The summer issue of International Security has my article on a very interesting period of the Cold War in the 1970s, when the Soviet Union largely achieved "strategic parity" with the United Sates: The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn't: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s. The bottom line of the story is that the United States seriously overestimated the capabilities of the Soviet ICBM force - the much discussed "window of vulnerability" never existed. Read the article for the details - it has some interesting data.
The book
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In the 1970’s the arrival of the SS-18 missile “convinced” American military planners that the Soviet Union was building a first-strike weapon that could destroy 80% of the Minuteman III fleet in their silos. As indicated in your research that was in error. There were novel basing strategies proposed for the new MX missile and plans to redeploy the MMIII fleet. Road and rail mobile systems were designed for the new small ICBM, the so called Midgetman. Dense pack was favored for the MX. What to do about the Minuteman III system? Then something happened. Perhaps it was human intelligence derived or perhaps improved space based surveillance but a change occurred in American thinking. Suddenly it seemed the American strategic planners weren’t so convinced the Soviets had the accuracy to achieve this so called “bolt from the blue” strike that had caused the Pentagon to lose so much sleep in the 1970’s. The size and power of the Soviet ICBMs were seen as a weakness; compensation for poor targeting precision. True? I’ve got no clue but Midgetman died on the drawing boards. The MX missile was limited to only 50 missiles, housed in pre-existing converted MMIII silos. The once thought “vulnerable” Minuteman III itself was left in its existing silos. Certainly the successful development of the Trident missile and its W-76 warhead provided some relief to the Pentagon planners. However something simply changed. The primary goal of the US arms reduction talks with the Soviets in the 1980’s had one main theme, eliminate the SS-18 “Satan” ICBM. START II furthered the American goal of ending all land based MIRV missile systems. After the lengthy delay in START II ramification by the Duma, the time had passed. The United States no longer seemed to care if the Soviets, later of course Russia, deployed MIRV ICBMs or not. START ends next year and SORT is a poor replacement. Yet today, the Pentagon is well satisfied with its Minuteman III fleet and its silo basing. In fact, it has been stated the Minuteman III replacement to be fielded in the 2028 time-frame will still be based in the old existing MMIII silos of today. I’ve often been curious about this American “change of heart”; who actually made the decision and the what was the entire thought process.
Pavel, great job on the research and a good read.
Frank Shuler
USA
Your conclusion is suspect. The Reagan build-up successfully bankrupted the USSR, thus it was a praiseworthy policy. What will a "critical look" add to this fact?
A window of vulnerability had been open... but in Russia. It started around 2005 because of the lack of investments during the nineties. It will take at least a decade to stabilize the fall in the size of the Russian nuclear forces.
Kolokol
I suspect when history looks back, Russia will be seen no more vulnerable today than the perception America was in the 1970-early-80’s. Perhaps, that is the true lesson of Pavel’s article.
Frank Shuler
USA
A superb article. However, I'll add that while the western estimates of a 2 on 1 attack resulting in 90% destruction of Minuteman silos were bogus, the model presented in the article suggests that 60% would be destroyed. Therefore, it is within reason that all the Soviets have to do is dedicate 3 warheads per silo to bring the silo destruction closer to 90%.
So the vulnerability existed, but only on a 3 on 1 basis. Does anyone else agree?
Joe: No, it doesn't work that way. Allocating an additional warhead wouldn't have brought the kill probability to 90%.
A very interesting read.
I suppose that the United States is happy about the Minuteman III silos because of the improved capabilities of the 'Ohio' class (which did not enter service until the early 1980s), the B-1B, the B-2 and the general reduction in the likely number of missiles to launched at the USA.
If China is perceived to be the main nuclear enemy by the US, it becomes clearer. China has, what, c.20 ICBMs?
About Silent Killer's remark above, if China is seen as the main threat by the US, why the missile defence systems are being installed in Poland and the Czeck republic? Can someone pls put some light on this?