the contrary, I consider, that we need to think about increase in construction of new submarines, new surface ships and other means for the armed struggle on the sea".
President Putin has especially noted that 'present program of building of new Project 955 SSBNs Alexander Nevskiy and Vladimir Monomakh' 'will surely be finished'.
- So, gentlemen, times of uncertainties in the Russian military planning is practically gone. Please try to believe it. ;-)
> Could Yuri use Sineva SLBM instead?
> No, to use a different missile it would need an entirely new missile compartment.
- Pavel, would you please to write here the exact (OFFICIAL) external diameters for:
(a) Bulava
(b) Sineva
- I just think that IF (Bulava diameter) is close to the (Sineva diameter), - there's a remote (rather theoretical) possibility to quickly change 'YD' armament to 'Sineva' SLBM, without change whole missile compartment?
- Of course, if LENGHT of start tube allow 'Sineva' installation.
- Also, please note that Project 955 was originally developed to carry 95-tonn 'Bark' missiles... So may be the 'YD' start tubes will be able to accomodate not only 37-tonn 'Bulava', - but also 40-tonn 'Sineva'?
- In short: if diameters and lenght allows to accomodate, - what's the difference between 37 tonn and 40 tonn SLBMs?
Launch and amortization systems may also be adopted - why not?
- According my sources, - maximal diameter of 'Sineva' is 190 cm, diameter of 'Bulava' - 200 (?) cm; so the question is, - how wide the launch tubes of 'YD' are... And what's the amortisation system in it...
Russian: It's not just the size of a silo. For one thing, a liquid-fuel Sineva would need a system to flood the silo before the launch, stabilize the submarine, etc.
Gentlemen:
“Modern” Russia as has only existed since 1992. In the past 16 years, tremendous changes have been cast on Russian society and its accomplishments are impressive. To move from the old Soviet centralized economy to a market-based economic system in a generation is impressive, but, in only 16 years? Today, Moscow has many challenges and opportunities it its future. The launch of the Yuriy Dolgorukiy is a big accomplishment, remembering that “Russia” has never before built a nuclear submarine. To reconstitute the manufacturing abilities and create new suppliers for equipment to support a resilient submarines program is a fair complement. The Yuriy Dolgorukiy will undergo extensive trials and the Bulava will be installed in time. This is a very complicated process and delays are natural and expected. I suspect Russia will complete the first three and then there will be a pause to operationally evaluate the system. I think the class will top out at maximum five submarines and then the Kremlin will move on to another design.
Just a best guess.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank:
While I agree that this is big accomplishment, Russia is not a new country in the way you are describing. They may have lost some of their minds to the west, but they were still the same country under new leadership. It was run dramatically different, but they didn't have to re-learn everything from their Soviet predecessors.
But I do agree that "reconstitute the manufacturing abilities and create new suppliers for equipment to support a resilient submarines program is a fair complement."
But on the other hand, the West (extremely happy with the fall of the Soviet Union) provided a lot of help in the beginning.
Rich:
Of course, I would argue that Russia today isn’t “the same country as the Soviet Union just under new leadership”. Granted Russia didn’t have to re-learn everything from their Soviet predecessors but much intellectual and technical skill talent left when the republics went their own way in 1992. More so the industrial base for submarines had to be reconstructed. The factory in Ukraine that made precision diagnostic equipment for sonar now makes washing machines and such. Big change.
Frank Shuler
USA
Yuri Dolgoruky would atleast go through a year of sea trial , before it gets officially commissioned into the RuN.
This is the minimum period they have to prove atleast 3 successful test of Bulava SLBM, before they integrate the Bulava with Borei and get into some kind of Initial Operation Mode some time around mid 2009.
Ofcourse they will still test the missile/sub combination , before this becomes fully operational and starts its regular patrol.
Austin Joseph:
If memory serves, the Kremlin & the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), the design bureau, have recently announced a delay to Bulava testing and deployment to 2012. Please correct me if my facts are wrong.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank:
The report stated that they are not REQUIRED to complete it until 2012. It is not a year set in stone, if things go well, then it may come sooner.
Rich:
Thanks for the clarification. It will be interesting to follow the progress.
Frank Shuler
USA
> They may have lost some of their minds to the west...
- Not only minds in 1990s. Also a HUGE sums of money gone to the west.
> But on the other hand, the West (extremely happy with the fall of the Soviet Union) provided a lot of help in the beginning.
- What help, Rich? Can you imagine HOW MANY Russian money gone in 1990s to the Western banks?
- Really, we was able to built at least THOUSAND 'Boreys' on these money, - Boreys, made of titanium, with hull-coating of pure platinum... ;-)
So feel the scale of loss...
> The report stated that they are not REQUIRED to complete it until 2012.
- Meanwhile, according to Admiral Vladimir Masorin, the decision about 'Bulava-M' serial production was made in August 2007. Also in August 2007, there was a plans 'to finish Bulava tests completely in 2008'.
- It seems that information you've cited, - about '2012 timeframe', - is coming from Yuri Baluevski. He told in December 2007:
'I do not hide, that by 2012, we shall have a SSBN with 'Bulava' missile complex, - and not one sub, but few ones'.
He also agreed, that there are separate problems with 'Bulava' now:
'Problems exist, but not catastrophic ones'.
Russian:
>What help, Rich? Can you imagine HOW MANY Russian money gone in 1990s to the Western banks?
I wasn't talking only about money. During the transition, the West opened their doors to Russia and provided support.
As for money, during the 1998 financial crisis, the US was key in getting the IMF to give $4.8 billion to Russia, but it was too late. Now granted that had a line not been drawn against capital-account controls as a response to the crises sweeping several East Asian economies after the collapse of the Thai baht in mid-1997 things may have been different by adopting temporary exchange controls as an emergency measure with IMF and U.S. Treasury sanction.
>It seems that information you've cited, - about '2012 timeframe', - is coming from Yuri Baluevski. He told in December 2007:
No...actually this is the report we are talking about.
Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye in Russian 25 Jan 08 reported that it was decided that the Bulava will not be completed until 2012.
"It has been decided to regard the Bulava launch failures as "noncatastrophic," to continue testing, and to defer from 2008 to 2012 the MITT missile complex's scheduled adoption for operational service. Although the plans to replace the Sineva with this RK [missile complex] after 2030 have no military-strategic, systemic, or technological basis."
Well 2012 is a long way ( ~ 5 years !!! ) , that kind of delay is only possible if they are redesigning the Bulava from scratch.( all statements have indicated that failures are not due to design flaw but poor components supplied by manufacturer )
They have tested Bulava 8 times , with at least 3 successful test , what they need is 3 consecutive successful test , so that Bulava/Borei gets initial operational clearance.
Since the program is on a high priority list ,see no reason why they can achieve that in 2 years ie by 2009.
Gentlemen, let’s keep on the topic. The key question is “when Bulava will start to be fitted in the fist Borey?”
Respect to the off-topic issue of the “generous western help” to Russia, well, history tells that this “help” works like poison rather than medicine. In fact Russia starts to improve after the western “good-faith advices” were mostly ignored. Other countries like i.e. Argentina also had a similar experience. So, please refrain to “help” us. May be the IMF should now advice Mr Bush in their own fiscal mess. Sorry about this off-topic.
Kolokol:
Keeping on topic, when do you think Bulava will be introduced based on your research and readings?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank, I am just guessing... 2011
Kolokol:
My conclusion was that the issue with Bulava had actually been identified and the revised schedule pushing the program out to 2012 was in response to design & manufacturing changes necessary to correct these problems. I couldn’t think of a better reason for postponing the Bulava operational release to such a specific time. Otherwise it seems to me the announcement, if there was really any need for such an announcement, would simply be that testing continues.
It will be interesting to see if construction of the Alexander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh slows during this time-frame.
Frank Shuler
USA
May be Frank. My opinion is that more than initially planed tests are neccesary. We just must wait and see.
> Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye in Russian 25 Jan 08 reported that it was decided that the Bulava will not be completed until 2012.
- Rich, when you're reading the NVO you must always remember that this is a resource that is quite critical to the Bulava and MITT, - and, contrary, - a resource 'friendly' to Sineva / Makeyev Design Bureau...
> Respect to the off-topic issue of the “generous western help” to Russia, well, history tells that this “help” works like poison rather than medicine. In fact Russia starts to improve after the western “good-faith advices” were mostly ignored. Other countries like i.e. Argentina also had a similar experience.
- I can only agree, basing on my own life experience... Gentlemen, sorry for off-top.
It seems to me that Russia would be better served by making sure that it has 100% operational and COMPLETE coverage by ballistic missile early warning systems- both radar and satellite- which has yet to be demonstrated in the post 1992 era, (Rich alluded to this earlier) before they spend all kinds of money on new SSBN's.
> I think the class will top out at maximum five submarines and then the Kremlin will move on to another design.
- This 'another design' is probably already at staples: there's some rumors that the third sub of 955 serie ('Vladimir Monomakh', construction started Q106), will be 'Project 955A', and not 'Project 955 Orj'.
- As to Russian strategic fleet structure in the 2010 - 2020 timeframe, I'll try to predict the following:
(a) from the Putin's words that 'we need to think about increase in construction of new submarines', we can conclude that further reduction of Russian strategic fleet will not take place; at the same time, Russia will not provocate the new weapons race, only trying to keep it retaliate capability 'ALMOST EXACTLY' at the actual US level. For example:
- (one Project 949A 'Anthei' SSGN) vs (one US aircraft-carrier);
- (one Russian SSBN with 16 SLBMs onboard) vs (one US SSBN with 24 SLBMs onboard).
Please note that this strategy practically exists in the last years; for example, - number of operational Russian SSBNs was not reduced below the 12 subs level, and, after 'Kursk' SSGN died, - in the same year Russia begin to build another 949A class SSGN to replace 'Kursk' (number of US aircraft-carriers = number of Russian 'Granit'-carriers).
(b) if the number of US Ohio SSBNs will not be reduced from the present 12 - 14 subs level, - Russia will try to keep the same number of SSBNs (12 - 14 subs, presently 12 operational + 2 '941 unarmed' + 1 '955 unarmed').
(c) if bilateral treaty appear in this timeframe, and number of US Ohio SSBNs will be diminished from the present (12 - 14 subs) level to a (8 - 9 subs) level, - Russia will surely keep the same number of SSBNs (8 - 9 subs).
(d) as to coming Project 955 to the fleet, - we can expect to the 2012 at least 2 - 3 'Boreys' at the fleet. It'll look like a simple replace of 'the most older and the most problem' Delta III with 'brand new' Borey; after problems with 'Bulava' will be fully resolved, - ONE 'Borey' will replace ONE Delta III. After all Delta III's will be replaced with Boreys, - the turn of Delta IV's will come.
(e) in short, we can expect up to the (8 - 12) Project 955 Boreys in the fleet till 2020, accompanied with (4 - 0) Delta IVs, in a manner: (8 Boreys + 4 Delta IVs) or (12 Boreys + 0 Delta IVs), - or 8 Boreys only, if new Treaty will appear and / or US will go down to 8 Ohios.
Russian, the Belgorod (the supposed replace of Kursk) was not completed and will not be completed as Sergei Ivanov confirmed this some time ago. I am afraid the number of active Anthei SSGN is currently at most eight. That’s enough for the current world scenario.
Respect to the SSBN fleet, I am afraid you are over optimistic and the stationary level, post 2010 time frame will be around 8-9 irrespective of Treaties existences. The question is not money anymore but infrastructure bottlenecks. Consequences of the collapse of the SU are still affecting Russia and will affect even also the restarting of the “re-confederating” process.
Like it or not the gap respect USA potential will continue to grow. This is not necessarily bad if Strategic Forces are flexible and survivable enough. Russia must not race again but, at the some time must have a deterrent credible for any potential threat, ranging from the smallest one to the “democratic” one.
Just an opinion.
Russian:
There is no plan to reduce the American Trident fleet below the current 14 boats.
What incentive would Russia have to offer to entice Washington to such a reduction?
Frank Shuler
USA
> I am afraid you are over optimistic...
- It's hard times for predictions now... Optimists say that 'the glass is 1/2 full', and the pessimists that 'the glass is 1/2 empty'... ;-)
But we must see the trends of efforts.
> Like it or not the gap respect USA potential will continue to grow.
- I doubt. We should understand that Putin's official words is practically a DOCTRINE now. :-)
> the Belgorod (the supposed replace of Kursk) was not completed and will not be completed as Sergei Ivanov confirmed this some time ago.
- I doubt. But anyway, even if 'Belgorod' will not be completed, - Project 885 'Granay' will appear as a 'best replace'. Please remember 'that we need to think about increase in construction of new submarines'. ;-)
> I am afraid the number of active Anthei SSGN is currently at most eight.
> That’s enough for the current world scenario.
- Formally, it's 10 'battle ready' Project 949A Oscar IIs + 1 'Belgorod' undercon + 2 Project 949 Oscar Is 'at strategic reserve'.
- I may agree with you, that 8 SSGNs may be enough against 11 - 12 aircraft-carriers... But, surely, it would be the _lowest_ ratio with 1,5 : 1 (US - RF) coefficient.
> Respect to the SSBN fleet ... the stationary level, post 2010 time frame will be around 8-9 irrespective of Treaties existences.
- Most of our experts consider the level of 8 - 10 SSBNs as quite adequate for the strategic deterrence; so, I may agree with you here with the only note that this is the _minimally acceptable_ level.
- Also, please consider the following facts: Russia now 'takes a bath of petrodollars', and the hard times when we was short of money, is over... But even at the 'most bad times', Russia was able to keep 12 SSBNs; so why Russia should to reduce SSBNs NOW - where is the logic?
- Another fact: as you know, one Delta III (K-44 Ryazan) was back from the overhaul at Q407... All 6 Delta IVs (now 5) was / will be overhauled, too. And, - probably 3 'Boreys' will go to patrols till 2012. The result is:
(6 Delta IVs + 1 Delta III + 3 Boreys) = 10 SSBNs 'at least'.
And what if another 2 Delta IIIs will be overhauled, - why K-44 Ryazan should stay alone?
- As I wrote a few days earlier, I do consider the ratios between 1 : 1 and 1,5 : 1 (let's say - 1,3 : 1 average), as the most optimal for the (US - RF) strategic balance, - just for example:
Lowest ratios:
(a) 2200 US warheads vs 1700 RF warheads (1,3 : 1)
(b) 11 - 12 aircraft-carriers vs 8 SSGNs (1,5 : 1)
(c) 12 - 14 US SSBNs vs 8 - 10 RF SSBNs (1,5 : 1)
Maximal ratios:
(a) 2200 US warheads vs 2200 RF warheads (1 : 1)
(b) 11 - 12 aircraft-carriers vs 11 - 12 SSGNs (1 : 1)
(c) 12 - 14 US SSBNs vs 12 - 14 RF SSBNs (1 : 1)
The truth should be somewhere inside these borders.
Dear Russian, I think it will be near your lowest ratio prediction. Why? As I told you and surely you know there are many infrastructure bottlenecks that must be fixed. This takes time, no just money. And in fact, for Russia the problem now is that there are too many petrodollars flooding the economy (!!!) generating inflationary pressures. So, it is paradoxical, during the tragic 90s “no money” and right now “to much money”… :-() Strange but a real problem for Mr. Kudrin.
On the other hand as you told us, if Putin's official words are practically doctrine now, then the target level will be 1.500 strategic warheads plus “an insurance” against dangerous trends in the American NMD as he claimed some time ago. (200 warheads insurance? 300? Who knows?).
Finally, we should no discard the likelihood Dima the weak boy will want to be a real president and want to please “our partners” with unilateral concessions. I think, geo-strategic realities will prevent him to do it but, still there is a little chance.
Russian:
With all respect, your thought process here is flawed. While I admire your attempt to mathematically correlate various weapon systems into a matrix of equals, the root values aren’t the same. An Oscar II SSGN is in no way relative to an American aircraft carrier in role or capabilities. No matter how many Oscar II submarines Russia has in the fleet, they will not compensate for the lack of carrier aviation in the Russian Navy. For example, trying to somehow justify that the role of each Oscar II is to cancel out an American aircraft carrier is unrealistic and makes little practical military sense. It’s like making the assumption that all Russia needs to shoot-down any Air Launch Cruise Missile (ALCM) strike is the MIG-31 in direct proportion to the number of ALCM launched. So, if the US has 500 of these weapons, Russia needs 250 MIG-31s each armed with four air-to-air missiles in anticipation that every MIG could strike down two ALCMs in flight. Silly argument, isn’t it?
Numbers on paper are meaningless.
What is the minimum deterrent Russia needs to secure her national survival? With a single strategic nuclear submarine equipped with 16 missiles and 96 warheads on patrol, 60 single warhead silo SS-27 Topol-M ICBMs and 100 road-mobile RS-24s, each with three warheads, Russia would be “untouchable”. With only 456 nuclear warheads, Russia could inflect such a devastating counter response to any attack on her as to make war impossible. As I have said many times, what issue is there between the United States and Russia that would be worth the loss of 20 American cities in victory? None, I can assure you.
Frank Shuler
USA
> I think it will be near your lowest ratio prediction. Why? As I told you and surely you know there are many infrastructure bottlenecks that must be fixed. This takes time, no just money.
- But they are in the process of 'fixing'. For example, Russian Navy will get since 2008 at least one 'stealth' corvette of Project 20380 'Steregushiy' in a year, - and, - the most interesting news, - these ships production will take place soon at our FAR EAST shipyards, not only at Northern-European ones.
> And in fact, for Russia the problem now is that there are too many petrodollars flooding the economy (!!!) generating inflationary pressures. So, it is paradoxical, during the tragic 90s “no money” and right now “to much money”… :-() Strange but a real problem for Mr. Kudrin.
- Confirmed, the inflation is probably the most real danger in Russia; that's why we spend so little money from our 480-billion 'reserves'.
- Putin's '2020 Plan', tell us about of 'creation of innovative economics', - i.e., this is about modern economical infrastructure again. Convert petrodollars into modern, innovative production facilities, - I think we can do it.
> On the other hand as you told us, if Putin's official words are practically doctrine now, then the target level will be 1.500 strategic warheads plus “an insurance” against dangerous trends in the American NMD as he claimed some time ago. (200 warheads insurance? 300? Who knows?).
- As Boris Solomonov told in 2006, 'Moscow by 2011 will have at least 2000 warheads; it'll allow to keep strategic balance with the USA':
http://nuclearno.ru/text.asp?10735
- I do think that SS-25s will stay until 2010 - 2011 without 'mass scrapping'; and, after 2009, increased to a 11 - 13 per year production of Topol-Ms, will mark the beginning of SS-25s mass scrapping.
- Anyway, April's MOU will tell us exactly about number of Russian strategic delivery platforms (SDP)... I think I can predict almost 'full stop' of Russian SDPs scrapping due to the modern geopolitical situation.
Main points of the article:
- 6-9 Topol-M per year
- There will not be a “Land Bulava” at least in decades
- The only thing taken from the Bulava to land is the 6-MIRV warhead.
So, as far I see the situation there will be around 120-180 Topol-M (both in MARV & MIRV configurations), assuming a Topol-M 20+ lifespan. So, although unlikely, up to 1000 warheads will be land deployed. In the and, … yes a 2000 warheads is feasible but I don’t saw the 10-12 Topolm/year data. I think 6-9 will be the stationary rate,… quite low.
> Main points of the article:
> 6-9 Topol-M per year
- This 'main point' is a 'journalist's extrapolations'... The one and only real value of the article, - is the Solomonov's words.
It seems that people still can't believe that yearly production of SS-27 / RS-24 could be easily increased - SUDDENLY, at any time, at every day...
Time will tell.
> yes a 2000 warheads is feasible but I don’t saw the 10-12 Topolm/year data.
- Kolokol, if you need a source, - here it is:
http://www.novopol.ru/print-text32837.html
'После 2009 года в РВСН начнётся поставка 12-14 ракетных комплексов "Тополь-М" в год'
- The newsmaker is gen-col Nikolay Solovtsov, RVSN chief commander...
Can we trust him?
- By the way, 12 - 14 'Topol-Ms' per year, - it's a (14 x 20) * 1.1 = 308 Topol-M's deployed (with 10 % reserve for a test shooting); ratio (Minuteman III) / (Topol-M) in this case will be 450 / 308 = 1.46
It's inside the above mentioned boundaries (1.0 - 1.5).
OK, Russian, you are right. I give up :-/
These are more logical numbers for the current situation. May I have a question: What do you think about Medvedev?
> What do you think about Medvedev?
- Putin said recently that he 'fully trust to Medvedev'; they both was in the same SPb command in a years; I think that it's enough warranty that 'Putin course' will be continued by Dmitry Medvedev...
He seems weaker respect to the West and that might entail no-good consequences for Russia. I hope I am wrong.
Russian:
1) You keep bringing up the Delta III. Great, the K-44 went through overhaul...but we have heard nothing about her missiles being extended. A giant throwing paper clips can do no damage.
2) Kolokol asked YOUR opinion of Medvedev. You just replied that Putin trusts him so be it. What is your opinion, I am honestly interested.
3) As for your 10-12 Topol-M's per year, I again bring up that Ivanov said that 7 is enough and that is what they can accomplish and would not build up the production rate. (Sorry no link but Interfax in Russian 1201 GMT 07 Dec 07 and ITAR-TASS in English 1116 GMT 19 Dec 07)
"We think that six or seven [missile systems] a year are within our capacity, if we take RVSN (Russian Strategic Missile Troops), land strategic nuclear forces. We think this is enough given our real capabilities," Ivanov said on Friday
Rich, Putin trusts him. I do not.
> You keep bringing up the Delta III. Great, the K-44 went through overhaul... but we have heard nothing about her missiles being extended. A giant throwing paper clips can do no damage.
- Rich, why are you so critical to our 'old by good' ;-) SS-N-18? These SLBMs still fly well:
On August 7, 2007, the K-211 Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy submarine of the Project 667BDR (Delta III) conducted a successful test launch of a R-29R (SS-N-18) missile. The Navy reported that the missile warhead reached its intended target at the Chizha test site at Kanin Peninsula.:
http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/08/test_launch_of_r29r_missile_fr.shtml
- Again: these 'paper clips' still able to fly (and thus do damage), even on very unusual for Russian Navy route from Pacific Ocean to the North-European test range Chizha.
- After all, we must wait until April 2008 to know from MOU what SLBMs K-44 Ryazan can carry after overhaul - R-29R or R-29RM.
2) Kolokol asked YOUR opinion of Medvedev. You just replied that Putin trusts him so be it. What is your opinion, I am honestly interested.
- OK, listen to my answer: as a typical Russian, I'll prefer to completely rely in this question on opinion of 'Putin The Great'. ;-)
> As for your 10-12 Topol-M's per year, I again bring up that Ivanov said that 7 is enough and that is what they can accomplish and would not build up the production rate. (Sorry no link but Interfax in Russian 07 Dec 07).
- I already wrote about it. Vice-premier Ivanov may told about PRESENT 'Topol-M' production rate (7 - 8 per year), and RSF chief-commander Solovtsov, - surely about FUTURE ('after 2009') one (12 - 14 per year).
- Also, we must always remember, that the world is changing quickly, so Russia need to answer VERY quickly on these changes. There's some 'time gap' (10 days) between Ivanov's and Solovtsov's words, and Solovtsov's words was 'the last ones'.
- Anyway, it's good that we was able to share our opinions here at Pavel's blog; and, according to Russian proverb, 'the time will be the best judge'.
Russian:
I do apologize that I missed the blog about the R-29R, but I would still like to see an official confirmation that the missile class will be extended. I do agree with Pavel that the K-44 may be a test space launch platform and the others scrapped. When was the last time a Delta III patrolled? I know that that information isn't readily available, but I would wager one hasn't left port in awhile.
As for trusting "Putin the Great"...wow, I don't know what to say about that. Seems like a step backwards to fully rely on one person, who is "stepping down" to become the Prime Minister. Correct me if I am wrong, but can't the Prime Minister transfer all presidential powers to the PM? Seems like a backwards way to simulate a democracy.
As Kolokol shows, not everyone has complete faith in your savior.
And as for Ivanov and Solovtsov: Glad to see the U.S. isn't the only country with the military and political leaders in disagreement!
> I know that that information isn't readily available, but I would wager one hasn't left port in awhile.
- If we don't know something, - it doesn't mean that this 'something' does not exist.
> As for trusting "Putin the Great"... wow, I don't know what to say about that.
- Don't be so serious, Rich... It was just a joke.
> Correct me if I am wrong, but can't the Prime Minister transfer all presidential powers to the PM?
- All is possible, but why?
> As Kolokol shows, not everyone has complete faith in your savior.
- Usually, it's 65 - 75 % of Russian people, according to last polls.
- 'Putin The Savior'... Well, I surely use it somewhere... ;-)
> And as for Ivanov and Solovtsov: Glad to see the U.S. isn't the only country with the military and political leaders in disagreement!
- I don't think it's 'disagreement' - it looks like something was changed in these 10 days... Also, Solovtsov's words was an offical press-release, and Ivanov's ones - was said in a 'live' speech on a regular meeting with veterans of Russian military-industrial complex.
Here the Ivanov's words, be the way:
'Thirty Topol-Ms in a year is not necessary for us, we consider, that six - seven in a year is necessary... The Joint Staff considers, that it is acceptably'.
Russian:
>All is possible, but why?
Well, your country has a history of one person retaining power for an extended time. Putin has stated he doesn't want to go down the path to change the constitution in order to obtain a 3rd term, but to transfer the power from president to PM does not require a constitutional change.
As you have said before...only time will tell.
But as for me misunderstanding your joke..every joke has a hidden meaning. Maybe Pavel was right about your Nashist leanings...
Way off topic...I apologize.
> But as for me misunderstanding your joke..every joke has a hidden meaning. Maybe Pavel was right about your Nashist leanings...
- Up to a Point, Lord Rumsfeld!
;-)
> With all respect, your thought process here is flawed.
- I don't think so, - below are arguments.
> An Oscar II SSGN is in no way relative to an American aircraft carrier in role or capabilities.
- NO relative 'in role or capabilities'. But QUITE relative as a complementary deterrent tool.
It's like a complementary pair: [one US aircraft carrier - one Russian Oscar SSGN].
> No matter how many Oscar II submarines Russia has in the fleet, they will not compensate for the lack of carrier aviation in the Russian Navy.
- We still have enough Tu-22M3s. Enough for deterrence together with 'Oscars'.
- Also, PAK-DA (Prospective Aviational Complex of Long-range Aviation) should be developed till 2015.
> It's like making the assumption that all Russia needs to shoot-down any Air Launch Cruise Missile (ALCM) strike is the MIG-31 in direct proportion to the number of ALCM launched. So, if the US has 500 of these weapons, Russia needs 250 MIG-31s each armed with four air-to-air missiles in anticipation that every MIG could strike down two ALCMs in flight.
> Silly argument, isn't it?
- Yes. Really 'silly'. You mixed up two classes of weapons: universal deterrent tools (like MiG-31 in your example) and dedicated to practically one task (Oscar SSGN).
> Numbers on paper are meaningless.
- 'Numbers on paper' are NOT meaningless, when these numbers reflects the facts or trends. In one - three years, we will be able to see what the real trends are.
> What is the minimum deterrent Russia needs to secure her national survival?
> With a single strategic nuclear submarine equipped with 16 missiles and 96 warheads on patrol, 60 single warhead silo SS-27 Topol-M ICBMs and 100 road-mobile RS-24s, each with three warheads, Russia would be УuntouchableФ.
- Dear Frank, thank you very much for allowing Russian Federation to have 'a single strategic nuclear submarine equipped with 16 missiles and 96 warheads on patrol, 60 single warhead silo SS-27 Topol-M ICBMs and 100 road-mobile RS-24s, each with three warheads'. :-)
> With only 456 nuclear warheads, Russia could inflect such a devastating counter response to any attack on her as to make war impossible.
- The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov has declared recently, that in the near future 'the USA plan to place thousand interceptors on perimeter of Russia':
'Most likely, already in the foreseeable future we shall hear conversations about hundreds and even thousands interceptors in the most various parts of a planet, including the Europe. Poland is only 'a feeler'. Today, objects of American NMD are already created or under creation on Alaska, at California, in Northeast Asia. Look at a map of the world, and at once it becomes clear, that all this is happening on perimeter of our borders'.
'The trend of approach of the American strategic infrastructure to the Russian borders causes serious concerns in Moscow. The administration of the USA, does not wish to give any guarantees, that scales of NMD expansion will be limited by something'.
'If situation will go on the way of unconstrained escalation of global American NMD, we shall be simply compelled to reconsider our strategic approaches, to search for adequate methods of reaction'.
'Is someone really thinks that Russia will easy look, - how the US strategic potentials on Russian borders are consistently increased, and to wait, - while critical for our national security antimissile potential will be created?
The last phrase is a keyword, Frank... Can you imagine that practically ALL people in Russia understand the current situation in this way?
Original is here (in Russian):
http://news.mail.ru/politics/1599977/print/
Russian:
My point was so simple, you missed it.
My opinion was that Russia only needed one strategic submarine, 60 single warhead silo ICBMs and 100 mobile multi-warhead ICBMs to maintain a creditable deterrent with only 456 nuclear weapons. The question you need to ask is how many warheads and delivery systems, and what kind of delivery systems, does Russia need to ensure that its arsenal remains “an effective deterrent”? The deterrent goal of China in relationship to the United States is simple. Today, Beijing holds 20 American cities hostage with 20 liquid-fueled soft-silo single warhead ICBMs. In the future because of American advances in ABM systems and such, China may need to have 20 mobile ICBMs each equipped with three warheads to accomplish the same goal, holding those 20 American cities at risk. The size of the Chinese arsenal may change but the goal remains the same. What are Russia’s goals? That understanding is the key to all these discussions.
By the way, the Russian Navy no longer flies the Tu-22M3s.
Frank Shuler
USA
> My point was so simple, you missed it.
> My opinion was that Russia only needed one strategic submarine, 60 single warhead silo ICBMs and 100 mobile multi-warhead ICBMs to maintain a creditable deterrent with only 456 nuclear weapons.
- Contrary, I can understand your opinion very clearly. But I honestly must said that your point of view are not quite popular here in Russia; moreover, nobody in Russia will consider such a 'low-level deterrence' seriously now, after Kosovo's 'independence' and NMD facilities approaching to the Russian borders.
- Some people at West may still cherish these 'sweet dreams' about unilateral strategic disarmament of Russia, - but all realist people must clearly understand that these dreams will never came true.
In short: no more 'unilateral disarmament', - this is the mood of modern Russian society. And I bring to you this mood from the heart of Russia.
> The deterrent goal of China in relationship to the United States is simple. Today, Beijing holds 20 American cities hostage with 20 liquid-fueled soft-silo single warhead ICBMs.
- Please don't compare China and Russia; we choose different ways.
> By the way, the Russian Navy no longer flies the Tu-22M3s.
- By the way, try to google for key phrase 'Tu-22 exercises' and please report here the results. :-)
Why no more unilateral disarmaments? With the budget surplus that you keep raving about, the "missile gap" that developed after START I and the financial strain that START II would have placed on your nuclear forces shouldn't be an issue in the future. Russia should have no problems "keeping up" with the US.
And although Bush gave in on the SORT, it doesn't mean that there will be future treaties. If we decide to unilaterally disarm, you have no choice in the matter.
> With the budget surplus that you keep raving about...
- You was not able to understand my words, Rich. 480 billion dollars 'I was raving about'... - it's NOT a budget. It's state strategic reserves - by the way, best in the history of not only Russia, but also Soviet Union.
> If we decide to unilaterally disarm, you have no choice in the matter.
- I don't think so, Rich. We need to consider here the ratio between US antimissiles deployed to the Russian strategic missiles deployed.
- In other words, US may 'unilaterally disarm' (I really doubt that it will take place in reality); but, if US antimissile potential will continue to grow, Russia will not follow to such a 'disarmament'.
- Again, please try to understand the Sergey Lavrov's words:
'Is someone really thinks that Russia will easy look, - how the US strategic potentials on Russian borders are consistently increased, and to wait, - while critical for our national security antimissile potential will be created?
That's a key.
- Pavel, here the interesting view on 'Yuri Dolgorukiy' and it's SLBMs... Rather unusual view:
http://www.vz.ru/society/2008/2/15/144803.print.html
Russian:
Russia and the United States have much in common; similar international concerns and shared economic goals. One big difference is that Russia defines its national security by, and only by, its relationship with the United States. Every American move on the world stage is perceived at Russia’s expense. Every geo-political-military decision the United States makes is made against Russian interest. Conversely, the United States seems to take little interest in Russia’s concerns. Why? I think the answer is simple. The US doesn’t think of Russia as an enemy. We certainly have an adversarial relationship with Russia on many issues but we also have such relationships with China, India, France, etc.
Russia just doesn’t garner such attention from the US military planners as does North Korea, Iran or even a Cuba. From the heartland of America, the average citizen could care less how many Topol-M ICBMs Russia builds. It’s just not important. Honest.
Russia will build whatever arsenal of weapons it thinks it needs to defend itself and so will the United States. Russia will define is needs based on “peer equality” with the US. In turn, the United States will define its security by other criteria. That’s the difference.
By the way, those aren’t Russian Navy Tu-22s.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank you are not correct when you say “that Russia defines its national security by, and only by, its relationship with the United States”. That’s wrong. Russian planning is based in an “all azimuth doctrine” on which a large number of hypotheses are considered, ranging i.e. from a confrontation with NATO to a suppression of safe havens for Chechen terrorists in Georgia. Of course NATO and USA consume a big fraction of the planning but this is because they are the biggest ones, no because they are USA and Russia is obsessed with USA. Now, as China grows and NATO diminishes its relative weight in the geopolitical scenario Russia changes its planes accordingly.
Now, also I must say that planning is also based in concrete realities rather than in perceptions and words. And history indicates that there is a trend after the end of Warsaw Pact. And the trend is to encircle Russia with NATO bases. OK the west say that this have no anti-Russian aims but it have to do with other things. Irrelevant. They can say they want. Russia must not base its planning on not-credible words but on concrete realities, and therefore, if these bases are considered to be a threat, must be targeted and neutralized “just in case”.
There is no animosity on this but rationality: There is a thing here that can be used against Russia. So Russia must target the thing to assure its neutralization. I know that Russia has a little chance to influence NATO decisions on the issue but also NATO have little chance to influence Russia to do not take countermeasures. So, in the end if some European countries want to be diminished its security because they want some ABM bases well, lets them. That’s the thing work. Every one have chosen its security path.
Kolokol:
One of the best written commentaries I have seen posted. I stand corrected on the “US Obsession” statement and am persuaded to your opinion. Today, the United States does not think of Russia as an enemy; we have other security issues that to the Americans are more of a threat. Building the necessary infrastructure, such as alliances, military bases and enhanced technology weapons, to meet that challenge are not directly aimed at Russia. However, I concede this “infrastructure” is not in Russia’s best political interest. This draws me to a question. Other than the “threat of direct targeting” does Russia have any recourse to this American “encroachment”? Veiled military threats against Poland and the Czech Republic seem to only strengthen the US position. Russia telling Ukraine not to join NATO seems to have had the opposite intended affect pushing Kiev closer to the Western Alliance. The US just signed a five-year agreement to update the military of Kazakhstan to NATO standards. None of these events could be comfortable if you’re sitting in the Kremlin today. Russia has more nuclear weapons than the rest of the world combined and yet they seem to bring her little real comfort. How does Russia improve its position in this different, new world?
I sincerely appreciate your thoughts.
Frank Shuler
USA
Well, after all, Russian won the discussion.
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080227/100186983.html
Frank, I am sure USA doesn’t consider Russia enemy but there are a lot of planning with Russia as enemy. Things work in such a way. Nevertheless, this is not a problem, as far as plans will not become real.
Respect to Ukraine, well I know the orange team is desperate to put Ukraine into NATO and they are delighted to cause problems to Russia (like i.e. siphoning European gas and so on) but the Ukrainian people is adamantly opposed to NATO (specially now after Kosovo). The oranges know well this and therefore are trying to block a referendum on the issue proposed by the blue-white side. In the end even the Europeans will be tired of the orange games. So lets them be.
On the agreement with Kazakhstan, I don’t know very much but I don’t’ think Nasarbayev to behave like the Oranges. He is a quite pragmatic man. Weapon buys? Perhaps. I don’t know. After all Russia have some good agreements with Mr. Hugo, the Bolivarian man. I know USA is not happy on these agreements but such movements will be more common in the future and both Russia and USA want to sell their toys anyplace anytime.
Kolokol:
The Kazakhstan situation doesn’t seem to involve weapons sales as much as radar and command & control systems. I’m sure the US-Kazakhstan military will exchange military officers for staff training and such. According to the various press releases, Kazakhstan considers Russia its primary weapons supplier and that relationship will not change.
I wouldn’t be too concerned about Ukraine. The more NATO expands, the less relevant it becomes. Remember I contend that one day in the future, Russia will be a NATO member too.
Frank Shuler
USA
> By the way, those aren’t Russian Navy Tu-22s.
- Frank, - in fact, - it does not matter where these Tu-22M3s formally attached to, - to the Navy or to the Air Forces... More significant the tasks they can do. And these tasks are:
23.01.08 - 'From Jan. 23, 2008, the aviation component in the zone where the exercises are going on will be widened, and the following planes will take part: Tu-160, Tu-95, Tu-22M3, Il-78, A-50, - the Air Force representative said'.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2008/01/23/016-print.html
12.07.07 - 'During exercises of Northern Fleet, pilots of Long-range Aviation have executed more than 20 flights of Tu-22M3s, including 4 flights today. Tu-22M3s have launched cruise missiles which have hit their intended targets in Barents Sea'.
http://www.izvestia.ru/news/news141728/?print
and so on...
> Well, after all, Russian won the discussion.
> http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080227/100186983.html
- It's not me, it's all Putin... ;-)
By the way, Anatoly Zak has published a picture of 'Topol-M' interior at his RussianSpaceWeb site:
http://www.russianspaceweb.com/topolm_interior_1.jpg
- But I can't say exactly is this 3D rendering a 'real' Topol-M interior or just Anatoly's fantasies...
Hello everybody.
As the newest one I feel obliged to salute you all.
On the topic's subject -without getting into details- I just want to exprim my satisfaction that Russia finally got the first Borei-class launched.
Pavel, a question:
Are there only strictly strategic issues to be discussed in the topics as one could figure out from your site's title? I've noted that, e.g. there isn't much talk about Russia's attack boats in the Navy section.
I believe that it's quite a mistake not to include the fleets of SSNs while evaluating military strategic affairs. Afterall, if the bad comes to worst, the SSNs job will be to make sure that there wouldn't be a strategic reserve at all or at least to diminish it as much as possible.:)
Once again, it's good to be here.