On November 10, 2015 President Putin held a regular meeting with his generals in Sochi to discuss development of the Russian strategic forces. The president used the occasion to complain again about U.S. missile defense plans and to warn that Russia will do whatever it takes to preserve the strategic balance.
But that was not the most interesting part of the news story. One sharp observer (MJ) noticed that the camera took a peek at one of the documents prepared for the meetings (it is at 1:46 in the news story). It showed a summary of one of the projects that presumably were discussed at the meeting as part of the plan to restore that strategic balance that the U.S. missile defense system so blatantly undermines.
The project is called "Ocean Multipurpose System 'Status-6'" with the TsKB MT Rubin design bureau listed as the lead developer (Rubin is the design bureau that built virtually all submarines that are currently in service). A brief paragraph describes the mission of the proposed system as follows:
Damaging the important components of the adversary's economy in a coastal area and inflicting unacceptable damage to a country's territory by creating areas of wide radioactive contamination that would be unsuitable for military, economic, or other activity for long periods of time.
The picture that follows shows that at the core of the weapon system is an underwater autonomous drone ("self-propelled underwater craft" or SPA), which could be delivered by one of the two submarines - Project 09852 or Project 09851. For some reason, the drone is shown as attached to the bottom of the 09852 submarine, but not to the 09851 [UPDATE: Colleagues tell me that the vehicle attached to the 09582 sub is not the drone pictured later on the slide]. The text is hard to read, but it appears that Project 09852 submarine will carry four drones and Project 09852 - either 3 or 6. Given that 09852 is a smaller submarine (its displacement is shown as "10000 t" vs. what looks like a larger number for 09852), it's probably 3. It certainly does not look like "1", although "2" is a possibility. [UPDATE: I am told that a better quality photo shows that the number is "6".]
Interestingly, these two submarines are relatively recent projects. Project 09852 was laid down at Sevmash in December 2012. It is said to use the hull of the Belgorod submarine of the Project 949A/Oscar II class. The first Project 09851 submarine, Khabarovsk, was laid down in July 2014. (Project 09851 was also mentioned in the R&D known as Kalitka-SMP.)
Again, the text is barely legible, but it appears that the drone would be able to travel at the depth of up to 1000 m at a fairly high speed (something like 105 km/h?). The range appears to be listed as 10000 km, which is a bit hard to believe, but this is what the slide says. The diameter ("caliber") of the drone appears to be more than 1 meter (probably 1.6 m), the general's hand hides the length of the device.
The drone appears to be nuclear-powered - the fourth compartment is marked "Reactor module". This would explain the range, I guess, although it would need some guidance system to find its way around.
Further down the list, there is a drawing of the system's components - command and control, support ships (non-nuclear submarine "Sarov" and some surface ship - Zvezdochka rescue ship I'm told), and something else that we cannot see.
Finally, the timeline at the bottom of the slide says that pilot system will be built by 2019, so the state tests can be conducted in 2019-2020.
I'm not quite sure what to make of this. First, it's an interesting security lapse. I know that quite a few people believe that the leak was intentional, but I don't think it's the case. Indeed, as I understand, the news organizations quickly removed the clip from their sites. On the other hand, Bill Getz did have a story about Russian underwater drone, Kanyon, two months ago. The name is different, but it appears to be more or less the system Gertz's Pentagon sources described. So, maybe Moscow decided that the leak would not be such a big deal. Still, they would have probably preferred to keep some details out of it.
As for the project itself, Russia is not the only country that is working on underwater drones. But the payload looks like a massive "dirty bomb", which strikes me as absolutely crazy. A number of people noted that the description does not necessarily exclude the possibility that the initial "damaging" can be done by a regular nuclear device. Which only makes this whole thing even more insane - do they think that a nuclear weapon on its own would not inflict "unacceptable damage"?
UPDATE 11/12/15: The story generated quite a buzz, which is probably what the authors of this whole thing counted on. The consensus that is emerging from a number of discussions is that the "leak" was intentional. Moreover, a colleague who follow these things quite closely made a strong case that the "drone" on the slide is probably just an enlarged (and modified) image of a "regular" torpedo (such as UGST). This would explain the unusually large "combat module" and a number of other inconsistencies. However, the rest of the slide seems real - the submarines, the Zvezdochka ship, etc. Indeed, it is quite possible that the project is real as well - the Soviet Union did work on an underwater vehicle like this in the 1980s (here is an interesting story, although I would take it with a pinch of salt). Specifically, some work has been done on the vehicle's nuclear reactor. The project was abandoned, of course, but these things rarely die. In fact, NITI in Sosnovy Bor is building a new facility to test liquid metal-cooled naval reactors. It is probably not related to this drone, but who knows.
Still, the whole thing strikes me as crazy regardless of whether the project is real or not. If it is real, I find it quite appalling that the ideas of this kind ever reach the level of a discussion with the president. If it is an attempt of high-level trolling, it's even worse - if people in the Kremlin believe it was a clever way of sending some kind of a signal, they probably lost all their marbles.
The book
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What a strange story. Bizarre. Today, I think what the Pentagon finds so alarming about current Russian military policy is the apparent disconnect between “strategic” and “tactical” nuclear weapons by the Kremlin. Clearly, revised Russian war plans call for the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons in any “conventional” war. There seems to be a policy void on how the use of Russian nuclear weapons could actually “win” a war without inviting a nuclear strike against Russia in response.
Given the propensity of President Putin to brand NATO as a primary threat to the very survival of Russia, it’s a scary situation. I don’t think this is political rhetoric.
Is the purpose of such a nuclear-propelled, underwater drone armed with a massive “dirty” warhead to launch a “limited” first strike?
Will there even be a chance of extending New START in the future or is the era of Russo-American arm control agreements at an end? Will we even make it to the New START implementation date of February, 2018?
Frank Shuler
USA
The Kremlin officially admitted the fact of leakage of the classified information:
http://www.rbc.ru/politics/11/11/2015/564371b49a7947a62d2ca390
After that, I am even more inclined to think that it is sophisticated high-ranking trolling.
I think that the USA have to assess this situation as humour.
I don't see how a small number of short range interceptors in one or two places in southern Europe is even a mild threat to Russia's strategic nuclear capability
The interesting thing is this precise concept was considered by the Soviet Union back in the early 1950's: not to create a large radioactive zone, but rather to create a huge tidal wave that would wipe out coastal military facilities and major cities. This was the T-15 torpedo with a 100 megaton warhead proposed by none other than Andrei Sakharov.
Regardless of whether this concept has any basis in reality or is just smoke, This is clearly intended to highlight the stark fact that the US/NATO BMD system is aimed at destabilizing Russia's nuclear deterrent, and that should not be a surprise to anyone familiar with the US State Department's wholehearted embrace of Wolfowitz/Brzezinsky/neocon doctrine (Grand Chessboard anyone?) For a little perspective, recall the ABM treaty negotiations and the fact that the US was seriously worried that Russia's anti-aircraft missiles could possibly be used to intercept ICBM's and thus give a false impression of actual ABM numbers? (this from John S Foster Jr., technical advisor for the ABM treaty hearings, DDRE for Johnson and Nixon, and CISAC member Michael May's predecessor at Livermore). We are talking SM-3 Block II with mach 15+ speed here, not Patriot's, and the numbers being proposed keep growing.
In light of that, branding NATO (i.e., the US) a primary threat to Russia's survival is simply calling a spade a spade.
Foster interview link here: http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-adf447-interview-with-john-foster-1987
to Ryan Alt:
I don't see too, but the Kremlin sees it in it...
to Jon Grams:
Unless the main threat to a survival of Russia consists in threat of interception of its missiles? But if to abstract from missiles?:-)
The specific mentioning of 'inflicting unacceptable damage' seems to be a direct reference to deterrence theory. To me, that indicates that this weapon is seen (or rather presented) as a tool for strategic deterrence. Such wording - as well as the following passage on the level of destruction - is not consistent with limited (nuclear) war.
The occasion for the leak, i.e. during the statement by Putin that Russia will seek ways to uphold the strategic stability the American BMD is said to threaten, also indicates that this is seen as one possible remedy.
I wonder if the remarkable wording about 'creating areas of wide radioactive contamination that would be unsuitable for military, economic, or other activity for long periods of time' is meant to convey not that it is a dirty bomb, but rather that is will be effective even if it - due to protective counter-measures - will have to detonate some distance off the coast.
My primary question though, is whether this all is mainly meant for the internal Russian audience (to show Russian strength) or if it first and foremost is a message to the US?
Rose: the US considers the measures against Russia because of the charges the INF
http://ria.ru/world/20151112/1319528358.html
WASHINGTON, November 12 - RIA Novosti, Alexei Bogdanovsky. US authorities are studying "economic and military measures" in connection with the accusations against the Russian Federation alleging violations of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), said the agency Sputnik Assistant Secretary of State Control Arms Frank Rose.
Alexander Stukalin: I see. Or I think I see, what's behind the fever around short range missiles in Europe: NATO want to be as close as possible to intervene in the ascending phase of ICBMs (which never before was an option).
However, I don't think US/NATO will be lucky, anyway.
Aegis ship interceptors(even the newer ones)can only reach an altitude of at most 300 miles. That is less than half the altitude of a typical Russian icbm arc of 700-1000 miles. This means that aegis does not have the possibility of intercepting any of Russia's icbms. By the way, the US government openly admits this. It is just a matter of facts, physics and geography. Add that to the fact that neutralizing two or three ships in the Black Sea would be trivially easy, and the fact that Russian missiles vastly outnumber the few aegis interceptors that could potentially be there. I think Russian complaints about "missile defense" are either one or a combination of, public justification of Russia's own large scale nuclear deployments currently underway, hyper-caution, and appearing assertive for the general public.
First, The SM3 block IIA and future IIB both have operational ceilings of over 900 miles and speeds of 4.5 km/sec or more. Russia is concerned about the velocity in particular, as ~5 km/sec is a threat to their ICBM's. Why would Russia be concerned if these missiles didn't pose a threat to their deterrent?
Second, the US refuses to give any kind of guarantee in writing -which Russia has repeatedly requested- that this system is incapable of intercepting their ICBM's. This would be a simple solution to the issue. Russia can otherwise only assume that the US is lying about the ICBM intercept potential of these interceptors. It was the US that unilaterally pulled out of the ABM treaty.
Third, no one in their right mind can possibly believe that Iran would launch a nuclear armed missile at Eastern (or even western) Europe. There is absolutely no basis anywhere for this conclusion. No remotely realistic argument for this scenario has ever been presented. But we do know that there are many in the US pushing for a BMD system aimed at Russia's deterrent. Again, what do you think Russia is supposed to conclude from this?
First of all, aegis ship interceptors are tiny and don't have anywhere near the specifications you gave. ceiling is 300 miles at most. I think you are thinking of the few land based interceptors in Alaska, which are largely irrelevant to Russia's arsenal because they are completely out of range(by thousands of miles)of all Russian land based icbms. I'm sure if US ever tries to put capable interceptors in Europe, Russia will station short or medium range strike systems nearby to neutralize them(which is the easiest thing in the world). US interceptors are shit. Never once been tested against anything even resembling a realistic attack(even a small one). As for long range interceptors in Alaska, all 40 of them would be depleted by chasing warheads and decoys from a single icbm. Anyone who knows anything about rockets would take one look at aegis ship interceptors and very accurately estimate their range based on size. The US has already made concessions by cancelling phase 4 even though that would not have been much of a threat either.
There is practically a consensus among relevant experts that no kinetic interceptors will ever be sufficient to have a serious effect on such a large and widely distributed, mirv-equipped icbm arsenal. Check what people like Lawrence Krauss, Freeman Dyson, and Steven Weinberg say about it. I just looked it up again and yes Aegis ship interceptors(even the newest) have a maximum ceiling of 300 miles. Considering their size, there is no possible way they could reach beyond a couple hundred miles. Apparently the US was going to put a small number of longer range ground based interceptors in Europe until Russia promised to target the site with short range strike weapons to obliterate the interceptor site. Not suprising the US cancelled phase 4 missile defense scheme. Even if they would have fully developed the system, it would have been vastly outnumbered and easily neutralized. Aegis ships are simply not even a minor threat to Russia's arsenal, they just aren't. It's facts, physics and geography.
This is distinctly different from the large MX/Pegasus-based GBD interceptors in Alaska. The source of information regarding SM3 Block IIA performance parameters are from an article in Breaking Defense titled "Why Russia keeps moving the football on European Missile Defense: Politics" ... "The SM-3 Block IIA is intended to have a burn-out velocity of at least 4.5 km/s. This is not unrealistic for a solid-propellant missile with a 21 inch diameter body and the same length as the SM-3 Block IA and IB. Parameters for such a missile can be found in the technical appendix of 'Does Missile Defence in Europe threaten Russia', by Dean Wilkening, in: Survival: Global Politics and strategy (2012) 54:1, p31-52. We used these parameters for the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in the simulations."
The SM3 altitude capability/simulation chart link is here-
http://breakingdefense.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/10/EPAA-JOan-op-ed-figure2.jpg
If Russia does counter ABM deployment in Eastern Europe with short range ballistic missiles and improved reentry vehicles/boosters, we have the exact situation that the ABM treaty was designed to prevent.
I'm aware that US missile defense has had less than stellar success with hit-to-kill intercepts in unrealistic scenarios, but ever increasing computing power will guarantee the system can only improve. Plus there is no way to know how many interceptors will be deployed on Aegis ships, "official" numbers from the state dept are meaningless
Aegis interceptors do not have even close to sufficient range. This is according to every source about it. All you have to do is look at the small size of aegis interceptors, not even close. Computers are not going to change the underlined physics. Moreover, warheads and decoys from even a handful of launchers would quickly deplete hundreds of interceptors. Originally the US wanted to put longer range interceptors on aegis ships but realized that long range interceptors are far too massive for aegis ships.
I did some more searching and it turns out there are no block2b interceptors at all. I also confirmed that interceptors on aegis ships do not have an icbm capability. All aegis ship intercept tests to date involved a short range missile under scripted conditions(of course) and at altitudes no higher than 150 miles(which is a far cry from 900 miles). There have been quite a few aegis intercept tests(very unrealistic ones), but not even one involved an icbm warhead. There is also agreement among missile and rocket experts that the 900 mile altitude claim is definitely false. It is at best an over blown theoretical limit requiring conditions that would never occur in reality. You should be especially skeptical about the fact that the only people claiming those absurd characteristics are the people trying to sell them. There is a website called "Union of concerned scientists" that offers a lot of useful insight from experts on these matters.
Performance specs for Block IIA (in testing right now) are the same as for the proposed (but not built) Block IIB. All the tests done up to the beginning of this year are with the smaller diameter and far lower performance Block I SM3 interceptors which are the missiles with the range and altitude capabilities you have mentioned.
We can go back and forth on the supposed capabilities of this system, but the fact of the matter is neither of us has access to the performance specs of the SM3 Black IIA as it just started testing this year. The point is the supposed "threat" from Iranian nuclear tipped IRBM's is the most absurd piece of logic ever used to justify an ABM system. It is to this issue that we have no reasonable justification or answer. The only other possibility is simply that this means big money for LockMart and Raytheon, but I have a hard time believing the US state dept would risk escalating nuclear tensions with Russia for the sake of larger defense budgets. As I said before, you have to put yourself is Russia's place.
It goes without saying that Russia has far better access than either of us, (or our sources) to the potential capabilities of the proposed BMD system. If Russia was confident that it posed no threat to its deterrent, then they would be far less concerned about its installation. It is obvious to the Russians, (as it should be to all of us) that the chances of Iran launching a warhead which it does not have with a launch vehicle it does not have to a target with which it has no outstanding quarrel (central and eastern Europe) is about as likely as the director of the CIA apologizing to Iran for the coup it carried out against its democratically elected prime minister (Mosaddeq) and replacing him with the Shah.
Gentlemen:
You miss a simple point. Russian opposition to the establishment of American ABM bases in Romania and Poland has less to do with the Aegis Ashore System than the bases themselves. Once the US has established the principle of such bases in Europe, where does the technology end? Today, it’s the SM-3 Block IIB. However; what interceptor and support equipment will be there in twenty or thirty years? The embedded weapon systems and sensors will continue to evolve and mature but the constant is the base itself. All that being said, Russia could have made this “problem” go away years ago but chose not to negotiate with Washington. If these bases and the SM-3 system is such a perilous threat to state security from the Kremlin’s perspective, what is Russia willing to give up in exchange for a deal? What does Russia have to offer to make these bases “go away”?
Frank Shuler
USA