The series of sea-based missile launches conducted last week (Bulava, R-29RM, and R-29) was clearly part of a fairly large-scale naval exercise. On September 10 the Minister of Defense reported to President Putin that the exercise was successful. The report was brief and had some interesting bits of information in it:
Today, eight nuclear submarines are at sea on operational patrol or in transfer. Of these, five are strategic submarines and three – multipurpose [attack] submarines, but all they have nuclear weapons on board.Let’s start with strategic submarines. According to the latest publicly available START data exchange, Russia has 17 submarines that can carry sea-launched ballistic missiles – five Project 941 (Typhoon), one of which has been converted to carry RSM-56 (i.e. Bulava) missile, six Project 667BDR (Delta III) and six Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) submarines.
Project 941 submarines cannot possibly be among those five on patrol – the division that included these ships was disbanded in April 2004 and Dmitri Donskoy - the submarine that is used for Bulava tests – obviously cannot carry nuclear weapons.
This leaves Delta submarines. Of the six Project 667BDR, two are deployed with the Northern Fleet - K-44 Ryazan and K-496 Borisoglebsk. Four more are in the Pacific - K-211 Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, K-223 Podolsk, K-433 Sv. Georgiy Pobedonosets, and K-506 Zelenograd. But according to the START data, the Northern Fleet submarines have only 29 deployed missiles, instead of full complement of 32, while the submarines in the Pacific have 56 deployed missiles for their 64 tubes. This means that the Navy began removing missiles from at least two submarines and it is highly unlikely that these two are available for patrol. (An alternative explanation for the empty tubes – that they are used for space launches – does not seem to work. In 2005, when the Borisoglebsk submarine was used for space-related launches twice, on June 21st and October 7th, START data listed 32 missiles at the Northern Fleet.) This leaves only four operational Project 667BDR submarines.
The situation with Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) submarines is a bit different. Far from being decommissioned, they are undergoing overhaul during which they are equipped with newly manufactured R-29RM Sineva missiles. But this still mean that not all of the START-accountable submarines are in active service. Two submarines – K-117 Bryansk, and K-18 Karelia – are currently in overhaul. Of the four others – K-51 Verkhoturie, K-84 Ekaterinburg, K-407 Novomoskovsk, and K-114 Tula – one (Novomoskovsk) has not been in overhaul yet, so it is reasonable to assume that it about to begin it, now that Tula has returned to the active service. Besides, Novomoskovsk was one of the submarines (with Karelia) involved in the failures of February 2004. So, I think it is reasonable to assume that Novomoskovsk is out and only three Project 667BDRM submarines are operational.
Would it be possible for the Russian Navy to have five of its seven operational submarines at sea? Certainly. We know that two of them were there – the Sv. Georgiy Pobedonosets and Ekaterinburg launched their missiles. Add two Project 667BDRM submarines fresh from overhaul, Tula and Verkhoturie, and one Project 667BDR (Borisoglebsk seems to be the only other sea-worthy submarine of this class) and you get five. But I really doubt that this deployment rate can be sustained for any period of time. Not that there is anything wrong with that – first, even one or two submarines on patrol would be perfectly adequate for any imaginable mission, and, second, as long as the Russian Navy can increase the number of submarines on patrol when necessary, they don’t have to keep them at sea all the time.
Attack submarines – in the next post.
The book
Comments
Pavel:
One could make the assumption the Rs. Dmitri Donskoy is capable of launching an operational nuclear Bulava missile and thus be so counted. I think this is a big reach but it might be "technically true".
Frank Shuler
USA
No. The problem is that there are no operational nuclear (or non-nuclear, for that matter) Bulava missiles.
I was thinking more on the lines of her carrying nuclear torpedoes and thus being classified as a "strategic" submarine carrying nuclear weapons. Ok. I was carrying the argument to the very extreme. (smile)
I’m very interested in the second part of your report on the “attack” submarines. If Russian fleet boats are now carrying nuclear weapons, that’s a big story.
Frank Shuler
USA
So, we can summarize claiming that, in effect 5 boomers were (and can be) deployed but just in a limited time period. It sound logic. They are different from long endurance deterrence patrols (around 100 days). Nevertheless this might indicate an overall increase of the operational threshold. Finally repairing and overhauls are paying-off.
2/3 submarines in regular patrols is a very good sign for Russian Navy and for Russia's security. It will surely boost Navy's efficiency. I wonder if these (probably) 5 submarines would be replaced by new submarines in next 10 years.
Doesn't Ivanov specifically say that the attack boats are carrying nuclear weapons? That seems like quite a provactive move.
I do not think that there are seven operational SSBNs in the Russian Navy. My reasoning is as follows: K-44 "Ryazan" of the Northern Fleet has been in dock since November 2005, so it is definitely non-operational. As for the Delta III's in the Pacific, with the exception of "St. George" they have not been overhauled for a very long time, thus it is unlikely that they are capable of going to sea. This leaves just the five SSBNs you listed.
As for your statement that "one or two submarines on patrol would be perfectly adequate for any imaginable mission", I do not think that such a force can survive a US attack. This is mostly due to the weakness of Russia's conventional forces, which can no longer create a "bastion" for the strategic submarines.
James:
I suspect Russia would need to maintain two attack submarines (fleet submarines) to “guard” one strategic boat. That level of protection and the ability of Russian submarines to launch “under the ice” would create the uncertainty needed to provide deterrence. However, that does bring up another issue. While there seems to be a firm plan on having five operational Bulava-equipped submarines in operation in 2016-18, what of the attack boats? Russia is attempting to refuel and refit some Akula & Sierra-class submarines to extend their life but the “new” Project 855 Severodvinsk has floundered. There doesn’t appear to be any Russian plan to build new attack submarines in the immediate future. Russia will need an inventory of five Borey-class submarines to keep one on constant patrol. The Russian Navy will need ten attack submarines to always provide two for guard duty. Where will these submarines come from in 2016 and beyond?
Frank Shuler
USA
James: I agree, it is quite possible that the five submarines are the only sea-worthy ones that Russia has at the moment. I don't think it's a problem, though. I'm not sure what kind of "U.S. attack" you have in mind, but I would argue that even in the case of a "bolt of out the blue" strike there would be a non-zero probability that some submarines may survive. Which is all Russia needs.
Pavel:
We know the Rs. Dmitri Donskoy is capable of launching an “operational” Bulava missile and is the test platform for the project. I was curious if only one launch tube had been converted for Bulava or was the entire submarine (20 launch tubes) so modified?
Frank Shuler
USA
My guess is that Dmitri Donskoy has one or two tubes capable of launching missiles. It's a test bed after all. Besides, there are no missiles to be launched from it and won't be for a while.
That makes all sense, as refitting a Typhoon-class submarine to launch the Bulava must have been an expensive conversion and the Dmitri Donskoy an expensive boat to operate. Do we have any guess when the next Bulava test will occur?
Frank Shuler
USA