It's not about Russian Strategic Navy, but about Chinese ones:

- At present, China already has one SSBN, and, as Pentagon says, build another five SSBNs + some amount of SSNs to support SSBNs operations. So, the total number of Chinese SSBNs should grow from 1 at present to 6 in the nearest future.

- To accommodate these forces, China built a new submarine base at the South-Chinese sea, at Hainan island, not far from Sanya resort city; the base built here known as Yulin submarine / naval base.

- Google Earth shows the base installations quite clearly at N18°12' E109°42'; these installations include 3 piers 230 metres long each, able to accommodate 2 SSBNs each (so base looks like able to accommodate the entire fleet of Chinese SSBNs at the same time), as well as the 'tunnel entrance' to the underground shelter for the subs (a.k.a. 'Hainan Dao Submarine Cave Entrance)'.

OK, it seems not only Russia is concerned about the 'NMD threat'... ;-)

Russian:

The Chinese nuclear policy against the United States hasn’t changed. China’s strategy for the last twenty years has been to have the ability to hold twenty American cities at risk with its missile fleet. What argument between the United States and China is worth the loss of twenty US cities? Today that “risk strategy” is accomplished by deploying an operational inventory of 20 single warhead ICBMs, the soft-silo, DF-5As. In the future this missile may be replaced by the single warhead DF-31A road mobile system procured in greater numbers to hold the same twenty cities at risk. The systems the Chinese seem to be most producing is the DF-31 road mobile IRBM and the DF-21-series MRBM. For more than twenty years China has had the technical capability to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) but has chosen not to do so. The submarines you mentioned will carry the Jl-2 missile system with a range of 8000 miles or so, a theater weapon as the submarines are designed to be based in Chinese territorial waters and surge to sea only in an emergency. The initial submarine, the Xia, is a training boat and has never gone to sea on any kind of deterrent patrol. China is expected to build five or so of the follow-up class to the Xia. The naval facility on the island of Hainan is designed to support such a fleet and lends credence to China’s interest in controlling the oil route from the Middle East, through the Straits of Malacca and across the South China Sea to China proper. This move has India very concerned.

Most of China’s nuclear ambitions seem to be regional in nature and not global. Perhaps Beijing is more concerned about Russia’s large number of tactical nuclear weapons? The rise of India as a major nuclear power?

Frank Shuler
USA

> The naval facility on the island of Hainan is designed to support such a fleet and lends credence to China's interest in controlling the oil route from the Middle East, through the Straits of Malacca and across the South China Sea to China proper.

- Well, to hit a pirate's boat with SLBM is cool idea... Really cool, - I like it! ;-)

> 20 single warhead ICBMs, the soft-silo, DF-5As. In the future this missile may be replaced by the single warhead DF-31A road mobile system...

- Frank, all this I've learned years ago. You also forget to say that Ju Lang-2 (JL-2) is, probably, originated from land-based DF-31 solid-state road-mobile missile complex, - or at least, JL-2 has some 'common units' with DF-31.

> The Chinese nuclear policy against the United States hasn't changed.

- Well, 6 subs; 12 missiles on each; 3 warheads on every missile, - will surely endanger (6 * 12 * 3) = 216 cities, not 20 ones.

> ... the submarines you mentioned will carry the Jl-2 missile system with a range of 8000 miles or so...

- Not 'miles', Frank. 8000 - 9000 kilometers.

- Missile system with 8000 statute or nautical miles range, will endanger all the Pacific coast of the US 'right from the pier' at Yulin naval base, i.e. even without a need in a deterrence patrol of any kind.

- Also: noone, - not you, not me, not even all the US fleet, - can not prohibit to Chinese SSBNs to go to the open ocean at any time they'll want.

> What argument between the United States and China is worth the loss of twenty US cities?

- Again: six SSBNs will surely increase the '20' number, while NMD initially has tried to diminish it.

> The initial submarine, the Xia, is a training boat and has never gone to sea on any kind of deterrent patrol.

- If sub able to shoot their missiles, - even right from the pier or from home waters, - it's surely provide some deterrence... No absolute need in 'deterrence patrols' in it's classic, i.e. US Navy, style.

- And, by the way, six SSBNs will surely provide to China a good chance to organize such a 'deterrence patrols' in the nearest future, - even if we consider the entire fleet's readiness as 5 : 1 (as you teach us).

> Most of China's nuclear ambitions seem to be regional in nature and not global.

- This is not about 'Chinese nuclear ambitions'. We could even conclude that if China has maintained such a low level of nuclear weapons for years, - as before the US NMD and Chinese SSBNs deployment was, - then China had no 'nuclear ambitions' at all... Until the recent time when NMD program has awakened such an ambitions. ;-)

Again: this is not about the 'China's nuclear ambitions', this is about China's ability to retaliate... NMD deployment has made a big noise around the Globe, and Chinese military planners was able to understand quite clearly that US NMD program will, first of all, depreciate relatively small Chinese nuclear potential.

> Perhaps Beijing is more concerned about Russia's large number of tactical nuclear weapons?

- And may be about the tactical nuclear weapons of small green humanoids from Venus? (smile)

- Well, the program of first international trip of Dmitry Medvedev in it's President rank, was planned to demonstrate clearly to the West the vector of Russian 'political movement': in the frameworks of one abroad trip, the first visit was to Kazakhstan ('to the East' in both geographical and geopolitical sense), and the second one was to the China ('to the East' again both geographically and geopolitically).

Frank, you often say that 'Russia is alone'; but, let me to remind to you: both Russia and China are participatants of the ODKB military alliance. Whatever you say, - we are allies, - at least formally.

- As one of result of the Mr. Medvedev's visit to China, the bilateral declaration was signed; here the few words of the declaration:

China and Russia consider, that creation of global system of antimissile defense, including expansion of such system in some regions of the world or adjustment of corresponding international cooperation, do not promote maintenance of strategic balance and stability, interfere with the international efforts under the arms control and non-proliferation, weaken the trust between the states and regional stability'.

- Thus, I stay at my point: there's enough arguments here to consider new Chinese SSBNs as a contrmeasure to US NMD program.

Russian

I must admit you seem to have a great deal more confidence in these mythical ballistic missile defense systems the US is building than anyone here. There must be something to this after all.

Kolokol has a great saying, “It is always easier to sharpen the sword than polish the shield”. However, if you are right and this layered defense against ballistic missiles actually will work in a combat situation, what is Russia to do? It will always be far easier and less expensive for America to build interceptors than for Russia to add ICBMs.

To add additional interest to these discussions, only this week have industry contracts been given by the MDA and DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) for the development of a new multi-warhead EKV. The theory is to give one Ground Base Interceptor (GBI) the capability to strike several ICBMs in flight with one launch. Seems like a logical progression to the technology.

Frank Shuler
USA