Missile Defense: The Russian Reaction
The Bulletin Online, February 26, 2007
By Pavel Podvig
The row over U.S. intentions to deploy elements of its missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic has the potential of bringing U.S.-Russian relations--not to mention bilateral arms control--to a new low. Russia has disapproved of the scheme ever since the United States first went public with the system about two years ago. But despite sounding angry, Russia remained calm, arguing that it already possessed the technology to deal with the interceptors the United States planned to place in Eastern Europe.
Recently, however, Moscow decided to up the ante. Clearly inspired by the assertive and rather confrontational presentation given by President Vladimir Putin at a conference in Munich on February 10, Russian generals started painting a picture of a much harsher response to the possible deployment. The commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces bluntly stated that his missiles could target U.S. missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic if the political leadership ordered him to do so.
Meanwhile, the Chief of the General Staff announced that the missile defense deployment could trigger Russia's withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that the United States and Soviet Union signed in 1987. Russia's foreign minister sounded more conciliatory--sticking to the earlier "our technology can defeat the system" line--but the message had been sent.
If the purpose of that message was to dissuade Poland and the Czech Republic from deploying the system on their territory, it failed spectacularly--both governments immediately announced that they would accept the U.S. proposal. It is even possible that the strong rhetoric coming from Russia will help the Polish and Czech governments quell public opposition to the plan in both countries. Given the region's history, Russia should understand that pressure will not work.
According to the plan, the site at Jince in the Czech Republic will host a European midcourse radar while the site near Koszalin, Poland, will be used to deploy a battery of ground-based interceptors. The site in Poland is located on the flight path from Iran to the U.S. East Coast. But the interceptors could also theoretically reach the trajectory of Russian missiles launched from bases in Russia's European territory--Teykovo, Tatishchevo, and others. (Whether they would be able to intercept them is another matter.)
The United States, of course, insists that the missile defense deployments will not target Russian missiles, but few people in Russia are willing to believe this. In Russia, U.S. missile defense is invariably thought to be directed against Russian strategic forces. Besides, the fact that elements of the missile defense system will reside in two new NATO countries serves as a point of contention alone.
But it's misguided to argue that the United States should move the interceptors elsewhere or somehow limit the missile defense system's capability so it would not intercept Russian missiles (which it won't be able to do anyway). Preserving Russia's retaliatory potential and the balance of mutual assured destruction doesn't make missile defense a better idea. The problem with missile defense is that it's an inherently flawed concept. What we see today is a demonstration of the core error in the concept: Instead of solving problems, missile defense creates them.
It's quite likely that Russia will use the system's deployment in Europe as a pretext for pulling out of the INF Treaty. What kind of benefit this withdrawal could bring to Russia remains unclear. But at this point, Russia could do so just to prove it can. If the United States is able to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, why can't Russia unilaterally extract itself from the treaties it no longer likes? Isn't that what superpowers do these days? If so, we're in serious trouble.
Comments
Hello Mr.Podvig!
But if Russia would decide to Re-Open lets say the SS-20 production line (and mabe even re-start SS-18 production) wouldn't this lead to the same dilemma which we had in europe in the early 80ties? And by that to "enjoy" another circle of nonsense like: russia field SS-18/SS-20/SS-22/SS-23/SS-26 and maybe SSC-4 "Slingshot" and Nato will answer with MX/Pershing II and sort of land based Tomahawks...
Best Regards from bernd reuter
"We were told that NATO would not expand and that no military infrastructure would be placed in Eastern Europe," Lavrov said on TV Center. "The time for talking is past. We will now decide how to ensure our security based on the facts."
I don't think Russia will "re-open" anything or will start a new circle. I agree - that would be a circle of nonsense. I believe this is well understood in Russia and in the United States.
As for Lavrov's words, I'm all for Russia's ensuring its security, but the problem is that pulling out of the INF Treaty or deploying intermediate-range missiles has nothing to do with that security. Just as deployment of missile defense has nothing to do with security of the United States.
Well, this is very interesting. I always thought that GBI in Europe should protect the Europeans (!) against Iranian IRBMs, fired by a mad regime and for sure also somewhat forced to that ultimate madness by lets say "a less sensitive" US Admistration like Mr.Bush ones.
But according to your post it seems that the "polish battery" is more intended for Iranian "ICBMs" aiming to the US Eastcoast. -
But this would be complete nonsense. They could do the same job to intercept those iranian ICBMs (if they ever will have some) from within the US territory. Moreover to field just 12 Missiles do not seriously threaten Russia's ability to strike the US but will seriously spoil a beginning partnership.
So what is this nonsense for? Just to destroy all political confidence and trust we had won in the past 15 years? And to exchange it for what...another Cold War? This is all madness.
First point, it's obvious that pr. Putin did upgrade the general staff after the shuffle in the government.Those military professionals only holds acount to capacity in military terms. So, the discussion if a missile defense system near the Russian border is capable of stopping Russian ICBM or not doesn't matter.The Russian forces have to make the calculation of a US missile def. in Eastern Europe (or Asia) makes Russian live safer or vice versa and react accordingly, after all they have to live with realities and not with intentions from their partners friends enemies.The fact that the "harsh" reaction on the part of the Russian general staff on the Polish or Czech government failed "spectaculary" to dissuade both country's from deploying the system is to early to tell, because today,26 feb, the Polish foreign min. told the missile talks could take several years.And here we are in the political arena,I don't know if pulling out of the INF treaty is the right technical solution to deal with this matter. But I do know that missiles who treaten Germany and France have a positive influence on the behavior of the European elite and population to get hold of their own security. And frankly speaking you can already see that the Polish government is being cornered by the EU core group. After all, didn't the US remove his rockets from Turkey thanks the Cuba crisis.Conclusion, some people must come in serious trouble before they see the "light".
As far I understand these sites can be targeted by Iskander SRBM placed in Kaliningrad. Right?
Bernd, GBI is a midcourse intercept system, which is why the US wants to place it in Europe. Norway or the UK would be the best site for interceptors defending America against Iran, but both those countries are currently unlikely to agree to the stationing of the system.
As to any ideas of a "partnership" with Russia, they are mere delusions.
Russia is frustrated because no one is listening to her concerns. If America does this we’re going to do that… and no one cares. Russia threatens to leave the INF Treaty and it doesn’t even make the front page of the New York Times. Russia is going to target Poland and the Czech Republic if they host any part of this American anti-missile system and that only encourages those governments to support the system more. Russia is going to build new SS-20s or an entire new generation of nuclear weapons to support their position and Europe is more concerned by the Madrid trials and who is going to be elected president of France. The “Cold War” seems so long ago…
The average American thinks of Russia as a strong country with a pragmatic and forceful president. There is no fear of Russia in the United States and most Americans look forward to joint business opportunities and expanded trade. We’ll never get to Mars without Russia. There is an expression here in Washington DC; it is “all politics is local”. What the citizens of America are concerned about is what affects their daily lives. We don’t fear a nuclear strike by Russia. It seems to me all this posturing by the Russian government is only politics for local consumption. No one is the Untied States seems to be paying attention.
Does the average Russian fear the United States?
Frank Shuler
USA
Kolokol:
I thought about that option but I'm unsure if Iskander has range for that purpose.Its maximum range for the Russian forces is "supposed" to be 400km while for export only 280km. Get a map out and you'll see.
Frank Shuler:
"Does the average Russian fear the United States?" I can't speak for the average but I am more concern with this current administration than I have ever been in my entire life.ie: even though Iran does NOT have a bomb yet, this administration is willing to "bomb it back to the stone age"(using nuclear tippped weapons to accomplish such goal is very much intended. I see Russia appeasing the US(that is just MHO) while China Stands up to it. Remember, a bully only respects another bully. BTW if I were Putin(obviously I'm not) I would not pull out of INF treaty. If the US pulled out of ABM treaty, that's the treaty I'm pulling out from to. This does not necessarilly mean the strategic response has to come from that side(ABM) Could the New York Times front page ignore the news of Russia re-starting its ss-18 production line to correct the strategic mistake of converting one warhead Topol=M into MIRV's? I would think not.
Pavel Podvig:
Earlier you mention Russia will not be re-starting production of anything, An-124, and Tu-160's beg to differ with you. While not advocating to break INF by re-starting ss-20 production I believe it quite sensible for Russia to always have a heavy strategic BM capability.
Here comes the reaction to ABM treaty pullout by the US.
GOVT. COMMISSION TO VIEW FIFTH GENERATION AIR-DEFENSE SYSTEM. Rian
This article is about newly commissioned Triumph system s-400(yet like media all over the world there's no respect to ones intelligence) but the picture of the system on the article is of Buk and not s-400. The article ends with the following quote by Ivanov.........."priority should now be given to the development of fifth-generation air-defense systems, combining elements of air-,missile-,and space defense."
I think it is official ABM has been bi-laterally torm to shreds and theres no coming back.
Whether or not the Iskander has the range to reach those sites matters little, if they don't have the pin-point accuracy to hit the silos. Nuclear warheads on the Iskander would solve that problem, but that might be a step too far.
For pin-point accuracy I would rely on airplane droped nuclear tipped bunker busting bombs.
Getting back to the subject of heavy BM, in looking at Angara's 1.1 size I realized it almost identical to ss-18.:
a- Could the light Angara double as a BM?
b- What would be more economically feasible, re-starting ss-18 production(everything is place, technology, silos, etc..)or, having already production ready rockets such as Angara 1.1 take over? Reconfiguring silos has been done before and i do not expect this to be a problem. Any answers on question a or b are welcome.
Kolokol:
I found an interesting article on the subject Iskander;
The Iskander is the brother of the OTR 23 rocket “OKA” which was destroyed following the INF treaty. Following the parameters set by the INF treaty the OKA had to survive, but the US were so afraid of the system at that time they managed to negotiated it with Gorbatsjov to include the OKA in the list of rockets that had to be destroyed.
The OKA was placed on one vehicle and needed only 3 people to operate, where the American Pershing 1 or 2 needed a lot more vehicles and therefore was inflexible and easy to track. The operators of the OKA could stay in the vehicle while firing the missiles. The missile could be retargeted in flight not only by a mobile command center on the ground but also by the long range radar airplane type A-50. the rocket was resistant against electronic warfare and was capable to carry cluster, vacuum, conventional and nuclear charges with a high degree of precision. The missile did have 18 years ago the technology which became more widespread after the US stealth fighters. The OTR-23 vehicle was an off-road who was capable to negotiate rivers. The system could be transported by Ruslan airplanes or train to any part of the Earth. While the system wasn’t officially introduced in the Soviet Army , Gorbatsjov and Scheverdnadse without consulting defensemin. Marshall Dimitry Jasow and OKA chief constructor Sergei Nepobedimyj gave a great gift to the USA. 360 complexes where destroyed in Alma Ata Kazakhstan. All the bleu prints and machinery , including for the vehicles where destroyed. The land forces of the USSR and then Russian forces did lose a important attack potential.
By the end of the 1990 ‘s the construction bureau in Kolomna started without financial reserves the new rocket complex Iskander-E.
The name Iskander means Alexander the Great in Arabic. The E-version for export can fly 280 km and is not capable to carry nuclear weapons, the Russian version can fly further, but doesn’t exceed 500 km and is nuclear capable.
Translation from German version of rian.ru an article by Viktor Litowkin sept 2004
More Iskander
The launch installation has two missiles with a range of 280 km. Each missile has a 480 kilogram warhead consisting of 54 elements. The system can be used against small and large targets. The accuracy of fire is 2 meter. The Iskander missile can easily overcome air defense systems. It’s almost impossible to prevent a launch of an Iskander missile because of the system’s mobility. Targets can be found not only by satellite and aircraft but also by a conventional intelligence center and by a soldier who directs artillery fire. Targets can also be found from photos, which will be put into a computer by means of a scanner. The self-direction device functions even in fog or darkness. Only the Iskander system can accomplish such tasks. The US has tried to reconsider the missile technology control regime and here arises the question whether this may be an obstacle for the sale abroad.
(Extract from Voice of Russia 2005)
Start weight of a missile is 3800 kg, conventional warhead 480 kg.
The missile system has passed tests and has been adopted. The First squad of Iskander missile systems will be formed in the North Caucasian military district Col. Gen. Vladimir Zaritsky (jan 2005)
By January 1,2007, formation of the first tactical battalion, equipped with Iskander systems, will be completed at the MFA test site in Kapustin Yar
The 92nd missile brigade of the Privolzhky-Uralsky military district and the 107th missile brigade of the Far Eastern military district will be the First to receive Iskander missile complexes. Col. Gen. Vladimir Zaritsky ( nov 2006)
Some comments about Iskander:
- It have roughly the same dimensions of Oka. This generated some NATO suspicions when the system was in development.
- Range was limited to 280 km for export version by adding some ballasts in the fuel stage, so the 400 km range for the Russian version is perfectly feasible.
- Terminal precision is correspond to a CEP of about 5 m. Is not enough to destroy silos?
Guy Buytaert: I would really appreciate it if people would refrain from posting lengthy articles in comments. A link would be perfectly fine. Not to mention that one should generally be careful about separating facts from fiction and propaganda in most of what is published in Russian media these days. For example, I'm wondering where did the 5 m CEP, quoted in another comment, come from?
Boris Buliak:
A subtle thing to understand about American foreign policy is that the decision-makers transcend political parties and presidents. The American decision to create an anti-ballistics missile system came from the Clinton Administration and the general policies of the now Bush Administration will be continued in substance by whoever is president next. I don’t think you and I are average citizens of Russia or the United States because we are having this discussion. I honestly think most Americans are only concerned about the war in Iraq because it affects their daily lives. Russia does not.
I do think America changed after September 11th in ways we haven’t adjusted to yet. Do not underestimate America’s fear.
I don’t think Russia restarting manufacturing of SS-18 Satan ICBMs makes the front page of the New York Times (understand I mean metaphorically speaking) either. Russia is not an enemy. I do think a dialog with Washington on such a decision would be important; America is big on transparently in nuclear weapons.
I continue to be amazed at the rhetoric on ABM systems. I like Kolokol saying, “It’s easier to sharpen the sword than polishing the shield”. Would the world be safer if America decided to cancel the ABM systems and build instead 1000 new ICBMs? I think not.
Frank Shuler
USA
i'm verry sorry for the lenghty article, but it wasn't possible to make the link electronically because everything stood on paper. Your comments about facts and fictions is true, but not only for the Russian media.
If data about Iskander is not reliable or is propaganda, it would be fine to supply reliable data and/or references rather than just discredit another posts.
Boris Buliak:
Angara is not suitable as ICBM, because it uses kersoene/LOX as fuel, like the first generation ICBM. This is unsuitable for new military weapons. The Angara would have to be converted into an UDMH/NTO fueled rocket like the US did when they changed the Titan I into Titan II. Relaunching the production of a liquid fueled ICBM is nonsense I think, these rockets are to complicated and expensive. Solid missiles are the most easiest and reliable way.
Martin
It is obvious that US drive to gain crushing nuclear superiority over Russia in the near future. Hitherto they tried to do it quite secretly but now it seems Americans feel so strong they openly start unfriendly military moves against Russia. Many things suggest US are building new military infrastructure extremely close to Russian borders with unknown reasons. Probably Pentagon seeks for situation when effective military pressure on Russia would be possible. Unfortunately stupid Russian rulers can't wake-up even now, when insolent US warmongers are placing their "anti-missiles" three minutes away from Moscow.
Damn! If Brezhnev were alive, the second Cuban Missile Crisis would erupt shortly after such overt US provocation was made public!
Anonymous:
Thanks for the clarification.
"Solid missiles are the most easiest and reliable way". Of the three bastion heavy BM of 3-4 generation in Russia only one missile was solid and its the one NOT being used now(Scalpel)
The workhorses, Satan and Stiletto are both liquid(one hot and the other could launched)topol and Topol-M are solid, but if you ask me Topol-M strategic niche is as a single warhead mobile unit. I do not believe anything that has a throw weight of 1200kg should belong in a silo. Subs and trucks is allright but not silo.
Frank Shuler;
Lets say you and I are in the middle. You're not gunho(at least is looks that way) for your side and I'm not gunho for the other side. I guess we both want balance and thus peace. There's plenty of little wars to be had. BTW with all this talk about nuclear armed Iskanders I thought there was a treaty banning tactical nuclear weapons. Am I mistaken? In case I'm not, does nuclear tipped bombs not count as tactical?
To prevent US imperialists from trying any nuclear blackmail Russia should rebuild its strategic nuclear arsenal at 6000 warheads level!
To do so in ten years Russia must build 45 mobile Topol-M ICBMs annually with six MIRVs each.
Additionally Russia must field eight "Borey" SSBNs armed with "Bulava" SLBMs each carrying six MIRVs also.
Re-equipment of entire "Delta-IV" fleet with "Sinevas" is necessary.
Over one thousand "stealth" ALCMs H-101 class must be introduced for new "Blackjack" and modernized "Bear" strategic bombers and multipurpose nuclear submarines.
Some several hundred new LR-INF missile systems similar in concept to "Skorost" project along with "Iskander" SRBMs should be deployed in Kaliningrad Oblast, Belarus, North Caucasus, Armenia and Far East.
Upgrading and strengthing Russian strategic I4C systems should be a priority.
That is a sole way to disillusion Americans for gaining unique nuclear immunity and thus strategic hegemony over the World!
Boris Buliak:
I know of no such treaty that restricts or limits tactical nuclear weapons. However, this is something I have long thought was necessary. However, there are a series of “gentleman’s agreements” that do restrict their deployment. For example, such a handshake agreement between Russia and the United States removed tactical nuclear weapons from US and Russian naval ships and submarines. Today, the only US Navy tactical nuclear weapons are some 250-350 Tomahawk cruise missiles stored at two naval arsenals ashore and not available to the fleet. Russia and America also shook hands on an agreement not to expand nuclear weapons into former Warsaw Pact countries that have joined NATO in exchange for the pledge to remove all such weapons from the Kaliningrad enclave. Frankly, the Moscow Treaty itself seems more of a gentleman’s agreement that a true nuclear disarmament treaty. It certainly isn’t START. Perhaps in the future, post Moscow Treaty 2012, Russian and the United States could agree on an absolute number of “nuclear” weapons regardless of strategic or tactical labels. That would be an easy way for Russia to match the number of American nuclear weapons at little or no expense and keep the balance. That would be a worthwhile endeavor.
Frank Shuler
USA
Bum-Bum
Your plan would seem logical IF the funds were available to implement them all. However, reality is quite different and a numbers game(like Frank's said before)is not one Russia wants to play with the US. I'm still in some doubt if tactical nuclear warheads are allowed under treaties. If they are this would be cheapest option to attain certain parity, notice the word certain. Without breaking any treaties Russia could do something to maintain some parity. This would be my humble recommendations:
1-Re-star production of ss-18, put most of the land based MIRV's on it instead of in Topol-M.
2- When Bulava comes into service, deploy them also on land(say the Far East)
3-In response to ABM treaty pullout Russia IS already working on space based air-defense system, pull up a chair and wait for this system, but it should come to pass.
Boris Buliak:
It is comprehensible you can't understand that simply because all disarmament treaties are a piece of skin-games scrapped immediately when they become inconvenient as we could see a few years ago.
That is why I strongly oppose any stupid agreements with such unserious partner like US. They want only to cheat other sides and sidestep them as soon as circumstances permitted!
Mr. Buliak:
Don't listen this US provocateur twaddling about next "wonderful treaties" and "gentleman's agreements" aimed at outsmart Russia forever!
My plan is quite rationale and possible! It would cost Russia about six billions USD annually. Russian rulers only lack good political will to put it across!
Frank Shuler:
So tactical nuclear warheads are very much in play then. Your suggestion about former Warsaw pact countries is another matter . I don't know if you're aware, but the Russians are mighty pissed at the breakage of "hand shake" promise not to expand Nato into former Warsaw pact countries. This promise was broken, however, taking up your initiative could prove a helpful start to rapidly deterioreting relationship.
Bum-Bum:
Somehow a country that has to struggle to get 2 su-34 bombers does not strike me like it can implement your above mentioned plans. IMO
As for US provocateurs, is not just them, RIA News had recently an article:"A bad treaty is better then a good missile". This is the lovely state press expressing those feelings. I happen to disagree with their opinion, but refuse to call them peace provocateurs.
Boris Buliak:
To clarify, there was no agreement between Russia and the United States on expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe. I think world events happened so fast, the Warsaw Pact imploded before any “agreements” were even thought necessary by Moscow. However, as NATO did begin its expansion, such a “hand shake” promise not to base nuclear weapons in former Pact countries was made and kept.
Frank Shuler
USA
"Promise not to expand NATO into former Warsaw pact countries...not mention about expanding NATO military infrastructure there" - a big example of US sponsored "gentlemen's agreement" for naive morons!
A lot better solution than believe in this stupid "promise" was to keep thirty Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe!
Mr. Buriak:
Present ridiculous level of weapon purchases in Russia is caused by unimaginable industrial management disorder, lack of transparent long-term budget planning, stupid wasting of resources, big corruption and finally lack of political will to resolve all these pathologies.
But amount of money and potential of military industrial complex are now enough to handle my plan!
Frank Shuler:
I beg to differ, sir. Although there was not an agreement per say, there was a "hand shake" promise given to not only Gorbachov, but Yeltsin as well.
Bum-Bum I understand you're upset, but try and calm down and reason.ie: my plan would be much smaller than yours, yet even then I don't think it will be implemented. Thinking and implementing new alternatives are always better than though talk. Like a former American president said:"Talk softly and carry a big stick".
Interesting information to back my point of view:
In 2001-2007 time period Russia has already spent about 52 billions USD on military modernization programs about 52 billions USD at least on paper! But unfortunately Russia bought almost nothing new arms then. Assigned funds were mainly sent back to the state budget after every fiscal year's end or simply disappeared.
It is very strange, isn't it???
Speaking of corruption I read an article also in rian about how nice % of the defense budget had disappered. When I read it I assumed(we all know what happens when one assumes) that it went to some covert-developmental program/s. It looks like there's rampant corruption at that level and that's no joke.
Mr. Buriak:
Unfortunately your "modest" plan is a pure fantasy!
1. SS-18 was manufactured on Ukraine, so its build up now in Russia is out of question.
2. Russia has no space-based air-defense system in development! Even new but quite conventional S-400 system is badly delayed!
Boris Buliak:
Actually, it has only been Russia that has had troops and nuclear weapons stationed on NATO territory. A historical curiosity was created by the unification of Germany in October 1990 whereby former East Germany's Warsaw Pact membership ended but still had first Soviet (later Russian –1992)) troops stationed in its territory until mid-1994.
Frank Shuler
USA
A link to a page comparing the Russian version and the export version of the Iskander
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS-26_Stone
PD: CEP of the Russian version is 10 m
Quote:
Bolt From the Blue
Russian land-based precision-strike missiles
by Michal Fiszer and Jerzy Gruszczynski
Mar. 1, 2003
At the same time, it was officially announced that the Iskander-E had passed the all trials successfully and is ready for production, while the trials and updates of the full Tender system are still ongoing. Most probably, the aforementioned Russian brigade has been equipped with a hybrid of the Iskander-E's simpler missile avionics with the Russian missile. The latter has a larger fuel chamber and a heavier warhead (allowed under INF). In the Iskander-E, the missile size and weight is the same, but some ballast is incorporated to stay within the 300-km range and 500-kg warhead limits. The 700-kg Russian submunitions warhead would carry 72 instead of 54 homing bomblets, and a penetrator is available.
Kolokol:
I’m assuming the dramatic increase in accuracy attributed to the “Iskander" family of tactical missiles is due to an improved guidance system. (???) The R-300 Elbrus (western generic name SCUD) was rated with a CEP of 50m and the international copies, North Korean and such, much, much greater. What do we attribute this improvement in CEP? Even 10m seems to be GPS quality. Any additional thoughts on this?
Frank Shuler
USA
Or a optic-electronic guidance
Quote:
The Iskander-E has an array of merits, an information support system being one of them. This includes subsystems for target reconnaissance, target designation and its transmission to missile launch sites. The key element of the missile's onboard system is optic-electronic correlation and extreme conditions guidance system, also a product of TsNIIAG. A 20 kg optic homing head fitted to the missile is ready for launch in no more than 5 minutes, the guidance error being within 20 m. Specialists of TsNIIAG have developed data processing stations (DPS) and command vehicles (CV) based on the Kamaz all-terrain truck. Those are fitted with optic fiber and radio communications systems, local computing networks using personal computers with built-in information protection devices and dedicated software.
http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/attachment.php?attachmentid=77672
Hey gentlemen, tell me how Russia spends that $30 billion allocated for defense!
When American missile defense system will be fully operational say by ten years (assume between 2015-2020), America will definitely increase number of missile interceptors. No doubt about that! I think in that time Russian would feel the heat! With just about 150 Topol-M ICBM Russia cannot afford many missile interceptors around its borders. I think there is hardly any scope to restart production of SS-18 and SS-19. Only the viable option is to build more Topol-M preferably Topol-M1 (mobile version) say 40 a year. I think Russia has enough money and production facilities to do the job easily. Russia badly needs many mobile launchers to safeguard its security. Some people may argue but when you have nothing to do with your strategic forces you have no option but to build many more Topol-M. You can not develop new ground based strategic delivery system overnight. I think MITT should work on increasing the accuracy level of Topol-M and its range, 400m CEP isn’t acceptable these days. All the present days American ICBM has around 100m CEP!
Anonymous is me, sorry!
Parimal Debnath:
What are Russia’s strategic expectations? That is the key to this discussion. Agree or certainly disagree, President Putin and the Kremlin have a plan and are aggressively pursuing that plan with a 2015-18 deadline. By 2018, Russia will have five submarines with the new Bulava missiles armed with 456 warheads, 110 Topol-M ICBMs (current plans call for one warhead) with 110 warheads, and 50 modernized bombers with an average of twelve warheads each for a total of 600 warheads. Total force: 1166 warheads Even if the 50 or so Topol-M1 (mobile version) are MIRVed with six warheads each as have been suggested here, only an additional 250 warheads would be made available to the SRF. MIRVing the silo-based Topol-M missiles would add only 300 additional warheads to the mix. Therefore in 2018, the maximum number of deliverable warheads available to the Kremlin would be 1716. If the SS-27 stays a single warhead weapon, and I think it will, the number falls to the before mentioned 1166. That’s the plan.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank some small corrections. The target number of Topol-m is around 140. In addition, the 5 Borey will have different number of launches. Vessels “1” and “2” will have only 12 launchers (because of the adaptation of launchers from Bark to Bulava) but vessels 3 to 5 will have 16. That means 72 SLBM. And up to 432 warheads.
I don’t know the possible warheads distribution but if the project about “common vehicles” continue, there will be 3 vehicle types with 1, 3 or 6 warheads. See
http://www.dtig.org/docs/Bulava.pdf
Off course this can change. If IRBM are to be deployed, probably the ICBM number will be smaller. A 2 ICBM x 3 IRBM is a quite fair empiric rule to estimate possible changes. I.e. 20 less ICBM changed by 30 IRBM
Well Frank, I think your calculation is quite viable considering Kremlin's present defense plan. But they won't be able to comply with their own minimum warheads limit forget about maximum limit! None can be sure what their real expectations are! I predict a bleak future for the Russian strategic forces 10 years later if they don't change the gear!
Kolokol, is there any english version of that link?
Parimal Debnath
Unfortunately not.
Kolokol:
Agreed.
My logic was based on having an aggregate of 150 Topol-M ICBMs but having to replace (or refurbish) the early units in the 2015-18 timeline resulting in only 110 units “operational”. Also there is the question of the remaining 30 SS-19s (the Ukrainian surplus missiles) that I assumed will never be installed. I also have the Rs. Alexander Nevsky (2nd in Borey Class) having 16 missiles tubes (???) and assumed by 2018 there would be the Rs. “Yuri Dolgoruki” and the four follow up “Alexander Nevsky” class having a total of 76 launchers for the Bulava missiles.
Frank Shuler
USA
[...]
The only way to counter this massive American threat is to deploy viable nuclear deterrent against US. So I described above one of its variants. If carried out, Russia would possess about 5500 strategic warheads on very secure delivery vehicles. Below you have a possible scenario of composition of RVSN in 2018:
- 500 mobile Topol-M (6x100kT) equals 3000 warheads
- 7 SSBN "Borey" with 112 SLBM "Bulava" (6x100kT) armed with 672 warheads
- 1 SSBN "Typhoon" with 20 "Bulava" and 120 warheads
- 6 SSBN "Delta IV" with 96 SLBM "Sineva" (10x100kT) and 960 warheads
- 50 Tu-160M new strategic bombers with 600 ALCMs of H-101 type
- 30 Tu-95MSM modernized bombers with 240 ALCMs of H-101 class
GRAND TOTAL: 5592 strategic warheads on 808 delivery vehicles!
Each "Topol-M", "Bulava" and "Sineva" warhead should have CEP less than 100 meters thanks to using GLONASS system. Also H-101 should achieve less than 10 meters accuracy. In other words Russia would possess over 5000 hard-target-kill warheads in its arsenal and all of them on mobile launchers! Even any IRBMs wouldn't be necessary for Russia if Topol-Ms based in European part of country were fired at depressed trajectories to quickly reach all time critical targets!
It is exactly what US are developing now and simultaneously exactly what US fear at most!
[...]
Bum-Bum;
Mispelling my name once is accdeptable, doing it twice looks a little unprofessional. Get your information straight: Lotsa stuff USED to be buildt in Ukraine, some of which according to high ranking Russian AirForce officials, one of them is quoted as saying if "political" decision was made ss-18 could be build entirely on Russia territory. So this refutes your claim that my plan is unrealistic. Nothing that've proposed is "fantasy". BTW Tu-160 and An-124 were also made in the Ukraine and guees what, production of this has been re-started(at least for the An-124 for sure)
Gentlemen
I suggest to think realistically. It’s a reality that USA will have almost a thousand launchers and two thousand deployed nukes plus a “rapid reload stockpile” of near three thousand nukes plus a global (nor national) ABM system. But the proposed arsenal does not fit with Russian economical realities. Off-course budget black-holes must be terminated. But even with maximal economic efficiency a small but extremely survivable nuclear arsenal is necessary.
Pavel Podvig:
You do a great job of censorship. I know my loss is no ones concern, but I still have my dignity.
I'll still read the posts, but if silencing me is your goal, you've succeded.
Krivak (aka Bum-Bum): I would really appreciate it if you could keep your comments brief and to the point. And, please, be easy on the exclamation marks.
Boris Buliak: There is no goal to silence anyone. It just takes time to approve comments.
Kolokol: I'm not sure that that file on Bulava is credible. Who are the people who put it together?
Take a look Pavel.
http://www.dtig.org/
PD: I don't undestand German.
Yes, I've seen this. But the site doesn't tell who these people are and where do they get the information.
Hi everyone, my assumption is that by 2015 there will be 152 Topol-Ms (72 mobile and 80 silo-based) with probably 3RVs each.
8-9 Boreys (source:archive of lenta.ru in august Masorin said,quote "Russia will build 8-9 SSBNs in 10 years")each of the Boreys will carry 16 Bulavas except the first dumbed-down "Dolgo" giving Strategic forces a total of 1200 (1296) warheads add to that probably 25
Tu-160s by 2015 with 12 ALCMs each (source:Mikhailov said,quote"we'll be receiving 2-3 new Tu-160s every 2-3 years")I know some of these are gonna be just modernized planes,but others will be some "new" planes,the building of which started in the USSR's time,u probably know that in Kazan there are quite a few of those,so the 2015 arsenal is probably 1500 strategic warheads, seems realistic and credible to me.
http://www.rian.ru/analytics/20070227/61325188.html
Yakov:
I think your absolute numbers are probably very accurate. President Putin pressed the United States for a maximum deployed inventory of 1500 strategic weapons when the Moscow Treaty was agreed to. At the end, in deference to American’s wishes, the number was increased to the current range, 1700-2200. So, I would assume the original plan was for Russia to acquire and retain the 1500 number you suggested. I think this number is what President Putin thought Russia could afford and what was needed to provide national security.
However, I’m not sure I agree all the Borey-class submarines will be at sea by 2015. Nor, am I particularly convinced in “new construction” deliveries of the Tu-160 Blackjack bomber. I just think if "Tupolev" really was building new aircraft, there would be more public agony from the suppliers and avionics companies both in Russia-proper and potential suppliers in Western Europe and India trying to support & update twenty year old pre-existing equipment. I think we would have heard of at least one Indian company remarking it was bidding on a contract for this Blackjack sensor or that radar system, for example. Not hearing that kind of comment from industry lends me to think what we have to work with is the original twenty Tu-160 airframes, sixteen in current inventory and four surplus units at the Kazan Aircraft Plant. I’ll believe in “new Blackjack construction” when the 21st airplane enters the 37th Air Army. But I’ll tell you this; the Tu-160 Blackjack is incredible airplane and will provide exceptional service to Russia for many years.
Frank Shuler
USA
Ivanov talked about eight SSBM. He didn’t specified what type. Knowing his tendency to tricky and confusing statements I bet there will be 5 Borey and 2 or 3 “new” Typhoons. That’s old vessels refurnished like the Donskoy. This is a possibility but is consistent with the 1.500 level plus an “insurance” to ABM (around 200?) claimed by Solomonov a year ago. Furthermore it will be cheaper than start a very hurry construction of new vessels.
I don't think that Project 941 submarines will be back. They are gone. I think even Dmitry Donskoy will be retired after the tests are completed.
I think Russia will always need a “trials boat” for Bulava testing and certainly the “Dmitry Donskoy” would server that purpose admirably as the newer 16 tube Borey-class submarines come in service. Pavel, in your statement regarding the “Dmitry Donskoy” being “retired after the tests are completed”, do you mean as the follow-up class is operational or literally after the Bulava SLBM is certified operational?
Frank Shuler
USA
'I don't think that Project 941 submarines will be back. They are gone. I think even Dmitry Donskoy will be retired after the tests are completed'.
You even can't imagine what could be... :-) 'Cause Russia is UNPREDICTABLE...
Dear Frank:
I live in Kazan, Russia. So, what do you want to say me about 'Kazan Aircraft Plant' (by the way, in Russian we call it KAPO - Kazanskoe Aviacionnoe Proizvodstvennoe Ob'edinenie)? :-)
Russian:
I would greatly welcome exchanging ideas with you and would appreciate you correcting any inaccurate opinions I post. KAPO (Kazanskoe Aviacionnoe Proizvodstvennoe Ob'edinenie) is a manufacturing facility that is working on Tu-160 production? With so much consolidation and change in the Russian defense industry, it is so difficult to follow. Is this part of the old Tupolev organization? And, what other aircraft production work is done there? Forgive me, I don’t speak Russian and must rely on translations to understand printed publications and non-english websites. What opinions do you share on "new" Tu-160 Blackjack bomber production?
Frank Shuler
USA
Dear Frank:
I can only say that KAPO is out of economical crisis now, and started production again. Just look at Google Earth at the point of (55°51'41.12"N, 49°07'48.19"E, eye altitude 300 meters), and you'll find something... That looks like subject of your question... :-)
PS Of course, this spaceshot at Google Earth is ~ 1.5 year old...
Here some introductory clips on Russian / Soviet missiles:
SS-18 Satan (RS-20 Voevoda):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LZS9SllAmJ0
SS-21 Scarab (OTR-21 Tochka) vs FROG-7 (Luna) older complex:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VeRzHyFX68M
SS-23 Spider (OTR-23 Oka) vs SCUD older complex:
http://youtube.com/watch?v=MM2v2JYjlco
SS-24 Scalpel (RS-22 Molodets):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i8hVbKtgNZI
SS-25 Sickle (RS-12M Topol):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aenhlGrXr44
SS-27 Topol-M (RS-12M2 Topol-M):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hesaGoYfyV8
US missile defense radar in Georgia! - Could anybody wake-up Putin before it will be too late???
Nobody eats up US cornball propaganda that NMD is directed against some "rogue states".
"NMD is directed against Russia!" - the greatest US secret was unmasked!!!!
Frank, regarding what Masorin said I remember he said "Rossiya postroit 8-9 raketonostsev za 9 let"
litterally it means "Russia will BUILD
8-9 SSBNs in 9 years".Ill try to show u this article to you if I find it in the archive, and yes I agree with you 1500 active strategic warheads is what is needed, enough to wipe-out any potential enemy and sane,plus 500 ? in storage ? The US won't keep 10K either,probably around 2000-2500,read on defensetech.org,there was a warhead number forecast for the US.
Stay clam Sertonius. I share your diagnostic but the best answer must be no just “asymmetric”. It must be calm clever, cheap, effective and burdensome for who want to press Russia. We have several not expensive options:
· Off course develop and deploy IRBM in order to optimize the payload-to-cost ratio.
· Maintain some liquid-fuel ICBM because of its higher payload-to-mass ratio. As they have a slower ascent phase they should be deployed in the heart of Russia (geographical optimization). Some land-based Sineva can be very useful and cheap and can work as an efficient interim solution.
· Continue the deployment of mobile Topol-M. Deployment of silo-based ones should stop after 60 to give space to the deployment of Sineva (2 tn payload to a 10.000 km range).
· Accelerate the research and deployment of “common vehicles” for ICBM, SLBM and IRBM and the same for MARV.
· Optimize the deployment of IRBM. Far east and near Karelia former bases of Pioneer looks as the most attractive places for deployment.
If wishes are allowed, my ideal force comprises, in land, 60 silo-based Topol-M, 90 mobile Topol-M, 30 “land”-Sineva and 30 Skorost type IRBM. The submarines forces should include the 6 Dolphyns and 5 Boreys with its corresponding load of Sineva and Bulava. The air leg of 18 Tu-160 and 32 Tu-90 looks fine if Kh-101/102 are deployed. They can also be adapted for launch from Tu-22M3 “just in case” and as “rapid reload stockpile”. This will render the whole NMD futile against Russia. If they still have in reality desires to press us they will have to embrace on another much more expensive research and testing round, and, by looking the American budget of the last years, I doubt their finances will support this.
Mr. Kolokol: Your plan is detailed below. I assumed maximum possible missile's loadouts:
- 150 "Topol-Ms" (6x100kT)= 900 warheads
- 6 Delta-IVs armed with with 90 "Sinevas" (10x100kT) = 960 warheads
- 5 "Boreys" with 80 "Bulavas" (6x100kT) = 540 warheads
- 18 Tu-160Ms with 216 H-101 ALCMs
- 32 Tu-95s with 256 H-101 ALCMs
GRAND TOTAL: 2872 warheads on 376 delivery vehicles!
Well, I still can't be calm because your arsenal is far from being adequate to repeal threat posed by massive US military build-up against Russia. Unfortunately now I don't have enough time to point out why your plan is not sufficient. Yet I suggest you to try another way estimating proper size of Russian nuclear arsenal.
Try to count:
- How many targets RVSN should be able to destroy in the event of nuclear war with US/NATO?
HINT: During Cold War CIA estimated 1900 targets in Western Europe and 2000 ones in CONUS (exclusive of all strategic nuclear weapon sites!) to be targeted by RVSN missiles and LRA bombers.
- How many Russian strategic/tactical delivery vehicles could withstand US first strike and reach their targets afterwards taking all US anti-missile systems into account?
HINT: It must be pointed out PAC-3, THAAD, SM-3, GBI, ABL and possible space based interceptors!
Given numbers should be basis for every estimation about future size of Russian nuclear forces.
http://www.missilethreat.com/iwgreport/pageID.163/default.asp
Having read this report I must change my attitude toward US course of actions. My guess is simple:
At least some influenced circles in US establishment are trying to prepare US armed forces for possible winnable nuclear war with Russia!
It isn't any paranoia, stupidity, derision or so! It is a pure reality!
If US carry out plans proposed in this memo, Russia will be placed in badly no-win position. Read this yourselves and think carefully about your black future, Russian guys!
Sertonius: Please calm down. There is no need to abuse exclamation marks, boldface font or words like "paranoia" etc. It looks rather silly.
Russian:
Still have my doubts on more than 20 operational Tu-160 bombers but we’ll see.
Just think. If we had Google Earth back in May 1960, we would have never needed Gary Powers and his U-2. (smile)
Frank Shuler
USA
Yakov:
The US arsenal of nuclear weapons has dropped to somewhere around 6000 weapons with hundreds and hundreds targeted for destruction. By 2012, the US should have 2200 operational weapons, 2400 backup weapons in its Responsive Force and perhaps nuclear devices still in the process of dismantling.
I agree with you on Masorin’s comments, but it seems unlikely to me with all the delays in the Borey submarines and unrelated issues with R-30 Bulava, that such an aggressive building schedule can be maintained. I suspect by 2015, there will still be some active Delta IV submarines (Project 667BDRM) in service. Would you agree?
Frank Shuler
USA
The RIAN article in Russian
http://www.rian.ru/analytics/20070227/61325188.html
now in English
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070302/61469215.html
It's very clear about consecuences of ABM deployment around Russia and claim that there are not causes of alarm... so far. It also hints correctly that strategic planning must consider these deployments and that nuclear deterrence is unavoidable.
Kolokol:
Best article on the subject I have read. Thanks!
Frank Shuler
USA
'Could anybody wake-up Putin before it will be too late???'
We are trying... :-)
Russian: Try harder! Otherwise you will have to wake-up Stalin! :)
You're right Frank,they won't probably build that many that fast, but the fact remains that they plan to build them so if it's not 2015 it'll probably be 2020(hope so),but could anybody tell me why isn't the Tu-95 written-off or at least redirected into a reco or ASM role?Can anybody seriously assume that such a vintage plane can in the event of a nuke war deliver its payload to a "probable" enemy without getting detected and shot down LONG before reaching striking distance ?
About Topol-M,I looked in wiki about the future french M-51 (equivalent of Bulava)it weighs 56 tons and carries six stealthy new gen warheads(tête nucléaire océanique TNO) ,the Topol weighs 50 tons, why can't it carry the same number of modern enhanced penetration warheads,even sacrificing a little in its range wouldn't be such a problem it's already great.Could anybody explain it to me ?
It just occured to me that, if Russia were to pull out of INF Treaty(I wish they didn't) it does not need to re-start production of anything. Why re-start manufacture of ss-20 when kh101/02 can do the job not only from air(as is now the case) but from land and sea as well. Re-start land and sea variations of kh-101/02 would seem cheapest options in the inmediate future.
A question to Pavel Podvig:
I am not sure I understand how the NMD GBI Interceptors to be located in Koszalin (Poland) will threaten Russian ICBMs.
I read that for sucessful interception, the GBI should be located no more than 500 km from Russian UDMH/nitrogen tetraoxide ICBMS and no more than 300 km from solid fuelled SS-25/27 ICBMS.
The distance to:
Tatishevo silos (SS-19,27) is ~1,876 km;
Kozelsk silos (SS-19)is ~1,284 km;
Teykovo (SS-25) is ~ 1,554 km;
Vypolzovo (SS-25) is ~1,153 km;
Yoshkar Ola (SS-25) is ~1,980 km;
Neprich'ya, Zapadnaya Litsa
(Delta III, Delta IV, Typhoon) is ~1,880 km.
Others in European part of Russia are even further.
If the radar in Jince has a range of 5,000 km, it will see virtually all Russian bases except for Uzhur-4 (SS-18); Kansk (SS-25); Irkutsk).
But that would make no difference in the interception itself.
If the 500/300 km range is required, the only possibility for GBI interception is from the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Skandinavia.
Yakov: Compare M-51 and "Bulava" payloads!
Boris Buliak: Flying time between IRBM and GLCM differs considerably, buddy. Besides how you can assure few Russian bombers and SSGNs security?
Petr Vakatov: How many of these bases will be active in ten years?
Silvanus:
The NMD interceptors in Poland are going to be deployed much earlier than 2017.
To answer your question, I would say that the SS-25 missiles will be retired, however their bases will home the much newer SS-27 Topol-M mobile missile variant (the replacement process has just started). The same thing occurred in the late 1980s when the SS-25 was put in the former SS-20 Pioneer bases. The SS-19 (Tatishevo, Kozelsk) will still be arond, as Russia has decided to open its Cold-War warehouses and deploy 30 new SS-19 missiles, to serve much beyound 2017. Besides, these locations will be home for the SS-27 Topol-M silo version. So, most if not all of the locations I mentioned will still be important for Russian national security 10 years from now.
To compare:
the distance to the Iranian missile base in Tabriz is 2,890 km,
nearly twice as much when compared to Russian missile bases. So it does make much more sence to deploy NMD interceptors in Turkey rather than Poland if the NMD is not against Russia.
Silvanus:
IRBM is at present not part of the equation unless Russia drops from INF treaty, which I highly doubt. As for GLCM being slower than IRBM, I knew that. Whats the point? It is the only real alternative Russia has right now, besides, even though they're slower they may be more accurate.
BTW I share missilethreat.com opinion that CEP for Topol-M is underestimated. Its pretty illogical to think that a missile such as the Scalpel which is being replaced by Topol-M could have a lower CEP than Topol, but thats just my logic.
Petr Vakatov:
Though you posed a question for Pavel Podvig, I'll drop in my two cents. I'm begining to think this latest row over GBI in Eastern Europe and possibly in the Caucasus is just a political game in which Russia feels uncomfortable because it did not anticipate it. Has the Russian side come out with the arguement that:
1- Now that North Korea situation "seems" to have been defused, where are the concrete steps from the US in response to such.? US is always said it needed to pull out of ABM treaty to guard from pssible missile attacks from N. Korea and Iran. Well, one down, one more to go.
2- If US attacks Iran and lets say it's a rosy picture(maximum damage, little or no co-laterall damage) What is the need to have an ABM system in so far Europe if Iran after a succesfull attack is no longer a threat?
Earlier I thought China and Russia would stand fast right by its partner, now the policy seems to be changing right in front of my eyes. The bait flung in front of Russia's eyes, co-operation against further expansion of Nato into Russias backyard, and a possible(highly doubtful)joint development of ABM system between Russia and US.
Petr Vakatov: Don't be childish, buddy. About sixty mobile SS-27s can't replace 360 launchers strong SS-25 force on one-to-one basis! Thus majority of SS-25 bases will be closed along with Topol's withdrawal. The same affects SS-18 and SS-19 bases. Eventually Russia will possess a few ICBM bases in ten years which is a very risky and vulnerable posture in the event of US first strike.
Boris Buliak: I suppose that Russia will withdraw from INF treaty though, so new IRBM will be fielded. You are wrong about GLCM versus IRBM accuracy ratio. New Russian IRBM could achieve a pinpoint accuracy as well.
Petr Vakatov: One more thing, I have almost forgotten. This NMD base in Poland will be operational in 2011, not 2017.
Silvanus (a.k.a. Sertonius, Quintus, Bum-Bum etc.): I would really appreciate it if you could keep just one name and moderate the tone of your comments.
Russia plans to have 100-120 missiles by the year 2015. After the end of START I treaty, each Topol-M missile will be MIRVED with three warheads.
While I agree that the SS-18 Satan will be retired by then, the 30 brand new SS-19 missiles Putin spoke last year about will remain for 30 years untill 2037.
SS-27 120*3= 360
SS-19 30 *6= 180
For a total of 540 warheads, what is 27% or roughly a third of the total of 2000 warheads projected to have then.
Is possible for "Admiral Nakhimov" which is under modernization, to be armed with the Kh-101, is mistake for the russian navy to have only air lanced cruise missiles and not sea based. The tocoderoga US cruisers carring 122 tomahawk in maximum load imaginne how many kh-65 Granat or kh-101 the Nakhimov would carry!!! Surely up to 80!! The SS-N-21 are still operational in the Akula and Victor III classes????
Leonid Brezhnev:
You're confusing nuclear ALCM's with non-nuclear sea-based cruise missiles which are allowable by treaty. Of the many points in favor of a treaty there's one overriding one and it is money. A numbers game is best played by players with stacks of cash.
Silvanus
"I suppose that Russia will withdraw from the INF treaty though, so new IRBM will be fielded."
Why? at first I thought like you, break some treaty just to show the US Russia means business. What a waste of money and resources that would have been. So you want the Pioneer back? How about a missile that's newer, smaller, more accurate, harder to detect and kill with longer range but with a smaller payload. could you live with the smaller payload? If so, may I present land based Bulava. All thats needed is a little patience and in due time the system may or may not be fielded.
Ok, I will make another question. Is possible for Russian navy to install a conversional land attack missile (like the US tomahawk)to the missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov??? Do you know what will be the new missiles that will be installed on it?? Finally
do you know if the russian navy will develop a new DDG sized vessel for replacement of Sovremmenyy and Udaloy classes or will have only corvettes and river boats at the future?
I still don't understand where this "land-based" Bulava myth came from? What land-based Bulava ? Is there such a thing?Has there been ONE official confirmation that such a thing is being developed ?I don't think so...The Bulava is and will remain SLBM,the ICBM will be the Topol-M,and adding to that it's known that the Topol-M and Bulava share 70% of their components in common,why waste ressources with a "land-based Bulava"??
Ok,I will make a modied question... Is possible for the "Admiral Nakhimov" to be refitted with convesional land attack missiles like the (US Tomahawk missile)??? I mean a conversional SS-N-21 or a conversional naval vesion of Kh-101/102
Yakov:
For what it's worth, I agree.
Frank Shuler
USA
Yakov:
The land-based Bulava myth comes from a reference of it by wiki and as I also understand even Pavel mentioned it although right now he seems to think it MIIT propaganda. As for why waste resources on a land-based Bulava:
1-Unlike Topol-M(early on Topol-M development there was a thought as to make it MIRV capable, however if I'm correct this never happened and Topol-M was finally designed as a single warhead delivery system) Bulava has been design to carry six MIRV's from its inception. This could eliminate the need to retrofit Topol-M single warheads.
2- Bulava is smaller and thus better suited for a truck than the Topol-M is.
3- If Topol-M can carry only three MIRV's versus the six MIRV's that Bulava can carry, and ones pressed for warheads, which would be more logical?
4- As for detractors of converting sea-based into land-based,: the Chinese JL-2 rocket(sea-based version)is yet to be in production whilst the land-based counterpart is already in production.
Why does the US need to build an Early Warning radar in Jince? The Site III radar in Fylingdales, with a range of 5,556 km is capable of monitoring not only Iranian territory, but most part of Russian territory as well. Besides, the similar radar in Thule, Greenland, with a range of 5,556 km, seems to serve the primary function of detecting Russian ICBM/SLBM launches.
Peter, simple, the reality shows that american behavior is not correlated with american words.
Petr Vakatov: Well, the Earth is not flat. As I understand, the Fylingdales radar won't be able to see a missile launched from Iran for some time.
Petr Vakatov:
The system at Fylingdales is really positioned to “catch” ICBM flights over the US East Coast, However, that system and the one at Thule may one day queue a future GBI base often mentioned for construction in Maine, USA.
Frank Shuler
USA
I've said it before and I'll say it again, for Russia, at the present time, continuing to spend money on SLBM systems such as Bulava and the associated SSBN platforms is a misuse of scarce funds. What Russia needs is more single warhead launchers, not fewer mirved launchers. I sincerely believe that Russia could afford 1000 single MARV warhead Topol-M's and about 250-300 new build upgraded SS-20 Pioner's if it abandoned the new SSBN program and Bulava. That would be a far more effective and survivable deterrent, especially in the light of US ABM system deployment in Eastern Europe. Also, regarding the proposed US ABM system, the point is not whether it is capable of intercepting Russian ICBM's, the point is that it is so close to Russia and blatantly disregards the agreements made at the end of the Cold War. Hey, don't look at me, I didn't vote for the neocons.
Jon Grams:
While I can understand the national military advantage of having a robust sea-based ballistic missile capability, I do understand your point. The submarine program, and its Bulava missile, is struggling for success at a time when defense resources seem to be scarce. I also agree, Russia is far better served by greater numbers of single warhead ICBMs than with much fewer multiple warhead ones. I must ask however, what agreements were made at the end of the cold war that the United States is “blatantly disregarding”?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank Shuler:
what about the radars at Shemya and Adak? Is their purpose the sole monitoring of ICBMs during the midcourse stage? How are they different from the Upgraded Early Warning Radars (Cape Cod, Beale, Clear)? Can they not detect ICBM launches? The declared future range of Shemya radar is in excess of 6,000 km, what potentially gives the radar significant advantages.
I have another question:
I read that the X-band radars are capable at distiunguishing a warhead from a decoy in space. How is that possible? Both the warhead and decoy are free falling at the same rate in space. Besides, there are measures to supress a warhead's infra-red signature in space. For example, by placing it into a some sort of "baloon" in special coating (containing aluminum).
Petr Vakatov:
The systems at Shemya-Adak are designed to both detect the inbound ICBMs and provide the “guidance” to cue the kinetic interceptors to their targets. How the X-Band radar can detect the separating warheads from a RV and ascertain the warhead from a decoy is well beyond my understanding. The “Upgraded Early Warning Radars” (Cape Cod, Beale, Clear) are useful to track launch platforms and provide threat information to the US Strategic Command for reprisal launches but useless to cue the GBIs. However, the X-Band systems, regardless of their range, can’t “detect” an ICBM at launch. This is done by satellites equipped with non-imaging infrared sensors, such as the USAF Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite system, that can detect such a launch. The American DSP system is due for replacement in the next ten years or so and is to be followed by another series of command & control satellites that will be used to cue the GBI systems from space. All of this is at least twenty years away from reality.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
Regarding the "agreements", I am referring to Putin's speech made last month in Munich. (I believe the full text is still available) On the other issue, I agree that there is a place for an SSBN force, It's just that I don't believe that Russia's defense budget will allow for a fully operational, reliable, and meaningfully effective SSBN force. Given the budgetary constraints, more Topol-M's with the single MARV warhead would be the better deterrent choice in my view.
Jon Grams:
I agree completely. If the Yuri Dolgoruki’s future is only a trials boat, Russia will need to build five Alexander Nevsky (Borey) class submarines to maintain only one on constant deterrent patrol. That’s a lot of resources to deploy only 16 missiles (or perhaps only 12; the exact number of launch tubes on these submarines still seems to be in question). Perhaps these resources, at this time, should have been put into road-mobile SS-27s. However, I suspect the infighting between the SRF and the Russian Navy for funding is just as intense as between our Air Force and Navy here. Logic always gives way to politics.
I only got the sound bites on President Putin’s Munich speech and the translations referred to more “our understanding” than “agreements”. Do you have a link? Thanks!
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank, sorry for the delay- here is the full text:
www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/
Thanks, Jon.
Frank Shuler
USA
United States is breaking its promises it made a decade ago that NATO would not move closer to Russian borders!!
Hehe If the US wants to deploy a missle shield to help protect europe and the US then Russia should deploy a missle shield in Cuba to help out the US, out of the goodness of their hearts.
What? anti missiles in Poland. what for? according to the USA the missilles are for the eastcost portection. But this must be fair, the USA can't put those anti missiles in some bodies country and at the same time at the border of a super power like him. TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM, why dont USA leave the Russians instal their own anti misilles at the border? all this is leading to a great war which will never end. BUSH! you have destroyed Iraq, and now you are breaking the realtion ship between Americans and Russians. So where are you leading us?
Your own safety can be your own danger. USA is just showing some symbols of weekness, so the Russians and the Chinese must unite to take over this is the right time.