What a difference eight years makes. Following the 2000 U.S. presidential election, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered a new disarmament initiative that called for reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,500 warheads apiece. Although that statement was basically ignored--at the time, Washington was embroiled in the recount saga--Putin's proposal remained the official Russian position on disarmament in subsequent years.
Fast-forward to this recent president election. Instead of calling for reductions in nuclear weapons in the aftermath of Barack Obama's victory, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev threatened to move short-range ballistic missiles to the Kaliningrad region if Obama proceeds with installing missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Thus, he quickly presented Obama with his first major foreign policy test--how to handle the issue of missile defense in Europe, the biggest irritant in U.S.-Russian relations. He also seemed determined to demonstrate that Russia is going to be a difficult and capricious partner for the new U.S. administration.
So far, the Obama team has shown great care in dealing with the thorny issue of missile defense in Europe. During the campaign, they deliberately avoided making any critical statements on the European system to avoid alienating Polish voters in battleground states such as Pennsylvania. And now that the election is over, we're hearing that they're telling the eager Polish government that their general position on missile defense--it should be deployed only "when the technology is proved to be workable"--applies to the European part of the system as well. This isn't good news for missile defense in Europe, since its technology is "workable" only in a narrow sense, if at all.
Of course, this story is far from over. If the Obama administration decides not to deploy interceptors and radar in Europe, it opens itself to a charge of yielding to Russian pressure--especially from Republicans, for whom missile defense is a signature issue. The plan to deploy missile defense in Europe also has supporters in Poland and the Czech Republic; both governments seem to believe that the presence of U.S. personnel on their soil would provide them a security guarantee far stronger than NATO membership. Finally, Russia isn't exactly interested in seeing the issue disappear: The system presents no threat whatsoever, but the controversy allows the Kremlin to score lots of rhetorical points.
Finding a solution that calms the waters and satisfies everyone won't be easy. But it's not impossible either. One thing the new administration must avoid is getting into a discussion with Russia about whether Washington has the right to deploy its military facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic, or whether Russia should have the right to veto such a decision. While a legitimate discussion, we know that it's not going to get us anywhere.
Therefore, we need to take the dispute in a different direction. Instead of arguing about the terms and conditions of missile defense deployment, Washington should accept Moscow's standing offer to use its early warning radars in Armavir and Gabala to build elements of a joint monitoring system. The offer still seems to be on the table, although Russia has been far less enthusiastic about it since the United States made clear that this joint system wouldn't replace the missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.
The problem with those sites might seem serious, but it can be solved. A year ago, Washington considered delaying the actual deployment of the interceptors until the ballistic missile threat from Iran (or maybe some other country) becomes evident. Moscow seemed interested, but the United States withdrew the offer. It certainly could be revived now. And I believe such a compromise would satisfy missile defense supporters and skeptics alike and also buy the necessary time to make the issue less sensitive politically. History shows us that once controversy dissipates, legitimate questions can be asked about effectiveness and cost--and on these counts, the current U.S. plan for missile defense in Europe fails in any sober, independent assessment.
What would remain then is a joint U.S.-Russian project in which both countries would work together to monitor missile tests and satellite launches. It's hard to think of a better legacy of the current missile defense dispute.
The book
Comments
Russian attitude toward the US initiative for missile defense in Europe continues to puzzle. This system is clearly not a threat to Russia. Twelve operational Trident nuclear submarines are a threat. Minuteman III and B-2 bombers are a threat. Ten GBI interceptors in Poland? The only conclusion I can reach is that Russia knows something we don’t. Perhaps, this GBI missile defense system that has had a troubled and lengthy development cycle and is still years from being an operational military weapon system must be good. Really good. Perhaps much better than our Pentagon has suggested or that our Congress believes.
I also suspect, that any chance President-elect Obama had walking away from the European site ended with the threat by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to move short-range ballistic missiles to the Kaliningrad region if Obama proceeds with installing missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. President Obama may now have no choice in supporting such a system regardless of his previous opinions. Diplomacy is best practiced behind closed doors and out of the newspapers. It was almost like Russia wanted to commit the new Administration to this course; that Russia needed this issue to continue to be a dividing point in Russo-American relations.
Frank Shuler
USA
As far as the missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic will go ahead, the Kaliningrad Iskander deployment will also go ahead. It's simple Russia certainly cannot stop the new ABM base, but NATO-USA also cannot stop the move of SRBM to the Kaliningrad. So, if they want the ABM base they will have to live with the SRBM. Simple.
Not quite as simple. As I already mentioned the real problem is not the system itself, but the symbolic increase in American presence and American influence in Eastern Europe. This system also is the development of a new unique capability. One that could neutralize Russia's one and only source of parity at this time, MAD. It's not the ten interceptors there right now, it's the development of the technology and the capability that are a major nuisance. If American can successfully deploy 10 operational interceptors today, then tomorrow they can deploy 100, and the day after that 1000.
On an unrelated not, rian.ru posted and article claiming that one more Bulava test is scheduled this year. The launch will be from the Dmitriy donskoy, from the White Sea, to the Kura test range at Kamchatka. The plan is to accept the submarine (YD) and the Bulava together next year. Pavel should add it to the blog.
http://rian.ru/defense_safety/20081112/154888456.html
Frank, this system is clearly not a threat to Russia BY NOW. With series of swift modifications it will become something very, very diffirent - someday. All the proposals by US administration and Pentagon about missle defense in Europe seems to me just the same document with slightly changed order of words, which guarantees to Russia as many as nothing in terms of security in the next decades.
Besides, one regiment is not a problem, but who says 'one' or 'no more in the next several years' or 'legally binding US-EU-Russia agreements put on paper'? Did you hear something about 'just one regiment'? It's clearly will be 'as many as we want and everythere we want, just shut up alredy'. There is no 'walking away from it for Obama and US military lobby', never been and never will be. It's from the start line clear equally for President and 'average Russian'. This understanding is behind it all. Оne site in Poland, one in, say, Norway, one maybe on the northern coast of Japan, one in Kazakhstan with enough pressure on them and some good contracts. And someday - someday! - this regiments suddently turns to be offensive (short to mid range) with several radars covers up major part of Russia. Even if possibility of this is 0,00000000000000001%
Russia must counter, render this systems completly (and I mean completly) useless (with all respect to US taxpayers) against Russia, jamming all of them 7/24/356 even taking very serious hits to the international image of the country.
There is the difference: America talks about present of Russia, Russia talks about future of Russia. Nations which have no concerns about own future, about own security not in months or years (like US administration readily assuring Russia), but in decades and live only here and now... well, I remember Byzantine Empire and I remember Rome.
There is no solution at all. Agreement about using radar stantion in Gabala must be build on mutual feeling of trust and respect. Plans of US global missle defence must be scrapped (all of them, all the sites, building now or planned to be build in the future around the globe), EU must be assured by Russia in terms of security and lack of basis for aggressive expansion. Possibility of both events is extremely low, because there's almost no trust and very little respect, and as I see it now joint statement must content agreements on both problems simultaneously, maybe even on the same page. So, task becoming even harder to complete. No, not 'harder' - impossible, that's it.
I think the biggest issue for Russia is not how effective 10 ABM's will be against their ICBM's, but rather completely unwarranted NATO military expansion eastward and the consequent breaking of the NATO-Russia agreement in 1991 that NATO would not expand past Germany's borders. Russia has another good point; the idea that Iranian missiles (potential or otherwise) pose a threat to Europe is just plain nonsense. By that logic, Pakistan's missiles and India's missiles are a threat to Europe. It's the US that Iran has the issue with. And lastly, Iran would not launch a nuclear strike when it knows full well that it would be met with massive retaliation by the US or NATO, for that matter. Remember, the majority of the population in both Poland and the Czech Republic are against this system. NATO has become a liability and an obstruction to peace and cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe. If meaningful reductions in nuclear arsenals are ever to become a reality, ABM's must be eliminated. Some very wise men already figured this out back in the early '70's with the ABM treaty.
1) Certainly the radars can see deep within Russian territory. This is well known. 2) Also, bush also stated that it would be 10 Interceptors "initially". 3) They are positioned along russian borders in previous SU area against previous US agreements that weapons would not be. As you can see it is obvious why, even with US assurances (which have been broken in the past, see pass agreements) why this is upsetting the russians.
I think Iskander in Kaliningrad are enough, for now. When the number of deployed GBI grows and/or when new bases around Russia are announced, then it will be time to kill the INF. Some IRBM in Chukota and in Belarus will have to feel the hot to those that want to coerce Russia.
An article today released by (AP)
...Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said in a televised interview with French journalists broadcast Thursday that Moscow was willing to reconsider deploying Iskander missiles in its westernmost region of Kaliningrad if Washington did not place 10 missile interceptors in Poland and a missile-tracking radar in the Czech Republic
US Secretary of Defense Gates said that the proposal was not acceptable to the United States.
"Quite frankly I'm not sure what the missiles in Kaliningrad would be for," Gates said. "After all, the only real emerging threat to Russia's periphery is Iran, and I don't think the Iskander missile has the range to get there from Kaliningrad."
Medvedev announced Moscow's intention to deploy the missiles a day after the U.S. presidential election.
It was "hardly the welcome a new American administration deserves," Gates said. "Such provocative remarks are unnecessary and misguided."...
I have no idea if the GBI missile defense system will work in a combat situation. The truth is I also have no idea if the Minuteman III system will work in a combat situation either; as neither has ever been used in war. You miss my point. If Russia is serious about negotiating her position with the new American President, why throw down the gauntlet on the very first day? The only conclusion I can reach is that the present government of Russia isn’t interested in such negotiations with a new American Administration and needs this issue to remain in contention for local domestic politics. Russia has a military-industrial-complex too.
Russia and the United States will do what is in their best interest to defend themselves and that is as it should be. The US doesn’t see the GBI system in Poland and the Czech Republic as a threat to Russia in any way and Russia sees this as a primal threat to its very existence. Where is the compromise? What if the US offered to base its radar systems in Georgia and Azerbaijan, far south of any Russian ICBMs, and base US Navy Destroyers equipped with the SM-3 ABM missile system at Sevastopol in the Ukraine? Perhaps such an arrangement would check any Iranian ballistic missile advances expected over the next 20 years and satisfy Russia’s concerns.
Frank Shuler
USA
Jon
Remember, there was no NATO-Russian agreement in 1991 on the future expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe. Just an historical footnote to these discussions.
Frank Shuler
USA
There is no way Russia will agree to American destroyers based in Sevastopol. And even if Russia did agree, the public outrage in Sevastopol would be very hard to deal with.
Feanor
If Russia must protect herself from this American GBI system in Poland and the Czech Republic that threatens her so, even if the real threat is 20 years away, this is something she must do. However, can you deny America the same right to defend herself from an Iranian threat also 20 years in the future? For those of you that say Iran is not a future threat, think back to the world of 1988. It is amazing to me how world security has changed in only 20 short years. Russia didn’t even exist. Remember, the proposed facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic are not NATO facilities at all. These agreements between Prague, Warsaw, and Washington are bi-lateral. These systems are designed to defend America and American interest in Europe.
No nation has ever used a nuclear ICBM in combat. Yet, having the capability to launch such a weapon, even one, alters the military balance of power. How can the United States defend itself from such a future threat, no mater how remote, and not do so at Russia’s expense?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
I agree with you that USA has the right to defend itself, even at a cost of other countries expense (like every other country IMO) BUT the question here is: does US has only defence from Iran in its mind or something else? Because, if it does, there is a number of things she could do and not cause Russian anger (first thing is cooperation with Russia, moving the radar on the place of Gabala radar, allowing 24/7 presence of Russian experts, moving the missiles somewhere else i.e. Albania where it would be out of range of russian ICBM fields and so on,..). Americas unwillingness to go open, cooperate, or even commit itself it won't spread the system further speak enough for itself. As you said, the world strategic picture changes rapidly in years. When talking about Russia, everyone seems to believe it is going to begin some new, extensive rearmament program, based on petrol dollars or so...Well, on the one hand, if you remember even during the 90-ties period all the time you could find some high official saying Russia is all but started its rearmament,... Petrol price has decreased and Russia has more things on her mind than buying weapons. Even if it rearms, it won't nearly match her current force in quantity. My point is: russia's nuclear detterent will decrease, significanse of BMD will increase (also its capabilities) and there is a fresh perspective of spreading the system. That's exactly what Russia is worried about and I can completely understand why she see's itself as a target - because she probably is.
On the other hand, let's look at Iran (or any other state in the similar situation). I agree with you that technology progresses with time and that in 20 years they will probably have ICBM capability (maybe even in 10). I know the possibility to use one or two missiles is highly remote but let's discuss that remote possibility, when would it occur? What would make one country fire 2 missiles on USA and face immediate anniolation? I will tell you my friend: nothing (no policy or mad leader), nothing but being attacked first with the same means. If USA is affraid of retaliation, that means it has potential plan to destroy someone in some possible future scenario for whatever (primarily economic) reasons. This is a part of policy that USA has to reexamine. All of USA was in wonders after 9/11, but the truth is, when you use force to get your political and economical points, you could expect a kickback. Admit it or not, USA is constantly involved in millitary conflicts it created or helped create under excuse its bringing peace or defending justice, deciding whats right or wrong. If someone dissagrees, he becomes a target. That is what defines North Korea as a undemocratic "axis of evil" country and not Saudi Arabia for example. Look what happened to Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld said they have WMDs. What he forgot to mention is that he himself some years ago sold plans for chemical weapons factories to that same country. Did we forget that same Rumsfeld issued a nuclear factory plan sales to North Korea? America is playing a dangerous game in which what defines right or wrong and causes the millitary intervention is the current economic or strategic interest. This was maybe far from the issue...
Back to the point, Frank, tell me (because we are talking about remote possibilities), can we say there is not even a remote possibilitie that Iranian rocket be missed by BMD shield?
Ivan
Ivan
You points are valid and taken. Politics take strange turns and the “friend of today” can become the adversary of tomorrow. Think of all the Soviet arms that were passed from former client state Egypt through first Israel and Pakistan to the Afghans resisting Soviet occupation in 1980’s. Today, the most dangerous nation on the planet is Pakistan and American foreign policy has made this situation little better; perhaps far worse.
I don’t think it is clearly understood in world opinion how the events of September 11th, 2001 affected the United States or how this event will continue to shape our foreign policy. I think we are still “feeling our way” in a world we don’t really understand; trust. Perhaps the next American Administration will be able to correct some mistakes while taking into consideration it will make new mistakes on its own. This is just the way it is.
There are some technical issues to basing the X-Band Radar System at Gabala. Remember this is not only a search radar system but also a tracking and target acquisition system. The additional distance between the radar system and the potential launch site is necessary to “process the intercept”. Remember, this isn’t a “boost phase” system but a ballistic intercept by an inert warhead that destroys its target by collusion. You really can’t change geography. The interceptor site in Poland is on the ballistic path of a missile headed to the East Coast of the United States from an Iranian launch. The United States has offered inspection of the GBI sites but I think the US would baulk at the 24/7 presence of Russian experts but I think this is something the United States has always been willing to discuss. However, the objections to such a presence have been made by both Poland and the Czech Republic. With the old Soviet days fresh on their minds, neither wants Russian “troops” on their soil.
Good conversation.
Frank Shuler
USA
There is a far more important point here. Why does the USA want the ability to defend Europe from Iran? In what case would Iran attack Europe? Could Iran attempt to hold Europe hostage in case of a serious threat of American attack? So is then the real purpose of the BMD an offensive one, to give the USA free reign in attacking Iran and not having to worry about response in depth? And if so is that justified? Think about the purpose of BMD. It's an invalidation of MAD. A very dangerous step in a very dangerous direction.
Another way to look at things is how many TOTAL (in all theatres) ABM missiles/systems the US has. This includes the 25 interceptors at Ft Greely AK, Vandenburg GBI interceptors coming on line, the Navy's SM-3, Patriot PAC-3, up to 7 ABL aircraft (future), and potentially, the army's M-THEL system. In total, along with potential GBI interceptors in Poland, these systems form a serious (potential) threat to Russia's strategic deterrent force (SM-3, GBI, and ABL in particular). I can't say enough how the US decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty is a huge mistake.
Ft. Grrely is an interesting point. Why is Russia so focused on the potential bases in Poland/CR, while there is already a base in Alaska, although not fully operational yet. I would think that the GBI's in Alaska a larger threat for Russian ICBM than the future ones in Poland.
Martin
I completely agree on the Ft. Greely. The purpose of that installation is to protect the United States from a polar strike, which today would include a Russian or Chinese launch and in the distant future a North Korea. The ability for a US site in Poland catching up to a Russian launch is perhaps mathematically possible but illogical to assume in a combat situation. The US would almost have to have pre-launch knowledge of a Russia strike to queue the Polish interceptors. Next to impossible. The American GBI system in Europe is designed to protect American interest in Europe, read American bases, and the East Coast of the United States from a limited nuclear power equipped with ICBMs. Perhaps Iran in 20 years.
Frank Shuler
USA
Feanor
I’m not sure the United States really trusts the Iranians to make rational decisions when it comes to using nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems. Remember, the United States is also acting in Israel’s interest as well. It is that lack of trust that dominates the American foreign policy with Iran. To a large extent, these feelings of mistrust go back to 1979 and the US Embassy takeover. Perhaps, an Iranian nuclear missile capable of striking Israel or the United States, or American assets in Europe, is only a political bluff. Perhaps the American GBI system in Europe is also only a political bluff. Think of it this way, let’s say Tehran has half-a-dozen road-mobile ICBMs now equipped with single nuclear warheads and threatens an attack on Israel. If the US intervenes, Iran will launch a missile at Boston. Without some measure of defense from such a threat, the US is limited to a nuclear response, perhaps a first-strike on Iranian military targets but with little hope of actually catching the road mobile systems in the open or a retaliation strike only after Tel Aviv is destroyed. Would the US launch such a strike on Iran if the cost of such a strike was the loss of a major American city, Boston? I have no idea. However if the level of doubt is raised by an American ABM system, the entire decision matrix changes. Would Iran gamble on launching a strike on Israel if it knew the United States would respond with a nuclear counterstrike and the American ABM system would counter, or might counter, any response by Tehran? Doubt begins to creep in the process. Maybe that is the real value of the American ABM systems.
Frank Shuler
USA
Jon Grams
There is no doubt the efforts of the United States regarding ballistic missile defense is multi-faceted and varied. However, only the existing GBI system based in Alaska and California and proposed for Europe and the Navy’s SM3 systems are designed to hit long-range ICBM targets. The PAC-3 version of the Patriot and the US Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) are designed to hit short and medium ranged tactical missiles at best and are more theater systems than strategic. While the ABL project is designed to hit ballistic missiles in boost phase, the Mobile Tactical High-Energy Laser, or M-THEL, is a battlefield laser designed to strike targets as small as a mortar or conventional artillery round up to a Katyusha-class rocket; hardly a strategic system. My opinion is the Airborne Laser Project (ABL) will never survive the budget and won’t be built, expect perhaps as a continuing R&D test bed. Boeing is also building a small battlefield version of the ABL (different technology) that will be flown in a modified C-130J transport that is getting great reviews and shows promise as a future weapon system. The US Navy’s SM3 project is the most interesting. While this system was originally intended to hit ballistic missiles during boost phase, it is now a true multi-qualified system capable of striking ICBMs in boost phase or orbit and even providing the fleet a terminal defense against anti-naval ICBMs. Look for the Navy SM3 system to prosper in President Obama’s upcoming defense budgets.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
In some ways, the SM-3 should be Russia's biggest concern, since there is no way of knowing how many will eventually be deployed, and there are enough VLS launchers on the Arleigh Burke's and Ticonderoga's to easily accommodate over a thousand, (theoretically).
Patriot PAC-3 also poses another interesting escalation problem as it can be used to defend Eastern European GBI sites from Russian Iskander's.
Jon Grams
I completely agree on the US Navy’s SM3 system. It also seems the most flexible to changing situations. Note the modified version that took down the recent US Defense Department satellite. The recent decision by the Pentagon to halt future procurement of the new Zumwalt-class destroyer in order to go back and build additional Arleigh Burke’s was made with missile defense clearly in mind. The older designed Arleigh Burke Class, equipped with the AEGIS radar system and the SM3 for missile defense, was considered the greater need by the US Navy.
However the even bigger future danger for any American adversary (today read Russia or China) is the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) system. This weapon is designed to be completely mobile and air transportable and scalable to the threat. Once the command-and-control system is delivered, the mobile X-Band radar system active, and the satellites queued, you can add as many mobile interceptors as needed to counter the threat.
The existing GBI system is only one component of America’s commitment to ballistic missile defense.
Frank Shuler
USA
In a couple of years the whole BMD system, safe a handful of early-warning radars, will be semi-mobile land-based, ship based, or orbital. And the whole debate about Poland will be pointless.
BUT: What really is needed now is a thorough analysis of the consequences that (a working) BMD complex has on the stability of MAD. That is missing so far.
Distiller: I'm fairly certain that missile defense will never get to the point when it would be "working" to the extent that it would have consequences for MAD (or, I should say, for deterrence).
I disagree Pavel. I think it's already there. Perhaps not in terms of Russia, but the Chinese arsenal is certainly questionable as a deterrence tool at this point in time. And with the two major trends: on one hand the decrease in size of the Russian arsenal, and on the other hand the continuing increase in BMD systems on the other, it will not be more then a decade before the Russian arsenal is also of questionable value. Now if Russian ICBM production continues to go up, then in a few years it will surpass replenishment rate, and we will see the Russian arsenal increase again. That will be a different story.
What's an idea Armavir and Gabala next radars? What's value added thanks these radars? Whole idea of Ballistic Missile Defense is not just "know we will die", but idea is to counter ballistic missile - destroy them, not only find them.