I've previously read some of your proposals about possible mutual relocation of TNW out of Europe as a first step to some sort of negotiation on reductions.

If I remember correctly (please correct me if I am confusing your position with someone else's), you proposed that as a confidence-building measure US moved tactical weapons out of Europe, while Russia moves tactical weapons to its Asian part.

Do you really think it is realistic? After all, Russian tactical nuclear weapons form the backbone of the Moscow missile defense system. If the warheads are not located close to the interceptor bases, how can the missile defense system be even remotely viable, from the point of view of the Russian national security establishment?

On a different note, the divergence in Russian and European/American positions seem to be partly of language. Europeans seems to understand the phrase "centralized depots" to be a geographical term, i.e. Russian weapons would be moved away from NATO borders toward geographically central locations in Russia (e.g. somewhere around Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, and the like). The Russian position seems to be that "centralized depots" means that weapons are not scattered around operational military bases, but rather stored in a limited number of special warehouses administered by the 12th GUMO. For example, nuclear weapons assigned to the Russian Northern Fleet are stored somewhere around Olenegorsk, which is not that far from Norwegian border. This makes sense to the Russians, since they cannot deploy these warheads to operational units in a militarily acceptable time if storage facilities are located far away from submarine bases in Olenya, Ura, Rybachy, etc. However, this is something Europeans seem to be pushing against.

I don't honestly see how these differences may be breached until one of the sides completely changes their position/military posture.

But surely, Kaliningrad *is* a part of Russia, no different to say, Alaska in the case of the United States - it's not 'just another ally in the region' as Germany or Italy are to the US.

Secondly, I would argue that while one can debate the military value of a large strategic deterrent, Russia's tactical arsenal *does* remain a critical part of its forces (especially naval), and will remain so until the day that they can match or surpass America conventionally.

Remember that without such weapons as Russia's numerous nuclear-capable anti-ship missiles, a US carrier strike group would become basically invulnerable... and in a world without nuclear weapons altogether, NATO would have complete and utter, worldwide, unchecked, unipolar military dominance.

And as is the case with politics, I'd much rather see two rival parties keeping each other in check, than one single strongman with unlimited authority on the world stage.

Kaliningrad is Russian national territory.

artjomh: No, I never said that Russia's moving its weapons to Asia should be part of the plan. That would complicate things and is not really necessary. It should be enough to move them to centralized 12th GUMO facilities wherever they are.

I wouldn't overestimate the difficulty of convincing NATO that centralized storage is an adequate solution. Of course, most Europeans believe that the farther away the better, but that's because no serious discussion of the issue has started yet. When people get to the details of this, they would realize that if we are talking about centralized storage, geographical location doesn't matter at all.

uvb76: Of course I didn't mean to imply that Kaliningrad is in any way different from the rest of Russian territory. This would apply to, say, Olenegorsk, or other places that host dual capable aircraft or missiles.

I would disagree with the notion that nuclear weapons are a critical part of the forces. I guess you could make an argument in the case of anti-ship missiles, but even then the utility of this kind of capability is questionable.

With New START, Russia got the arms treaty with the United States it wanted. The US must reduce its aging inventory of “strategic” warheads and Russia is allowed to build new weapons to reach the treaty’s defined limits. Russia doesn’t seem interested in the least in really limiting the overall number of nuclear weapons. The argument is that the Kremlin, surrounded by enemies on every side, needs tactical nuclear weapons to offset its weakness in conventional warfare. By linking reduction in such tactical warheads to missile defense, space based weapons, NATO expansion, B-61s in Europe, etc. only ensures a treaty limiting such weapons will never be signed.

I don’t see this as a “hardening” of Russian opinion. I think this has been the recognized opinion of Moscow all along.

Frank Shuler
USA

>>It should be enough to move them to centralized 12th GUMO facilities wherever they are.

Isn't this already the case, Pavel? You've covered this subject in detail, tactical nuclear weapons are not deployed in the field as per at least 20 year old policy.

If the Russian pre-condition for even starting the talks is merely the removal of B61s from Belgium, Italy, Turkey, etc., then Russia loses nothing by going along with it. They can always stonewall the talks later, after they get what they want.

After the removal of TLAM-N cruise missiles from Japan and a very calm reaction of Japanese and South Korean governments last year, I honestly don't see what US loses by removing obsolete gravity bombs from Europe.

Russia said the weapons are at "centralized storage facilities," but we don't know whether these are 12th GUMO or some regional facilities of some kind. My guess is that not everything is at 12th GUMO sites, so Russia would have to do something in exchange to U.S. weapons withdrawal. Then, in any event, the key element is verification and "elimination of infrastructure of redeployment."

I am afraid that Frank Shuler is right about the prospect of the agreement on TNW. But, strangely, we may see quite a lot of diplomacy concerning the issues mentioned by Lavrov and quoted by Pavel above.
The U.S. is strongly interested in lowering its reliance on nuclear weapons, what we can read and hear almost every day. This is because nukes are not good tool of day-to-day diplomacy, contrary to the conventional arms that may serve as such (sometimes better, sometimes worse, of course). American overwhelming military power can be matched only by the asymmetry, which, for example, nuclear weapons provide (as mentioned above, bluntly but precisely, by uvb76). That is one of the simplest reasons behind American “nuclear zero” option. All this means that, at least until Obama is in power, the U.S. will try to act further on nuclear disarmament.
On the other hand, we have Russians, who want their country be recognized as a World Power. Engaging the U.S. on a parity basis, as an equal partner, is one of the few ways to show that Russia matters in the world. And this can be done only when it comes to the nuclear weapons and other strategic issues. All the other fields of interaction are marked by strong asymmetry in favor of Americans. That is why the Kremlin will gladly go into the nuclear dialogue, broadening it as wide as possible in order to reach two goals:
- to show around that Russia is equal to the U.S. and can make Americans negotiate, even the things they do not want to talk about,
- to win, eventually, if possible, some concrete concessions on number of strategic issues in the areas where Russia cannot match American technology such as anti-missile defense, conventional global strike and so on.
That is why the dialogue will probably go on for years but probably with rather limited effect.
M

Given that TNW are the only way the current Russian military can effectively deter a NATO offensive (short of a strategic strike) I seriously hope these negotiations don't get anywhere.

Russia needs to continue to maintain and develop a credible TNW arsenal, with the latest delivery systems (Iskander, next-gen cruise missiles/ASMs).

The question vis-a-vis Russian conditions is this: are these points (i.e. PGS, missiles defense, European bombs) a negotiating tactic or actual Russian goals.

Of course, Russia will undoubtedly love to get everything: a limit on PGS, a limit of missile defense, a limit on conventional arms, a removal of American tactical weapons from Europe, but we have to ask a question: what do they consider a realistic end-result and what do they consider a throw-away bargaining chip?

If Russia wants removal of B-61s from Europe, then it makes sense to them to start with asking for everything and then lowering it down to just B-61s. But if Russia seriously wants a limit of missile defense, then it's a different bargain.

As far as tactical nuclear weapons, I like the suggestion proposed by Steven Pifer from Brookings: instead of negotiating separate treaties on TNWs and reserve nukes, negotiate a single ceiling for both and let each country determine their own composition.

Russia has an advantage in tactical nukes. US has an advantage in strategic warheads held in reserve. Pifer proposed that Russia and US negotiate a single ceiling for both weapons, so that in the end we have some limit of both TNWs and reserve warheads, but each country can still preserve their advantage in each category.

US is never giving up missile defense, but Russia has no incentive to give up the advantage in TNWs either. So an asymmetrical treaty makes sense because each country gets something without compromising their advantage.

artjomh: The idea of a common ceiling for tactical and strategic weapons is not new (and Pifer is far from the first who suggested it). I know it is popular with some U.S. administration officials, but it's actually a bad idea - instead of strengthening the principle that tactical weapons should be kept in the doghouse (i.e. in centralized storage), it assumes that they have some value.

Feanor: It's an illusion that tactical weapons have a deterrent value that is separate from that of strategic weapons. Even if we consider a possibility of "NATO offensive," any use of nuclear weapons would be strategic. The logic of controlling the escalation was faulty when it was used by NATO during the Cold War and it is faulty today, when it is used by Russia.

Pavel, that's your opinion. With all due respect, until this is put the test we will not know whether that is the case. However I think that the real option to act in a limited nuclear manner should be preserved if only to allow for a response short of a strategic nuclear attack, in the event of a conflict with NATO.

There is also the question of third powers, (say Japan) who do not posses nuclear weapons, but have absolute conventional superiority. I dare suggest that without TNW the Pacific Fleet is hardly in a position to even hold its own against the Japanese. In the even of a war with say China, the issue becomes an even more real one.

Feanor: I've always been puzzled by people's thinking of national security in terms of World War II concepts - tank armies, occupation of territory, and things like that.

I'm not sure where occupation of territories or tank armies appear in my post. I'm writing on the possibility of escalating border tensions between Russia and Japan. Given Japanese conventional superiority, this would be a rather desperate situation with Russia.

Feanor

I must confess, Japan landing in Vladivostok and driving on Moscow with “absolute conventional superiority” is a concept beyond my understanding. Surely you don’t believe this? If you do, forget the Japanese. Keep you eye on the Koreans. Never let the South Koreans (ROK) cross the Yalu. Far greater risk!

Frank Shuler
USA

Conventional superiority refers mainly to their naval and airborne assets. In terms of land forces East MD is quite capable of holding its own.

I was thinking more of a situation where a dispute over naval boundaries, or detention of a fishing vessel by either side escalating into a limiting conflict.

Feanor

Here is my question on point. How does tactical nuclear weapons ensure Russia’s defense in such a hypothetical conflict with Japan over fishing rights or limited territorial issues on the Kuril Islands? How did China being a nuclear power deter Japan in their latest tiff over possessions in the East China Sea? (Senkaku (or the Diaoyu) Islands)

This reinforces my opinion that there is no longer a military-political difference between, so called, tactical nuclear weapons and strategic warheads. Today, there are only nuclear weapons. The story goes Russia needs battlefield nuclear weapons to compensate for its recognized lack of conventional warfare capabilities. Yet, there is no real circumstance where by such weapons would be used. The Kremlin, no different from the Pentagon or Whitehall, could never guarantee the use of such a “limited” nuclear response would stay, or could stay, “limited”. Once a nuclear weapon is used, escalation is inevitable; or, at least, the risk of escalation outweighs any benefits from the original use. Nuclear weapons are no longer really military weapons but instead have become political tools for domestic politics.

Georgia didn’t not fear Russian nuclear weapons when they made the grab for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, they learned to fear Russian tanks. That’s the lesson.

Frank Shuler
USA

>>Yet, there is no real circumstance where by such weapons would be used.

There is at least one, Frank: A-135 missile defense. It cannot operate without the use of nuclear weapons. Use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia in a purely defensive scenario (and assuming no further nuclear exchange) would not puncture the strategic threshold.

Also, I am not sure where people get this notion that Russia sees itself using nuclear weapons (of whichever flavor) in a limited conventional conflict. The current military doctrine explicitly limits them to a conflict that threatens the very existence of the Russian state, which a border war certainly isn't. The only time Russian military officials EVER contemplated tactical nuclear weapons as a tool of conventional war was a single article in the journal "Military Thought" (sort of Russian equivalent of USNI's Proceedings) in 1999, which had an article by several generals outlining a use of nuclear weapons as a tool of de-escalating a regional conflict. This option was never subsequently mentioned or supported by the top political leadership.

As for Japanese threat, it isn't very serious. JSDF may have a regional naval superiority, but Russian armed forces have an advantage in everything else. Not least of which the ability to target the opponent industry and cities, which Japanese air force lacks. But more importantly, the Japanese have no will to fight or to be militarily aggressive. Do not mistake the ramblings of a few far-right wackos for a national mandate to retake the Kurils.

Anonymous

I was only referencing Feanor’s comments on needing battlefield nuclear weapons to check a third-power, such as Japan, because of Russia’s conventional warfare weakness. I don’t think Russia has anything to worry from Tokyo. I’m also not sure such weapons are really practical against China in a “limited conventional conflict”. Any map you buy from a vender in Beijing today, shows the historical lands of “The Middle Kingdom” extending from the river Amur south, with the city of Vladivostok shown as Hǎishēnwǎi. I doubt China has any territorial ambitions on Russia either. However, it has always been curious to me to learn exactly what the Chinese people think “historical China” actually was. Always looking for insights.

And by the way, if Russia ever has to actually use the A-135 missile defense system, it won’t be in a limited tactical nuclear war scenario. The world as we know it will have ended.

Frank Shuler
USA

Unless, Frank, it is a rogue or mistaken launch, or a launch by a third power like Iran.

Think about this scenario. I know it's silly, but in case of a Dr. Strangelove-like situation, it would be better for Russia to have the capacity and confidence to use tactical nuclear weapons to deter a rogue attack, than to let Moscow get destroyed and then run the risk that whatever continuity of government emerges doesn't strike back with everything they've got.

After all, isn't that the rationale for American missile defense? Instead of nuking Iran or anyone else into the stone age, US now has the capacity to defend against a limited attack without having to revert to nukes because some rogue state just wiped NYC off the face of the earth.

The only difference is that US has the technology to use a conventional kinetic warhead, while Russia has to use a nuclear area blast. But that's a technology problem, not a problem of crossing the nuclear threshold, which is why I say there is still a difference between a tactical and a strategic usage.

artjomh

My central argument is the historical difference between strategic and tactical nuclear warheads has ended. Today, there are only nuclear weapons. No longer will tactical, I prefer to call them battlefield, nuclear weapons be released to the generals and admirals for their discretionary use in combat. Such weapons are now under strict National Command Authority in both Russia and the United States. I do believe a mix of nuclear weapons, different yields and delivery systems are useful and necessary in today’s world. However, I differ with Pavel and others and think a treaty limiting all nuclear weapons is both useful and necessary. The pragmatist in me realizes such a treaty will never be.

I disagree on one of your conclusions. Nuclear weapons will never deter a rogue attack. By definition such an attack can’t be influenced by deterrence. That is why the United States is investing so much time, money, and technology in ballistic missile defense; weapon systems for a future, uncertain world. That being said, today both Russia and the United States have more to fear from a nuclear device delivered by a truck than an ICBM.

Frank Shuler
USA

You misunderstood me, Frank. I did not mean to say that such tactical weapons will deter a rogue/terrorist attack, but rather that they will counter it, either defensively or offensively. The defensive scenario is the one I outlined.

Your definition of tactical weapons as ones being under the authority of individual unit commanders is puzzling to me. Frankly speaking, all nuclear weapons are under the presidential authority, until the time when they are released to unit commanders for launch. This has always been the case for all types of nuclear weapons. The difference between tactical and strategic weapons is such that strategic weapons will feature in a direct intercontinental battle between superpowers, while tactical weapons could only serve as tools of a regional conflict due to limitations of range of their delivery vehicles.

artjomh

Just a clarification. Historically, the United States did indeed released tactical weapons to battlefield commanders for their discretionary use. Once the wartime decision by the National Command Authority, the US President as Commander-in-Chief, was made and nuclear authority was granted to the battlefield commanders, such weapons could be launched without farther review. Once the “free release status” of tactical nuclear weapons was made, it was up to the commanders to “ascertain the threat and respond accordingly”. For an example, a US admiral did not need to ask permission from the Pentagon to use a nuclear depth charge on a Soviet submarine if he felt his ships in danger. Remember, the US had thousands of such tactical nuclear weapons in Europe under NATO alone. From nuclear warheads for Pershing missiles, B-61 bombs for aircraft, Honest John rockets, Nike Hercules surface to air weapons, artillery shells, nuclear land mines etc. Once the NCA gave permission, it was up to the commanders to fight the war.

Today is far, far different. The United States has gone from thousands of battlefield nuclear weapons to a relatively handful B-61 bombs. (less than 500)

The US President would never release such weapons to individual commanders for their discretionary use. If the decision was made to drop a B-61 nuclear bomb, that decision would be made at the very top of the command structure, by the President as Commander-in-Chief. By the way, whether the B-61 was “tactical” (model 3 or 4) and launched by a F-16 fighter or “strategic” (model 7 or 11) and dropped by a B-2 would be indifferent.

Good exchange of views.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank

I dare say that battlefield nuclear weapons in the form of nuclear ASMs would come in very handy in dealing with the Japanese Navy, be they coastal-ASMs like the Bastion-P complexes planned for deployment to the Kurils but with larger nuclear missiles, or be they ship-based nuclear ASMs similar to the P-700 Granit/Shipwreck class ASMs on the Kirov class.

There is also little room for escalation, as Japan does not have nuclear weapons of its own, and at the same time can not reliably count on America to escalate to Armageddon over a handful of irradiated hulks of former Japanese ships.

The political situation in Georgia is quite different. It should be noted that the current Russian state is far less stable then might appear to an external observer. A major defeat against a regional power like Japan would have major internal repercussions. Additionally I would consider that the VVS assets in East MD are stretched dangerously thin, especially when it comes to airspace control. This is crucial. I'm not sure the VVS would even be able to contest air superiority in the long run.

Feanor

Even in your hypothetical confrontation between Russia and Japan, do not assume the United States would not stand shoulder to shoulder with Tokyo; especially if the Kremlin rattled the nuclear sword.

It would be a mistake.

Frank Shuler
USA

"After the removal of TLAM-N cruise missiles from Japan and a very calm reaction of Japanese and South Korean governments last year, I honestly don't see what US loses by removing obsolete gravity bombs from Europe."
[artjomh]

artjomh - what the United States would lose by a unilateral decision to withdraw these bombs would be Alliance cohesion. Several European Allies still value the presence of the weapons and have made this very clear to Washington. So any change can only follow an internal Alliance decision that alternative means of reassurance are in place. This may (or may not) be the outcome of the review of defence and deterrence that the Alliance is about to begin. Whether Russia likes any alternative to the presence of US nuclear weapons that NATO comes up with any better remains to be seen.

Frank, the Kuril islands are explicitly not covered by the US-Japan mutual security treaty. Any attempt by Japan to retake the islands by force will not find military support in Washington.

Ian, which allies would those be? Like I said, Japan and South Korea were fine with US taking nuclear weapons out. Belgium, Netherlands and Germany are on record wanting to remove nuclear weapons from their territory (not sure about Italy's and Turkey's position).

artjomh - It is not only the countries that host weapons which would need to be on board for a change, it has to be agreed by all Allies. Some countries have made unilateral decisions in the past (Greece and the UK for example) but the current hosting states have made it clear they will only make a change following a collective decision.

I believe that France, Turkey and Estonia were the most active in lobbying the United States for no major change in the current policy or posture during the elaboration of the new strategic concept. Other Baltic states as well as the Czech Republic and perhaps other central European countries probably also made their support for the status quo known. However, I think it is true (actually I am fairly certain) that no country formally proposed the removal of US weapons from Europe to NATO. There are national statements along those lines -- notably by Germany -- but nobody put a proposal on the table for a decision. I doubt if anybody will put that question formally until everyone agrees on the answer. Pushing a membership with split views for a premature decision is corrosive in a consensus organization.

Gentlemen

Just to clear up a discrepancy, nuclear Tomahawk TLAM-N cruise missiles were never deployed on Japanese soil. Since the January 1992 handshake agreement between Presidents George H.W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin, the United States has not deployed tactical nuclear weapons at sea. (Presidential Nuclear Initiatives Agreements) The remaining nuclear Tomahawk missiles have been in “operational storage” at York Naval Weapons Station in Virginia and at Naval Base Kitsap (Bangor) in Washington State, USA. Both Seoul and Tokyo were notified by Washington that these weapons were being placed into inactive storage pending disposal and neither raised any security issues with the decision.

Artjomh, I never suggested that Feanor’s hypothetical “conflict” between Russia and Japan involved an actual invasion of the Kuril Islands by Tokyo. His premise was that such a conflict “might” involve [a dispute over naval boundaries, or detention of a fishing vessel by either side escalating into a limiting conflict]. My reply argument was that tactical, battlefield, nuclear weapons would be useless in such a situation, unable to prevent it or bring such a conflict to conclusion.

Make no mistake. If a shooting war between Russia and Japan breaks out, big or small, the US will stand firmly beside Tokyo.

On another policy issue, paradoxically the United States maintains nuclear weapons today in Europe, under dual-key arrangements with NATO, specifically at Germany’s request.

Frank Shuler
USA

OK, we are getting somewhat off-topic, but for the sake of the argument...

While TLAM-N weren't deployed to Los Angeles class submarines since the PNIs (similar to how Russia semi-retired SS-N-19 SLCMs from its submarines), TLAM-N missiles held in storage did provide a kind of extended deterrent in Asia. Their removal from the active reserve confirmed to Asia-Pacific nations that the United States is no longer providing this extended deterrent, which, in my opinion, is simply a confirmation of the obvious.

Japan is fine with this, being a great supporter of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The same is true for South Korea. The same is true for the majority of Western European nations.

That was my entire point. Alliance stability wasn't shaken with the confirmation that US will not provide any nuclear deterrent in Asia-Pacific region. Why would it be shaken if the same thing was done in Europe? Who exactly is insisting that tactical nuclear weapons in European NATO counties still serve some purpose, whether it is military or as a morale booster, I do not know..

[TLAM-N] [Their removal from the active reserve confirmed to Asia-Pacific nations that the United States is no longer providing this extended deterrent, which, in my opinion, is simply a confirmation of the obvious.]

My only argument with your statement is that the United States very much is committed to providing a “nuclear deterrent” to Japan and by default South Korea. My point is tactical, battlefield, nuclear weapons have become irrelevant to this deterrent.

NATO is a completely different matter. However; even then, tactical nuclear weapons, specifically the B-61, today are more political policy tools than military weapons.

Frank Shuler
USA

Yes, I agree with you, Frank.

Feathers must be smoothed, sensibilities must be carefully protected, fears must be calmed, consultations must be conducted. But in the end, isn't it in US interest to proceed with withdrawal of these weapons from Europe, if they are even slightly serious about conducting talks on the Russian arsenal? As a goodwill gesture, if nothing else...

I know that many in US are quite naive about what it would take to get Russia to draw down its tactical arsenal, but people in Pentagon and Foggy Bottom can't possible expect any negotiation not to include B-61s in Europe, can they?

artjomh

I think the United States would enjoy a continuing dialog with Russia on lowering the number of all nuclear weapons; battlefield weapons included. For the US, the only tactical nuclear weapon left in our arsenal is the B-61 gravity bomb. Back on topic however, it seems Moscow wants to link any such negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons to a plethora of bi-lateral issues; space based weapons, ABM systems, NATO expansion, WTO, Save the Whales, etc. Given that, it just won’t get done...

An additional point to ponder. The US may very well be in the process of “giving up the tactical nuclear mission”. A key example is the news from Seymour Johnson Air Base here in North Carolina (USA) that its F-15E Strike Eagles while still considered nuclear capable, are no longer “nuclear certified”. It appears now these aircraft are no longer “nuclear coded”. The significance? The 4th Fighter Wing at Seymour is the only USAF wing in the entire United States Air Force tasked with the tactical nuclear mission. Perhaps, the decision has already been made that the US will exit the tactical nuclear "game”. Perhaps, the few remaining B-61s in Europe will be maintained for exclusive NATO use. (read: European NATO countries and not the US)

Something to think about.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank make no mistake, if a confrontation between the Japanese Navy and Pacific fleet escalated, and the Pacific fleet with AVMF support used ASMs (including nuclear) to destroy the Japanese task force, or force them to retreat, no matter how firmly the USA supports Japan, they would not escalate to an all out nuclear exchange over an incident of this sort.

It may be extremely damaging to Russia's stance internationally, but less so then an embarrassing defeat. Not to mention such a defeat may be very costly in terms of assets and lives.

Feanor

There once was a time when some Serbian expatriates decided to assassinate the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Such success might thwart the expansion of Vienna in the Balkans and aid greater Serbia. That was the plan. Of course such action might also precipitate the Third Balkan War of 1914 but even if Serbia was found guilty by association, Belgrade had the blessing and support the Tsar Nicholas II and Russia. Surely Austria-Hungary would never go to war with Serbia knowing it also meant war with Russia. Well, we all know how that worked out...

War by its very definition is always unpredictable and messy; with many unintended consequences. You have no idea the American response to a nuclear attack on our ally Japan. Neither do I. However; one thing I do know, things would spin out of control quickly.

Frank Shuler
USA

Despite the predominantly anti-TNW attitude of the previous posts I say tactical nuclear weapons are essential for preventing large scale conventional war.

Couple of assumptions:
-- Almost certainly the use of nuclear weapons atween countries armed with strategic nuclear weapons leads to strategic nuclear war.
-- Strategic weapons don't scale very well.
-- Purely strategic nuclear armarment invites salami tactics.
-- Against non-NBC enemies the use of strategic weapons will have such a high threshold that they will realistically not be used. A determined enemy can exploit that fact.
-- The use of nuclear weapons at sea doesn't necessarily lead to nuclear war.
-- Only nuclear weapons prevent large scale land war.
-- Even if direct war among countries with strategic nuclear weapons is not likely (make sure MAD works!), they still can engage in proxy wars. Use strategic weapons in such proxy wars? No. Use nuclear weapons? Very well so!

Scenario 1: Saddam doesn't stop in Kuwait, but his 1000 tanks roll on into Saudi Arabia? No conventional asset can stop that. The world's major oil reserves just 10 hours away from being highjacked. Strategic nuke on Baghdad? No. Use tactical nuclear weapons to his army him while still in the desert? Very well so!

Scenario 2: Chinese invasion fleet with course Batavia (sorry - Jakarta). Strategic nuke on Peking? No. Tactical nuke across the bow of the invasion fleet, or directly on it if need be? Very well so!

Without tactical weapons the value of strategic weapons is highly deminished. This does not mean we should arm the forces down to regimental level with nukes, but there should be a nuclear option on all operational levels across all forces. Meaning from the Army's ATACMS, to the the aerial forces' son-of-SRAM, to the Navy's torpedoes and anti-ship missiles, to strategic systems like ICBMs, SLBMs, CMs.

To demand of Russia to withdraw their TNW behind the Ural is hubris. Don't be so U.S.-centric!!! What would the Chinese say to that? And Russia has these systems on its *own soil*, whereas the U.S. occupational forces have theirs on a foreign continent in foreign countries, to safeguard the empire. Do I sound anti-US? I'm not, but don't be arrogant!

Any threaty covering TNW would have to include, or at least be open to other powers. China, France, India, Pakistan, &c. A purely Russian - American game wouldn't reflect this world's reality.

@Frank Shuler: "An additional point to ponder. The US may very well be in the process of “giving up the tactical nuclear mission”. A key example is the news from Seymour Johnson Air Base here in North Carolina (USA) that its F-15E Strike Eagles while still considered nuclear capable, are no longer “nuclear certified”. It appears now these aircraft are no longer “nuclear coded”."

Frank, this thread is probably not the place for the discussion, but I have been trying to follow the potential role of the dual-capable version of the F35. It is now decided that there will be such a thing, but when you look at the various documents describing how the US sees nuclear operations there is no obvious place where short-range fast jets fit either in terms of force structure or missions.

If you could point me to any literature on this issue I would be very grateful.

Ian

As the role of tactical nuclear weapons and potential negotiations between Russia and the United States to limit such is “on topic”, I don’t think we’ve strayed too far.

The F-35A is a nuclear puzzle. Facts are hard to come by.

Intriguing is the preliminary information released by the US Congress on a “nuclearized F-35” came very late in the F-35 development program. It was not a requirement in the original “Joint Strike Fighter” competition between Boeing and Lockheed. Even stranger, the initial request for cost and capabilities of a nuclear equipped F-35A came from the Dutch and not the USAF. Of the five NATO countries that have a nuclear role in the Alliance, the Dutch, Belgians and Turkey all fly the F-16. The Germans and Italians fly the Tornado. Who would order a nuclear capable F-35A? (significantly more expensive than a baseline aircraft) The Netherlands is a definite F-35A customer and so are the Turks. Germany has no interest in the F-35 program; Italy only wants a few F-35Bs (STOL) for its carrier navy. Belgium seem uninterested in buying any new fighters at all. I would conclude a dual-role, nuclear capable version of F-35A is questionable at this point. Just my opinion.

By the way, with the 4th Fighter Wing standing down from the tactical nuclear mission, only the two squadrons of the 31st Fighter Wing and their F-16s are nuclear certified. IF this information is indeed correct, there is a certain logic to that. The 31st is based at Aviano Air Base, Italy and that base has a “nuclear mission”.

Frank Shuler
USA

The interesting thing is that a nuclear capable JSF will also need a new TNW, as the existing B61 Mods are not compatible with the F-35. Therefore B61 Mod.12 is under development. By spending that much money in the new technologies, I think the role of TNW for the US will be cemented over the next 20 years at least.

http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/1/64.full.pdf
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/02/nuclearbudget.php

Martin

Martin

I had missed this. Thanks for the information and bringing a little clarity to the issue.
What I lost track of was the new mod-12 project was to bring all three versions of the current B-61, the Mod 3 & 4 tactical weapon and the Mod 7 strategic bomb to a common architecture. For the US then, the line between a “tactical” and “strategic” B-61 somewhat goes away; it becomes about variable yields and the deliver system. There is a certain logic to that approach, but questions as well. Will the new B-61-12 be considered a tactical warhead not covered by New START or will all US B-61s be considered strategic and be covered by the Treaty? Any thoughts?

So, I guess we can infer that the new B-61-12 will be carried by the F-35A and the F-16s, now tasked with the tactical nuclear mission in Europe, will “soldier on” until replaced by the JSF. It will be interesting to see if there are any European takers on the nuclearized F-35A and the modernized B-61-12. Or, if the European NATO countries will invest in alternative platforms for the “tactical nuclear” mission. Or, will NATO finally decide to abdicate the nuclear mission entirely?

Frank Shuler
USA

>Will the new B-61-12 be considered a tactical warhead not covered by New START or will all US B-61s be considered strategic and be covered by the Treaty? Any thoughts?

The treaty is pretty clear on this.

New START only concerns itself with nuclear warheads deployed on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. A heavy bomber is considered to be an aircraft with a range exceeding 8000 km AND capable of launching nuclear ALCM.

Since F-35 satisfies neither of the criteria, any warheads delivered by it are not accounted under the Treaty limits. However, warheads deployed on B-52H and B-2 are accounted, one warhead per bomber (unless the bomber is classified as not equipped for nuclear weapons).

It doesn't matter if B-61 Mod. 12 is a nuclear Christmas cracker or a megaton range citybuster. If it is not deliverable intercontinentally, it is not considered to be a part of strategic arms.

artjomh

Thanks for the review of New START’s bomber counting rules.

[A heavy bomber is considered to be an aircraft with a range exceeding 8000 km AND capable of launching nuclear ALCM]

Should this be and/or? The B-2s don’t carry ALCM but is a declared Heavy Bomber under the Treaty, right?

Frank Shuler
USA

Ah, yes, you are correct. Either criteria would work. I stumbled a bit on the language in the Protocol.

23. (80.) The term "heavy bomber" means a bomber of a type, any one of which satisfies either of the following criteria:
(a) Its range is greater than 8000 kilometers; or
(b) It is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

A bomber shall not be considered to be a heavy bomber if it meets neither criterion (a) nor criterion (b) or if otherwise agreed by the Parties.

25. (82.) The term "heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments" means a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs.

Martin
artjomh

To return to the jest of my question regarding the B-61. When speaking on how the United States would treat the “new” B-61-12 weapon, I did not mean to infer how exactly the weapon would be classified under New START in regards to the counting rules. For example, New START only counts the 60 American “declared” bombers as a single warhead each against the 1550 total and the 60 are held as a single delivery system each against the 700/800 rule on launchers; with no limits on nuclear warheads. Whether the US has 250 or 2500 B-61-12 bombs is indifferent to New START.

Rather, my attempt was to ask the question how would Washington, read the Pentagon, interoperate this weapon; as a strategic or “tactical” nuclear weapon? The nuance is significant. How would Washington treat the B-61-12; as a tactical weapon outside the parameter of New START or as a strategic weapon within the declared US nuclear framework scope of New START? The difference may well be in the number of such B-61s converted to the new model. If the US decides to upgrade only a few such weapons, say 200-250, it will fall under the strategic umbrella of US thinking. If however, the US decides to rebuild 1000+ weapons, the US position shifts to the thinking this is a hedge tactical weapon needed to counter Russian battlefield weapons. Thoughts?

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank, I am not certain I follow your logic. If the Pentagon wants to load B-61 bombs on the nuclear coded bombers, they are free to do so. I personally don't see why they would want to do that when they have limited space for AGM-129 missiles. Taking up the available space with bombs seems like a way to decrease the offensive/deterrent potential of B-52H, not the other way around.

The way I think of it, what you are suggesting is a way for Pentagon to use B-61 as a secondary weapons on nuclear coded bombers. Say, B-52H and B-2 goes to war, lets loose their regular complement of AGM-129 and B-83, then comes back and has a hedge of more bombs (B-61) they can drop. That sounds not a little bit ridiculous to me. Similar to the Soviet "idea" of SSBN reloads. Once the first missiles fly, that's it, there is no second wave, the world is over. So having a hedge makes no difference whatsoever.

If B-61 was a cruise missiles, like TLAM-N or GLCM, it would be another issue, since there are/were many launch platforms for those. But B-61 is a slow-deploying gravity bomb. You can't use it concurrently with your other weapons, so its utility as a hedge is somewhat fanciful.

Frank, let me be clear. Regardless of our difference in opinions on the outcomes, I believe the capability to effectively deliver a strike using nuclear ASMs is one that should be retained by the VMF and AVMF. I believe it is useful to have the discriminatory capability to strike a naval taskforce with nuclear weapons, without having to immediately resort to an all-out exchange. I think this tactical nuclear arsenal is more likely to be used should it come to it, I believe it is more likely that Japan would expect it to be used, and I believe it is less likely to cause an all-out nuclear response. This is why the capability should be maintained.

Anonymous

My first premise is that nuclear weapons are really political weapons and not really military ones; whether we’re talking about the B-61-12 gravity bomb or a W87 warhead on a Minuteman III ICBM for that matter. Hypothetically, it is possible to imagine a military scenario where by the use of the variable yield B-61-12 makes more sense against a non-peer nuclear power; regardless of delivery system (B-2, B-52, F-16 or the future F-35). That being said, once nuclear warheads are used the future becomes very unpredictable. I can’t envision any general war scenario where US nuclear bombers would “re-load” after delivering their deadly cargo for some kind of second strike.

If the US remanufactured, let’s say, 250 B-61-12 bombs, then these weapons will be considered more strategic to US planners regardless of delivery systems. (Assuming the B-61-12 can be deployed interchangeably between both bomber and fighters) However, if the US remanufactures a much larger quantity of such mod-12 versions, it means Washington sees the geo-political advantage of off-setting the vastly superior force of Russian tactical nuclear warheads with these weapons. Of course, this concept of using the B-61-12 as a hedge force is asinine. Note: the US had several thousand B-83-0 gravity bombs but correctly decided to rebuild only 300 to the newest B83-1 mod and surplus the rest. I think the same kind of decision will be made in the case of the B-61-12.

My understanding is that the B-52H can carry a total of 20 ALCM (N), eight internally and twelve on wing pylons. However, I have read from multiple sources that the maximum gravity bombs carried on each is four. Space for ALCM and gravity bombs (B83 or 61s) are not “in competition”.

Do you have additional information on the nuclear payload of the B-52H?

Good exchange of views.

Frank Shuler
USA

Frank,

(that was me previously, got logged out by mistake).

Does it really matter how Washington "sees" the situation or the role of those bombs, as long as they don't do anything about it?

The "strategic" quality of nuclear weapons is defined by their delivery vehicles. If Pentagon sees these bombs/warheads as "strategic", then it would manufacture intercontinental delivery vehicles: bombers, submarine missile tubes, ICBMs, long-range cruise missiles, etc. If Pentagon does not plan to manufacture these additional delivery mechanisms, then it doesn't really matter what label they stick on those bombs. They might as well be a part of the Enduring Stockpile.

While I agree that nuclear weapons are inherently political, their deterrent value is derived from their ability to present a credible military threat. If a nuclear weapon cannot be delivered on target in a realistic battlefield scenario (i.e. SIOP/OPLAN/CONPLAN), then that weapon might as well be sitting in a warehouse, gathering dust.

If those B-61-12 will not be directly assigned to intercontinental delivery vehicles, then they do not present a credible deterrent and they are just part of the non-operational stockpile.

The size of the reserve is important, mind you, because it gives US an upload potential, but that potential is mostly concentrated in Trident's W88 warheads and all those unused RV slots.

PS: I cannot contribute much on the B-52H, unfortunately.

artjomh

Washington position on battlefield (tactical) nuclear weapons as I’ve previously stated is only relevant to the before mentioned topic, “Russia hardens its position on tactical nuclear weapons”. There are many that think the decision to pull all B-61s out of Europe had already been made by President George W. Bush. Now there seems to be this feeling in the Obama Administration that the US needs to “get something” from Russia in return. When pulling the B-61s from Incirlik in Turkey is completed, the only depot in NATO where the USAF will have access to nuclear weapons is Aviano. Yet, now it seems all negotiations on battlefield nuclear weapons between Russia and the United States is lost in collateral issues that doom such an agreement from ever being signed. Given that, I still suspect the number of such B-61 nuclear weapons in Europe to fall to the absolute lowest level possible while still maintaining the facade of a nuclear NATO.

Do nuclear weapons still provide a credible military threat?

Do nuclear weapons keep Russia and the United States from making war on each other or do Russia and the United States really have nothing to go to war over, nuclear weapons or not? Other than the fact, Russia and the United States have enough nuclear weapons to utterly destroy each other many times over, what are the national issues today that really separate Washington and Moscow?

Recently, nuclear weapons didn’t stop war between Russia and Georgia. Nor, deter Argentina against Great Britain back in 1982. Maybe these weapons really are “sitting in a warehouse, gathering dust.”

By the way, I suspect most of the W88 warheads are at sea with Trident. The upload potential will come from the W76-1s.

Frank Shuler
USA

While US and Russia have currently nothing to go to war over, should such an opportunity present itself, nuclear weapons would most likely deter or limit such conflict. After all, what else can do it, if push comes to shove?

In my opinion, nuclear weapons deter not the possibility of war in itself, but the possibility of a nuclear exchange during a war between nuclear weapons states. Neither the MiG Alley, nor the Sino-Soviet border conflict evolved beyond the conventional.

Going back to the difference (or lack thereof) between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, what interests me is this: do strategic nuclear weapons also deter the usage of limited tactical weapons, and vice versa? Will a tactical strike on a US Navy battle group inevitably lead to a strategic level exchange, or is there a level of de-escalation involved, whereas a limited "demonstration" strike may force an opponent to back down for an all out war?

Does the balance of strategic weapons prevent the limited battlefield usage of tactical weapons in due to the inevitability of escalation? And conversely, does the Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons preclude the US from achieving "nuclear primacy" and hence deter a strategic first strike option? Thoughts?

artjomh

I do completely agree that nuclear arms between peer powers indeed limit the scope of conventional warfare. However, I disagree on the value of such weapons in a “limited nuclear conflict” between such peer powers. Once the “dogs of war” are released, I believe escalation is inevitable. Or, at the very least, the risk of escalation is incalculable.

While hypotheticals are always interesting, rarely can they be broad enough to reach meaningful conclusions. For example, why would a Russian tactical nuclear strike on an US Navy battle group even be contemplated? What are the political circumstances that would lead to such an event? I can’t imagine such a situation that would not be apart of a far greater drama between Russia and the United States.

“Nuclear Primacy” is a myth. Even an American attack on a non-peer nuclear rival such as North Korea comes with risks. While the US has overwhelming nuclear supremacy over the weapons available to Pyongyang, there is no 100% guarantee that the US would not face retaliation. If a conflict on the Korean peninsula escalated to a nuclear strike by the United States, who is to say a Panamanian registered cargo ship with a North Korean nuclear device onboard isn’t already steaming to a US port.

Therein lies the paradox. You have to have nuclear weapons to be a world power. But, having nuclear weapons means you never can use them. It is only the threat of their use that creates deterrence. With deterrence in place, the battlefield shifts to the conventional. It is that battlefield, the conventional battlefield, that the United States is determined to dominate.

Frank Shuler
USA