We don't know at this point what the next U.S.-Russian arms control agreement will look like, but everyone in the international community expects it to be a step toward significantly reducing the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. The levels set in the Moscow Treaty, which Washington and Moscow signed in May 2002, commit them to reducing the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads on each side to no more than 1,700-2,200 warheads by 2012. One would expect that a post-Moscow Treaty agreement will bring much lower numbers.
Optimists suggest that each country could go to as low as 500 operationally deployed warheads. I think this would be difficult--in part because it would require further bending of the already lax counting rules for "operationally deployed warheads." A number such as 1,500 warheads would be easier to reach. The main problem with a 1,500-warhead level is that it's too close to the Moscow Treaty limit for the reduction to count as a dramatic disarmament step. Most likely then we'll end up with something in between, with 1,000-1,200 warheads representing a good bet.
While getting there will require skillful, difficult negotiations between the U.S. and Russian delegations, the hardest conversations will take place at home with the countries' respective military-industrial complexes. This is particularly so for Russia, where the political leadership already has given its defense industry and military a free hand in shaping Moscow's national security policy. Specifically, recent promises and commitments that Moscow has made regarding the future buildup of its strategic forces put Russia on a trajectory that's incompatible with substantial nuclear reductions. More directly, if all of the currently scheduled programs materialize, Russia will find itself in a situation where its strategic arsenal will start growing.
In fact, it already is growing--although that growth is masked by the dramatic reduction of old missiles with multiple warheads. But these missiles will be around for some time; it appears that the current plan is to keep old Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) around until about 2021, which is when the last SS-18 missile will turn 30 years old. I hope that if the United States and Russia agree on dramatic reductions in the near future, these missiles could be eliminated sooner--after all, they're old. But getting rid of the new Russian missiles, submarines, and bombers that are being built today will be much more difficult, presenting a potentially serious obstacle to cutting the number of nuclear warheads in Russia's arsenal much below 1,500.
In particular, two major new strategic systems are currently under development: (1) the Topol-M, or SS-27, ICBM; and (2) the Project 955 Borey submarine with Bulava missiles. In addition, Russia has resumed production of Tu-160 strategic bombers. None of these three programs have been large in terms of deployment, but even small numbers add up over time.
With Topol-M, the Strategic Rocket Forces have added about six new missiles a year for about a decade. In total, there are 65 missiles deployed today, each carrying a single warhead. The current plan is to continue deployment at about the same rate throughout the next few years, bringing the number of deployed missiles to 110-120 by 2015. The program, however, will undergo a major change in December when new Topol-M missiles will be equipped with multiple warheads. (This missile configuration is known as RS-24.) Assuming that the missiles will carry three warheads, Topol-Ms would then account for about 210 warheads, and the entire ICBM force would have about 800 warheads by 2015. As older missiles retire and the deployment of new Topol-Ms continue, the missile force would shrink to about 400 warheads, all deployed on new Topol-M missiles--although they won't be so new by that time.
Development of the sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), Bulava, has run into some serious problems, but Russia seems determined to continue the program, with the first Borey submarine scheduled to be deployed in either 2010 or 2011. Two more submarines are under construction, and the plan is to build eight of these ships in all. In the meantime, the Russian Navy will rely on six older Delta IV submarines. Assuming that the navy would maintain a fleet of eight submarines--both old and new--the total number of warheads on its SLBMs will stay at 600-700 over the next decade.
Finally, the number of Tu-160 bombers is expected to double in the next decade, with 30 aircraft expected to be in service by 20102025-2030. It's reasonable to assume that older bombers will retire to keep the total number of bomber-carried nuclear weapons at the level of 400-500, which is slightly less than Russia has today.
Taken together, all of this means that Russia is planning to have about 1,400-1,600 nuclear warheads in its strategic force for some time. And this could be a conservative estimate. For example, there's a possibility that the multiple-warhead version of the Topol-M missile will carry more than three warheads. There's also persistent talk about developing a new multiple-warhead missile that would be deployed alongside Topol-Ms. If this were to occur, the number of warheads in the Russian arsenal would be pushed even higher. More importantly, most of these warheads would be deployed on relatively new systems that could stay in service for many years. And if history is any guide, liquidating them would be a contentious domestic issue.
Nothing, of course, is set in stone. Plans can be changed. After all, the point of having arms reductions is to cut back on weapon development programs. But it would be much harder to do this once these programs gain a momentum--making a new U.S.-Russian disarmament agreement much more urgent.
The book
Comments
I think that Russia will condition any involvement in the next treaty wholly on the USA abandoning Missile Defense. I dont think Russia will or should agree to a reduction to 1000-1500 warheads in the presence of a BMD. This low a number would be very borderline in terms of a credible second strike deterrent with a layered BMD present.
A hypothetical first strike by the USA would destroy say 90% of warheads, and a layered BMD could maybe absorb anywhere between 50% and 90% or incoming warheads. Starting from 1000 operational warheads this means only say 10-50 warheads reaching their targets. I dont think this would look very attractive from a Russian POV.
On the flip side, the USA would in fact become LESS secure in this situation, because Russia would then want to avoid this situation by any means possible, with the obvious solution being to place all ICBMs on hair-trigger alert, launch on warning. This would prevent a first-strike taking out 90% of warheads but would increase the chance of accidendal launch.
The best way to maintain the strategic balance of both countries is to keep their strategic assets at the same level as of today. Further decrease in Russia's nuclear arsenal poses a great risk to their deterrent capability as they are temporarily outmatched by the US in conventional warfare. Also, since there is a huge gap between the two nation's defense budget and the fact that the US operates more bases abroad, having a slightly larger nuclear force is not a bad idea for Russia.
Pavel,
What would be in your opinion the impact of MKV and other MDA goodies on the Russians?
Russia has not resumed production of the Tu-160. It does not have that capability. It would be good if you made yourself aware of such fundamental facts, Mr. Podvig.
Mr Podvig: Nothing can change obvious fact that overall US nuclear and conventional supremacy over Russia will result US capability to mount successful nuclear blackmail on that country in the future. To avoid such course of action Russia would have to start serious military rearmament program and not only twaddling about it all the time and keeping old and probably faulty Soviet junk indefinitely it its constantly shrining outdated arsenal. New "massive" weapons programs (trashy Bulava, single warhead Topol-M, 15 years old and still not battle-ready Borey SSBN, "new-old" Tu-160) are so ridiculous I am in consternation reportedly major power can make such unfortunate things.
Thus all I can see now is secretly growing US strategic capabilities and deeply eroding Russian deterrence in the same time. That combination is potentially very dangerous for Russia taking into consideration rather opposing both countries geopolitical interests. If Russia nuclear arsenal will decrease to French or Chinese level (what I think is now certain!) this country will be very vulnerable in every confrontation with US even in its near abroad...
So I think some people in Russia should finally sober-up and draw a right conclusions from present situation.
I’m cautiously optimistic under the new Obama Administration a continuance of the existing START agreement can be negotiated by December 5, 2009. I also sincerely believe a follow-on agreement to the Moscow Treaty (SORT) can be implemented and be in place by January 1, 2013. What I don’t see is any real change. As long as Russia and the United States refuse to negotiate an agreement that actually lowers the absolute number of nuclear weapons in each nation’s arsenal, what is actually accomplished? This concept of only declaring a limit on “operational deployed nuclear weapons” (ODNW) seems meaningless to me. I have no doubt the US can reduce its OPNW to the 1500 device level that has been mentioned just as long as it reserves the right, as so would Russia, to upload warheads from its “operational reserve inventory” at any time in the future in the case of some “national emergency”. What actually defines a “national emergency” is of course unclear. Only negotiating a verifiable agreement to limit the absolute number of warheads makes any sense. To have a safer world, we need to eliminate nuclear weapons, period. A future agreement between Washington and Moscow that reduces the inventories of both countries to, say, 3000 total weapons are far more important than any agreement on just “deployed” warheads. Just my opinion
Frank Shuler
USA
Nuclear weapons will never be eliminated. The best we can do is try to control them. That's not pessimism but reality. We can't even keep the tinpot countries from developing them now when in theory we have the means to force them.
Biased article. It focuses too much on the Russian Arsenal and there is not a single comment on the developments on the American side.
sferrin
At the end of The Great War (the First World War), that was general international consensus that submarines should be banned from all navies. The only nation that disagreed was Great Britain; the very nation that was so menaced by such a weapon during the war. The Royal Navy would never agree to “limits” regardless of the benefits. Another historical example of “arms control” was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1921, which attempted to limit the number of dreadnaughts’ in the world’s navies. While such an agreement for the first time guaranteed the United States Navy equality with Great Britain, Japan was slighted. We all know the results. My statement, “eliminate nuclear weapons”, only suggested a limit on numbers. Today, one can make the argument that only Russia and the United States have the nuclear inventories to wage an offensive war. Other nuclear powers, Great Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, and soon Iran only have nuclear arsenals sized for self-defense. How many nuclear weapons does the United States and Russia need for self-defense? Is it possible, Washington and Moscow could agree on limits that would take us to these numbers? Is that number 2500-3000 warheads?
Frank Shuler
USA
Oleg
Your argument is all about winning a nuclear war and not deterring one. In your example of a 1000 warhead Russian inventory, with only 100 nuclear weapons surviving an American first strike and then only 10 warheads making it past the US ballistic missile defense systems, the United States still loses ten cities. What argument between Russia and the United States is worth the loss of ten American cities in “victory”? None I can think of.
Frank Shuler
USA
Kolokol: I agree - the situation in the United States is not much better. However, the problems in the U.S. are a bit different and I think it is entirely possible to see quite dramatic reductions of deployed nuclear warheads there. In Russia the political leadership seems to be too weak for that.
Frank
And if US finds itself with clear guarantee [by military and Pentagon experts] of losing no cities at all then there will be first strike - there's no another goal of building such layered missile-defense except massive FS. Why? Eliminating possible runner-ups and international obstacle in many ways, getting multi-trillion contracts, oil, gas, metals, diamonds, cementing No1 position for another sixty or seventy years, whole generation. Don't forget the Arctic question. Of course it will be in theoretical form for some time, but vector is seen for sure.
Will be support for such a move in US, I mean prosperity and no risks of losing any cities on one hand and unchangeable Russians on other? What do you think, how percentage in two-answer country wide poll will look like? Not now with Iraq and Afghanistan and all, but in more peaceful time. Just US, Russia, unimaginable pile of resources and generation-long dominance, no risks, sheet and a pen.
Frank
it is conceivable in my mind at least that the US would view eliminating the only other great nuclear power would be worth the lives of several million Americans. VERY unlikely, but conceivable. The point of an effective deterrent is to make an attack completely INconceivable.
If you remember back to the late 40s and the 50s, there was a considerable movement in the US to pre-emptively attack the Soviet Union, with nukes. People like Von Neumann were strong supporters, a quote from him goes something "With the Russians it is not a question of whether but of when. [...] If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at 5 o'clock, I say why not one o'clock?".
Now say there is a stand off between the US and Russia, involving anything from Caspian Energy to the Ukraine. Now say the US is lead by a hawkish president, someone like Dick Cheney, someone who believes that the US should get what it wants when it wants, and would use force if necessary.
Now, also take into account the classic Russian paranoia stemming from our violent history, WW1 and WW2 didnt do too much for our sense of security. With such a background you should appreciate that I dont think we should leave ourselves open to any possibly conceivable attack.
Oleg
You are mistaken. No American government would ever accept the deaths of millions of its citizens as the price of victory in any war where we weren’t first attacked. My evidence is the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1961. If the US ever had an incentive to launch a crippling first strike with the total support of the American people, it was then. Didn’t happen; won’t happen.
John von Neumann, while an important member of the original Manhattan Project, was not a US policy advisor and his remarks were always his own. I suspect he was motivated by Soviet repression in his native Hungary during the 1956 Uprising.
Today, Russia has more nuclear weapons that the rest of the world combined. Yet these vast numbers of nuclear warheads seem to provide Russia will little real security. Russian “paranoia” stems from its policy of always “going it alone”. Not since the Triple Entente of 1907, has Russia has allies’ worthy of the name. Today, she still stands alone.
Frank Shuler
USA
Shrike
As Carl von Clausewitz reminds us, in war there are no guarantees.
The United States is building a layered ballistic missile defense system to protect America from advisories twenty years in the future. It will take that long to have the necessary future satellite systems for command & control in place and farther develop ground and space assets into a true military weapon system. Today, the work you see is little more than a grand research & development project designed to achieve this future goal. Please understand, the concept of a “national missile defense system” is a myth. There is no technology that can protect the United States from nuclear attack. These technologies only hold the promise of mitigating the damage if America is attacked. They also provide a measure of uncertainty for any attacker; perhaps that might be deterrence enough.
Frank Shuler
USA
In the end, all that really matters is that Russia has a deterrent that balances evenly with the US, including the present or future capabilities of US BMD systems. No country, particularly the US, should ever be allowed to have unchecked nuclear superiority.
Jon Grams
Do you have any concept of what such a Russian deterrent would look like? What Russian response would provide this “balance”? Curious as to your thoughts.
Frank Shuler
USA
If ever any country decides to use nuclear weapons, that country can only be the U.S. No other country has such decisive mindset as the U.S. It only requires to be sufficiently sure that other countries do not have weapons that could penetrate its defensive shield. The moment it has achived this goal, there will be no knowing what will happen. The U.S. media and its people are led to believe in a fallacious image of a glorified America.
Frank
Did you see personally any difference between defense of lives of US citizens and a defense of political and business interests on foreign soil? I see Cuban crisis as the former and Georgian supplies and training programs as the latter. Maybe you does not think so. US missile defense layer in Eurasia is falling under both of this concepts from Russian point of view. I think this problem will be No1 question constantly raised by Russian side on whatever talks - from decreasing number of nuclear weapons to ecology.
Frank
Well, it's not a question of goodwill for new US administration as you may put it. They want see at least something valuable first.
I wonder if cut in cradle idea of supplying S-400 systems to Iran or Venezuela is good price to agree and forget about any MD near Russian borders.
Shrike
I think politically the United States is committed to our allies. American public opinion has strongly supported such a post World War II foreign policy, no matter which American political party controlled Congress or whom was President. This policy is easy to see in our relations with Great Britain, the NATO countries, Israel, Japan, Singapore, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines. American foreign policy is far more ambivalent in our relations with other “allies”; for example, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Taiwan. The United States refuses to recognize Russian “spheres of influence” in any of the former Soviet Republics. I think that is the single most frustrating issue between Moscow and Washington today. Whether, Ukraine or Georgia will become future allies of the US or in what capacity is yet to be determined.
The European ABM site is not designed to defend Europe; this is not a NATO installation. The agreements between Poland and the Czech Republic are bi-national accords with the United States and this system is being built to defend the United States proper from a missile launch from Iran. Remember, this is an untested 2 stage missile version of the existing Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) system under deployment in Alaska and California. The odds of this system being ultimately installed have always been 50% at best but Russia’s passionate opposition to this system has hardened the political argument. President Obama may have to proceed with this project for no other reason than to satisfy the political concerns and not the military. In any event, what does Russia have to trade to encourage the United States not to proceed with this system?
The United States does not fear the S-400 in the hands of Iran or Venezuela.
Good exchange of views.
Frank Shuler
USA