A brief statement by the Russian defense minister last week raised questions about Russia's commitment to the unilateral initiatives of 1991-1992, in which the United States and the Soviet Union and then Russia pledged to remove tactical nuclear weapons from their surface ships and submarines.
What Sergei Ivanov said was that Russia has eight submarines with nuclear weapons at sea - five of them are ballistic missile submarines and three -multipurpose (or attack) submarines. Ivanov's statement got some attention in Russia (but, characteristically, was completely ignored in the United States - by the administration, the media, and the expert community). The consensus seems to be that if there are any nuclear weapons on those attack submarines, these must be the R-55 Granat (SS-N-21) long-range sea-based cruise missiles. The Granat missile is a naval version of the Kh-55 ALCM [UPDATE 09/18/06: I was told that it is not - these are quite different missiles. So, it should be "naval equivalent of Kh-55"], which is in many respects comparable to the U.S. Tomahawk. The argument has been made that since the Soviet military always considered long-range cruise missiles to be strategic weapons, the return of nuclear Granat missiles to submarines would not violate the 1991-1992 commitments.
Well, not really. As I describe below, a fairly strong argument can be made that these commitments cover the long-range sea-launched cruise missiles.
They long-range SLCMs were indeed discussed during the START negotiations with the Soviet Union trying to get them into the treaty and the United States rejecting that "both on the ground that nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles are not strategic weapons and on the ground that limits on nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles are inherently unverifiable" (the quote is from the U.S. article-by-article analysis of the treaty). Eventually, the solution was found in the form of the United States and the Soviet Union making identical unilateral declarations in which they promised not to deploy more than 880 of those. Conventional cruise missiles as well as non-deployed or short-range (less than 600 km) nuclear ones were not included in this limit.
Although mentioning long-range SLCMs in a document that accompanies the START Treaty (but is not part of it) does seem to suggest that they have something to do with the strategic forces, just as the Soviet Union insisted, the fact that SLCMs were not included in the treaty is probably a stronger sign that there was an understanding that they are not. So, the treaty record is inconclusive at least.
The debate about nuclear SLCMs took a new turn on September 27, 1991, when President Bush introduced a number of measures related to strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Here is what he said about sea-based cruise missiles:
the United States will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships and attack submarines, as well as those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft. This means removing all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles from US ships and submarines, as well as nuclear bombs aboard aircraft carriers.As we can see, the long-range sea-based cruise missiles were included into the "tactical" category and not just rhetorically - the United States actually committed to withdraw these missiles.
Announcing the reciprocal Soviet initiative, Mikhail Gorbachev, then President of the Soviet Union, said in his address on October 4, 1991:
All tactical nuclear weapons will be removed from surface ships and multipurpose submarines. These weapons, as well as all nuclear weapons of ground-based naval aviation, will be stored in centralized sites. Part of them will be eliminated. [...] we propose to the United States to eliminate totally, on a reciprocal basis, sea-based tactical nuclear weapons.Here, long-range SLCMs are not mentioned explicitly, which, given that the Soviet Union believed they are strategic weapons, seems to leave the door open for interpretations. But at that time there was no doubt about whether the Soviet pledge covered long-range SLCM. It was understood that the declarations on SLCM that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to submit will contain zeros (article-by-article analysis, emphasis added):
On September 27, 1991, as part of a far-reaching initiative on nuclear weapons, the President announced that the United States will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships and attack submarines, meaning that all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles will be removed from U.S. ships and submarines. Therefore, although the U.S. will continue to abide by its political commitment to provide an annual declaration of planned deployments, the annual U.S. declaration will be zero as soon as the Department of the Navy completes implementation of the President's directive. Likewise, consistent with President Gorbachev's October 4, 1991, statement on the withdrawal of Soviet naval tactical nuclear weapons, the annual Soviet declaration is also expected to be zero.This analysis was apparently written before the breakup of the Soviet Union, for it does not mention Russia at all. The breakup, however, did not change the situation very much - Russia confirmed all Soviet obligations regarding tactical nuclear weapons. There was one difference, though, that may be relevant in this case. When President Yeltsin of Russia announced his first arms-control initiative on January 29, 1992, he included SLCMs into the "strategic" paragraph:
First. In the field of strategic offensive armaments. [...] We are also stopping production of corresponding types of sea-based nuclear cruise missiles. At the same time we are ready, on a reciprocal basis, to liquidate all the existing nuclear long-range sea-based cruise missiles.In the "tactical" paragraph Yeltsin repeated Gorbachev's pledge to remove all tactical weapons from submarines and said that Russia will eliminate 1/3 of them:
Second. Tactical nuclear weapons. Large-scale measures for their deep cuts have already been taken, simultaneously with the USA. [...] Russia will eliminate one-third of its sea-based tactical nuclear weapons [...]As far as I can tell, whoever prepared Yeltsin's speech knew about the "SLCMs-are-strategic" Soviet position and made sure that it was affirmed in the statement. But I would note that the main reason that position existed in the first place was that the Soviet Union was trying to limit U.S. cruise missiles, not to preserve its own. After the United States said it will withdraw all its sea-based cruise missiles unilaterally, sticking to this position made little practical sense. Still, some may say that having placed SLCMs into the "strategic paragraph" Russia confirmed that it did not accept their classification as "tactical" and therefore it is under no obligation to remove them from its submarines.
Not at all. Moving words around matters, but what matters more is the practical policy that a country implements. The United States not just said Tomahawks are tactical, it actually removed them from ships together with other tactical weapons. Russia may have never agreed that its SLCMs are tactical, but it acted as if they were - as far as I can tell, Russia had withdrawn its nuclear cruise missiles from submarines in the early 1990s. I haven't yet seen the declarations on SLCMs from that time (I'm trying to locate them), but I'm quite certain that had the Russian declaration contained anything different from zero in 1994, when the treaty came into force (or every year after that), we would have known about it. And submitting zero confirmed (albeit indirectly) that Russia agrees that SLCMs are covered by the presidential initiatives.
The bottom line is that I don't find the theory about Russia's believing that SLCMs are strategic and therefore exempt from the presidential initiatives very plausible. In practice Russia acted as if it accepted their classification as tactical weapons and complied with it for a long period of time, which means that this definition has become legally binding. Another strong argument here is that the United States withdrew its SLCMs and Russia clearly committed itself to reciprocity. Taken together, these arguments don't leave much room for the "strategic" theory.
If not long-range SLCMs, could Ivanov's nuclear weapons be short-range (anti-ship) cruise missiles or torpedoes? In theory, yes. But this would be an absolutely clear violation of the 1991-1992 obligations. That would have certainly caught attention in the United States, its lack of attention to the developments in Russia notwithstanding.
Interestingly, the annual declarations that the United States and Russia are supposed to submit, should cover short-range cruise missiles as well. This information is supposed to be confidential, so we probably won't see it, but the U.S. government would have it. And again, it certainly expects to see only one number there (article-to-article analysis, emphasis added):
the Parties agreed to exchange, on a confidential basis, annual information on the number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 300 and 600km. Only the Soviet Union possesses nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles in this range. The number of such cruise missiles is not included in the 880 limit referred to in the declarations. Again, consistent with President Gorbachev's statement of October 4, l99l, on the withdrawal of naval tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union declaration should be zero.Of course, at the times when the United States and Russia seem to believe that abandoning their treaty obligations is not a big deal, I would not be surprised if Russia one day just submitted a declaration with non-zeros in it. But I would still expect that this to be known (if only from the likes of Curt Weldon). This is probably not a very convincing argument, but my experience tells me that we would have.
So, what are those nuclear weapons on multipurpose submarines Sergei Ivanov was talking about? I would certainly like to know it myself. I must note that one should never underestimate the ability of Russian officials to make misleading statements (to put it mildly), so it is quite possible that there were no nuclear weapons there and what Ivanov really meant was that these submarines are nuclear capable. But if those three submarines did carry nuclear warheads, they probably did so in violation of the commitment that the Soviet Union and Russia made in 1991-1992.
UPDATE 02/14/13: A few important notes. The Helsinki 1997 Joint Statement contains this sentence:
The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long range sea launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems [...]
This clearly indicates that Russia does not consider long-range SLCMs as tactical weapons and the United States agrees with this position. Also, a story on Russia's plans to deploy SLCMs on its submarines, Global Security Newswire provides the following quote from the Pentagon:
"In 1991, the United States and the then-Soviet Union, as a political commitment, voluntarily agreed to cease deploying any nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles on surface ships or multipurpose submarines. The United States has no definitive information that the Russian Federation is not abiding by this political commitment," Pentagon spokeswoman Lt. Col. Monica Matoush said in a prepared statement to GSN.I would guess that if the Russian declarations did not contain zeros, this statement would have been different.
Finally, ArmsControlWonk provided a link to an actual U.S. SLCM declaration in one of the WikiLeaks cables.
The book
Comments
At this point, whether Russian attack submarines have gone to sea with tactical nuclear weapons onboard is unknown. I will give Minister Sergei Ivanov the benefit of the doubt until proved wrong. I won’t even be drawn into the silly argument that the Oscar IIs SS-N-19 “Shipwreck” (NATO designation) missile with a range of 550km and a 500kt warhead is a “strategic” weapon. However, if true, this decision is significant for many reasons beyond a simple breach of trust. I guess we wait for developments…
Frank Shuler
USA
I can't see anything strange in reintroduction of TNW in the Russian fleet. Simply Russian Navy conventional capabilities against US Navy are now very limited so only nuclear weapon can offset US naval superiority over Russia. I personally think Russian subs and surface ships are now equipped with anti-ship/ASW nuclear systems as SS-N-15, SS-N-16, SS-N-19, SS-N-22 and nuclear torpedos.
Maybe SS-N-21 are also deployed but it would mean Russia is "de facto" abandoning INF treaty in a very clever way!
There is nothing intelligent in the re-deployment of nuclear weapons aboard non-strategic submarines. This does not enhance Russian security, proof that Russia is an untrustworthy partner. Therefore, I believe that Ivanov simply made a mistake, as there would have been a very strong US reaction otherwise, depite the apparent lack of concern on the part of the DoD.
Rokosovsky:
The reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons in the Russian Navy serves no useful purpose. If the reason for this decision is to offset US naval superiority, how does this help? How does the reintroduction of such weapons in the US Navy, in response, aid Russia? If Russia has made this decision, it is one of desperation, not reason; politics not military judgment. This you must understand, the Russian Navy is dieing. Based on current building rates, in twenty years the Andreevsky Flag will fly over five Borey-class strategic missile submarines, a few frigates, and little else. As the decision to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons, if true, makes no military sense, I can only guess the reason is internal politics. The Admiralty is desperate to secure building funds for its fleets to avoid the catastrophe that is coming. If the Russian Navy had to sortie from port today in an emergency, you would be heartbroken to see how few ships would cast off.
Frank Shuler
USA
No strong US reaction is expected because Rummy told Ivanov a year ago there is unimportant for US whether Russia withdraws from INF or not.
Mr. Shuler: I am sure you misunderstand naval TNW strength if you wrote such a nonsense!
One Russian frigate or sub without nuclear weapon can only sunk a Japan trawler. But the same ship armed with TNW can sunk entire US carrier group with one shot!
Can you perceive this subtle difference???
Rokosovsky:
My friend, if such reassurances were previously given government to government, I agree. In any event whether Russian attack submarines carry tactical nuclear weapons or not, changes the military balance little. By the way, if the Russian Navy doesn’t get some immediate funding for fleet modernization & shipbuilding, that Japanese trawler might prove a worthy adversary!
Frank Shuler
USA
Can you give me present Russian seaworthy submarine force details?
Rokosovsky:
It depends on your security clearance! (smile)
Historically over the last fifteen years, the Russian Navy has struggled to maintain 25% of its submarine force operationally at sea at any given time. The published decision to procure five Borey-class strategic submarines is based on the need to have one submarine on deterrence patrol at any given time. One submarine would always be in dry-dock maintenance and four would be available to sustain one submarine on patrol. The same availability ratio serves the attack submarine fleet as well. I have always thought the Russian Navy should imitate the French and provide two crews for both its strategic submarines and also its tactical boats. The US Navy has always maintained such a crewing arrangement for its strategic submarines, going all the way back to the beginning with Polaris. Just a thought on how to maximize the value of the Russian submarine force.
Frank Shuler
USA
Are below numbers real?
SSBN Delta III 5
SSBN Delta IV 6
SSBN Typhoon 1
SSGN Oscar II 7
SSN Akula 9
SSN Sierra I 1
SSN Sierra II 2
SSN Victor III 4
SSK Kilo 16
If so, Russia has 12 SSBNs, 7 SSGNs, 16 SSNs and 16 SSKs which means 51 submarines including 35 nuclewar powered.
In contrary US Navy possesses:
SSBN Ohio 14
SSGN Ohio 3
SSN Los Angeles 49
SSN Seawolf 3
Taken together US Navy has 14 SSBNs, 3 SSGNs and 52 SSNs and 64 submarines, all nuclear powered.
Next is Royal Navy with its:
SSBN Vanguard 4
SSN Switfsure 2
SSN Trafalgar 7
So RN has 13 nuclear subs including 4 SSBNs.
Let's look at French Navy:
SSBN Redoutable 1
SSBN Triomphant 3
SSN Rubis 6
It is 10 nuclear subs including 4 SSBNs.
And Chinese Navy:
SSN 091 Han 5
SSN 093 1
SSBN 092 Xia class 1
SSBN 094 1
SSK 033 Romeo ~20
SSK 035 Ming 17 ships
SSK 039 Song 12 ships
SSK Kilo 4
SSK Yuan 1
China has 62 submarines but only 8 nuclear and a huge number of them is obsolete.
I can't see any huge numerical dispariy between Russian Navy and US Navy at present if Russia takes defensive naval posture. Moreover Russian Navy is still superior to the Royal Navy, Marine Nationale and PLAN!
Additionally nuclear TNW gives Russia a formidable offset against US surface ships and subs.
Rokosovsky:
I would add a Delta III and two Typhoons to your list. Also, perhaps the Oscar II numbers could be moved to nine, the Akula to ten. The USN’s numbers should reflect two additional Virginia-class attack boats and an additional Ohio-class undergoing cruise missile conversion. However in your research, you have made my point. The French are building two Le Triomphant-class strategic submarines to replace their older L’Inflexible sisters and have the Barracuda-class nuclear fleet boats funded to replace the existing Amethyste-Rubis submarines. The British have their Astute-class fleet submarines building to replace Swiftsure and probably the rest of the Trafalgar-class in time. The British decision on replacing their Trident boats should come next year. China? Who knows?
If a navy isn’t building; it’s dying.
Frank Shuler
USA
I also can state that Russian Navy is building a lot of new submarines:
- three new SSBNs "Borey"
- two or three new SSNs "Yasen"
- two almost finished SSGNs "Oscar-II"
- two waiting for sea trials SSNs "Akula-II"
- one or two SSK "Lada"
So, we have TEN-to-TWELWE new subs under construcion. It is more than any other navy currently builds!
Rokosovsky:
The United States Congress only funded four ships for the US Navy last year. I understand the pain of a navy deprived of shipbuilding funds. Russia has:
- One Borey ready for sea trials next year, perhaps without her missile armament. The keel for the second is laid. The third is funded in a class of five.
- The SSN Severodvinsk class (Project 885) is suspended. Never heard of Yasen-class. Is it project 885 submarine?
- One additional Akula II may be commissioned, work is 90% finished, but the latest attack boat to be completed, an Akula I class is being “held” for India. Conventional wisdom says if India ever accepts an Akula for its fleet, several existing operational Russian Akula(s) will be refurbished and leased.
- The last Oscar II submarine was suspended at 80% after no work was done for five years. It is being used for parts to support the existing Oscar fleet.
- The Sankt Petersburg (Project 677, Landa) is suspended. India had been approached to provide joint venture funds for the submarines completion and international marketing but decided to procure the French Scorpion diesel submarine in its place.
Frank Shuler
USA
[...]
- THREE project 885 "Granay" (former "Yasen") SSNs are under construction in Severodvinsk. Many more are planned in the 2010-2030 timeframe.
- ONE "Oscar-II" was finished this year but now is waiting for its new 72 SS-N-26 missiles. It will be indeed the last "Oscar-II" class vessel made for Russian fleet.
- ONE project 671RTM "Akula-II" (K-152 "Nerpa") SSN was finished in June. There is the last "Akula" class sub launched because SSGN "Granay" will be both "Akula" and "Oscar" classes succesor. None of "Akulas" is intended for sale to India! [...]
- TWO project 677 "Lada" SSKs ("Petrozavodsk" and "Kronshtadt") are built for Russian Navy. Only SSK "Amur" class is developed for export purposes.
[...]
The Akula I class submarine just launched, the Nerpa (K-152), had her keel laid in 1986. I think that says it all.
Frank Shuler
USA
Rokosovsky: Please calm down.
I would ask everyone to stick to the facts and refrain from unsubstantiated claims. This includes calling information somehow "anti-Russian" (or "anti-American" for that matter) or opinionating on what could have been "sold for a cup of vodka" and when.
Interesting discussion on Russian Navy’s nuclear submarines and weapon systems. Do we have any additional information on the Project 885 SSN’s? I have tracked the Severodvinsk (Yasen Class) but have no knowledge of the “Granay” follow up program at Sevmashpredpriyatiye. Interested in all information.
Also curious about the SS-N-26 Yakhont system. I was unaware this system was to be refitted in the Oscar II class. The Oscar II has 24 tubes for missile launch. Is the plan to have multiple SS-N-26 missiles in each launch tube?
Frank Shuler
USA
We all know that Russian military ability is declining at submarine's speed!!! Not only Navy in all departments of military establishment is diminishing day by day. It's really shame for a country which once dominated the world with military might now in real threat to live under shadow of military might of other countries. I can't understand why a democratic free economic country with all the natural wealth, lots of people with tremendous caliber, established industrial and military installations, is not able to provide adequate fund for the defense forces to increase its military ability. Can you people tell me what USSR had that Russia doesn't have now? I am talking about the resources. How did USSR manage such a huge amount of money for its forces that Russia cannot? Do you say that Soviet people were starving then? Well, I think you should have will to build your ability. Money always comes second. I always wonder why Russia is unable to sell more conventional weapons as do other countries specially the US and earn enough money. The more money they can earn, the more money they can spend for its own security.
Now few words for Americans. You are telling that Russia cannot survive a first nuclear attack and Russia doesn't have the ability to attack the US as well. It’s true that Russian forces will be in the worst situation when the entire Soviet made nuclear launchers will be retired within next few years. Russia doesn't have enough conventional military ability either. So why you people are always crying for Russian military ability? Why you are building military installation around Russia? Why you are withdrawing from ABM treaty? Why all the nuclear submarines are on patrol only around Russia? Why you want to keep enough nuclear warheads in your reserve stock which should be dismantled as per START treaty? Why you people spend more than 400 billion dollars a year for defense purpose when you have no real nuclear capable enemy but few so called rogue states which don't have ability to hit America?
I really want a peaceful world. I never like countries like America and Russia go back to arm race once again. They should maintain minimum deterrence for self defense only, not to destroy or finish any other country.
debpc:
It’s only worse. The United States spends $400 billion dollars just on the Defense Department but probably $100 billion more on the Energy Department, who is responsible for our nation’s nuclear arsenal. Add a couple hundred billion more for our Homeland Security Department…
Please understand, I disagree completely on Russia’s future as a nuclear power and her role as a “great power” in international politics. Russia is in the process of great change. She is rebuilding her nuclear arsenal and will have by 2016-18 a completely revamped, modern nuclear capability while the United States will just be beginning replacing its 50-year old Minuteman III inventory, its 60-year old B-52 fleet, and its 40-year old Trident submarine force. America hasn’t built a new nuclear warhead since the early 1990’s with the W-88.
Cry no tears for Russia. She is strong today; she will be strong tomorrow.
Frank Shuler
USA
It is obvious that the Russian Navy is not in the best shape. But I think it is not in such a bad condition as westerners see (or wish to see) it. Upgrades and repairing are going at a constant level and the accident of the last week showed that al least a few Shchuka (Victor-III) SSN will be subject to extension of service lives. That may indicate that all operative Barrakuda and Shchuka-B will also be retained.
In addition we have under construction:
- Two Shchuka-B (One very likely will be finished)
- The Belogorod is 80% complete and it was not decided if it will be continued. Claims about its use as “spare supplier” seems to be hot air.
- The Severodvinsk is suspended. Future faith unknown
- Three Borey in different stages (Yuri Dolgoruky near completion, Alexander Nevsky advancing and Vladimir Monomakh starting)
- The Sankt Petersburg IS in the navy and the first series Lada is being built.
Off course the Navy have suffered very much, because of the disastrous liberal age, but Yeltsin had long gone and fortunately its liberal-“sons” will not regain power. In fact and luckily, pro-western-liberals parties are agonizing.
The navy is severely weekend? YES. Sure. It is dying? Almost with total certainty NO. It is just question to improve planning and management (a lot can be done in this issue), but claims about the “disappearing Russian Navy” seems to be western wishful thinking.
Kolokol:
I appreciate your comments and information regarding the Russian Navy. Most of my information quoted comes not from Western media sources but from the Russian press. The only exception is the occasional news on Russian naval systems from Aviation Week & Space Technology. For example, in RIA Novosti dated 7/20/2006 (is this Russian news service?) the source I used for the information I reported on the Oscar II-class, the Belgorod was reported as 80% completed and not going to be finished for the Russian Navy. Funds set aside for this project were going to be diverted to the overhaul of the Admiral Nakhimov instead. Minister Sergei Ivanov also hinted that the Russian government would be open to finishing the Belgorod for a foreign customer. Failing that, the submarine would be used to support the fleet. (I assumed that to mean for spare parts etc.)
Most of my general information comes from online publications, such as Kommersant. Is this a good format for learning factual information on Russia?
What is the Shchuka-B project?
Confused about the Sankt Petersburg as well. This was the named lead boat in the Lada-class and then construction was suspended. Was this name assign to one of the improved Kilo-submarines? Is the Lada project to continue? Was indeed the Sankt Petersburg the lead Lada submarine and now the project is in series production? Will this submarine be a long term replacement for the Kilo? Thanks for your help.
Frank Shuler
USA
Since it has become a subject of discussion, I am posting a list Russian non-strategic nuclear-powered submarines currently in commission:
1.Project 949A SSGN (Oscar II)
Operational:
K-410, K-442, K-266, K-186, K-150
In Refit:
K-132
Non-operational:
K-119, K-456
The "Belgorod" (K-139) will not be commissioned.
2. Project 971 SSN (Akula)
Operational:
K-391, K-331, K-419, K-295, K-461, K-328, K-154, K-157, K-335
In Refit:
K-263, K-317
Non-operational:
K-322
The "Nerpa" (K-152) will be completed for the Indian navy.
3. Project 945 SSN (Sierra)
Operational:
K-276, K-336
Non-operational:
K-534
4. Project 671RTMK SSN (Victor III)
Operational:
B-388, B-138, B-414, B-448
The first two submarines of this class are in a poor technical condition and will decomission soon.
There are a total of 20 operational non-strategic submarines, with a further 3 in refit and 4 non-operational.
1. Mr. Shuler: SS-N-26 missile was intended to replace SS-N-7/9/22 missiles in the early 1990s. Of course due to known facts it wasn't materialized. Also SSGN Charlie-class subs was to get Yakhonts and because SS-N-7/9 missile tubes are far wider than Yaknont's container diameter it was planned to place three SS-N-26's TPKs in each Charlie's launch tube. In time all Charlies were retired and SS-N-26 was adopted to use in final "Oscar-II" subs because SS-N-19 Shipwreck's successor called "Meteorit" was also abandoned. So each "Oscar-II" can carry 72 SS-N-26 SLCMs to compensate their shorter range by increased salvo rate.
2. Mr. debpc: I also think that present Russian military spendings and weapon aquisition rates (about ONE PERCENT of Soviet outlays!) are some plaintive madness because such a phenomenon can't be explained by any real circumstances. It must be some political obstacle preventing normal VPK functioning. Maybe present Kremlin's party tries to change fundation of Russian influence in the World from military power to resources power? But it isn't impossible that Kremlin's elite is secretly controlled by Western powers which forbid Russia to maintain its military might. This is because the West could afraid reduction of its own influence in the oil and gas reach regions in Euroasia by effective Russian military capabilities. For example any NATO enlargement over former Soviet republics wouldn't be possible in such a situation. It is obvious to me that present US military spendings fixed at Cold War levels, entire NMD programs, apporaching US/NATO military infrastructure closer and closer to the Russian borders aren't accidental. It is well-thought-out US grand strategy aimed at establishing a "cordone sanitare" over Russia, depriving this country any bordering allied states, seizure control over entire Russian oil export routs abroad and finally setting up some kind of secret rule over Russia resting on overwhelming US military and geopolitical superiority over Russia. At the same time Russian rulers are dismantling Russian Army, Navy and VPK to the point where Russia won't be able to produce any kind of modern weapons in the future. Even now there are many signs of this like indefinitely prolongation of entering service all new weapon systems or this sad fact that in the last 15 years Russia wasn't able to field any resonable number of already being in production conventional weapons. Look at Russian military planes aquisitions, it is the best example of this huge breakdown. And when this finally happens Russia will be militarly doomed forever!
Besides in short I think Mr. debpc that downfall of Soviet Union was an unique phenomenon in the human history! Such a military superpower (its superpower status was maintained ONLY by its military might!) was in a few years reduced to the country which isn't able to wage any hypothetical conventional war even with its Third World neighbours! Really, USSR/Russia follows Carthago way...
Gentlemen, as far I know:
- the Belgorod was “frozen”. The same fate for the Severodvinsk. May be they will be scraped but no claims nor final decisions about that were made.
- The Sankt Petersburg was the first vessel of the Amur class. She is a non-series built Amur but is not a Kilo. The first series-built Amur is inching.
-Shchuka-B are known as Akula-class in the west.
-The replacement of P-700 (SS-N-19) by P-800 (SS-N-26) is unclear but supposedly was planned a few years ago. More info about that will be appreciated.
A list of construction (it may not be updated)
http://www.warfare.ru/?linkid=1720&catid=243&pending=true
Rokosovsky:
Thanks for the update on the SS-N-26 system. The Yakhonts missile has impressive specifications and would be most difficult to defend. Do we think the entire Oscar II fleet will be so modified or just the last boat?
I agree with you the fall of the Soviet Union was an unprecedented event in world history. The change was so startling in scope that it is easy to forget the current progress of Russia. All the changes in the general Russian economy are certainly reflected in the VPK as well. Modern Russia is only 15 years old, it will take time.
Frank Shuler
USA
James:
My numbers generally agree. Thanks for your work.
Do you have any data on new Russian nuclear fleet submarine construction? I have tracked the Severodvinsk (Yasen Class) but information is so unreliable. Project 885 submarines are in production, or suspended. One launched but never completed. Work continues. No funding. Class of 18 to be built at Sevmashpredpriyatiye. etc. Just curious.
Frank Shuler
USA
Kolokol:
Would the Shchuka-B refer to the Akula II class? The (B) designation?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank, finally, I see with a little bit of surprise that NATO classifications are even more complex than Russian ones (smile).
Shchuka is known in the west as “Victor class”, afterwards, they divide the series in “I”, “II” or “III”. In the same way Shchuka-B is named “Akula class” and then sub-classified as “I”, “Improved” and “II”. For the Russian navy they are simply Shchuka and Shchuka-B and are part of the same family. Although NATO classification have some technical basis, it is not entirely accurate since a vessel is different from its predecessor in some technical parameters, even in the same series (i.e. two Victor-III can have a little bit different parameters).
Shchuka are something like a “evolving class”.
Regards.
Frank: As I know Russia's total annual budget is about 260 billion dollars while the US is spending around 500 billion dollars yearly for defense purpose only. Oh dear oh dear... It is really Cold War level spending for the US. Cold War is not there, USSR is not there, Warsaw Pact is not there, threat of communism isn't there but still the US is increasing its defense budget and building military installations around Russia. NATO is also expanding. What do you think? What do the US and NATO want to do nowadays when they have no real enemy? What's the need of NATO? Just to work as peace-keepers under UN?
Rokosovsky: I agree with you. Russian administration seems forget about their own defense otherwise they should not let their forces go down at such a rapid pace. Even Russia is struggling to stop separatist and terrorist activities in its own soil. It's a real shame for Russia. I never heard any kind of such criminal activities in USSR. I like to make another point here. You see the US and western countries provide all kind of trade facilities to China although China is a communist country. Americans are pouring huge amount of money there. China enjoys special trade benefit. On the other hand the US is reluctant to provide any kind of real trade facilities to Russia although Russia is a free democratic country. The irony is the US can trust China but not Russia! I don’t know what’s wrong with Russia. I can't understand why the US is opposing Russia's entry to the WTO?
The US is a great country. I always admire her. But sometimes I am very disappointed for her foreign and military policy. Sad part is America sometimes maintains double standard, policy isn’t unique!
Frank, The State Armaments Program envisions the commissioning of two SSNs and four SSKs, so the "Severodvinsk" may be commissioned in the future. However, it is more likely that the SSNs will be of a new, smaller class, as the "Graney" is far too large and expensive for the modern Russian military.
The new small SSN isn’t yet in the design boards. They “are” just some general specifications. So hardly may be commissioned in the next decade. MAY BE the State Armaments Program refers to the Severodvinsk and the Nerpa.
James:
Kolokol:
I agree that the two mentioned SSNs are probably the Nerpa (Akula I) and perhaps the Severodvinsk. However, is there a last Akula II to be commissioned? I just have lingering doubts on the Severodvinsk. I completely agree Russia needs a new, smaller nuclear attack submarine that can be placed into service within a reasonable time and produced to replace the Akula, Sierra, and Oscar-class boats. A long term inventory of twelve is necessary to support the Russian Navy.
Frank Shuler
USA
I don’t see reasons to be pessimist respect to the SSN fleet. Most vessels are fairly new and with proper maintenance works they can operate for 30 years. Retirement of Shchuka can be compensated by commissioning 1 or 2 Shchuka-B plus the Severodvinsk. This will define a relatively young SSN fleet. Antey (Oscar-II) are also relatively new. They are extremely powerful and, the Navy, even with just 6 such vessels will have the capability to disrupt the Oceans.
SSBN fleet seems to be in a more pressing condition. Then, there is no hurry to develop the new small SSN, mostly considering that many littoral warfare tasks will be assumed by the new conventional Amur. SSN should then be liberated to green and blue water tasks.
Off-course a proper maintenance and training program is necessary to keep this situation. If this is achieved, the new small SSN can be introduced after 2020.
Frank, the K-152 is an Akula II, laid down in 1993 and launched on the 24th of June, 2006. It is to be leased to the Indian Navy. The destination of the last hull, order number 519, which was 42% complete in 2002, is unclear. It will either be leased to India or completed for the Russian Navy, but work is proceeding extremely slowly, which is why I did not list it above.
As regards the "Severodvinsk", there will only be one boat, and even her completion is in doubt. Apart from theoretical issues of size and cost, there is a practical and immediate problem - the absence of most equipment originally intended for the "Graney" class. As it was intended to be a "Seawolf" equivalent, a variety of revolutionary electronic devices were to be developed for it, which were never funded.
Kolokol:
James:
Thanks for the information!
Frank Shuler
USA
Can anyone tell me what is the production cost of a Topol-M and a Bulava ICBM?
It's very difficult to estimate cost in defense industry in general and in Russian industry in particular.
Debpc does raise an interesting question, however. I wonder what is the relative cost between the two missile systems? Does a Bulava missile cost twice as much as a Topol-M? Three times? Any thoughts?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank, I also wonder what is the relative cost? Production cost of Topol-M and Topol-M1 may also vary! Well Frank, what is the production cost of Minuteman-III, do you have any idea?
debpc, the “official” cost for the Minuteman III missile was $7 million (in 1970 dollars) The replacement cost for a new ICBM, I would wager, would approach $75 million dollars. Just a guess…
Frank Shuler
USA
Comparison to the costs of a Minuteman III is maybe difficult, because that missile was an upgrade of an already existing missile system and produced in a very large quantity. I think the number of Mintemans (all types including test missiles) should be around 2000 pieces, so the fix costs were split on very many missiles.
Maybe a comparison to the MX is better, which costs 70 Mio USD per missile with maybe 100 produced units (50 operational units + spares and test missiles). Or the Trident II D-5, which cost 29.1 Mio USD per unit.
(Source: www.fas.org/nuke)
Martin:
Even taking into consideration the $7 million price tag of a Minuteman III in 1970, the cost did not include the RV or any warheads. And of course, not the silo or command structure either.
Frank Shuler
USA
Do the Topol-M´s and Bulavas get new RV´s and warheads or get they those one from phased out rockets?
This is a good question. My guess would be that they use RVs and "physical packages" that were developed back in the Soviet times. This wouldn't be something unusual. On the other hand, there were reports about Sineva missile's getting a new warhead, so this option cannot be completely ruled out.
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