By Pavel Podvig | 29 February 2008
The intercept of the disabled USA-193 spy satellite the United States conducted on February 20 set a new benchmark for military exercises that have no benefits, but come at a tremendous political cost. The intercept topped even the U.S. decision to deploy missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic as an ill-advised maneuver that could only bring scores of suspicion and mistrust--exactly what the deployments inspired in Russia, where missile defense now poisons virtually every other issue in U.S.-Russian relations. In this vein, the intercept, or more aptly, a test of an antisatellite (ASAT) capability, merely fosters further international distrust of U.S. policies and intentions.
For starters, the official U.S. explanation for shooting down the satellite with an intercept is completely unconvincing. The satellite failed shortly after its December 2006 launch, meaning there wasn't a way to guide the USA-193's reentry to a safe area--i.e., over an ocean. And because the satellite contained toxic hydrazine fuel, Washington claimed that anyone on the ground who came in contact with the USA-193 after its uncontrollable reentry into the atmosphere would be in danger.
That claim is almost impossible to verify. Relevant experience with the reentry of other satellites demonstrates that there's virtually no chance of a fuel tank reaching the ground intact--the hydrazine usually safely dispersing somewhere in the upper levels of the atmosphere. But to accurately estimate the actual risk, certain details about the satellite are needed. Since USA-193 was classified, none of these details other than the approximate size and mass of its fuel tank were disclosed by the Defense Department. Even the satellite orbit was known only from data collected by amateur observers.
In fact, Defense officials barely tried to present a plausible risk estimate, seemingly accepting that everyone would see the intercept for what it was--a chance to test the U.S. missile defense system in ASAT mode. Of course, Defense protested that it wasn't conducting an ASAT test, and that its exercise greatly differed from the ASAT test China carried out in January 2007--both of which were unconvincing. To me, the U.S. intercept was different from the Chinese test in just one regard: It produced less long-lived space debris.
Further, it's unlikely that the test added any new understanding as to how ASAT systems operate. Washington demonstrated the technical capability to intercept satellites in 1985 when it shot down another of its satellites. Likewise, the Soviet Union maintained an active ASAT program until the 1980s. And, of course, China proved that it possessed this capability during its infamous ASAT test a year ago. Not that the capability to shoot down satellites means much anyway. Despite all the talk about space dominance, ASAT systems have very little, if any, military utility. If a nation relies on its military or civilian space assets enough for them to matter, that country will always make sure it can tolerate the loss of some of these assets.
Nor did the intercept of USA-193 help prove the effectiveness of missile defense. True, the United States demonstrated that it can hit a target in space, but that was never in doubt. Long ago, missile defense proved it could hit fast-moving targets; USA-193 was moving with a speed of about 8 kilometers per second--faster than any current ballistic missile can travel. For missile defense to make a useful contribution to security, it would need to work with extremely high reliability under a broad range of difficult, uncertain conditions such as multiple targets and countermeasures. And it's impossible to ever build these capabilities.
So, given all of the above, the only thing the test resulted in was political backlash.
Days before the United States announced its plan to destroy USA-193, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Russia and China introduced a draft treaty that would prohibit the deployment of space weapons. There are reasons to be skeptical about the draft, but it was an important step. After the embarrassment of the debris fallout from its ASAT test, China seemed once again ready to negotiate. Russia also was serious about the treaty. Proponents of negotiations in both countries were clearly getting the upper hand.
The U.S. test certainly changed this dynamic. In January, when a Russian general suggested that Moscow should enhance its air defense systems to include the ability to target satellites, it remained merely talk. But given recent events, the general could make his argument more forcefully in the future. And the Russian industry would happily oblige, with many old ASAT projects waiting for an opportunity to be put into production. China could take a similar approach, perhaps even using the same rationale as Washington employed to establish the legitimacy of any future tests--namely, announcing the tests a few days in advance and ensuring that they don't create a debris trail.
Of course, from the military point of view, the pursuit of space weapons or ASAT systems makes little sense for Russia or China, just like it doesn't make sense for the United States. The utility of these weapons is so low that it's virtually nonexistent. Sadly, though, this probably won't stop all three countries from building and fielding these systems at the expense of negotiations and ultimately, their own security.
The book
Comments
One could argue that Sputnik wasn’t necessary.
Or, going to the moon.
Or, launching the first test of an ICBM.
Or, launching a strategic missile from a submarine.
Or, developing the ‘cruise missile”.
Or…
All are valid arguments.
Frank Shuler
USA
I'm not sure Sputnik/going to the Moon and, say, the cruise missile are in the same category. ASAT certainly isn't.
Pavel:
I have no personal disagreement with your post in any way. However, all these "events" changed the world in certain ways. The US decision to down the USA 193 satellite also “changed the world”. For better or worse, who can say?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank:
Well, using the same argument one might argue about the necessity of WWIII, since that also would change the world in a certain way. I certainly disagree with that. I do hold a view that certain military systems should be developed for the sake of cutting-the-edge technology, but i do not feel that ASAT is such a tecnology, or needs to be devloped/put into service in any way - the cold war is over, for god's sake.
> ...where missile defense now poisons virtually every other issue in U.S.-Russian relations.
- Exactly.
OakenheaD:
The Cold War is indeed over. However threats, today’s and tomorrow’s, to American security remain. The focus of the Pentagon today is not on Russia but on emergent nations that may prove adversarial twenty years in the future. As I’ve stated, I have no clue whether the shoot-down of US 193 was necessary. I’m not speaking to the “necessity” of anything; only to the conclusions. This event will change the political-military landscape and the way nations think of space. ASAT is here to stay. Perhaps, it never really went away.
Frank Shuler
USA
>...The focus of the Pentagon today is not on Russia....
Frank, ha!!! It'd be reasonably for you to read the US intelligence office's annual report.
ASTUTE:
Actually "Mike" McConnell, the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), shares little with me. (smile)
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank:
I agree with you but this is the US official point of view on Russia.
The thing is that neither Russia nor China have a way of deploying large numbers of space-based weapons, while (within the forseeable future) the USA can. So the treaty is meant to slow down US space-weapon development and potentially give Russia and China time to develop response measures.
ASTUTE:
I tend to discount the public comments and supporting documents by governmental officials from the United States, or for that matter Russia, that are responsible for “procuring” the defense budget. The US spends more on its defense than the rest of the world combined and the admirals and generals always want more. So do Congressmen. The only way to have “more” is to have an “enemy”.
I stand by my original quote, “[The focus of the Pentagon today is not on Russia but on emergent nations that may prove adversarial twenty years in the future.]”
However, I do not preclude the fact that Russia may well be such a nation in the future. I guess we’ll see.
Frank Shuler
USA
I agree with Frank. The focus is not Russia but on so-called "rogue nations." Look at the focus of U.S. military procurements and this becomes obvious. The U.S. is in the process of improving its power projection capabilities, and how to fight LIC/COIN. Its exercises are not centered on massive battles (conventional or nuclear) against great powers.
I'm not quite sure what the fuss is all about. The end of the Cold War has not stopped Russia or China from developing new nuclear warheads or delivery systems. Space seems the next logical step in mankind's weapons development. Does anyone think that weapons in space would alter the strategic landscape at all?
It would alter the strategic balance if the USA is the first (and only) one to have them. If the USA can successfully deploy space-based weapons, and then use them as a means of unilaterally denying space-based weapons to anyone else that would certainly alter the strategic balance.
I agree with Frank, "Officially" the focus is "rouge" nations; which I have personally always taken to be one of the most intelligence-insulting arguments that I have ever seen for obscene defense spending and an agressive foreign policy that openly and officially seeks to maintain its "#1" position in the global heirarchy, and defend its global "security" and energy "interests" (since when have global "interests" -which are neither sovereign territory or property- been a legitimate moral justification for military force/war?)
If there is a threat from a rouge nation, its not because "they hate our freedom", its because of our imperialistic foreign policy, both militarily and economic. If you are wondering what I mean by that, I hold up the Japanese self-defense force and the current Russian armed forces as an example of what a "defense" oriented national defense vs an offensive, agressive one, like the U.S., actually looks like.
(I exclude strategic nuclear forces from this argument, since in a MAD scenario, they are "defensive" weapons).
Jon Grams:
However, a closer historical look at post-1945 American foreign policy paints an interesting and slightly different picture. The role of the United States after the 2nd World War has been to maintain the political, economic, and social status-quo of the “Western World.” One could successfully argue that the United States has stood in proxy to Japan and Germany and exercised American power in areas of the world of little interest to the United States proper in the pursuit of their security interest. (Japan and Germany) The United States has made the decision that the military rearmament of Japan and Germany was a far greater global risk to American security than carrying the sword in their place. The Korean War of the 1950’s was waged by the United States to protect Japan from the historical point of invasion, the Korean peninsula. The “falling domino theory” that led to the American involvement in Viet Nam had more to do with preserving trading partners in Asia for Japanese and American goods than raw political objectives. Who exactly wanted NATO “enlarged”? Germany using American power post-1990 achieved incredible political success by pushing Russia and its Red Army as far to the east as possible and bringing countries into NATO and the EU that German business could dominate; success without ever firing a shot. The United States imports about 8% of its energy from the Middle East, Japan 90%. Whose interest are we “protecting”? The only military campaign the United States has waged in the last 50 years solely in pursuit of American interest was our “invasion” of Panama in 1989 to protect the Panama Canal and remove a former CIA informant that had become too much of an embarrassment on the world stage, President Manuel Noriega.
Think how the world today would have been different had the United States abandoned its military commitments to Japan and Germany in the 1950’s and those nations unilaterally rearmed? How comfortable today would Russia be if Germany had “the bomb”? China of Japan? When you see America’s “imperialistic foreign policy” in that light, it makes different sense.
Just my opinion.
Frank Shuler
USA
I would disagree. Direct conflicts are not the only way to achieve foreign policy objectives. America has created it's own sphere of influence during the Cold War in Latin America, and has acted to protect it's own interests around the world quite decisively.
Feanor:
You’ve illustrated my conclusions. Latin America, indeed the entire Americas, is absolutely within the United States’ “sphere of influence” and has been so since December 2nd 1823 with the pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States has never been, nor will ever be, a European or Asiatic power. We are however an Atlantic and Pacific power of the first order. The cornerstone of American post-World War II foreign policy has been to “protect” the interest of Japan and Germany and in doing so protect our own national interest. Our political relationship with Japan and Germany is symbiotic and mutually inclusive. American’s other “defining partnership” is our relationship with Israel. America’s foreign policy is unfathomable at time when taken on its own merits. Does the United States really care if Kosovo is independent? (The EU certainly does.) However, when American policy is understood against these larger interests, certain sense begins to be made of it.
Again, just my personal opinion.
Frank Shuler
USA
I will politely disagree with Feanor on space weapons altering the strategic balance. Even if there were weapons in space, Russia and China still maintain sufficient nuclear weapon to inflict catastrophic damage on the US. I do not believe that shrinking the timelines for execution to detonation (or whatever form a space weapon would take) would significantly alter anything. As it is now, a submarine launched weapon can arrive in 15 minutes. Is anything altered if it shrinks to 10 minutes? I do not think so. It would require closer ties and increased strategic warning capability.
I also will politely disagree on the altering the strategic balance. I believe it could.
By deploying space weapons and ASAT technology, you are forgetting about the C3 of the platforms. Granted while both Russian and US use many redundant mechanisms for communications, submarines do not have that possibility. Yes, we do have other methods, but they are not that reliable and rarely used. We rely on satellites.
Can you think of other major military applications that utilize satellites? By taking out the satellites you are essentially blinding and muting the enemy. That presents you with a major strategic balance.
Rich,
The ability to destroy satellites in space has existed for decades. Any serious nuclear exchange model always included a series of high-altitude bursts, which would affect command & control terrestrially (through EMP) as well as damage medium and low orbit satellites (through a combination of gammas and the pumping of the Van Allen radiation belts). In effect, space weapons would make this much cleaner through targeted attacks rather than mass effects.
Submarines would not lack command and control any less than now. I cannot speculate on Russian submarine procedures, but I am fairly certain that US, British, and French submarines would attack only when directed. If they have no direction then no firing. Is this the fear?
Exactly...not an effective second strike capability without orders.
That and our navigation would also be extremely affected...this is more scary for me.
The real problem is the use of ASAT in limited wars, and the eventual proliferation of ASAT systems. Even right now the MiG-31 is offered for export, and it can be outfitted as an ASAT platform. If more capable, and more abundant ASAT systems become available for export, there may come a time when minor regional power in conflict with the USA or Russian (possibly acting as proxies) possess and employ them. The time for the proliferation of new weapons systems has shrunk dramatically from first appearance to international sales and this creates the real problem. Would the USA have invaded Iraq if Saddam had a modern AD-network and a capable ASAT system?
Frank,
I agree with most of what you said, but I believe that economic imperialism (in the form of capitalism) is just as destructive if not more destructive than militaristic imperialism. From 1945 to 2003, the United States attempted to overthrow more than 40 foreign governments, and to crush more than 30 populist-nationalist movements fighting against intolerable regimes. examples are the supporting of Diem, Mobutu, Pinochet, Suharto, Savimbi (UNITA), Marcos, Fujimori, Salinas, and scores of similar leaders; Orchestrating the overthrow of the Allende gov't in the early 70's, to say nothing of the economic motives for the invasion of the Phillipines in 1900 or the Spanish American war, of which Mark Twain said: "How our hearts burned with indignation against the atrocious Spaniards. . .But when the smoke was over, the dead buried and the cost of the war came back to the people in an increase in the price of commodities and rent--that is, when we sobered up from our patriotic spree--it suddenly dawned on us that the cause of the Spanish-American war was the price of sugar. . . . that the lives, blood, and money of the American people were used to protect the interests of American capitalists". These were all for economic gain, which is morally unjustified and reprehensible.
Why hasn't the US pulled out of Japan? Why didn't the US pull out of Germany after 1992? Where is the justification for the over 700 US military bases on foreign soil?
Jon Grams:
The United States has over 700 military bases in Germany alone. In fact in the recent down-sizing of the American military in Germany from over 200,000 troops to approximately 60,000 today, it was “discovered” the US Government actually owned over 100.000 German buildings and real estate properties going back to the post-1945 occupation.
Frank Shuler
USA