As the history of the cold war clearly demonstrates, nuclear primacy is a notoriously poorly defined and elusive goal. This is why it was very interesting to read the article by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy", in the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs. The authors argue that the United States has achieved (or is just about to achieve) nuclear primacy, which would make the concept of mutual assured destruction obsolete by taking "mutual" out of it. The United States, the authors argue, is getting the capability of destroying all (and they mean literally every single one) Russian strategic launchers in a first counterforce attack. A longer article, which the authors promise will contain details of the model they used to calculate effectiveness of a first strike, will appear in the Spring issue of International Security.
The argument looks convincing at first - Lieber and Press paint the familiar picture that many now take for granted - decline of the Russian strategic forces, gaps in the early-warning network, and all that. But a closer look at the article reveals a number of factual errors and unsubstantiated statements, which in my view completely undermine its conclusions.
Let's start with how Lieber and Press make their case when they try to prove that the Russian strategic arsenal "has sharply deteriorated". They quote the START Treaty statistics that tells us that "Russia has 39 percent fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer SSBNs than the Soviet Union fielded during its last days." This sounds about right (with the exception of the number for bombers - in 1990 the Soviet Union had 162 strategic bombers and Russia has 78 of them now, making it a somewhat steeper decline of 52 percent). But these numbers hardly prove anything. If we look at the U.S. forces, we will see that during the same period the number of missiles in the U.S. ICBM force went down from 1000 in 1990 to 500 today - a 50 percent decline. The United States "lost" two thirds of its strategic bomber force - it is down from 347 in 1990 to 115 in 2006. The U.S. Navy, as one would expect, preserved most of its strength, but even there the number of submarines is down to 14 from the 1990 level of 33, a decline of 58 percent. As we can see, the numbers on the U.S. side are pretty close to the Russian ones. The reason is simple - these numbers reflect a completely different process - reductions of nuclear arsenals from the insanely high cold war levels. To use them as evidence of force deterioration is quite misleading.
Of course, this does not automatically mean that the Russian forces are in good shape or that their evolution during the last fifteen years can match the modernization program undertaken by the United States. But this evolution is a much more complex process than the one presented by Lieber and Press.
Strategic aviation, traditionally the weakest leg of the Soviet and Russian triad, has received quite a boost lately - only in 2005 it participated in four major exercises. I guess some would still take this as a proof that strategic bombers "rarely conduct training exercises", but I'm not sure this statement accurately describes the state of affairs today. The strategic aviation has quite ambitious plans for this year, in terms of exercises and bomber modernization program. Yes, bombers are vulnerable to a surprise attack, but it is unclear how this vulnerability is greater today when they are "located at only two bases" and not at four, as it was the case before the Soviet breakup. Equally unclear is since when bomber warheads "are stored off-base", as Lieber and Press claim. To tell the truth, none of this is really relevant to the discussion of first-strike vulnerabilities, since neither the Soviet nor Russian military would ever assume that bombers have any chance of surviving an attack. But if the purpose of giving us all these details about the Russian strategic aviation was to demonstrate that it is in bad shape, then the "evidence" does not look entirely convincing.
The same is true for the description of the Russian strategic submarine fleet. While it is indeed in a difficult situation, it would be wrong to focus on comparing patrol rates of U.S. and Russian submarines. These navies operate in completely different modes and have entirely different missions. The sharp decline in patrol rates of Russian strategic submarines does indicate some loss of capability, but it is not nearly as serious as it would have been the case of the U.S. Navy had it suffered a similar decline.
To further make the point about the decline of the Russian navy, Lieber and Press refer to a number of failures during recent missile tests. But their evidence is misleading at best. They mention the two launch failures in February 2004, but forget to point out that the missiles involved in those tests were older modifications of the R-29RM/SS-N-23 missile. These are now being replaced by a newer modification of this missiles, known as Sineva, which just successfully completed flight tests and was equipped with a new warhead. The launch failure in summer 2005 involved a Volna launcher, which is an old R-29R/SS-N-18 missile modified to carry payload into space. In the other alleged failure, in a launch in October 2005 of a "Demonstrator" reentry capsule, it was the capsule that failed, not the missile (although that launch was postponed at least once because of the problems with the missile). While these incidents do tell a story about reliability of old submarines and missiles, it is hardly something we do not already know - that old submarines and missiles are getting older. This is nothing new and these submarines are slated for dismantlement and unlikely to remain in service much longer anyway.
What Lieber and Press do not mention when they describe SLBM launches is a number of successful tests of R-29R and R-29RM missiles and the apparently successful Bulava missile development program. Two successful flight tests of this new missile conducted in September 2005 and December 2005 indicate that the Russian strategic fleet will eventually receive the long-awaited Borey submarine, even though it is unlikely to happen before 2008-2009. Until then, Project 667BDRM/Delta IV, which are undergoing overhaul, and even some Project 667BRD/Delta III submarines would keep the Russian navy in business.
Again, this is not say that the Russian strategic fleet will ever be able to match the U.S. Navy. But by its own, much more modest, standards the Russian fleet has been doing quite well recently and seems to be quite adequate for the task that the Russian doctrine has for it.
An assessment of the situation with land-based missiles also requires close attention to details. First of all, one should be careful with the concept of "service life". While it may be true that "over 80 percent of Russia's silo-based ICBMs have exceeded their original service lives", this number hardly tells anything. For most missiles the "original service life" was set at the level of seven to ten years, but then was extended as the Rocket Forces accumulated experience in operating the missiles and the designers grew confident in their performance. Regular successful tests of missiles that were kept in silos for 25 years or longer confirm that this extension does not necessarily reduce reliability of a missile. Today, the Rocket Forces confidently discuss the possibility of keeping missiles in service for 25-30 years or even longer. Most of the missiles deployed today can easily be kept in service for five to ten more years and if Russia is decommissioning some of them it is because it does not need them, not because they are unreliable.
To replace the old missiles, Russia has been developing an deploying a new missile, Topol-M. Development of this missile has a long and complex history, but it is highly inaccurate to say that it was "stymied by failed tests". Of the fifteen flight tests of the missile conducted so far, only one failed - quite a remarkable achievement for any missile development program. As for the production rate, it may have been rather low - only 42 missiles have been deployed since 1997 - but the question to ask here is, low compared to what? A good case can be made that Russia does not really need silo-based Topol-M and should rather concentrate on building the mobile version of the missile. Which is exactly what is happening - the first regiment of mobile Topol-M missiles is expected to enter service later this year.
Yes, it is true that by the end of the decade and later Russia may have as few as 150 land-based missiles, which is a big step down from the 1398 it had in 1990. But Russia does not need 1400 missiles today and most likely will never need that many again. As for the 150 missiles, about half of them would probably be road-mobile Topol and Topol-M, which, if operated properly, would have a good chance of surviving a first strike. Lieber and Press dismiss mobile missiles by saying that they "rarely patrol". It is not clear, however, on what evidence do they base this claim. If there is some source of this information, they did not tell us what it is. In reality, very little is known about mobile missile patrol rates. There is some evidence that suggests that during normal peacetime operations no more than 25 percent of missiles are supposed to be in the field. It is quite plausible that patrol rates are somewhat lower these days, but it is a stretch to assume that they are zero.
It can be argued that land-based mobile missiles may be vulnerable even when they are on patrol, for the United States is constantly improving its capability to detect them. But even if this is true for missiles on peacetime patrol, locating the missiles would be much harder, if at all possible, if they get a chance to disperse in a crisis, as we discuss later.
Now let's turn to the Russian early-warning system, which Lieber and Press describe as "a mess". The problem with that characterization is that while the system is indeed past its prime, it has lost surprisingly little of its capability to do its job. This may seem counterintuitive at first, but Russia would gain very little were its early-warning system be deployed to the full extent. For example, adding the capability to detect launches of sea-based missiles, in North Atlantic or elsewhere, would not dramatically increase the time available to Russian leadership for attack assessment. The much talked about "gaping hole" in the radar network coverage that seems to exist in the east, also should be put into a proper context. First of all, the "hole" is not as large as it may appear - only missiles flying along carefully selected trajectories to a limited set of targets would be able to avoid detection. But more importantly, there is no way missiles launched from the Pacific could cover the entire range of targets to be destroyed in a first strike. A scenario in which "Russian leaders probably would not know of the attack until the warheads detonated" is a theoretical construct that has nothing to do with reality.
Speaking of theoretical constructs, the counterforce first strike that Lieber and Press describe assumes a bolt out of the blue attack, done with no preparation and without provocation. But hardly anyone ever believed that an attack of this kind is possible. Certainly not anyone in the Soviet Union or in Russia, which assumed that any attack would be preceded by a period of tensions, giving them the time and opportunity to disperse the strategic forces and bring the command and control system into a high degree of readiness. This is quite a reasonable assumption I should say. These measures would be relatively easy to implement and while they may not make the forces completely invulnerable, they would significantly raise the uncertainty associated with the first strike.
There are other serious issues with the paper. I believe that Lieber and Press seriously overestimate the potential utility, whether military or political, of counterforce first-strike capability and misread the history of the cold war. For example, never during that time the Soviet Union had "the hope of gaining nuclear superiority", even though it did end up building a massive nuclear arsenal. But getting into these issues would require a much longer reply and a different set of arguments.
The point of this message is that we should be careful with facts and their interpretation if we are making claims as bold as the one about rise of nuclear primacy and the end of MAD. Whether we like it or not, getting "mutual" out of MAD is much harder than putting it in.
The book
Comments
The article is very irritating from a slightly different point:
What uses would a 'concept', as postulated by the authors in the article, present to a state which tries to acquire this 'nuclear surpremacy'?
- The most part of the argument starts out with the assumption of the possibility of a "bolt out of the blue" attack on Russian nuclear forces (and C&C). First: which circumstances would morally permit the United States to live with the consequences of the scale of human victims in the vicinity of the force targets? Under which circumstances would this be a valid policy option? Second: preparations of and mobilizing the whole US strategic forces/ASW/etc. to conduct a full first strike would certainly not go completely undetected by the adversary's EW/intelligence (or the other way round: it is hard to completely prove beforehand that it would go unnoticed).
- What in my view somehow makes the concept really irritating is: (quote from the article in question)
[after the first strike], even a relatively modest or inefficient missile-defense system might well be enough to protect against any retaliatory strikes, because the devastated enemy would have so few warheads and decoys left. (my emphasis).
Again: what kind of policy option would be to prepare for this 'primacy' and/or to faciliate its use, if the authors themselves claim that maybe a nuclear warhead could fall within US soil (and certainly on a value target). I.e. if there still would be the possibility that just one of the targets of the adversary's offensive nuclear forces would survive, which then could retaliate on a major population center and then might penetrate the NMD, what would be won out of the whole concept?
Yes, I agree. Not only a bolt out of the blue attack is not an option, but even it it were, the uncertainties of an attack of this kind are so high that they would make it impossible anyway.
Thanks Pavel for putting things in the correct prespective.
No one can gurantee that all the Nuclear Assets of even a limited N power like China can be destroyed in a first strike , and to say that one can destroy all the assests of a major N Power like Russia is a pipe dream at best.
I am sure no one even in the Pentagon Fancies such a Dream.
Keir and Daryl should know that half knowledge on the subject is dangerous.
BMD Focus: Russia rattles missile treaty
"Last year, Defense Minister Ivanov startled U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld by suggesting to him at one of their meetings that the INF Treaty should be scrapped."
How serious are the suggesting from Russian side that both they & US move away from INF treaty
What about a "Perimeter System" also known as "The Dead Hand"? Hypothetically this is something like an automatic machine for retaliating a pre-emptive decapitation strike by US. Sound like a Hollywood-film stuff but some comments about this recurrently appear in the net.
About the INF withdrawal , sounds a little bit worrisome, but it looks like the Russian commanders are analyzing seriously this step.
The "Perimetr System" has been operational since 1st Jan 1985 , The system was finally tested in a major Nuclear exercise held in November 1984 and the organisation which developed it received a state award in 1987.
The system is a very complex one and has some human element in the initial phase and its meant to retaliate automatically incase the entire political setup is killed in a first strike.
The system is intelligent enough to discrimitate a strike bewteen US and from other countries like UK,France or China, Its one of a kind system in the world and it gives the political leadership some more time to think( faulty EW signal etc ) before ordering a N strike.
Even if they are eliminited they are fully aware that the Perimetr System will do the job.
Russian Perimetr System
C3: Nuclear Command, Control Cooperation by Yarynich
The operation of the Russian Perimetr system is described by in pp. 157 -158. During a high-level alert, the National Command Authority issues preliminary authorization to a super hardened radio command and control center. The crew working at the center prepares to transmit a launch order by means of Perimetr command missiles which radio the launch codes to the silos. The launch order is transmitted only if three conditions are simultaneously met: the preliminary authorization has been received, there has been a complete loss of communications with the NCA, and positive signals of nuclear detonations are received from the different types of sensors. Obviously, Perimetr cannot order Launch on Warning. Its purpose is to order "Launch After Detonation", but only if first activated by the NCA and then NCA communication is lost.
******
Pavel Podvig [ Strategicheskoye yadernoye vooruzheniye Rossii]
Some redundancy has also been built into the communication channels. In addition to mobile land and air-based relay stations, the nuclear C3 network also includes the Perimetr missile system which may be used to transmit launch commands to the nuclear forces. The Perimetr system uses missiles based on retired ballistic missile types (the most recent variant, the Perimetr-RTs, reportedly uses missiles based on the Topol ICBM, while earlier variants used missiles based on the Pioner IRBM and UR-100 ICBM) which would be launched upon the issue of nuclear attack orders and transmit these orders during their 20-50 minute flight over ICBM basing areas. Some consideration was given to enabling the Perimetr system to operate in an automated mode. Following a missile attack warning, Perimetr missiles could be set to launch automatically after a set period of time unless they received a second message stopping the countdown. Although this mode of operation would have provided further insurance against a decapitating strike, it was not adopted due to concerns over unauthorized nuclear launches in the event it proved impossible to stop the countdown.
Wow!! It sounds very scary. The Doomsday machine is real then!!
What about the INF? Europeans will not be very happy, … at least.
Yes Indeed the Perimetr System or Dead hand is a very real thing and the Organisation which developed it received a state award in 1987-88.
According to the "The Kremlin Nuclear Sword" in mid 90's the Russian tried to extend the system to their Submarine Arm , But were experiencing some problem with the communication system , Its unclear if they have operationalised such thing for their submarine arm.
May be Pavel can throw some light on it.
As far as INF goes there are some sound bites coming from Russia to nullify the INF treaty , But its unlikey it will happen in the near future . Russia enjoys quite a good relation with Europe and its oil export there earns good revenue for the economy
May be they are just testing the water by coming out with such statements.
Well, Perimeter is basically a communication system that allows to transmit orders to individual silos (and, potentially, to aircraft and submarines). It is not exactly a Dead Hand system. As far as I understand, Dead Hand has never been deployed, although it was in development.
To Pavel and others on this blog:
We appreciate the comments by Pavel and others on this blog about our recent article in Foreign Affairs. A more detailed version of our article will be published in the spring issue of the journal International Security. The International Security piece – which allows footnotes – should help allay some of Pavel’s concerns about sources and evidence.
Pavel’s work on nuclear forces has been a great help to us during this project. We really do value his feedback and appreciate the opportunity to continue a discussion on these important issues.
In Pavel’s post he disagrees with our characterization of several trends, but few of his critiques cast doubt on our main finding: the United States could conceivably destroy the Russian long-range nuclear force in a first strike under its current peacetime posture. In fact, Pavel’s recent research on this topic (his draft article, “Reducing the Danger”) reaches a very similar conclusion through a similar analysis. (More on that below.)
Pavel suggests that we’ve misunderstood several trends: e.g., he acknowledges that the number of Russian long range systems has declined dramatically, but notes that US forces are also declining in number; Russian ICBMs have far exceeded their service lives, but the service lives can continue to be extended; and new Russian weapon systems have failed tests, but the significance of these problems should not be exaggerated. Pavel also acknowledges that the Russian strategic submarine fleet in recent years has faced “a difficult situation” in general and a “sharp decline in patrol rates” in particular – but he discounts the importance of these developments compared to U.S. improvements because “by its own, much more modest, standards the Russian fleet has been doing quite well.”
This is a long list of critiques and we disagree with Pavel about many of these issues. For example, it is true that the overall size of the U.S. arsenal has declined from its Cold War levels, but it is in many ways a deadlier force (which, combined with a much smaller Russian target set makes a first-strike attack more feasible). The record of new system production delays (see, for example, Pavel’s own accounts of the new mobile ICBMs, Borey submarine, and Bulava missile) is leading to a dramatically smaller force. Russia may have modest standards for its Navy, as Pavel claims, but if the entire SSBN fleet is sitting dockside then it is vulnerable to a first strike, whatever its “standards” may be.
More importantly, none of Pavel’s critiques undermine our central finding. The strategic nuclear balance between the United States and Russia has shifted dramatically in the last decade, Russia’s current peacetime force is highly vulnerable – so vulnerable, in fact, that for the first time in almost half a century analysts can now plausibly model a successful U.S. first strike using all the standard calculations and assumptions, and the comparative trends in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia are heading in opposite directions. We would be surprised if Pavel disagreed with our warning that the Russian arsenal risks becoming even more vulnerable in coming decades if it continues to shrink, the U.S. arsenal becomes more accurate, and U.S. remote sensing of relocatable targets improves.
There are, however, three questions that Pavel raises that do challenge our core findings. We respond below:
(1) We argue that Russian mobile ICBMs patrol infrequently, and that there are times when none are on patrol. Podvig is correct to note that there is little rock-solid evidence available on this topic. Our assessment is based on interviews with a few experts who follow this issue closely and who have suggested to us that there are periods in which apparently no Russian mobile ICBMs patrol. Several years ago, when the mobile force was larger, Bruce Blair noted that Russia strained to disperse a single regiment of mobile rockets (nine missiles) into covert field locations. We (and others) are NOT claiming that today the mobile ICBMs never patrol; we claim that there are times when the entire mobile force is in garrison. (The shelters have hinged doors, which do allow the missiles to be fired from within). Interestingly, in Pavel’s most recent article (“Reducing the Danger”) he, too, models a U.S. attack on Russia assuming that the Russian mobiles are mostly in garrison and the few deployed have been located.
(2) Pavel raises questions about our analysis regarding the east-facing hole in Russia’s early warning network. He argues that the hole is very small and, at most, allows for a zero- or short-warning attack on targets in parts of Russia (presumably east of Moscow), but not across the entire country.
We based our analysis of the radar gap on the diagrams of Russian radar coverage in some of Ted Postol's work on this; on diagrams in Pavel’s "History and Current Status" article (2002), and on the diagrams in a recent RAND report. However, Pavel’s most recent draft article on this topic (“Reducing the Danger”) presents very interesting new information on the orientation of the Mishelevka radar, which suggests that the gap may in fact be smaller than he, and we, and others, originally believed. Three key points about this are critical, however:
(a) We are not yet convinced that Pavel is correct about the gap being narrow. Estimating the operationally relevant size of the radar hole requires analysis of several factors: the altitude of the radar beams as a function of their distance from the emitter (given the curvature of the earth), atmospheric factors that affect the radar signal, and the altitude of incoming warheads as they cross in front of the radar (which is a function of the launch point, the target, and the type of trajectory used). Now that we have the new information about Mishelevka, we are working to recalculate this.
(b) Even if Pavel is correct, and if attacks from Pacific-based subs would be detected as they crossed the northern face of the Mishelevka radar, U.S. targetters could simply use Pacific-based subs for short-warning attacks on targets east of Moscow (allowing only a few minutes of warning from detection to impact) and assign targets in Western Russia to B-2 stealth bombers and stealth cruise missiles (AGM-129). This targeting strategy would give Russian leaders very short warning of an attack – if they detected the B-2s and stealthy ACM-129 at all.
(c) As Podvig notes in “Reducing the Danger,” even if Russia detects an incoming attack, they would have very little warning and, as he notes, Russian military and political leaders would be very unlikely to retaliate in the face of warning of an attack because they do not trust their own early warning system.
For all of these reasons, our argument is sound: Russia does not have a good enough early warning system to provide reliable, credible, and prompt warning of an attack underway. Therefore they’d have to “ride out” an attack, and our calculations suggest they’d likely lose their entire long-range retaliatory force.
3) In Pavel’s third fundamental disagreement with our analysis, he argues that a bolt-from-the-blue strike on Russia is implausible, and that in a crisis Russia could alert its forces and thereby reduce their vulnerability. We agree on both points, and we made this point in our Foreign Affairs article. However, we would add a few key points about this. First, we both believe that the growing U.S. counterforce capability is being built primarily to confront China, not Russia. We cannot imagine a plausible Russo-U.S. crisis in the near- to medium-term that would entail great enough stakes to trigger nuclear threats, let alone a nuclear attack. We chose to model an attack on Russia because it is the hardest case and because U.S. nuclear primacy will nonetheless likely compel Russia to respond to reduce its vulnerability. Second, against either Russia or China, a bolt-from-the-blue strike is very unlikely. However, the significance of our article is that if the Chinese arsenal is very vulnerable at peacetime levels and a crisis occurs, then China would feel pressure to take steps (e.g., dispersing mobile missiles, fueling fixed missiles) to reduce their vulnerability, and these steps could look to U.S. observers like a Chinese attack was being prepared, which could lead to preemptive incentives on the part of the US. Furthermore, U.S. efforts to develop nuclear primacy – which we describe in our article – are pressuring Russia and China to strengthen their nuclear forces, and the U.S. may come to regret this. Russia is already upgrading its early warning network; Pavel argues that significant improvements to the Russian early warning network could – ironically – increase the odds of catastrophic disaster (“Reducing the Danger”). Russia may also decelerate weapons retirements or raise their peacetime alert levels—both unfortunate from an American standpoint. The point is NOT that the U.S. is going to launch a nuclear attack; the point is that pushing in the directions that U.S. planners are pushing will encourage Russia and China to respond in ways we may not like.
Several others on this blog have raised other interesting points. This post is already long, so perhaps we can respond to some of those other comments in a future post.
We reiterate how much we respect Pavel’s expertise on nuclear weapons issues, and how much we have learned from him, even though we have clear disagreements in how we analyze important recent trends.
We look forward to continuing this exchange.
Keir and Daryl
Daryl, I didn't quite get your point. If you admit that a bolt-from-the-blue strike is implausible, what good is your research for? How does it connect to reality?
Syndroma,
In my view, even though a bolt-from-the-blue attack is extremely unlikely, there are several likely negative effects of the US drive to build nuclear primacy:
1) Russia and China will feel pressure to reduce their vulnerability by expanding their arsenals and increasing their peactime alert levels. They will feel these pressures even though a US bolt-from-the-blue attack is highly unlikely. This is already happening: see the Gaidar op-ed in today's Financial Times attacking our Foreign Affairs article by pointing out that it encourages Russia to strengthen and alert its nuclear force. I don't blame our article, however--we're simply the messengers delivering the bad news. I blame the US drive for nuclear primacy.
China will face even greater pressures to dramatically increase its nuclear force, and build an arsenal that can be maintained at higher peacetime alert levels, because unlike Russia, China may plausibly find itself in serious crises or shooting wars with the United States in the future. My guess is that the real Russian reaction to the changing nuclear balance (as opposed to the current media chatter) will be quite restrained; the real Chinese reaction (as opposed to the quiet media response) will be much more vigorous. If I'm right, US leaders may soon regret that US policies encouraged Russia and China to strengthen and alert their nuclear forces.
2) If there is a crisis or conflict between, e.g., the US and China, and China has NOT done what I predicted in point #1, they will face powerful pressures to alert and disperse their nuclear forces during the crisis/war. If they do this, it will look to the US like China is preparing to use nuclear weapons, and tempt the US to preempt. These are the standard "crisis instability" issues that people feared during the Cold War.
To compound this problem, the sort of conventional military operations that the US would conduct in a war over Taiwan (e.g., US air and conventional missile attacks on PRC command and control, electricity, radar emitters, communications hubs, and short-range missile launchers) would appear to the Chinese like the steps the US might take in preparation for attacks on Chinese nuclear forces. This would create strong Chinese incentives to disperse their nuclear forces and alert some of their long-range missiles, which could raise US interest in preemption.
In fairness, I should also note that US nuclear primacy would also likely give the US coercive advantage over China if there were a serious crisis. This, by the way, is why I believe we're pursuing these enhanced nuclear capabilities. During the last period of US nuclear primacy -- the 1950s -- the US nuclear advantage conveyed significant benefits on the United States.
How to weigh the costs and benefits? If one favors the current US administration's foreign policy of "primacy" than the benefits of nuclear primacy may outweigh the costs; if one favors a more restrained US foreign policy -- as I do -- then the costs and dangers of primacy probably outweigh the potential benefits.
Daryl
Participants in this forum who have not yet read the letter to the Financial Times written by Yegor Gaidar ("Nuclear Punditry Can be a Dangerous Game" Financial Times, March 29) will find it a useful and, pardon the expression, provocative contribution.
We've drafted a reply to Gaidar's op-ed and will post it here whenever we hear back from the Financial Times.
Here is our letter in today's Financial Times, as well as a second letter.
Financial Times
Dramatic new realities of the strategic nuclear balance
By Keir Lieber and Daryl Press
Published: March 31 2006 03:00 | Last updated: March 31 2006 03:00
From Profs Keir Lieber and Daryl Press
Sir, Yegor Gaidar ("Nuclear punditry can be a dangerous game", March 29) claims that it was irresponsible for us to argue, in "The Rise of US Nuclear Primacy" (in the current issue of Foreign Affairs and forthcoming in longer form in the journal International Security) that the Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals have become vulnerable to a US disarming attack. But Mr Gaidar does not rebut any of our key claims about the erosion of the Russian arsenal or the growing lethality of US nuclear weapons. Instead he blames the messenger for delivering the alarming news.
These are the key facts: since the end of the cold war, every element of the Russian nuclear arsenal has decayed. Many Russian nuclear weapons have exceeded their service lives; Russian mobile missiles rarely patrol, remaining in garrison where they are vulnerable. Moscow's nuclear-armed submarines are usually lashed to their docks, totally exposed. And the country's satellites and radars would give Russian leaders at most a few minutes of warning before American weapons destroyed Russia's retaliatory forces.
More surprising than the Russian decay, however, is the pace of improvements to the US arsenal. The US has deployed new, highly accurate nuclear-tipped missiles on its submarines; replaced several hundred warheads with a new version that has many times the explosive power; upgraded the guidance systems on its land-based missiles; and improved the avionics on its stealth bombers. And more innovations are in the pipeline: improved nuclear warhead fuses are being developed; a prototype missile defence system has been deployed; and the US is experimenting with using the global positioning system to give its ballistic missiles pinpoint accuracy.
The implications of this change in the nuclear balance are uncertain but potentially troubling. If Russia seeks to reverse the precipitous decline of its arsenal, or if China accelerates its nuclear modernisation programme, the world could face a new nuclear arms race, increased tensions and greater crisis instability. On the other hand, if current trends continue, Russia and China will be forced to live under the shadow of US nuclear primacy.
Mr Gaidar believes that these issues should not be discussed openly. We disagree. The wisdom of American, Russian and Chinese nuclear policies should be debated. But doing so requires a clear appreciation of the dramatic new realities of the strategic nuclear balance.
Keir Lieber,
Assistant Professor,
University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, IN 46556, US
Daryl Press,
Associate Professor,
University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA 19104, US
*********
Financial Times
US academics add to a rich heritage of vibrant debate
By William Stormont
Published: March 31 2006 03:00 | Last updated: March 31 2006 03:00
From Mr William Stormont.
Sir, Having read the article by the US academics Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, which Yegor Gaidar refers to in his article (March 29), I find it hard to understand why he credits it with such a destabilising influence.
Their essay "The Rise of US Nuclear Primacy" provides us with a sophisticated appreciation of the divergent fortunes of US and Russian nuclear capabilities since the cold war. The authors go on to model the ultimate implications of US nuclear dominance under a pre-emptive nuclear strike scenario. Profs Lieber and Press do not suggest that their analysis is faultless, nor do they disregard the risks that the US pursuit of nuclear primacy may entail. Instead they place US nuclear doctrine in the context of that country's foreign policy goals and assess the benefits and dangers of nuclear primacy from that perspective.
Mr Gaidar seems to imply that, so inflammatory and controversial is this article, it should never have been published at all. Since George Kennan first articulated the US's cold war policy of containment, US academics have contributed to a vibrant foreign policy debate. Rather than betray this rich heritage, Profs Lieber and Press have ably added to it. Furthermore, the suggestion that, as a result of this analysis, resources from Russia's Stabilisation Fund will be directed towards revamping its nuclear arsenal, is tenuous at best. Russia's hierarchy does not need American academics to point out the decline of its military capability - nuclear or otherwise. Unfortunately, tragedies such as that which befell the Kursk lay bare this inadequacy for all to see.
Finally, if diplomacy over Iran's nuclear programme is to fail it will be because Russia and China's extensive commercial interests in that country have taken precedence over the tough actions required to prevent a rogue regime acquiring the very nuclear capabilities Mr Gaidar so deplores. Such an outcome will certainly not be due to the work of two free-thinking academics.
William Stormont,
London NW3 1HH
This is by far the most interesting and reflective commentary this site has seen. I would encourage all participants to continue sharing their views and insights. Most interesting.
Frank Shuler
USA
Keir & Daryl, I appreciate your comments here. And I really appreciate Pavel for providing the opportunity to exchange opinions on the subject.
1) "US Nuclear Primacy" thing
I think it's obvious that this card can be played only once. Either bolt-from-the-blue attack or threat of such one. We agreed that the attack is unlikely - but the threat is meaningless. If any of senior US government officials threats Russia of possible nuclear attack, next day Putin will gather the Cabinet and urge them to raise alertness level. And mobile ICBMs will patrol in a wild, and submarines will leave docks. And a nuclear apocalypse will become a little bit closer. In fact, Putin held such a meeting yesterday. This situation raises my question to you:
2) Do you sincerely believe your writing or did you intend to get the response like yesterday's one from Russian side?
Either option is dangerous one. I hope you know what you're doing.
Syndroma
Russia
Syndroma,
The point of our article was not to elicit any specific reaction from Russia or China. We wrote the article to trigger a debate in the United States about the wisdom of US steps that are greatly increasing the lethality of US nuclear forces.
Is it in the US national interest to deploy ground burst fuses on the W76 warheads, as we're planning? Is it in the US interest to swap the W87 warheads (from retired MX) onto Minuteman III? Is it in our interest to give US reentry vehicles GPS receivers? My understanding is that the first and second are planned; the third is not yet planned, but there have been tests.
The point of the article is to get US analysts and journalists, and scholars, and decision makers to think through the costs and the benefits of taking these and other steps. As you suggest, these steps will likely lead to a higher Russian peacetime alert level, and a bigger and more dangerous Chinese force. If you think those are unfortunate outcomes from the US perspective (and I'd agree) then you may want to oppose the US steps I described above (and many others).
Please keep in mind that whatever the Russian reactions are to US nuclear weapons improvements, Chinese reactions will likely be more vigorous because -- frankly -- the improvements Keir and I described probably aren't intended for Russia at all, but for China. That point has been lost in this discussion.
Daryl
If anyone would like to download a copy of the International Security article that is the foundation for the Foreign Affairs article, it is available at the following website:
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=article&item_id=1419
Daryl
Daryl,
This is one of the problems that I have with the argument in your article. You seem to assume that there is some kind of "military rationality", which drives the apparent U.S. quest for primacy and that will drive Russia's or China's response. But this may not be the case. It is quite possible that the developments in the U.S. are driven by institutional inertia rather than by requirements of military effectiveness. Yes, it does look like the U.S. military is striving for primacy, but this is because all these institutions were born during the cold war and the only thing they know how to do is building more accurate stealthier weapons. Just because they are building these weapons does not necessarily means that building them makes sense.
Similarly, a lot of developments in Russia (and probably in China) are driven by very pragmatic interests of the military or the defense industry. Of course, they would be glad to jump on the opportunity to justify their programs by pointing out at the developments in the U.S., so we may expect some sort of response from them. But there seems to be an understanding that the existing forces, whether in Russia or in China, provide the level of deterrence quite adequate to the current situation. We are not talking about guaranteed delivery of 200 warheads in a retaliatory strike anymore (which was the Soviet requirement ca. early 1980s) - just a chance to deliver something is quite enough for the deterrence to work today. I think that this understanding is largely shared in the United States as well, which explains the lack of concern about the U.S. buildup.
Here is another discussion of the article - in Daniel Drezner's blog.
Thanks a lot for the brilliant essay of Keir & Daryl! Here is a voice from Poland. And let me remind my toast to some Scandinavian Admiral a few years ago:
'For the Russian Fleet! Bottoms up!' Some Old Polish emigre Lady from Washington D.C. tought me it. Take care...
I think the article is completely wrong. Even assuming the author is right about destroying all Russian strategic launchers in the first strik.
The point of nuclear power is that you can destroy the whole world, without even attacking your enemy. The point of MAD is that, at that stage, both countries are willing to kill the whole humanity to resolve their differences. If a country is truly mad, it can kill the whole world by killing itself first. "destroying strategic launchers in the first trike" will not be able to take out the nuclear power, but only the launchers..
Pavel,
I just found your website from a link at ForeignAffairs.org and have just finished reading the ongoing debate on your blog. This is very interesting debate and echoes my own questions after reading the article in Foreign Affairs. It's nice to see a blog where the posters are generally polite and raising real points instead of insulting one another endlessly. I'm also impressed with Keir & Daryl for their own participation and candor. Thank you for providing a site for this discussion!
Michael
USA
Dear friends,
Deterrence is nothing fancy: "as ye sow, so ye shall reap ."
Frankly is am bored to tears with these sophisticated computer models. The basic truth is that if nuclear weapons are used again, they will be used again and again and again. The US had better believe that one of those 'again's will be in a US city. If we are uneasy about terrorist attack today, can you imagine our fear and loathing after a third use?
The most precious legacy of the Cold War is that nulcear weapons were not used; it would be a supreme irony if we were now to squander that legacy. Our best hope is to shift from deterring use in a nuclear-infested world, to deterring acquisition in a nuclear-free world. Could some of you please apply your technical skills to that end?
Regards, Aaron
If Bush thinks he can nullify China nw,the chance will come when Taiwan declares independence.That will be when China decides to attack Taiwan giving Bush a golden opportunity to disarm the Chinese once and for all.
To do that the Pentagon must give a guarantee that China would be unable to attack the US with nw.
Me believe the Chinese aint dumb not to think of
options to retaliate.As China modernizes the means to inflict more damage will increase regardless of US counter measures.
Yes ten years ago the US could have blown up China without suffering any damage not now.
Dear profs, politicians, war theorists and voice from Poland - LETS LIVE IN PEACE!
It's a pity I've read this discussion only today. Had a lot of important things and critics in mind to say then, in march.
I'll try to summarize them here:
1. The thing, everybody is missing here, is the inaccuracy of the computer modeling. It misses lots of things that will happen in a real world and will never happen in the funy computer thingy. It misses the misissues of the information, provided in the 'open press'. I can suppose the Russian Federation and the United States of America do have undisclosed and unrevealed military secrets. And they can(and I believe they really do) literally f**k up the clear science model in every way. Small things make the picture real, not the big ones. Every model lacks complexity and it only may be taken for information.
2. The second thing - mr. Hitler also did make plans, they really were beautiful and sounded great and even were believed to be truthful... But.. You know what can writen here. Shortly - he failed because his plans were a complete crap when they were facing reality in every way. How would you explain this to the guys, that survived the nuclear nightmare (if you would do it yourself) - 'our model was a crap'? Really?
3. The real world politics aren't disclosed in your 'article'. What do you think China will do if the US will strike Russia? Sit tight? I think Chinese leaders would retaliate for Russia because the next target after the fall of Russia would be Beijing. And what do we have? The US will count a massive and devastating Chinese strike after a strike on Russia. This will nulify any benefits of the first strike. And your complex model did never disclose the opportunity of a US retaliation in this case...
And sorry for my english... I know what it does...
I seriously doubt China would risk its nations survival for the Russian people.
To the author above. I am sure most of you are aware of the tension between China and Russia.