This is what you get when you ask KGB graduates to write a military doctrine - Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council, in an interview in Izvestia discussed some aspects of Russia's new doctrine, which is expected to be adopted later this year.
The new document apparently will have some interesting new provisions. Here are the paragraphs from the interview that are relevant to the issue of the possibility of preventive/preemptive nuclear strike - I tried to make the translation as close to the meaning of the original* as possible:
With regard to the provisions that regulate the possibility of using nuclear weapons, this section of the military doctrine is written in the spirit of the fact that Russian Federation is a nuclear power, which is capable of using nuclear deterrence to deter potential adversaries from aggression against Russia and its allies. It is the most important priority of our country in the foreseeable future.
We also adjusted the conditions of use of nuclear weapons to counter a conventional aggression – [now they apply] not only to full-scale wars, but also to regional and even to local wars.
In addition, the doctrine provides flexibility in the possibility of use of nuclear weapons depending on the situation and the intentions of the enemy. In situations critical for national security we do not rule out a possibility of using a preemptive (preventive) [sic!] nuclear strike against the aggressor.
If we are into serious hair-splitting, Partushev did not say anything radically new - he seemed to make sure that uprezhdayushchiy udar is understood as preventive strike, but it it can be preemptive as well. Then, since nuclear weapons are to be used against an aggressor, this at least implies that there is one, i.e. that Russia is under attack already. All this may be no more than just a reiteration of the current "first-use" posture. After all, this is not the first time the Russians are using words like "preemptive".
But maybe not. The final text of the doctrine may be more careful about making the distinction, but whatever the doctrine will actually say, it is clear that the idea of using nuclear weapons as an instrument of politics is very dear to the current Russian leadership. The fact that they are talking about considering a nuclear option in local wars (would the conflict in Georgia be an example?) is also deeply unsettling.
In my view, not only this love of nuclear weapons is dangerous, it is also seriously wrong for Russia's security. I can see where this idea of reliance on nuclear weapons is coming from, but it is a delusion to think that they would be able to deal with the security problems that Russia has to deal with today.
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* Here is the Russian original:
Что касается положений о возможности применения ядерного оружия, то этот раздел Военной доктрины сформулирован в духе сохранения за Российской Федерацией статуса ядерной державы, способной осуществить ядерное сдерживание потенциальных противников от развязывания агрессии против России и ее союзников. Это является в обозримой перспективе важнейшим приоритетом нашей страны.
Также скорректированы условия использования ядерного оружия при отражении агрессии с применением обычных средств поражения не только в крупномасштабной, но и в региональной и даже в локальной войне.
Кроме того, предусматривается вариантность возможности применения ядерного оружия в зависимости от условий обстановки и намерений вероятного противника. В критических для национальной безопасности ситуациях не исключается нанесение в том числе упреждающего (превентивного) ядерного удара по агрессору.
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Comments
Not surprising at all. Without tactical nukes, the Russian Army will in the next 5-10 years be at a major disadvantage. Current programs are undertaken to address that, including procurement of new weapon systems, and structural reforms, but there is currently a time lag due to limited production capacity of defense plants in some cases, and lack of funds overall to do it overnight in general. I expected something like this. What remains to be seen, is whether we proceed to develop and deploy new tactical nuclear munitions, in particular for the Iskander-M, and for the Su-34/Su-35. If that does happen, then I would be worried about prospects for employment of such weapons. Otherwise the posture looks more political then military in nature.
You forgot to mention that all of Russia's enemies are always "aggressors".
It is understandable, if Patrushev says that Russia retains "first use" option and is going to add local wars to their list of contexts to take such an option.
But it seems that Patrushev tries to mean another thing.
In practice, they are trying to deter intervention by American/NATO forces into a war between Russia and some of their neighbors.
It is interesting to note that Patrushev's words have become open around Clinton's stay in Moscow.
While Moscow insists that the timing is not aimed at undermining talks towards a new START treaty, it may undermine America's adoption of "sole purpose" principle to limit the role of nuclear weapons in the new Nuclear Posture Review.
(I am pondering whether the recent agreement between China and Russia to notify each other of impending ballistic missile launches have any connection with Russia's innovation.)
Anyway, Russia's nuclear strategy may become a destabilizing factor in the international startegic landscape, and in turn, can undermine Russia's own security and interests.