I should start counting how many times the media tells about a "start of a new nuclear arms race". The last one, of course, was prompted by the annual TV appearance of President Putin in a question and answer session on October 18, 2007. In what was clearly a prepared statement, the president mentioned "grandiose" strategic forces modernization plans. A closer look, however, shows that there was nothing really new there. Russia has been modernizing every single leg of its strategic triad already, so it is somewhat difficult to come up with something on top of that that would be "grandiose" enough to justify the rhetoric.
I guess what people noticed was Putin's words about "new strategic missile systems" that "go beyond MIRVed Topol-M" (which is the RS-24, of course). Well, as I understand, that's the old idea of building an UR-100N/SS-19-based liquid-propellant missile, which NPO Mashinostroyeniya still hopes to revive. Maybe even with a "maneuverable hypersonic warhead". Hardly qualifies as a new arms race.
Comments
Interestingly, Lieutenant General C. Robert Kehler, the commander of the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), was recently quoted as saying he doesn’t need nearly the 2200 operational warheads provided for in the 2012 Moscow Treaty (SORT) to achieve “the objectives” and sees that number falling. Moscow seems to need nuclear weapons for national & international prestige while Washington seems to need to reduce its inventory because of irrelevancy and cost. I don’t see a new arms race at all.
Frank Shuler
USA
Nuclear weapons are losing their relevancy amongst the senior DoD and military leadership. Does the US need 2200 warheads? Probably not, but when does unilateral disarmamanet become a destabilizig force? If the United States becomes a defacto non-nuclear power, will this actually encourage nuclear proliferation? Maybe among the US' current allies?
JF Cooper:
I honestly don’t think the trend you are seeing has anything to do with the United States “unilaterally disarming” but it does have everything to do with relevancy. The US Air Force wants a ton of stuff that is going to cost billions of future dollars in an increasingly tight Defense Budget. I honesty think the USAF would give up the Minuteman III force in a heartbeat and turn the strategic nuclear mission over to the Navy. I think the Air Force thinks the 15,000 airman that now support the MMIII force could be put to more relevant use, perhaps in the new Cyber Command. The USAF wants new conventional global strike systems, new satellite constellations for secure communications, intelligence, surveillance & recon missions, and battlefield support. The USAF wants a new bomber in 2018 that will server as an interim weapon system until the “future bomber” is available in 2036. All that, as well as new tankers, combat S&R helicopters, completing the Raptor program and introducing the F-35 Lighting joint strike fighter to operational use. I think this argument is really about money; funding to be exact.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
Budgets are tight. But some sort of nuclear deterrent that actually deters is still required. Advanced weapons systems are great, but several well placed nuclear weapons on key areas can decimate our conventional capabilities. The fact that we can retaliate in kind helps prevent this. Nuclear weapons still have a military as well as political role. I also strongly beleive that they help prevent any sort of armed conflict between Russia and the US. Granted, armed conflict is unlikely, but it is not out of the realm of possibility.
JF Cooper:
I don’t disagree with your conclusions; the United States needs a credible nuclear deterrent for both military and political needs. Historically, pre-end of Cold War, that deterrent was in the form of Minuteman III ICBMs, cruise missiles, and the Trident submarine. The theory went, to attack the US you have to destroy the Minuteman IIIs, but by doing so, you would face a devastating response from the Trident fleet. Thus, no nation (read Soviet Union) would risk such an attack. Today, however, the world’s political landscape has changed. There are no Soviet nuclear attack subs stalking the US Trident fleet and the Ohio-class submarines are untouchable. Perhaps, the time is right to shift the strategic nuclear deterrent to the Navy and have the USAF concentrate on the tactical missions with bomber delivered weapons. After all, it is those weapons that have the greatest likelihood of being used in today’s world.
Frank Shuler
USA
My problem with putting the strategic deterrent solely in the sub force is that if one of the subs sinks (however unlikely) you lose half your deterrent for a considerable amount of time. Multiple delivery means spreads the pain as it were. It also makes your enemies strike calculus harder.
JF Cooper:
With a total of 14 Trident submarines configured for the strategic nuclear deterrent mission, 12 are available to the fleet for deployment. Two are always in a state of dry-dock overhaul and unavailable for sea. Of the 12 available, 10 are usually deployable. Most sources say at least 4 are maintained “on station” with 2 in the process of returning to base. At the most, it would seem only 8 submarines would be available to the National Command Authority in the event of crisis, given if 2 boats could make an emergency sortie from port. Losing a submarine to a natural disaster (God forbid) would be significant but I don’t think catastrophic. The question is do we think 8 submarines, carrying 192 Trident D-5 missiles and 960 (5x24) warheads, a significant deterrent?
I believe it is.
Frank Shuler
USA
But what do they deter? The question becomes, how much is enough? 192 warheads seems like a lot, but what targets are they hitting? Cities? ICBM fields? ONce you start going after military targets, you quickly run out of warheads...
Now that the Russians are saying they will bedeveloping new nuclear warheads and delivery capabilities, too much lower becomes a bad thing.
JF Cooper:
They “deter” everything if an adversary decides the cost of attacking the United States outweighs any possible benefit. That is the true measure of deterrence. Hold a nation’s economic assets at risk and you make a war less likely. One Trident submarine can destroy the entire Russian oil & energy industry with enough warheads left over to devastate the largest 10 Russian cities and kill 20 million people. What argument does the United States have with Russia that is worth the price of 20 American cities in victory? Everyone loses in a nuclear war.
Frank Shuler
USA
The most likely scenario for a nuclear conflict is limited exchange...one to several warheads. Depending on how/where they are used, there could be a definitive winner/loser. A nuclear warhead does not automatically kill millions.
JF Cooper:
So, how many people does a nuclear warhead kill?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
Depends on how/where its used. Height of burst, reentry angle, yield, local geology, local climatology, etc.
JK Cooper:
Completely agree on the physics of nuclear detonation. The loss of life to a less capable uranium atomic bomb at Hiroshima was far greater than at Nagasaki struck by a far more capable plutonium weapon due to the environments you mentioned.
My point is there is no “most likely scenario” for a nuclear exchange. One the missiles are in the air, or the threat of them being destroyed in silo occurs, all war plans are moot. Can you honestly imagine, the Russians launching a SS-27 and striking Chicago and the US counters with a MMIII launch at St. Petersburg and then all sides taking a pause for negotiations? That is all too “Dr. Strangelove” for me. How many people would a Trident RV carrying 5 W-76-1 warheads (60 kt each) kill if it struck Shanghai? Too many to imagine. Once the “dogs or war” are released, nothing is “manageable”.
Good exchange of views.
Frank Shuler
USA
Second the exchange of views comment. Civil and intellectual!
Could a nuclear exchange between two near-peer nuclear pwoers be contained? Possibly...if cooler heads prevailed. What I think is the more interesting scenario is an exchange between two unequal powers...say Israel and Iran...this is s definte scenario where you could have a limited echange...1-10 weapons per side and have a definitive winner.
Interestingly enough, at a meeting here yesterday, one of former high-level U.S. officials said that during his time in the administration (in the 1970s), they understood that it might be impossible to stop a nuclear exchange once it started.
JF Cooper:
Pavel:
I would agree a limited exchange might be possible between near-peer-to-peer enemies. If Pakistan and India exchanged salvos, the United States and other vested nations would jump in immediately to limit the damage and press for a return to the status quo. I was always referring to the United States and Russia in my thoughts. If an exchange started, who would referee? Pavel, fascinated by your comment. Most 1970-80 war scenarios always began with some conventional conflict in Europe escalating to a Soviet thrust across the North German plains (“Seven Days to the Rhine”) and the decision to use NATO tactical nuclear weapons in response. That tactical exchange would lead, it was thought, to a limited use of strategic (read IRBM or B-52) strikes on Russia or NATO proper. (The so called Minsk for Birmingham exchange) It was assumed that such a situation would shock all into diplomacy. But, once the SS-18s and MMIII began to fly, all hope for a limited war would be lost.
I will never understand those who think a nuclear war can be “limited”. There are just too many unintended consequences; too may variables to calculate.
Frank Shuler
USA
Depends on what we mean by "arms race". A better way of looking at an arms race is not by way of numbers but technological capability. So long as the institutions involved in strategic nuclear weapons production and deployment exist then there will always exist pressure for an arms race in this sense of the term. Should not be surprised that rising commodity prices is giving the Russian military-industrial complex a new lease on life. The same dynamic applies in the US. The Soviet-US arms race was not "the" arms race but rather a chapter in an unfolding technological arms race that shows no sign of ending. The military plays too big a role in the political economy of both states and therein lies our problem.
According to RosBusinessConsulting (RBC) news agency, there will be:
- FIVE another ICBM launches till the end of 2007;
- FOUR new silo-based Topol-M's, deployed till the end of 2007;
- THREE new mobile Topol-M's, deployed till the end of 2007.
IMPORTANT: the tests of RS-24 should be 'finished till the end of 2010'.
So, there'll be 6 mobile Topol-M's deployed till the end of 2007, and 7 Topol-M's, deployed this year in both mods (silo-based and mobile) - all as was planned earlier.