BY PAVEL PODVIG | 1 JUNE 2012
Judging by the intensity of Russia's constant opposition to US missile defenses in Europe, one might think that the very survival of the nation is in danger. In reality, though, the opposite is true: The battle over missile defense is so fierce because the stakes are so low. In terms of an actual impact on Russia's security, US defense is largely irrelevant. The intensity of Russia's opposition to the missile defense plans owes more to its internal political circumstances than to anything else -- which is why the current controversy is so persistent despite efforts to resolve it. It is time to acknowledge this and to recognize that, as far as US-Russian relations are concerned, disagreement over missile defense is just an overblown distraction.
To be sure, missile defense is a rather significant undertaking. The United States seems to believe that missile defense will become a key element of its national security strategy and is willing to pay the substantial political and financial costs to achieve that strategy. But a significant undertaking is not the same as a successful one, and the missile defense program simply does not have much to show for its 30 years of development and more than $200 billion spent. The current phased adaptive approach is not expected to do more than "to defend against regional missile threats to US forces" in Europe -- hardly an ambitious goal for a $200 billion program. Of course, there is no shortage of projections that describe how the US system's capability will grow in the future with the deployment of better sensors and interceptors. But history gives us plenty of reasons to be skeptical about projections: No missile defense plan has ever survived an encounter with an actual missile threat -- as opposed to an imaginary one. What's more, it's not just a matter of building a more advanced system; even a capable missile defense would be entirely irrelevant if it ever comes to countering a real threat of a nuclear missile attack: While a nuclear threat needs only a small probability of success to be credible; missile defense needs absolute certainty.
It will take time, of course, for the United States to sort out its relationship with missile defense. Given America's own internal politics, the program is unlikely to ever be shut down entirely; but, in time, the United States is likely to downsize and reorient the program toward more realistic goals and toward a more reasonable size. This means that missile defense development and some deployment is likely to carry on, giving Russia plenty of reasons to continue to complain about missile defense's destabilizing nature and to threaten to take measures to counter the US deployment. These objections, however, should be put into perspective.
First, it is hard to see what if anything could make Russia stop griping about US missile defense. Russia's official line is that the United States must sign a legally binding agreement guaranteeing that US missile defense never be directed against Russian forces. Of course, it is no secret that an agreement of this kind is a political nonstarter for the United States. And, even in the improbable event an agreement were politically feasible, it is hard to imagine a set of technical limits that would make this obligation meaningful (something the United States and Russia should know from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty demarcation negotiations PDF in the 1990s).
However unreasonable, the "legally binding agreement" rhetoric would probably remain at the center of Russia's position, as it apparently comes from the very top of the Russian political leadership. As it turns out, missile defense is a very personal subject for the Russian president, who spoke passionately about it during his recent campaign. This passion, however, serves a very pragmatic political purpose: It paints a picture of Russia as under siege, which helps deflect challenges to the legitimacy of the Russian political system. As such, there is little incentive for the current Russian leadership to change its position on missile defense, and it is no surprise that Russia has been consistently dismissive of recent -- though admittedly limited -- attempts by the Obama administration to demonstrate that US defense does not have the capability to counter Russian missiles. Russia wants to keep the controversy alive, not to resolve it.
The row over missile defense has also given rise to a fairly large Russian industry of so-called "response measures." Every now and then, Russia warns the United States that, if no agreement on missile defense is reached, then Russia will have to resort to response measures to restore strategic balance. This is not a development that should be taken lightly, of course, but the reality is that Russia has been implementing response measures all along anyway. In fact, at this point, it's hard to see how a potential missile defense agreement would even be worth its while.
Indeed, if the response to missile defense is to increase the number of warheads on ballistic missiles, it has already been done. Russia began deployment of a multiple-warhead version of its Topol-M missile, RS-24, in 2010. And a version of its R-29 submarine-launched ballistic missile, which can carry 10 instead of four warheads, was successfully tested in 2011 and is now on its way to deployment. Meanwhile, Russia is currently at work on a new silo-based multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile, which is expected to enter service some time after 2016, along with at least one more new intercontinental ballistic missile. Each of these projects, of course, has been justified as a response to US missile defense development. But none really has anything to do with the US program; more important, none would stop were the United States to shut down its missile defense program tomorrow.
There is no easy way out of the current impasse. Dialogue and cooperation is still the best available choice. But at this point, very little progress is likely to be made on that front. So maybe those in the international community in general and the expert community in particular, who watch this gridlock in despair, should stop treating missile defense as if it were a vital national security matter -- it is not -- and look instead at the underlying issues that drive strategic modernization and prevent deep reductions of nuclear arsenals. No doubt missile defense makes moving forward more difficult. But right now, nuclear buildup and modernization -- whether in Russia, the United States, or elsewhere -- are happening regardless of missile defenses. These are the dynamics that need the most attention. Missile defense in this regard is a small, distracting, and not particularly important part of the picture.
The book
Comments
I disagree. I think Russia wants to really be part of a pan-European BMD. However a pan-EUROPEAN one. Not an American led one. And that lies at the core of their position. They see the new BMD as another way to mark legitimate players, from non-legitimate ones, and they don't want to be left on the outskirts. Russian leadership wants to be perceived as equals not as pariahs, that one can't ignore on account of their nuclear weapons. I think if Russia was invited to participate as an equal, they would be willing to reciprocate.
The problem is that the BMD is being largely funded by America, and will be run by NATO, an organization initially created for the sole purpose of opposing Russia, an inertia which it still maintains in some ways. And of course the position of the Russian leadership is that they're not just another East European country looking to make nice with the West, they're a super power and they ought to be treated as such. Equal players with France, Germany, Britain, etc. but certainly not on equal footing with Poland, or Romania. And therein lies the source of the conflict. NATO might accept and let in a Russia that comes to them seeking membership on the same terms as everyone else. Russia might get along with NATO, if it was accepted in as a powerful and leading nation, rather then another one in the herd. The hope for resolution lies in the fact that at the end of the day Russian elites want to be accepted in the West, and the West has a lot to gain from Russia. The question is whether that's enough to overcome the differences in their views of the situation.
I never understood the excitement about that topic.
I my eyes the US should simply forget all of Russia's critisism.
Missile Defense in the times of Ronald Reagan was just an (effective) instrument to expand the technological platform of the US Industry and thus givin a last hard punch to the dying Soviet political system.
Bush's GBI was more a homeland defense system lacking any tactical flexibility.
SM-3 makes indeed some sense. The possibility to counter isolated strikes of let's say Iran or North Korea might be necessary some day.
But why to listen to Putin's neurosis?
Russia followed the path the US went down 40 years ago. Spartan & Sprint turns into Gorgon & Gazelle and in so far Russia had the advantage to be the only nation having some sort of (useless) ABM capability for some 25 years. Moreover it has systems like S-400 and developing S-500 which are unparalled in the west.
I think the Russian authorities need to have this "new ABM threat" now to give at least some reasons to the people for their ongoing ICBM development programs.
Feanor
I understand the notion of equal partnership but I do not see how can it be achieved. There is a chasm of differences between US/Europe and Russia in terms of military thinking, strategic mindset political culture and so on. The very practical terms of co-operation need high level of understanding and the conviction of having common ground. In our case neither side is willing to bend to the other and even the simplest level of trust does not exist. I do not want to spark the discussion over who is more to blame, I just state the fact that precludes any significant co-operation in creating common military instruments.
What comes to Pavel’s article, well, as I study the issue of missile defense as a factor of international relations for some years I gradually come to the same conclusions. The issue is politically detached from actual military meaning, thus it has number political dimensions, more important to both sides than possible real effectiveness of anti-missile weapons. One of the points that should not be forgotten is the issue of prestige, what I have mentioned in some earlier comments. Some equality between US and Russia in terms of strategic nuclear weapons and related issues is one of the last remaining features of Russian superpower status. Prolonging the dialogue in this matter, raising the problems, protesting, negotiating and so on is in best Russian interest as it is the way to keep the prestige internally and abroad.
Yours
M
Frankly, with the state of the economy(worldwide, except for China which leaves in a bubble)I personally as a US citezen believe we shouldn't spend one dime in this European "shield". But I know that politically I'm wrong.
Pavel, is still worse.
I am more and more convinced that the thought on threat of a preventive U.S. strategic attack again strongly sat down at brains of our generals.
They almost openly speak: "We understand that U.S. ABM Defense not in a condition to neutralize our strategic potential. But the USA will beat out it in the first blow, and ABM Defense is very necessary to finish the remains".
And here it is much more sad. It turns out that we come back to any wild times.
Alexander: What else would the generals say? Whether they actually believe it or not is another issue. Most of them just don't give it much thought and repeat whatever the "convenient wisdom" might be.
Pavel, whether or not a US ABM system such as the SM-3 would be effective against Russian ICBM's is debatable. There are simply too many unknowns to say for certain that they would be ineffective, particularly as numbers can be hidden. The bigger question is why is European ballistic missile defense even being pursued in the first place? What evidence has there ever been that Iran would even consider launching an attack on the continent? Perhaps this is more about NATO than Europe. Disband NATO as should have been done in 1991 and the issue will cease to exist. This smells more like a means to maintain military power and hegemony over Europe and the surrounding region. NATO needs to go. Period. If a nuclear device is ever launched from the middle east to Europe, it will be because of NATO's antagonism, not because of the European people.
Jon Grams
Or, Russia could join NATO. What a win-win scenario for all sides! The US could concentrate on ballistic missile defense for Europe and NATO could rely on the vast tactical nuclear inventory of Moscow for deterrence. Then not only could the United States remove its small inventory of B-61 bombs from Europe but the French and British could pack in their nuclear weapons as well.
Or not.
Frank Shuler
USA
THAT would certainly be interesting. Another idea could be to have Russia join the EU in exchange for disbanding NATO...
Jon Grams
As bad as finances are in the EU today, I’m sure Russian petro-dollars would be welcomed. Of course, as much trouble as Moscow has had working out the banking details for WTO membership, they might sensibly pass on the whole “EU thing”.
Remember, Russia needs NATO. How else can the military-industrial complex there demand budgets for weapons that will never be used? Same problem everywhere...
Frank Shuler
USA
Although one may think that proposed missile shield is solely designed to deal with North Korean and Iranian threats, placing it right next to Russian's border suggests there is an obvious alternative motive. Today proposed missile shield does not have the technical capabilities to undermine Russia deterrent potential. In the near future US missile shield can drastically be improved, but that is not the main concern. Even hypothetical missile shield provides US with an immediate political leverage. Russia's "asymmetrical response" or deploying Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave and near Belorussia-Poland border alone, even hypothetically with 100mt warhead , is simply not sufficient.
US missile shield is designed to politically destabilize Russia, not military. Even in North Korea's case and its meager nuclear arsenal, military action is not possible. Too high of a risk for too little or no reward at all.
Although war can provide temporary economic boost and helps rid of outdated weapons, installing "democratic" or incapable clown regimes allows US and its allies to secure ultra cheap natural resources in incapacitated, war torn countries.
Now let's look at current situation in Iran. Reason why US and Israel are so paranoid about Iran's nuclear program because even one nuclear weapon will render any military action as unfavorable option. Keep in mind that Israel is "one bomb state". Unlike Iraq or Libya, US will have no choice but to deal with Iran on political arena and that can be long and expensive process. Note that in the last 200 years Iran did not attack any foreign state.
So how can you defeat your competition politically, culturally and economically?
There is so many insidious ways, but here are some examples: Meddle in internal affairs (M. McFaul advising opposition), slander government by leveraging mass media outlets ( Russia-Georgia conflict), provide financial support to the opposition, even if opposition consists of outright terrorists (FSA), use ethnic cleansing and human rights abuses as pretexts for draconian economic sanctions (Syria).
Solution:
US only respects position of power and Russia should up the ante and propose Space Based Missile Defense Initiative- SBMDI. Take old Soviet FOBS and US SDI concept as groundwork in fight against "global terrorism". It is absolutely critical to make a public announcement of such system and invite US to join in the fight against global war on terror. (LOL)
Russia should say SBMDI system is designed to protect Russian Federation and her partners form rouge ICBM launch from anywhere in the world. Say no to the future missiles of North Korea, Iran, Zimbabwe and Papua New Guinea!
Placing in orbit multiple platforms that can carry missile interceptors will raise a great concern. US is well aware that without thorough verification this so called "missile shield" can be easily turned into most devastating offensive weapon known to the mankind that will rain upon US cites in a godly firestorm without any warning.
That will force US to seriously negotiate with Russia on current missile shield installations in Eastern Europe.
To Alex Goncharov: What you paint here is a caricature (which incidentally repeats the Russian "party line") that has nothing to do with reality. I don't even see a point in arguing.