I think you and Cartwright understood the question differently. He's approaching the problem as though it were a problem of strategic stockpile verification: let enough inspectors see and Geiger your conventional stockpile that they have no doubts about what kind of weapons are on which shelves. I don't know the START procedures for ALCM or bomber base inspections but I know the procedures exist, and were designed to distinguish nuclear ALCMs from conventional ones, so that Russia wouldn't artificially inflate our totals with ambiguous inspection results.

You appear more concerned with the problem of launch ambiguity: when a missile is launched, how can any nation know that the missile is conventional fast enough that their best move is NOT to unload their silos at us? It's the best question about conventional ICBMs and continues to be a sticking point.

The Navy wouldn't like it, but the USAF could score a coup by requesting that the silo-based leg of the triad be shut down and the nuclear warheads be removed from *every* silo-based ICBM. That way, any silo-based launch from CONUS would have to be conventional. Subs and bombers would retain their capability for survivable retaliation, leaving our deterrent intact.

As far as ambiguity is concerned, SLBMs are a much bigger problem than ICBMs. It has a similar solution, though - just remove all nuclear warehads from submarines.

Or without verification, you could just say all nuclear missiles have been withdrawn from the Trident fleet. Without a verified arms agreement complete with site inspections, all this is just posturing. Talk.

Interestingly, the land based component of “Global Strike” is in active research & development with the Minotaur IV system and Northrop contracted to develop an “area suppression” warhead while yet another unnamed manufacturer is providing another, yet, unnamed payload.

Frank Shuler
USA

Again, the current administration and the pentagon are attempting to blur the distinction between nuclear/conventional, strategic/tactical weapon systems. Prompt global Strike is purely an offensive weapon system meant to be used pre-emptively. It is no secret that such a weapon could be used to take out ICBM silos as well as bunkers. This type of system should be banned by treaty; similar to the ABM treaty, as it undermines strategic balance.

However, how can any "adversary" be sure that the opposing side does not cheat in the event of a real conflict?

For example lets assume the US strategic command declares that all its SLBMs are not nuclear anymore.

Then, what happens and which weigth does this statement have when there would be some sort of crisis between the US and Russia? To take a rather implausible scenario to illustrate this: what happens if a (larger) Russian air strike against a former Soviet state leads to a heightened state of alert on the sides of NATO/US and Russia itself afterwards. And then, under a completely different mission (that 30min intelligence on high value targets) the US launches a conventional SLBM towards, lets say, Central Asia.

How will the BMEW and ICBM operators in Russia judge this? How can they be sure this is indeed a conventional strike and not the first blow of the "bolt out of the blue" decapitation strike (as discussed in Foreign Affairs)?

"Again, the current administration and the pentagon are attempting to blur the distinction between nuclear/conventional, strategic/tactical weapon systems. Prompt global Strike is purely an offensive weapon system meant to be used pre-emptively. It is no secret that such a weapon could be used to take out ICBM silos as well as bunkers. This type of system should be banned by treaty; similar to the ABM treaty, as it undermines strategic balance."

This really isn't the place for a Bush rant. And Prompt Global Strike isn't going to be fielding anything like the thousands of missiles you'd need to make it worth the effort of launching a first strike against Russia. It would only take missing a few dozen out of the THOUSANDS of nukes they have (really think about that) to make the whole endevour pretty much suicidal.

Is it designed for preemtive strike? Of course it is that's a "Prompt" means. Is it meant to allow George Bush to usher in the next thousand year Reich? Don't be rediculous.

"And then, under a completely different mission (that 30min intelligence on high value targets) the US launches a conventional SLBM towards, lets say, Central Asia. "

You scenario is why it's a better idea to have conventionally-armed Tridents than land-based ICBMs. The ICBM would have to fly over Russia to get to the Middle East. An SLBM could be launched from anywhere in the Indian Ocean. Avoids all kinds of complications and has the added benefit of a shorter time of flight.

The “Prompt Global Strike” project does clearly illustrate how the strategic balance is changing in scope. The line between strategic and tactical is truly blurred. I agree this project is designed to field a low number of weapons that could be used to strike a “high value” target anywhere in the world in minutes rather in days as with present systems. The advantage of a sea-based weapon over a land missile system is well documented here, however; I suspect both will be developed in due course. The “Prompt Global Strike” project is only an interim program designed to field a weapon in the near term. A new American bomber is coming in the 2018 time frame and the “real” PGS system is to be space based and enter inventory in around 2028 complementing the Minuteman III replacement.

Frank Shuler
USA

> 'Avoids all kinds of complications and has the added benefit of a shorter time of flight'.

- And makes the peace on Earth a hostage of so called 'American national security'.

American national security?

The Kalashnikov AK-47 has killed more soldiers and civilians alike than all the nuclear weapons ever used in history; it is truly a “weapon of mass destruction”.

For all those that try to morally justify one weapon of death over another; just a thought to ponder.

Frank Shuler
USA

" And makes the peace on Earth a hostage of so called 'American national security'."

You mean like it is currently hostage to Putin's nukes? It's no more difficult for Russia to drop a 20 MT SS-18 RIGHT NOW than what the US is contemplating for a few dozen CONVENTIONAL warheads. Am I the only one that's stupified by the hypocrisy contained in the line of thought that it's okay to have multi-megaton ICBMs and nuclear ABMs but just put a conventional warhead on an ICBM or better yet a warhead that doesn't even explode on a missile and it's the end of civilization as we know it?

Let's not get into the discussion whether AK-47 killed more people than M-16. It's for a different forum.

As for Russian SS-18s vs conventional warheads, I would note that, first, the 20 MT warheads are long gone, and, second, that it's not like the U.S. is replacing its nuclear-armed ballistic missiles with conventional ones.

Pavel:

I disagree. Indeed the US is replacing nuclear armed ballistic missiles it will never use with conventional ones that will indeed be used in the future at some point in time. The Minuteman III fleet is being reduced from 500 missiles to 450.

Frank Shuler
USA

Pavel:

I've heard two different scenarios. The first was to switch something like 50 MMIIIs to conventional strike leaving 450 nuclear MMIIIs and putting them in the original silos. The second was taking retired MMIIIs and basing them somewhere like Vandenburg. Don't know if those would be in addition to or instead of the nuclear ICBMs.

> ...to have multi-megaton ICBMs and nuclear ABMs but just put a conventional warhead on an ICBM or better yet a warhead that doesn't even explode on a missile and it's the end of civilization as we know it?

- Just imagine: when US launch the PGS system of any class, - space based or ballistic missile-based, equipped with conventional or even with kinetic warhead(s) - in direction to Russia, or just from site strategically close enough to the Russian territory, it will results surely in arising a question among our leadership and militaries: does this strike threat to Russian national security, to Russian arsenals and / or cities...

- Note that the political leaders will probably have just a few minutes to answer this question correctly...

- Add here a possibility, for modern and especially future PGS systems, to easily change their flight trajectories as well as add here these system's possibilty to have extremely low physical de-masking signatures during the flight...

- And you'll get the answer: PGS programs can not add anything to the global and American national security, they can only demolish the global and 'American national' security. 'Cause every time, PGS is launched, leaders & militaries MUST decide - SHOULD they answer with conventional or nuclear retaliate strike, and HOW they need to answer...

- In short: PGS systems deployment greatly increases the risk of 'erroneous' retaliate strike on US. If you're concerned about US national security - just try to understand, that the risk of such 'erroneous' retaliate strike will be much greater threat for the US, then still hypothetical 'terrorist nuclear strike' or 'rogue state nuclear strike', - or even a terrorist's 'dirty bomb'.

Scott:

I think the Pentagon put a quick end to the Congressional directive, part of the last Defense Authorization Law, that the proposed 50 Minuteman III reduction in inventory be tied to their use as a conventional quick launch weapon. The Minuteman, long out of production at Boeing, is just too old to be modified. That’s when the USAF brought in Orbital Sciences Corporation with their Minotaur IV system. The Minotaur IV incorporate parts of the Peacekeeper and other off the shelf components to build a simple system that is capable of launch from “unimproved” facilities using portable ground support equipment. Current facilities that support the Minotaur are Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) CA, Wallops Island, VA, Cape Canaveral, FL and Kodiak Island, AK. In tandem, the US Strategic Command began to develop the idea of using the Trident, a system still being procured today, as a conventional weapon. The discussion continues but Congress seems less enthused by the sea-based system. I bet however under a Democratic president in 2008, the conventional Trident will go forward.

Bottom line was the before mentioned 50 Minuteman III ICBMs with 3 W-62 warheads, or even reduced to just one W-78 under SORT, were meaningless to America. New threats call for new solutions.

Frank Shuler
USA

Russian:

I just don’t understand your logic. Russia launches ICBMs all the time.

Every time a Topol-M or Bulava is launched, the United States and NATO don’t panic and place their entire nuclear inventory on instant retaliation alert. Why? Because Russia has pre-told the United States it intends to launch a test missile and the US is able to monitor the launch telemetry and related information to ensure the payload and destination of the mission. I suspect the use of a conventional ICBM by the US would be handled the same way, in a Pentagon to Kremlin conversation.

Frank Shuler
USA