It looks like Russia is preparing the ground for pulling out of the INF Treaty. For about two years now it has been trying to get the United States to agree to terminate the treaty, but apparently without success. Today most Russian news agencies quoted an unnamed Ministry of Defense official who said in an interview to RIA Novosti that "if necessary, Russia will withdraw from the INF Treaty unilaterally." No points for guessing what kind of precedent was mentioned in this regard - he said, "We've seen precedents like this before - the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty."
It is true that the INF Treaty, which prohibits Russia and the United States from having ballistic missiles with 500 to 5500 km range, no longer has the military and political value that it had in the 1980s. But this does not mean it does not have any value. Quite the opposite - it establishes a very important norm of not having this kind of missiles. If Russia worries about Fiji's getting them (the actual example that the defense ministry source used), it may think about extending that norm to Fiji, not about scrapping it.
Trying to come up with at least some kind of justification for the itch to end the INF Treaty, the official said that "Russia has other neighbors [i.e. not the United States], countering which can be better done with medium-range missiles, not with intercontinental ones. And these missiles don't have to carry nuclear warheads." (Should we read it that they actually might?) He then specifically mentioned North Korea as one of those neighbors. North Korea? Since when Russia considers military action against North Korea? My guess is that he actually meant something like NATO, but that would be a non-starter in any anti-INF Treaty lobbying campaign.
Unfortunately, in today's situation I don't see what could prevent Russia from actually pulling out of the treaty if it gets really serious about it. That would be a very unfortunate development, if only because it may help entrench another "norm" (which, I should note, the United States has been working quite hard to establish) - that pulling out of the treaties that you don't like is okay.
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Well The US pulled out of the Mother of All Treaty , the ABM treaty.
And now plans to deploy newer Anti Missile System in an d around Russia,in one disguise or the other.
Its a long delayed decision, Now Russia would be free to Deploy if it chooses to Missile ranging from Medium to Intermediate Range and Highly Accurate once Conventional/Nuclear types to take care of Changing Security Needs and could devise an Appropriate response to Anti-Missile Systems.
I see no reason what purpose will INF serve Russia nor will her withdrawl harm NATO's interest in any way
It is really funny! US try to deploy NMD infractructure not only in Poland or Czech Republic but also in Georgia or Azerbajan but P. Podvig can't see anything dangerous to Russia in this activity. Also Russia's withdrawal from INF Treaty would be "unfortunate developement" but insolent US destruction of ABM treaty didn't matter.
Of course MRBM/IRBM missiles are far cheaper than ICBMs and Russia has a plenty of potential targets for them, especially US NMD bases in the "close abroad" and NATO/China/Pak/Iran/DPRK nuclear forces in Euroasia.
So, why Russia must wasting its still decreasing ICBM force on targeting these objects? Russian ICBMs targets lie only in the CONUS and it should remain so!
Austin, Russia withdrawal from INF treaty should harm US/NATO because US/NATO haven't paid attention to any Russian security concerns so far! Brussels message to Russia was simple: "We are your best friends so you shouldn't afraid anything. We take care you!"
Maybe someone in Kremlin realized that it may not be completely true and some counteraction is necessary?
I must agree with Austin and Rokosovsky - this would be a very intelligent strategic move on Russia's part, especially with former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states possibly recieving ABM's and X-band radar systems. Also, it would provide a more economical way for Russia to increase the number of strategic launch platforms.
On another subject, however, since credible retaliatory response is favored over first strike, Russia would be wiser to eliminate the SSBN and instead use the huge savings to build up the ICBM force and the SSN force. It would be reasonable to assume that 4 of the new Yuri D. class with 48 Bulava SLBM's would buy hundreds of mobile Topol-M's. Remember, all it takes is one torpedo to sink an SSBN. Realistically, Russia needs 1000 ICBM launchers all with single MARV warheads to ensure maximum penetration of any conceivable ABM system. Small numbers of MIRVed missiles do not help survivability at all. 120 TOPOL-M's are not nearly enough. A mix of 800 mobile Topol-M and 200 silo based SS-18/SS-19 replacements would not only be much more credible, but also affordable for Russia if SSBN's are eliminated. Even a "first strike" launch by the US using Trident submarines would still give enough warning time for Russia to give a full ICBM retalitory response. (note- I use the 1000 strategic warhead minimum as per an earlier discussion. I would also envision 500 or so IRBM's using a newer version of the SS-20 Pioner)
Jon, A submarine is the only platform which provide a least vulnerable way of delivering N-Weapons/Deterrence.
It is quite easy to track and mark Silo Based Launch platform , A Mobile Launcher will still be a little difficult to track , given adequate warning , But sooner or later the Sophtication of Satellite/Airborne sensors will catch up with it.
The law of Physics favours the submarine inspite of development in Sensors & Sonars.
And its a Huge Ocean out there and its easy to hide not to mention Under the Ice operation.
SSBN force remains the corner stone of First Strike & Counter Strike capability for any Nation from the most advanced to emerging Nuclear ones.
The Yury Dolg.. Class of SSBN are meant to provide Qualitative Improvement , By 2015 there will be 5 of these or thats the plan , 3 are under construction , The lead sub will have carry 12 Bulava , The remaining will carry 16 of them.
So eliminating SSBN force is signing a Certain Death Warrant.
In the end a Balance is important among Land/Air/Sea based deterrence as far as Strategic Force goes , No single platform can replace the other.
The withdrawl from INF treaty will help Russia build Costeffective , Accurate and in Numbers IRBM/MRBM to take care of ABM systems and Changing Security Scnerios , Like NK,Iran,China, Pakistan.. etc.
There is whole Gap out there at Present and Many Technological Achievements & Exploits can be utilised to develop BM within those gaps to fullfil the requirements
As for Jon's idea of replacing Russian triad with dyad: we should think what happens when all post-Soviet launchers will be withdrawn from service which isn't a distant perspective. At that time Russia will rest with 120 single warhead's Topol-M missiles and a few Boreys at best. I don't take into account Russian strategic aviation because it can't survive US first strike by any mean: simply it isn't keep on alert. Moreover Borey SSBN program seems to me quite impoverished. Mr. Ivanov is still twaddling about "final" deadlines of commisioning of these submarines but in reality this program is over-scheduled. I suppose Russian shipyard industry maybe isn't able to finish this submarines because of its downfall and underfinancing!
So, scarping sea leg of Russian triad and transferring saved money to the ICBM programs is a quite interesting idea. Only a few hundreds of MOBILE Tolol-Ms with MIRV-ed warheads could assure MAD with US and other countries. Of course, Russia should also much improve its EW and C4I systems associated with nuclear forces to be able to take "launch on warning" posture if necessary.
Three basic questions relating to my last post:
1. Could Russian military industry sustain production about 60 Topol-M and new IRBM missiles annually, if there were money on it?
2. Is it possible to equip Topol-M with three-to-six MIRVs without some big technological challenges or prolonged testing period?
3. Do US really have any capability to detect and constantly track dispersed Topol-M launchers now?
Answers:
1. No. Financial and infrastructure constraints are binding. At best 40 missiles/year is the current estimate. Furthermore it’s not necessary
2. Yes.
3. Almost with total certainty: No
If not new IRBM, I advise another interesting solution:
Maybe Russia should field new GLCM similiar to the Soviet RK-55 (SSC-X-4) banned under INF Treaty??? Such a GLCM could have some advantages:
1. GLCM is cheaper than any IRBM, so Russia could build them much more.
2. As many as six GLCMs can be mounted on one moving TEL.
3. GLCM range can be equal to the IRBM range.
4. GLCM's TEL should be considerably smaller than any IRBM's TEL and thus easier to hide.
5. Current GLCM nuclear or conventional can possess pinpoint accuracy (CEP less than ten meters!), hardly achieved by ballistic missiles even now.
One main GLCM disadvantage is far longer flying time but it can be relaxed by its "stealth" characteristics.
Now Russia has one brand-new cruise missile project called H-101. It is intended to use as ALCM but its conversion to the GLCM shouldn't be difficult. Twenty years ago USSR could do the same with H-55/RK-55 cruise missiles! Moreover H-101 shouldn't have any trouble with destruction of US ABM sites around Russia because neither they nor THAADs/PAC-3s which protected them aren't prepared to deal with cruise missiles!
Mr. Ivanov: Instead of preposterous prattling about some unreal phantoms like "hypersonic warheads" you should seriously consider my suggestion! :)
Kolokol: OK, forty Topol-Ms annually isn't bad rate of production. I think it is enough, if Russia will decide to MIRV-ing Topol-M in the near future. Of course, in this scenario we assume that needed funds come from discarding SSBN leg of the triad. Your next two positive answers only confirms me it is a considerate scanario.
Austin: I am not an enemy of Russian SSBN force but let's look at them carefully. If Russia can build adequate number of new SSBNs in a reasonable time, it is all OK! But now it seems to me that Russian shipbuilding industry has some big troubles with it. Entire "Borey" class production is still prolonged indefinitely, we even don't know when the first unit of this class enter service. The worse is that troubles with "Borey's" producion aren't caused by lack of money because Russia now has a plenty of petrodolars. They are caused by many stupid decisions, lacks in technology, non-integrated construction plans etc. At the same time many funds allocated to this project are simply wasted.
So, maybe Russia had better stop wasting money on this "sack without bottom" project and devote them on Topol-M missiles. At least we are sure Topol-M can be built on time without any drawbacks!
Dear Rokosovsky, a triad is more desirable and survivable than a dyad. Furthermore the money have been spent in Borey. Right now seems better to finish them and equip with Bulava. They and Dolphins can assure a relatively survivable sea-leg. It’s seems crucial to successfully complete the Bulava project. It could be used also like a “XXI century Pioneer” if land-deployed. Maybe this is the scenario to consider if the INF is scrapped. The another possibility, that is probably cheaper, is to re-assume test and production of Skorost
Dear Bell, I also think triad is better than dyad BUT I call into question whether present Russia has enough funds, technological and industrial potential to preserve its triad as a respectable force!
Now it looks like Russia tries to partially repeat wide USSR's nuclear buildup without having Soviet resources. This explains why Russia can build only several ICBMs annually instead of several tens ones as desired and for ten years Russia can't finish one new SSBN despite several other "Borey" hulls are still waiting in Severodvinsk for a "better times".
Thus in present situation Russia should concentrate its efforts on the cheapest, most reliable and proven designs like Topol-M. Of course, some inexpensive replacements like postulated new IRBM or GLCM are also welcomed.
Otherwise for a few years from now you may rest with a few efficient delivery vehicles, heap of unfinished "new-old" junks and a huge amount of totally wasted money not mention about a bunch of derision all around the World.
Think about it!
Well, I will be no so pessimistic about the boomers. It seems that the Bulava is the main cause of delays. In addition, this year no a single test was carried out.
Off course the SSBM fleet should be small and with a high degree of readiness. More information about the current status of Borey and Bulava is welcomed.
Dear Bell, I'll find out some analysis about new Russian boomers tomorrow. Anyway you have practically agreed Russia will rest with about ten per cent of the former USSR's nuclear arsenal in the ten years perspective. In the other words Russia will fall as much as up to French or Chinese level, if there isn't any radical change in the present nuclear policy and strategy.
Another quite ridiculous observation: Fifteen years after World War II USSR managed to send human into outer space. Fifteen years after USSR's collapse Russia must hire place on the ISS for "space tourists" because of lacking money in Russian Space Agency budget...what a shameful decay!
Rokosovsky , The Borei SSBN project is going on quite well after adequate funding has been given to it , The first of the class sub will launched in 2007 may be earlier and will be commisioned in 2008 , two more Borei are under construction and as the plans stands today , A total of 5 of this class will be built by 20015 ~ 16, With the last 4 carrying 16 SLBM.
I see no reason to be pessimistic about Russian SSBN fleet , Borei delay is due to lack of funding , design change and change of its SLBM in latter stage.
The Under water fleet has Delta IV which are being modernised and Typhoons , The testing platform Dimitri Donskoy is itself being readied
for Bulava.
The Bulava has gone 3 test till now the plan is to have a total of 10 Tests done in the next 2 years, It ofcourse dosent mean that all 10 tests need to be completed before its induction .
Most of the last few test will be done from the Borei submarine.
No amount of Numbers in Land Forces of any Nation can compensate for an SSBN , The submarine are far hard to detect , could be any where at a given point of time ( the Ocean still cover 70 % of Earth :)) and gives a assured 2nd Strike/Counter capability.
Yes the immediate systems that could be deployed if Russia moves out of INF is a Ground Launched Variant of KH-101 Cruise Missile , its supposed to be Stealth , Very Accurate and has a Range of 5000 Km.
And a land Based Mobile MIRV'd Variant ( or even large Conventional Payload ) of Bulava can be deployed in the next decade.
Gentlemen:
What provisions were made in the original INF Treaty for a country to unilaterally end its compliance?
Frank Shuler
USA
It's a standard "national interests" clause in Article XV.2:
Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Pavel, there was similar language in the ABM Treaty and the United States exercised its legal option, under that treaty, to end its compliance. It looks like Russia may very well reach the same national conclusions in regard to the INF Treaty.
If Russia builds 1000 SS-20-type intermediate range nuclear-armed missiles, who will feel threatened? China, India, Fiji? How will Russia be “better protected”?
If the goal is to build an intermediate range conventional missile with obviously a range greater than 600 km, only the United States will prosper. The US Navy has a conventional (nuclear maybe?) project, the Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM) in development. This missile has recently been “updated” for surface launch. I would think it would be in Russia’s interest to hold this project to a 600km range.
What is to be gained here?
Frank Shuler
USA
Yes, that's exactly the point - nobody would benefit from having one more treaty abandoned (just as nobody gained from the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty).
I'm not sure about the submarine-launched missiles. As far as I understand, they are exempted from the INF Treaty anyway.
Re; Borey class SSBN.
Contrary to popular belief, SSBN's do not roam the world's oceans undetected while under power. It is fallacy to assume that SSBN's guarantee first strike capability. SSBN's can be tracked and they can be sunk and sensors only improve, and there are also accidents. There is no doubt in my mind that Russia builds the world's best attack submarines - focus their limited naval resources on that and they will deal with opposing SSBN's. I maintain that no "first strike" by a Trident SSBN can hit a single Russian target before Russia can launch 90%
of its ICBM force. I also maintain given Russia's defense budget, SSBN's are a waste resources. BUY MORE TOPOL-M's!!!
Russia will surely not build 1000 SS-20-type missiles. Provably, if it decide to terminate with the INF, it will build a few dozens Skorost or mobile-Bulava and/or some GLCM to target threatening spots in the “near abroad”. Irrespectively of this, USA will do what it wants to do, as usual, and Russian concerns will not be taken into account. Consequently, intermediate missiles are useful to optimize the Russian nuclear sword considering current financial levels
This is just silly. What kind of threatening spots in 'near abroad' (or 'far abroad', for that matter) are there that require targeting by all these Bulavas? The reality here is that all these weapons are pretty much useless these days.
Well, Ivanov and Baluyevsky disagree with respect to the concept that they are “useless weapons”.
Mr. Podvig: Maybe American ABM interceptors in Poland or Czech Republic equipped with NUCLEAR WARHEADS could be such a "targeting spots" for Russian IRBMs???
Maybe someone in Russian MoD thinks such an option would be a quite attractive for US? Thus nuclear ABMs have a far bigger chance do destroy enemy missiles, especially if these missiles are in their boost phase and nuclear detonations takes place over enemy territory.
Maybe we should also consider this option...
Ivanov and Baluyevskiy are not exactly disinterested parties. Besides, I'm not sure even they would be able to say clearly what it is these weapons are good for. I wrote about this some time ago.
As for "nuclear interceptors" in Poland or elsewhere as targets for intermediate-range missiles, even if something like this were deployed (which it won't for a whole host of reasons), attacking them would make no military sense in any kind of scenario.
Well, considering the Russian geography I see in IRBM all the advantages that amerikaniskys see in conventional SLBM. Russian IRBM should not necessarily “go nuclear”. Even more important: they can save money otherwise diverted to ICBM.
As for Russian SSBN fleet: Apart from its overall cost and doubtful future resulting from financial reasons let's have a look at survivability of Russian boomers in the future!
In ten years Russia will possess about five-seven active SSBNs. It is about ten percent of Soviet SSBN force. How many of them will be on constant patrols? One or two taken into account poor crew training, money shortages and repair's prolonagtions.
Unfortunately US are making a big effort to improve their capabilites to detect and track of enemy subs. Many new US attack subs with brand-new sonar systems are now entering inventory (Seawolf, Virginia). US Navy domination over World Ocean is now stronger than ever before!
Do you belive present Russian Navy could screen a few of its boomers against US Navy??? Remember how many efforts Soviet Navy had to undertake in order to create so called "Sea Bastions" where Soviet subs could feel only partially safe during war. Now, Russian Navy nas noting to compare with mentioned Soviet capabilities.
Let's be frankly here: now during a conventional period of war US Navy could easily deploy their aircraft carriers, subs and support ships in the GIUK, crush Russian Northern Fleet (its naval bases, airfields, surface combatants) and next organize a regular hunting of Russian boomers on the Barents Sea. Of course, there wiil be even worse in the future because US will be able to accomplish this task almost secretly thanks to their subs, stealth bombers, ALCMs and still proceeding downfall of Russian Navy capabilities.
Here is how secure Russian SSBNs are and will be...
Mr. Podvig: These US "nuclear interceptors" could be potentially a far more dangeorius than everybody thinks!
They may be an important a part of US first strike potential against Russia. Instead of destroying Russian ICBMs they can be used as an "EMP storm" makers, which would paralyze the most crucial Russian command centers, EW instalations, relay nods and COMSAT nets during the critical time determining the success of US attack.
Nobody though about such a scenario so far???
Here is the thing and there really is no way to get around this, Russia will be just as powerful a country on the world stage in 2016 with five “Borey Class” submarines, sixty silo and seventy mobile single-warhead SS-27 Topol-M ICBMs than if she had ten times as many. Ending INF isn’t about nuclear weapons. It’s about increasing the range, flexability and effectiveness of conventional weapons.
Don’t you really think Russia could manufacture more that seven or so Topol-M ICBMs a year if there was a real need?
Frank Shuler
USA
Mr. Shuler: I suppose you can express such opinions so easily because you live in the US. Living in Russia you would be certainly less sure in my opinion. :)
I do agree with Kolokol. If the restrictions of the INF Treaty were removed, both Russia and the United States would be free to develop longer-ranged conventional ballistic and cruise missiles; weapons that would reflect the changing world situation. All these treaties were negotiated during “Cold War” times when the United States and the Soviet Union were the only “world powers”. Times and adversaries have changed.
Rokosovsky, I have never heard of American ABM systems using nuclear warheads. Can you clarify this? And, yes, I live in America. By living here I can say without a doubt, the average American citizen does not fear Russia. We are glad the ‘ol days are behind us and look forward to a future of cooperation and economic opportunity. Russia may never be our friend but she surely is not our enemy.
Frank Shuler
USA
I do not think that this particular discussion is very sensible, but it has touched on an issue which may assume some political importance in Russia. The third test of the Bulava missile, which was supposed to take place in July or earlier, has not yet occurred. This may indicate problems with the missile, which would in turn adversely impact Putin's "raketno-energeticheskaya derzhava" public relations.
Mr. Shuler: Have you never heard about US "Spartan" and "Sprint" anti-missiles formed "Safegurad" ABM system???
And note, that "average American citizen" isn't an "average American plutocratic ruler", alas! In fact, there is a huge difference between them...
Mr. Wolfson: I also suppose this overrated "Bulava" SLBM may never enter service because of underfinanacing, technological constraints etc. Yet the more comforting news is that Putin's propaganda hoaxing about "strenghing Russian nuclear forces" begins to fall to pieces together with "Bulava" program! :)
I have forgotten to write one crucial fact associated with "Bulava". If this program falls, all unfinished "Boreys" will have to be converted to carry some THIRD TYPE of SLBM! It is interesting WHEN they enter service in such a case???
Rokosovsky:
I stand both corrected and educated. Yes, indeed the 100 Spartan and Sprint missiles, active for only 24 hours with the Safeguard ABM system in 1975, were nuclear armed. In fact the warhead used for these interceptors was a neutron warhead and lay claims at the time to being the “perfect” nuclear weapon.
And, American plutocratic rulers are never “average”. (smile)
Remember, Russia has never built a nuclear ballistic missile submarine. I suspect the Bulava missile system will succeed in proper time and the Delta IVs will suffice in the meantime.
Frank Shuler
USA
Mr. Shuler: Well, now US could use its experience with "Safeguard" system to secretly modify current NMD interceptor with nuclear warhead. However it probably wouldn't be an ERW warhead but rather some high yield thermonuclear device optimized for a huge EMP burst. In fact "Spartan" warhead had a 1 MT yield. Anyway simultaneous detonation of several tens of such warheads over Western Russia should do a lot of damage to the Russian retaliatory capabilities.
Yes, Russia has never built any new SSBN since USSR's downfall but it doesn't mean that nowadays Russia is able to do so!
Rokosovsky:
The use of any modified ABM system for “offensive” nuclear strike seems farfetched. Why would you use such a system in this way when a “conventional” nuclear ICBM or SLBM would work so much more efficiently in such an EMP strike? This seems more of an academic argument than a practical discussion. Would you not agree?
Since 1991, Russia has not completed a naval warship larger than a frigate. Only an Akula-class fleet submarine has been commissioned and this boat was under construction for years. (this submarine is rumored for service to India and not the Russian Navy) An Oscar-class cruise missile submarine was ordered abandoned when 85% completed. I state these facts to only suggest building such warships is a very complicated task requiring vast expenditure of rubles and industrial capacity. The military-industrial complex needed to build such systems has had to be totally rebuilt since the end of the Soviet Union and reconstituted in Russia proper. When the Rs.Yuriy Dolgorukiy goes to sea, I have every confidence she will be an excellent submarine and the Bulava missile system a success. It just takes time.
Frank Shuler
USA
Well, the 2 previous Bulava tests have been OK. Something happens right now because the third tests is delayed, but it should not be something serious. May be the first test with multiple warheads is more complex than previous ones. The completion of the Bulava program is crucial for the future of the strategic forces.
Mr. Shuler: Of course, I disagree with you! You seem to know nothing about differences between ICBM/SLBM missile's and GBI anti-missile's fligh parameters.
First, they have completely different flight profils because ICBM/SLBM is a ballistic missile and GBI in my scenario would fly at aeroballistic trajectory.
Second, GBI possesses a much greater accelaration and thus speed after launch than any ballistic missile!
Taken together GBI fired from Poland could reach Moscow in only in three minutes and detonate its thermonuclear/EMP warhead over city. The Trident II SLBM even launched from Norwegian Sea can reach Russian capital in ten minutes at best. So, we have threefold time saving here! Moreover GBI launch could be much harder to detect by Russian EW systems than US SLBM launch although now Trident launch is also difficult to spot by Russia.
Therefore a sole Russian chance to survive such a US first strike scenario is to destroy all US NMD and other military bases around Russia with IRBMs as quickly as possible by preemptive strike in the event of any certain warning of incoming US attack. Additionally Russia must generally take a "launch on warning" or even "preemptive counter-C4I" strategy and do everything possible to be sure its EW/C4I infrastructure can handle this task.
I generally suppose that present US grand strategy towards Russia reminds me US "Dropshot" warplan against USSR from the 1950s. The main similarity is to bring US nuclear strike assets and infrastructure as close as possible to the Russian borders.
GBI fired from Poland could reach Moscow in only in three minutes and detonate its thermonuclear/EMP warhead over city.
Rokosovsky: All these amateurish bizarre scenarios that you are tyring to come up with have absolutely nothing to do with reality. What "aeroballistic trajectory"? What "three minutes"? Get a life!
Rokosovsky:
I must admit you write a better novel than Tom Clancy! Such a clever imagination! The truth in fact is that an American attack by our Trident nuclear submarines based in the Caspian Sea would target Moscow in mere seconds; with little or no warning time for Russia. IRBMs will not help your cause.
Frank Shuler
USA
Just a correction: the Spartan ABM warhead was the W-71. It had a yield of 5 megatons (tested underground in 1970) 35 were built and they have all been dismantled in the last 10 years. It does hold the record for having the highest yield to weight ratio of any operational "clean" warhead, in that 95% of its yield came from fusion reactions. The W-71 weighed 2850 lbs. The device was tailored to kill incoming RV's by x-ray flux. (it should be noted that the Spartan ABM did have the ability to accelerate its 5 megaton payload to mach 12 + and 750 miles range 10 times as fast as any current ICBM can do for that speed and range) According to Lawrence Livermore National Labs, advances were made in very high yield devices (over 25 megatons) such that in 1962, they had the capability to build a 60 megaton device with a weight of around 9000 lbs, and the device would be 95%+ fusion; just as the Tsar Bomba was.
If Russia is going to be as severely limited in numbers of strategic launchers as we are discussing, then using very high yield weapons (50+ megatons) should be a viable alternative. Just 100 ss-18/ss-19 size launchers with such a 50 MT warhead (MARV of course) would have 10 times the firepower of the entire Trident SSBN fleet with only 1/10 of the fallout. (the current Trident fleet of 14 boats has a max warhead loadout of 2688 at 8 per launcher, with 480 of those being 475 KT W-88's and the rest 150 KT for a total yield of around 550 MT; 85%of which is from fission.
It's something to consider. One thing is for sure, 130 Topol-M's with 550 KT each and 90 or so Bulavas with perhaps 600 KT for its six warheads combined (interceptable, non-MARV warheads, I might add) are not much of a deterrent. Small numbers of launchers should not be wasted on warheads with small yields and even more so, in the case of the 6 MIRV Bulava, with its interceptable non-MARV warheads.
For God's sake, at least save the 20/25 megaton RS-20's if there are even any left!
This proposed idea of conventional IRBM's is almost as bad as conventional tridents. The "changing world situation" does not warrent the extreme risk of using conventionally armed long range ballistic missiles. Its the same idea with "mini-nukes" for bunker busting. The snaller you make them, the more likely it is that they will be used, and cause escalation. The point is (contrary to the Bush administration and current Pentagon planners) Nuclear weapons should only exist as a deterrent i.e. defense, and the "new world order" changes nothing in that respect. The stellar record of the deterrent capability of nuclear weapons speaks for itself, and the end of the cold war DOES NOT CHANGE THIS. People are too eager to "move on" from the cold war and in the process they become people who (stupidly)want change simply for the sake of change.
Jon Grams:
Technical information on the Spartan ABM is most interesting. This was the “long range” weapons of Safeguard. Do you have any corresponding information on the “short range” missile, the Sprint? Technology aside, the system was only activated for 24 hours when Congress ordering it shut down for economic and political reasons. The truth was the system for all its sophistication simply didn’t work. Kolokol, who posts here, has a good saying, “it’s easier to sharpen the sword then the shield”. While we often respectfully disagree, I’ve always appreciated the wisdom of his thoughts and so apparently did the US Congress. Safeguard became a footnote of the Cold War.
Why stop at 50 megaton ICBMs? Why not 100 or 200? Why only 10 MIRV warheads? How much is really enough? Silly argument, isn’t it?
Change for change sake? Not really. The nuclear inventories and their delivery systems, of both Russia and the United States, will only change by obsolescence. This change is agonizingly slow. As the Cold War inventories begin to be replaced by modern systems, the absolute numbers will drop to levels that are affordable and meet both Russia and America’s national needs. By 2016, Russia will have a modern, efficient nuclear deterrence. That is the purpose of nuclear weapons, isn’t it?
Frank Shuler
USA
May be Rokosovsky went too far with his imagination. Bur even the most furious pro-American liberals (prone to defend everything USA do but obscenely against any action aimed at improve strategic Russian arsenals) must admit that NMD plans in Europe will affect Russian security. This can be deliberate or not. But this doesn’t matter. Russia must assure herself against any potential extortive purpose and must take measures to deter any aggressive action from any international actor. Trust in foreign promises of “partnership” is just insane. Fortunately the Yeltsin years have long gone and Russia must be absolutely free to design its forces according her best interests and capabilities. If the INF is an obstacle, then let we bury the treaty like a “cold war relic”.
Pavel:
In a previous post, we spoke of submarine launched Intermediate ranged conventional missiles in relation to the INF Treaty. The US Navy has its conventional warhead SLIRBM project in development and I think, in relationship to the INF Treaty, such missiles with a range in excess of 600km would be considered nuclear armed regardless of actual payload and thus accountable as such in START. For example, the four Trident submarines of the USS Ohio-class that have been pulled out for conversion to cruise missile carriers are still counted as Trident nuclear platforms in START and subject to its accounting rules. Are my facts straight here?
I think the significance of Russia and the United States setting this treaty aside is huge. It would signal the end of any future hope for a continuance of START after its 2009 deadline. Arms control as we have know it for the last 40 years is over.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank;
As for the Sprint ABM, the missile carried a kiloton range warhead which killed by neutron flux (neutron bomb). The Spartan was designed to intercept clouds of warheads, whereas the Sprint was a last ditch for any that got through. The Sprints range was only 35 miles, but it covered that distance in only a few seconds as it accelerated to mach 8 in less than one second and on to mach 12. The army tested an even faster ABM, HiBEX (similar to Sprint) which accelerated twice as fast as Sprint (200g's) and had a range of 10 miles. Interestingly enough, the Safeguard ABM's were so accurate that on a few occasions, they physically hit incoming RV's (not a requirement for successful intercept, which is as good a record as our current kinetic interceptor ABM system)
Regarding higher yields (50-100 megatons), ICBM's larger than the RS-20 are pretty much at the practical limit and the RV size at 100MT simply because it makes such a large target beyond this point. (this is assuming maximum theoretical yield to weight ratios, as Li6 fuel has an energy content of 62KT/kg assuming 100% burn efficiency. I mean you could use a Saturn 5 to carry a 2000MT warhead, but it would be too easy too shoot down, at least for a country with ABM capability. I am just saying that for Russia, 50-100MT would be a realistically practical (it's an ideal "city-buster" size), and could make up substantially for lack of numbers.
I maintain all my statements about nuclear armed GBI threat to Russia. Several "experts" stated here I am not right or I am a Clancy's double without any counterargument. Unaccountably none of them noticed two unimaginable nonsenses made above by Mr. Shuler:
1. Trident IIs can reach Moscov in "mere seconds". What "mere seconds"??? Is Trident II a "photon powered" missile???
2. US SSBN can be based on Caspian Sea! What "Caspian Sea"??? Thus it is an inland sea! So, how US boomers could reach this sea? Maybe US Navy plans to establish some naval base or boomer's shipyard in Ajerbajan and Mr. Shuler has some secret informations about that? Russian MoD would be very interested on it!
Well, I wish all local "experts" to have a bit cleaner glasses in the future! Otherwise I begin to seriously doubt in your military knowledge.
Kindly,
Rokosovsky
The Yury Dolg.. Class of SSBN are meant to provide Qualitative Improvement , By 2015 there will be 5 of these or thats the plan , 3 are under construction , The lead sub will have carry 12 Bulava , The remaining will carry 16 of them.
Austin:
This the first time I’ve read this interesting information on the “Borey” class. Are we certain the follow up submarines to the Yuriy Dolgorukiy will carry 16 Bulava missiles? I’m assuming the displacement of these submarines is greater than the initial boat?
Frank Shuler
USA
Another new advice to Russia I have found here is to equip its wretched number of remaining ICBMs with single multimegaton warheads.
Good hint! Russia will finally become a second nuclear China! It is a really good news for US!
I propose one more amazing counsel: Russia should keep these warheads unarmed and separated from its missiles! Only such a nuclear posture will make Russia secure forever against any foreign nuclear strike! Nuclear retaliation would be guaranteed at any case! :)
Rokosovsky:
Please take no offense at my little joke. Sometimes the fantasy of these discussions goes to my head and I speak out-of-turn. You are more than entitled to your opinions and I can assure you there are no Trident nuclear submarines based in the Caspian Sea. (smile) I enjoy your passion for the argument no matter how far a field it runs.
Frank Shuler
USA
Jon:
Thanks for the excellent read on the Safeguard ABM System and in particular on the Spartan & Sprint missiles. Amazing technology for its time! Pretty amazing technology today!
It has always seemed to me that warhead size has been in direct correlation to accuracy. The larger the yield; the less accurate. If the goal is to hit the Pentagon and the accuracy of your missile only allows you to strike Washington DC, you better have a big warhead to ensure that such a strike on Washington DC puts the Pentagon out of business. However, how large (yield) does a warhead have to be if you can launch the missile from a continent away and land the payload in the Kremlin’s square? Destruction force is also a relative term. For example, the destructive force of five 100kt W-76 warheads in a Trident missile, set to air burst over a city, will create far greater damage than a single 500kt warhead strike. Thoughts?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank, Thats indeed the case per newer reports , From the 2nd sub onwards the number of SLBM carried by Borie class sub has been increased to 16.
Yes I would like to think that they would have achieved it by lengthening the hull and consequently a moderate increase in its displacement.
The first Borei design owes a lot to the R&D work done during the Soviet times and since the sub was already laid down they would have continued with it and then from 2nd Sub onward it would have gone some moderate design change to accomodate more missile.
Frank, Point taken-
It is true that since ground targets are essentially two dimentional, greater numbers of smaller warheads will do more damage than one warhead of equal total yield because blast force (psi) decreases with the cube root of distance from epicenter, however, thermal energy which accounts for 80% of a nuclear explosion only decreases by the square root of distance. So, the incendiary effects of a single large, say, 4 metric ton weight 60MT warhead are much greater than for 4 metric tons of MIRV's (8-800lb 475kt w-88's and RV "bus"). Sub-megaton warheads are less efficient than multi-megaton warheads because of the larger needed % of fissile material vs thermonuclear fuel (primaries can only be made so small). Also, the smaller MIRV warheads need to be detonated closer to the ground to maximize effects which results in substantially more fallout (and the W-88 is an extremely dirty warhead as well) I am of course referring to large cities as targets,(vs military targets which are generally much smaller). To get a good idea of effects of KT range warheads vs MT range warheads check out the Nuclear Weapons Effects Calculator at www.stardestroyer.net/Empire/Science/Nuke.html
On this site you can input any yield from .001 MT to thousands of MT.
It is also interesting to note that the majority of deaths from sub-megaton yield weapons are from radiation sickness (one of the most horrible ways to die) where deaths from a multimegaton weapon are almost totally from instantaneous incendiary and blast effects (anyone close enough to recieve a lethal dose of ionizing radiation would be vaporized, which is not the case for KT range devices) So, if someone launched a nuclear weapon at me, I would rather have it be a large one so 1: I would either die instantaneously or 2: be able to have a chance at living without fallout everywhere.
Austin:
Thanks for the update on the Borey-Class. The five submarines, when operational by 2016, could then hold 76 Bulava missiles with 456 warheads. While this class has had a protracted and somewhat controversial construction history, I'm looking forward to seeing the RS.Yuriy Dolgorukiy. She'll be the pride of the Russian Navy.
Frank Shuler
USA
The real issue here is the nearness of the missile interceptors to Russia. U.S. surrounding Russia with interceptors which may include nuclear ones is only to cause any destruction to take place far away from U.S. shores. It doesn't really matter to them if ten million Russians, polish, caucasians or Azerbaijans are roasted alive in the process. Hence Russia must act to precipitate this issue before it's too late. Just watching U.S. encircling them wouldn't do. Did the U.S. wait and watch when Russia deployed missiles in Cuba?
Sharma:
This “destruction” you speak of is the result of interceptor ABMs striking exactly what? Is it your contention that these missiles, based in Poland, Azerbaijan or wherever, intercepting a Russian launch would result in mass civilian casualties by having their payloads fall back on Russian soil? I am most confused by this entire ABM issue.
If the United States wanted to move offensive nuclear weapons “nearer” to Russia wouldn’t America simple use submarines to accomplish this?
In 1961, the Soviet Union attempted to place intermediate ranged ballistic missiles in Cuba to address the perceived nuclear weapon “gap” in numbers relative to the American arsenal. We objected. You pulled your weapons from Cuba; we pulled ours from Turkey. Status Quo.
In the absence of the INF Treaty, I hope we are not back to those days.
Frank Shuler
USA
To all of the above comments on nuclear-armed GBI's--don't you think that the host countries (Poland, etc) would object? Second of all, the US Congress would clearly not allow it (they destroy military projects all of the time due to politicial ramifications). In addition, there is no way that those GBIs could intercept any Russian warheads launched from Siberia or SSBNs--enough deterent to annihilate just about everyone that matters. And lastly, I don't think that anyone in the US seriously considers a nuclear war imminent or think that Russia is their enemy. Today the enemy is terrorism; perhaps this will change one day but for the forseeable future, our military's aims will be protecting the country from terrorists' attacks by mainly bringing the fight to the enemy. As a final note, ridding arms limitations would clearly hurt the country that can least afford new weapons--that is Russia. Although Russia does have a foreseeable threat in both China and more importantly (the less stable) Iran. But instead of making more weapons, I agree with the earlier comment that extending the INF Treaty to China would be beneficial to all parties (Japan doesn't feel safe with all of those weapons there either). As for Iran...let us all pray that political foot-dragging stops and the UN can put a stop to Iran's nuclear program before it even starts. But as for now, most people agree that neither N Korea nor Iran has nuclear weapons small and strong enough to put onto accurate enough delivery systems that could destroy either Russia's or the US's capital or strategic command centers. And, however stupid they are, MAD is almost universially accepted.
Andrew
New Orleans,
USA
It’s not matter to construct hundreds of new weapons. It’s just necessary to construct enough IRBM (no more than 60) to neutralize near and intermediate threatening spots without wasting ICBM and SLBM. If USA wants to waste they resource building hundreds of GBI, this will not affect significantly the potential of modern defence-penetrating warheads. Let them.
Respect to the “Iranian threat to Russia”, this is just wishful thinking or deliberate misinformation. Russia doesn’t buy anymore silly American arguments and do not want to be a subordinate state. Like it or not the Yeltsin years have gone and the Russian interests are more important than western interests. This must be accepted. So, Russian strategic forces must be designed and optimized taking into account strategic, economic and political realities. No foreign influence must be allowed.
Andrew:
Kolokol:
I tend to agree with both your thoughts. I agree with Andrew that there is little fear of Russia in America today. We are no more concerned with Russian nuclear weapon modernizations or force structures than we are of the French. The Cold War is over. Regrettably, I have also come to the recent conclusion that Arms Control agreements and corollaries between Russia and the United States have also reached their end. The world of nuclear proliferation and international terrorism will weigh heavy on America’s foreign policy agenda in the future at the expense of traditional arms control negotiations with Russia. If Russia wants to set aside the INF Treaty because of her national security needs, this is what will be done. I agree the United States has no moral authority to lecture Russia on how to run its affairs, domestic or international. However, this notion that somehow “foreign influence” must be driven out of Russia at all cost sounds a little too much like the Taliban. “Foreign influence” in the form of trade with the EU and China will bring prosperity to Russia unseen in its history. Such prosperity comes with its own version of “foreign influence”. We live in a changing world; a global economy. Military decisions made today are really about the world in 20 years time. The United States is trying to get ahead of the curve by investing in counter-ballistic missile technology today in hopes of having a system that can protect our country down the road. It seems a fair investment to me.
And Kolokol, don’t be so quick to dismiss the ambitions of Persia.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank : We are talking about strategic security planning, so no foreign influence must be allowed. If we talk about international trade we are discussing another matter. Both of them are in separate spheres.
Subject Iran: Iran is not in position to be anti-Russian. On the contrary, they benefit with intense trade relationships with Russia. It no presents security concerns. On the contrary, in Caspian Sea discussion it has been very constructive. This hardly will change in the near and mid-term future.
Kolokol:
Russia has every right to defend herself and develop whatever military that best serves her national interest. It is that state of “national interest” that is in such a flux. START III took so long to ratify both sides lost interest. The United States decided the ABM treaty no longer met its national needs and set it aside. Russia wanted a comprehensive arms treaty to supersede START II and only got the Moscow treaty in return. Moscow “threatens” to end participation in the INF Treaty and this startling news doesn’t even make the front page in American newspapers. Changing times…
There are no separate spheres. That’s my point. In the future, the line between strategic security planning and global trade will begin the blur. If Russian banks complete a venture capital investment in EADS as recently reported in the Western press, and EADS wins the upcoming contract to supply tanker aircraft to the US Air Force, look at the conclusions. United States Air Force planes may well wind up flying one day in the future with Russian supplied aircraft parts; manufactured in Russia. Hard to imagine just a few years ago!
Iran is not so much anti-Russian as pro Iranian. Don’t forget history.
Frank Shuler
USA
We have that situation Frank mentioned already today. The American Lockheed-Martin Atlas V Booster uses a Russian engine (RD-180) in the first stage, a downgraded version from the Zenit RD-171 engine. The Atlas V is also used by the USAF to launch military payloads into orbit.
And if Russia invests in EADS, they will take part in a company producing the M-45 and M-5 SLBM for France, also aiming on Russian targets.
Interesting situation.
Martin
Germany
Martin:
When the American ABM system is fully “operational” in the next 10 years, the cueing command & control satellites needed for the system will be put into orbit by a Lockheed-Martin Atlas V rocket. If the SS-27 Topol-M turns out as operationally successful and long-term durable as all tests now indicate, perhaps the US Government should contract with the Moscow Institute of Heat Technology for our Minuteman III replacement?
It is an interesting situation, isn’t it?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank:
Maybe it´s time for an United Strategic Missile System USMS. Russia can develope the Missile, the US the MIRV Bus and Reentry vehicles and it can be produced in China. France and the UK can develope a SLBM-modification out of it, and Pakistan and India an IRBM-version, which they can sell to Israel, North Korea and Iran. Would save a lot of money and makes it easier for the intelligence agencies.
Martin:
I couldn't agree more! (smile)
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank - See the posting 'Russia, not a friend of U.S.' in the opening menu. The language in the article as in many others from U.S. is virulently anti-Russian. As you said earlier, I fully agree that while Americans are open hearted and compassionate, the American Admn., the Pentagon and CIA are just the opposite. The article states that the ship launched ABM which successfully intercepted the target 100 miles above was a response to Topol-M. If U.S. didn't think Russia was a threat, there was absolutely no reason to set up interceptor bases in far-off Poland & Caucasus. In your earlier posting on 31st Aug. on this subject you mentioned that 5 100 Kt.W-76 warheads from Trident missiles set to airburst over a city will cause much more destruction than a single 550 Kt. warhead. Thus any nuclear warhead exploding over Russian space be it from a nuclear missile interceptor, would cause enough fall-out to cause extensive destruction to life. The U.S. is far more hawkish when it comes to Russia than vice versa. While Russia just wants to defend itself, the U.S. has always been offensive in approach trying to dominate and dictate, irrespective of the rhetoric they indulge in on TV and news media to the contrary.
Sharma:
As always I respect your opinion and honestly find little to disagree with your comments. I suspect the American Administration, the Pentagon and CIA are far more “hawkish” than the American people in general. But, isn’t that their job? I suspect the Kremlin is probably more hawkish than the average Russian citizen as well. Prudent people always need to move the political discussions between Russia and the United States back to middle ground so we can build consensus and share common goals. I have honestly never seen any published information that has linked any American ABM test, ground or sea based, to any particular missile or foreign weapon system. I am certainly not an expert on such a ship-based launch but it seems to me the warship involved in such an interceptor launch would have to be relatively close by the launch point and north by degrees to catch the ballistic missile on a polar trajectory. After all, this is a “boost phase” weapon. Is my logic here not correct?
Right now, the capability of the United States ground-based ABM system is probably at the same level as North Korea’s development of an ICBM. Both are probably ten years away from being a “true” weapon system.
I’m also curious. The only place one reads about the United States developing a nuclear GBI is from the Russian press and discussion groups as in here. No such weapon system is funded by the US Congress or even spoken of. Is this just an academic argument or does Russia really think American has plans to develop such a nuclear weapon in the future?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank and Sharma:
I must agree with frank that there are no U.S. plans for nuclear armed ABM interceptors. It has been stated to me that the U.S. is far too dependent on electronic systems which are not hardened against EMP (or cannot be hardened against EMP) to be able to safely use nuclear armed ABM. Kinetic Kill Vehicles are seen as the only option, but require FAR greater accuracy to be effective and will probably never be effective against MARV warheads.
Jon Grams
Jon & Frank-
Suspicion must have a basis. The U.S. is in the process of setting up interceptor bases all around Russia. Russia has to take this fact into account. If Russia were to set up bases in Mexico & Canada or Cuba to intercept missiles from U.S., the U.S. can justifiably suspect the intentions of Russia. The U.S. has advanced enough to take care of the space directly above itself and perhaps far beyond through kinetic interceptors, Thaad, patriot, and even chemical laser weapons. This being so, why do they need to come to close proximity to Russia? Russia could also devise their own means to protect their air space and a little beyond. The only reason one can see in this action is the uncompromising desire for domination by putting economic pressures over Russia and interfere in their economic decisions to prevent it from prospering in a peaceful atmosphere. No one can deny this. The U.S. media projects a highly exaggerated picture of threats from other nations to justify actions which unfortunately are done with hidden ulterior motives.
Sharma:
“Suspicion must have a basis.” I understand the suspicions but I honestly believe they are unfounded. While I don’t completely understand the science, the kinetic interceptors deployed today in Alaska, the eleventh was just deployed in August, need to have a clear orbital path to intercept an ICBM. In other words, they need to be placed in a ballistic orbit that will result in collusion with a deployed ICBM payload to be successful. Essentially, they are a space vehicle designed to collide with another space vehicle. These ABMs are not designed to strike an ICBM at launch, the so-called boost phase weapon. I don’t think these missiles deployed in Alaska, or potentially Poland, could strike a Russian SS-27 on launch. The proposed deployment of such a system in Poland or the Czech Republic at this point is only political rhetoric. The US Congress isn’t going to fund this project and unless NATO raised some euros, this isn’t gong to happen. This doesn’t mean America wouldn’t want to deploy an X-Band radar system in Azerbaijan to keep our eye on the Persians however!
This family of systems you have written of all play different roles in ABM defense. Kinetic interceptors protect our country from a polar ICBM strike, THAAD is a regional defense for our troops, Patriot is a terminal weapon of last resort, and the Airborne Laser Project may be useful in cruise missile defense. Only the US Navy is testing a system that would be useful in hitting an ICBM at launch. Unless, American AEGIS cruisers start deploying in the White Sea, I wouldn’t worry too much about that either.
Frank Shuler
USA
I think Sharma is a sole person except me here who understand real but hidden US intentions toward Russia.
In addition to the US unfrendly actions there is a strange Kremlin's policy to weaken Russian military forces both conventional and nuclear. In recent days some Russian experts called into question Russian Navy ability to wage any real combat action. Moreover Russian warships are decomissioned very fast and in a few years Russia will be deprived of any major seaworthy combatants. It is another proof that Russian SSBNs will be almost useless in the near future because nothing can screen them.
So, Russia must consider liquidation of its SSBN fleet and rescheduling saved thanks to this money to the land ICBMs. Then it is necessary to produce about 40 Topol-Ms and new mobile IRBMs annually with heavy MIRV-ing, of course. Topol-M easily can carry 3x500 kT or 6x100kT warheads and new IRBM at least 3x100kT MIRVs. Some 3000 strategic warheads with improved Russian EW/C4I systems would be able to act as a "Launch-on-Warning" or "Launch-after-attack" retaliators.
Rokosovsky:
It seems Russia has a plan. By 2016, the Russian nuclear arsenal will consist of 1500 strategic weapons deployed in 60 silo-based and 70 road-mobile Topol-M single warhead ICBMs. Five 955-Type “Borey” submarines equipped with Bulava missiles will complete the Russian Navy contribution with the remaining strategic warheads provided by the 37th Air Army’s bombers and a new nuclear armed cruise missile.
I would contend Russia doesn’t need more warheads or delivery systems. What Russia will need is satellites, computer systems, and personal to man such. There must be a revolution in information sharing, communications and data processing. That is the true modernization needed in the Russian military.
Frank Shuler
USA
Are there already plans for a Russian medium range weapon? An upgraded Iskander maybe? Is Iskander already deployed and is it nuclear armed?
Martin
Martin:
Before I would invest in an IRBM program that would only slow down procurement of the SS-27 Topol-M project, I would use the Tu-22M5 Backfire bombers to strike intermediate ranged targets. A new cruise missile, with both a nuclear and various conventional payloads, would meet Russia’s needs at relatively little cost.
The Tu-22M5 is an amazing aircraft.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank:
You´re right I think, but in the case of using the TU-22M5 Russia don´t has to leave the INF treaty, or?
Martin
Martin:
As I understand the INF Treaty, Russia is bound to develop and deploy tactical weapons that only have a range of 600 km or less. Leaving the treaty would mean Russia could develop a family of tactical cruise missiles for the Tu-22M5 aircraft that exceeded, say 2000 km in range. That weapon system would satisfy Russia’s need to project power in a theater conflict and would also be less provoking to its neighbors. Building a new IRBM would only create some kind of inevitable Western response. With the IRBM approach, Russia would spend many a ruble, delay the Topol-M program, and gain no real military or political advantage. If I were a Russian general, I would like the Tu-22M5 approach.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank:
Sorry I don´t know, but the Tomahawk Cruise Missile has a range of over 1000km and there seems to be no conflict with that missile to the INF. Also the Kh-101 has a range of several tousend kilometer.
So I´m not sure if the INF also includes bomber-delivered weapons.
Martin
Stands all there on top in Pavels posting, we just have to read it:
"which prohibits Russia and the United States from having ballistic missiles with 500 to 5500 km range"
So for the TU-22M option they don´t have to leave the INF.
Martin:
Interesting read. So, it looks like Russia's only real incentive to leave the INF Treaty is to develop an IRBM. What adversary would threaten Russia in the future and call for the development of such a weapon? NATO? Doesn't seem likely, all of Russia's existing weapons are orientated against the West now. Russia has more than enough nuclear resources to deter the West and exercise considerable political muscle. Building new IRBMs to threaten the West would only play into America’s hands, continuing Western Europe’s dependency on America. China? North Korea? India? Iran? Russia is struggling to build seven or eight Topol-M missiles a year now and can’t afford to have its funding cut for an IRBM development program. Internal Russian politics? Is some design bureau campaigning for work, funding? Is this just a political gambit to convince NATO not to deploy a future ABM system? This situation will be interesting to watch.
Reflecting, I would guess that if Russia built the new cruise missile I suggested for the Tu-22M5, with the range we discussed, it might run into issues with START. However, with START ending in 2009 and with little chance of renewal, the new cruise missile has merits.
Frank Shuler
USA
I wish to know if aero-ballistic missiles like the Kh-15 (AS-16 Kickback in NATO nomenclature) with ranges farther than 500 km are forbidden. If this is not the case, maybe an enlarged version of this missile with ranges around 1000 km can suffice for Russian necessities.
Respect to funds, maybe with the money spent in a single ICBM, 2 IRBM can be built, thus optimizing the size and shape of the Nuclear Forces. Almost surely they will be looking south and east, relieving some ICBM from this task.
Frank,
There actually was a missile built back in the '60s that would be a perfect fit for either the Tu-22M5 or Tu-160. You may or may not be aware of the AGM-48A Skybolt missile the US developed (and cancelled) in 1962. It was an air to surface ballistic standoff missile to be carried by the B-52 (4 each) and Avro Vulcan (1 each). The solid-fuel Skybolt weighed 5000kg, had a range of 1850km, a speed of over mach 14 (9500mph), and carried a 1.2 megaton warhead. Imagine what could be built with 45 years newer technology? It would certainly be cheaper than a new IRBM.
Jon
Jon:
When President Kennedy decided to cancel the "Skybolt" project, he offered the Polaris SLBM to Great Britain in exchange. It was that decision, early in 1962, that got the UK into Trident today. That political decision helped cement the Atlantic Alliance between the United States and the UK that survives today. “Skybolt” had unbelievable technical specifications and was to replace the “Hound Dog” missile on the B-52s. A footnote in history, for sure!
Frank Shuler
USA
In my opinion will Russia aim its IRBM´s (if its not just a political thing) on China, India and the European NATO-members.
The few North-Korean nuclear weapons (if they exits) are headed on South Korea, Japan, and the US bases in the Pacific. Iran is also no possible enemy for Russia, and Pakistan aims all is power against India.
Leaving China and India in the region, both have the capacity of building long range ballistic missiles and nuclear wepons in a big quantity. China even has some. The modernisation of the chinese nuclear forces is going on, there was a DF-31 launch (maybe something like a Minuteman II or III) in the last days. And India has also a strong rocket science (with a lot of european technology, for example in the GSLV booster).
I think its as unlikely that there will be an major conflict between Russia and China/India as it is with the USA, but look at the some thousend warheads they aim on each other.
And at last the NATO states, from my knowledge Russia has no weapon system except ICBM and bombers to hit targets in my country, the UK or France.
And as mentioned before, an ICBM would be a waste for such targets.
But as Frank said, a new Cruise Missile would be the best I think. Something they can launch from Road mobiles, SSN´s, bombers or surface ships like the Tomahawk (but with a longer range) would be a good solution.
20 years ago there were Pioneers based not far from were I live, and Pershings were aimed on my head. Changing times.
Martin
I think that Russia should stop spending on SSBN's and instead produce many more topol-M's to deter the U.S. from pressurising. A figure of 3000 should be aimed at and at a much faster rate than being done. In this respect I agree with Rokosovsky. This is not the time for wasteful expenditure on SSBN's especially when Russia has not yet perfected Bulava's.
Sharma, Russia should increase (40 a year) production of Topol-M both silo and mobile, I agree. I think Topol-M is the best ICBM in the world at this moment. But Russia shouldn't abandon Bulava project. Russia badly needs new submarines and SSBN for its absolute security.
Well I'm not sure the Russians really want the US to redeploy Pershing 2, and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) back to europe. So I really don't understand why they would want to pull out of the INF treaty. My understanding is that they were able to retain ss-20 if they were east of the ural mountains. And furthermore it cannot serve to bolster NATO solidarity more then to threaten member states with nuclear annihilation. And someone should mention that the ABM systems are all non nuclear and the warheads have been offered up for inspection. Are they kidding? Or do they really want to be in a situation when they will only get 6 minutes of warning time before they have warheads on Moscow during a nuclear exchange?
Whoops my mistake all ss-20 missiles were eliminated under INF.