Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association sent around a very interesting exchange between Senator Lugar and John Rood, the Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, during hearings at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 21. Sen. Lugar asked Rood if the administration is working on a new arms control treaty with Russia. Here is Rood's response:
At present we have a difference of opinion with our Russian colleagues. Our view in the administration is that we want a treaty that will set limits on strategic nuclear warheads. We think that that is the appropriate focus of the follow-on treaty. Our Russian colleagues have sought a treaty with a broader scope, something which would also cover conventional armaments and conventional delivery systems and things of that nature.
We are in the process of transitioning to a greater reliance on conventional weapons and a reduced reliance on nuclear forces. We therefore don't wish to expand the scope of the treaty in the manner -- or other legally binding agreement -- in the manner that our Russian colleagues have identified.
Both sides, the Russians and the United States, do not wish to simply continue the existing START treaty. It's a phone book-size document of 750 pages. The negotiations began under Brezhnev when he was leader of the Soviet Union and were concluded under Gorbachev. And so we both recognize they need to be updated as a minimum.
We in the United States would like another approach, as I said, that focuses on strategic nuclear warheads and sets limitations upon them.
This doesn't sound good - with this kind of attitudes on both sides we will not have a treaty.
The book
Comments
Pavel
We have lamented the START agreement expiration for years; wanting a successor or at least a continence. I too think we will get neither. Why would Russia insist on tying conventional arms to a strategic nuclear weapons framework? I think the existing Russian nuclear arsenal will fall to the 1500 range regardless of what concessions are wrangled from the United States. Given that, what does Russia have to trade? Moscow has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal but refuses to discuss “tactical nuclear weapons” as part of any framework agreement with the US. This is understandable. Russia has many potential adversaries and its vast numbers of tactical nuclear warheads are hedges against such “enemies”. This strategy also underscores the present day limits of the conventional Russian military. It sounds like arm agreements between Russia and the United States have run their course.
Frank Shuler
USA
Pavel, does this not illustrate the problem with Russian politicians? They know that they are falling behind in conventional armaments and so want to manipulate a nuclear arms control agreement to include non-nuclear weapons. It is not possible to have confidene in such people.
Looks like prompt global strike is a major sticking point. I have always felt that the possibility of conventional counterforce might impact on strategic arms control processes (I think also the GMD booster is an issue) which is a pity because it's a bit like hawks using SDI to block an agreement...prompt global strike is not even funded by congress.
I think Jason's comments are too strong. Conventional counteforce is something that planners in Moscow, at the very least, need to take into account and it would be rational to try and obviate the possibility through arms control. In theory arms control is about achieving strategic stability and conventional counterforce is potentially de-stabilising one of the reasons why congress is loath to fund it.
But then again Team Bush invades another country leaving a trail of death and misery, withdraws from the ABMT, blocks space arms control, won't sign the CTBT so I would say "it is not possible to have confidence in such people."
Prompt global strike should absolutely be included in the sphere of any strategic nuclear forces reduction talks as this system has the potential to threaten Russian ICBM sites. Russian politicians are certainly within their rights (and duty-bound, I should think) to not compromise on an issue which could upset the strategic balance in the US's favor.
"Moscow has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal"
Really? Sources please.
MarkoB:
I am curious as to why GMD boosters should be an issue.
Feanor:
Here is a source: http://nukestrat.com/nukestatus.htm
Feanor
I generally quote the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists or Hans M. Kristensen’s work at the Federation of American Scientists. Victor Mikhailov, former Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, has also been widely quoted. I think all are neutral bias and reasonable accurate in an “open source” environment.
Pavel, care to join in? What do you think is the overall size of the Russian nuclear arsenal? Total and operational warheads?
Frank Shuler
USA
In such conditions is not in Russian interests to negotiate a treaty. USA is using its historic tricks, hoping that “Russian nuclear arsenal will fall to the 1500 range regardless of what concessions” while trying to negotiate a treaty in TNW, ignoring the NATO advantage in conventional weapons. It seems that they are not resigned to their dream of nuclear dominance. Nevertheless, if USA wants to bleed its resources and economy pursing such a dream, le it do. Russia will always find an appropriate “asymmetrical answer”. Furthermore a considerable resource reserve is available just in case of unexpected events. There is no worry anymore on the Russian side. Motherland should just sit down to observe the fall.
Marko, the Russians are not concerned about conventional counterforce as much as they are concerned about the overwhelming inferiority of their conventional forces. This is why Kolokol refers to "the NATO advantage in conventional weapons". Russia's flailing in this direction should be ignored.
> I am curious as to why GMD boosters should be an issue.
Theses of right answer:
- In fact, GBIs are IRBMs or at least 'IRBM capable' missiles.
- GBIs may be nuclear-tipped at any time as well as potentially re-programmed to hit the ground targets.
- As to GBI's primary capability: placing GBIs in the East Europe will allow to the US to hit Russian heavy ICBMs at their boost phase, with point of intercept somewhere in Nothern Atlantics.
It's rather easy task for KKV to hit rather 'slow' and 'big' objects like ICBMs at their boost phase than to hit rather 'fast' and 'small' multiple warheads at terminal phase of their flights; and, if KKV will be replaced sometime with a small nuclear anti-missile warhead, this task will be significantly easier.
Add here the ability for US to increase the number of GBIs easily when political precedent of anti-missile base deployment at European land will become a reality; now US establishment is roaring about 'Iranian missile treat' and require deployment of 10 GBIs in Europe when NO Iranian ICBMs exist; tomorrow, US will require deployment of 100 or more GBIs against a few Iranian ICBMs.
Besides of above reasons, new US military bases at European land should be considered as a tool for proliferation of US military influence in the Europe; that's why GBIs are real 'trojan horse' for EU.
But, anyway, Russia has clearly demonstrated to the Poland what kind of problems GBI deployment may cause.
> In such conditions is not in Russian interests to negotiate a treaty. USA is using its historic tricks, hoping that “Russian nuclear arsenal will fall to the 1500 range regardless of what concessions” while trying to negotiate a treaty in TNW, ignoring the NATO advantage in conventional weapons. It seems that they are not resigned to their dream of nuclear dominance.
- Completely agree. Happily, Kremlin not sleeps now, and if US will persist in this point of view, they surely will see only a 'Satan' reincarnation.
I also want to add - I still hope to see a 'Satan Improved', let's say in 100 - 200 units deployed, before I'll die by my natural death... ;-)
I do not consider 'Satan' as a tool of America's termination but rather as an appropriate tool of strategic deterrence; I do believe such an excellent weapon system must survive.
Kolokol
“Modern Russia” is only 16 years old.
Don’t spend so much time trying to arrive at the “asymmetrical answer” in relations with the United States. The United States does not consider Russia an enemy. However, we do consider Russia a potential advisory in the future along with a host of other 21st Century’s nations. It’s a long list. I suspect if Russia does what is in her best interest, and the United States does the same, we’ll both get along in the future. Look at the map. We have little in conflict; much in common.
Frank Shuler
USA
To Frank:
Time and type of development of the new tools of the Russian Arsenal is a technical question. We can only wait, see and comment.
To Russian:
I anxiously expect your news on the Tu-22M3 modernization.
On the OBV for the GMD interceptor and START. This is an issue because the booster for the GMD kill vehicle is the OBV. Now, this just happens also to be the envisaged booster for the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon.
This means, even according to the Reagan/Bush I era, point man on the START talks that the GMD interceptor might well not be START compliant because of this offensive link. Moscow might well want to place both the GMD and the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon within the remit of strategic arms control, something which the White House is loath to do obviously.
Russian:
> I am curious as to why GMD boosters should be an issue.
Theses of right answer:
- In fact, GBIs are IRBMs or at least 'IRBM capable' missiles.
Not with a KKV they aren't. Unless you think a few hundred pounds of unaimed KKV scrap makes an effective warhead against a surface target.
- GBIs may be nuclear-tipped at any time as well as potentially re-programmed to hit the ground targets.
If you think it's that easy you have a LOT to learn about the realities of how missiles work. You can't just slap a warhead on something and have a working missile (in a different role) without testing. And the testing of a new missile would be easily spotted. Not to mention it would be against a couple treaties.
- As to GBI's primary capability: placing GBIs in the East Europe will allow to the US to hit Russian heavy ICBMs at their boost phase, with point of intercept somewhere in Nothern Atlantics.
GBI isn't a boost phase interceptor. And even if it was all that would have to be done (assuming you have a point- which you don't) is use SLBMs against Eastern US targets and completely avoid the system. When you actually consider reality instead of Postol-cooked-up-ravings you'll see there is NO WAY those things are a threat to Russian ICBMs if only because of reaction time. Those ICBMs would be long gone before a decision could be made to launch against them.
-It's rather easy task for KKV to hit rather 'slow' and 'big' objects like ICBMs at their boost phase than to hit rather 'fast' and 'small' multiple warheads at terminal phase of their flights; and, if KKV will be replaced sometime with a small nuclear anti-missile warhead, this task will be significantly easier.
The US doesn't use nuclear warheads on it's ABMs/ATBMs. It doesn't need to. And GBI isn't quick enough. I'm surprised at all the screaming about GBI. KEI is the one you ought to be worried about. Poland could tell us to kiss off re. building GBI silos but as long as we had that radar in Czech. would could fly in KEIs anytime we wanted. And they ARE designed for boost phase intercept and will be MUCH quicker than GBI albeit without a 3000 mile range.
-Add here the ability for US to increase the number of GBIs easily when political precedent of anti-missile base deployment at European land will become a reality; now US establishment is roaring about 'Iranian missile treat' and require deployment of 10 GBIs in Europe when NO Iranian ICBMs exist; tomorrow, US will require deployment of 100 or more GBIs against a few Iranian ICBMs.
And maybe Russia will need a million SS-18s, let's all start freaking out over fantasies.
-Besides of above reasons, new US military bases at European land should be considered as a tool for proliferation of US military influence in the Europe; that's why GBIs are real 'trojan horse' for EU.
That's the EU's problem not Russia's.
Scot Ferrin:
> You can't just slap a warhead on something and have a working missile (in a different role) without testing. And the testing of a new missile would be easily spotted.
- Scott, I've worked for years at the Kazan Aviation Plant (KAPO im. Gorbunova) before I'll start my private business recently; so, please do not try to teach me 'how missiles work'. And what's your specialty, by the way?
- Again, I'll repeat: technically speaking, GBIs warhead replacement could be performed at any time; and 'needs of testing', - is not a problem; such a testing could be performed very quickly when needed.
The brightest example here is, - confirmed in a single testing, - SM3's anti-satellite capabilities.
The testing of 'antiground' GBI capabilities is significantly simplier thing, you may be sure.
- My point you refuse to understand: modern rocket engine and onboard electronics technologies really allow to make 'universal' missiles, suitable for easy 'modular' upgrade and easy task reassignment.
Such an 'universality' is a MAINSTREAM of modern missile and aviational technologies, and I can not see the reason why GBI should be an exclusion from this rule.
- A simple example of exclusion, - just for you: there's no much a sense to turn 53T6 / ABM-3 Gazelle into 'anti-ground system', as this missile intended just for one, very narrow, task: an ultrafast acceleration on a very short distance (speed of 4 kilometers per second could be achieved only in 4 seconds, - it's 250G acceleration from construction limit of 300G).
> GBI isn't a boost phase interceptor.
- Noone is able to prove this. That's why the discussion is so 'hot'.
- Many people still think that GBI is capable to kill the ballistic targets at their boost phase, so look at some examples you really hate ;-):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=COks8JbDVBo
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfJtFKeI0KM
- By the way, KKV (yes, the SAME KKV!) installed on air-launched missiles, has proved recently its ability to kill ballistic targets at their boost phase (F-15 was used as a launch platform).
- So I think that you're wrong here, - all the facts shows the potential possibility of GBI / KKV to hit the ballistic targets at the boost phase.
> The US doesn't use nuclear warheads on it's ABMs/ATBMs.
- Correction: the US doesn't use nuclear warheads on it's ABMs NOW... But what will be tomorrow, - when Iran will have a few REAL ICBMs?
Look:
(a) No Iranian ICBMs at all: - 'We need to deploy in Europe 10 GBIs equipped with KKV'
(b) A few Iranian ICBMs exists: - 'We need to deploy in Europe 100 GBIs additionally and re-equip GBIs with nukes'
Logical way, isn't it?
- Need to remind to you here the recent words of Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs:
'Is someone really thinks that Russia will easy look, - how the US strategic potentials on Russian borders are consistently increased, and to wait, - while critical for our national security antimissile potential will be created?
> And maybe Russia will need a million SS-18s...
- I'm a realist; as I can see, modern state of US / Russian strategic triades is enough warranty of peace for our countries; so, let's say, - 220 Topol / Topol-Ms, 100 RS-24 and / or Stilettos, and 70 - 100 Satans are enough quantities at present, - the quantities US administration even don't mind.
Until NMD does not affect seriously Russia's capability to retaliate.
> That's the EU's problem not Russia's.
- It's a problem of global security, so it's not the 'EU problem only'.
- And EU is our 'geopolitical neighbour', if you forget... Sometimes, problems of your neighbour could turn into your own problems, isn't it? ;-)
Quote: "And maybe Russia will need a million SS-18s,..."
There are much cheaper ways to render these bases useless. So let USA waste their money on their dreams (nuclear dominance) and nightmares (imaginary Iranian ICBM) while deepening their crisis. Russia has many effective options to assure the National security.
Kolokol:
1) And what would those options be? According to the most recent security doctrine of the RF and statements made my political leaders, you are emphasizing nuclear options in case of enemies threatening your sovereignty. That combined with the well known problems facing your conventional forces (underfunded, poor training, poor treatment of personnel, outdated equipment, etc..) nuclear seems to be your prime method of assuring National security.
2) Dreams of nuclear dominance? I do believe it was your government that begged for a new treaty (SORT) in order to maintain yourselves equals with the U.S.
3) We may be overstating the threat of the Iranians, but if we took the same actions in the late 1940s-1950s against the Soviet Union, maybe we could have spared 40 years of the threat of global annihilation. At the time it would have been quite a battle of forces and who knows the outcome, but we know that the Iranians are a inferior force and will not sit idly by while a known terrorist harborer develops nuclear weapons. For a country that is threatened by a bunch of democratic nations joining NATO, it is surprising that you feel this way.
We are not begging anymore Rich. In fact if your government wants to spend their money in such project, well, go ahead and waste your green papers (emptied because the printing machine is working at full). And we are no delighted by seen those big talkers (that always were happy on 90s Russian woes) slowly sinking in Iraq but we are simply observing the fall. That’s the things are now.
Respect to the problems of Russian conventional forces. They first will be covered by sub-kiloton TNW. That’s will buy time to fix those already detailed problems. I am not very worried on NATO tricks anymore. They are widely known and slowly but persistently being rendered ineffective.
Russia is caught in an interesting paradox.
The United States is building sophisticated defense systems to combat what it sees as 21st Century threats against America. These threats include, but are certainly not limited to, an emerging China as a world power, fundamental Islamic terrorism in the form of a nationalist state such as Iran or in a non-governmental organization such as Al-Qaeda, and nuclear proliferators such as North Korea. Weapons associated with such threats include new ABM systems, such as the GBI systems deployed in Alaska and California and proposed for Europe, the Standard SM-3+ ABM system deployed by the US Navy, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system deploying with the US Army, the Airborne Laser Aircraft (ABL), a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for recon & strike, new unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV), a new strategic bomber, the hypersonic FALCON space-plane, the Global Strike conventional ICBMs project and a hosts of new, exotic satellites for communications, data processing, surveillance, and intelligence gathering. The biggest shift in the Pentagon has been the vast mobilization of human resources within the US Military; reorganized and retrained to man these new emerging technological systems.
An important note to make, all these new technologies don’t involve nuclear weapons.
Russia’s dilemma is that all these technologies that are not aimed directly at Russia must still be accounted for in the Kremlin’s military planning. Any American weapon designed to shoot down a Chinese DF-31A ICBM will work just as good against a Topol-M SS-27.
That is Russia’s dilemma.
Frank Shuler
USA
I think Russia's dilemma is solving the demographic crisis, and producing a capable first world military, before we can even begin to asses 21st century threats.
Well Feanor, supposedly one of the main tasks that Mr Medvedev will be busy to solve is the demographic problem. As far I know, the population stabilization time will be reached around year 2010. That’s considering immigration. So Russia is currently trying to solve the demographic problem by siphoning people form the former USSR (mainly Ukraine). That’s obviously the short term solution. The long-term stable solution is (birth rate) > (death rate). Although the birth rate is growing and the death rate is slowly declining, the interception point will be reached past the 2012 timeline, more likely around 2015. So during this period and considering the very low population density of Russia, there is no other interim alternative than a nuclear bases doctrine biased to “usable” TNW. Meanwhile this time should be spent on designing new doctrines and new armament designed in face of new realities.
Russian:
- Scott, I've worked for years at the Kazan Aviation Plant (KAPO im. Gorbunova) before I'll start my private business recently; so, please do not try to teach me 'how missiles work'. And what's your specialty, by the way?
What I am or am not is irrelevant to the discussion (the whole "I've spent 15 years doing X" is the weakest form of argument- a statement should be able to stand on it's OWN merit). Show me one missile that has entered into service having never been tested for the role it entered service for? Do you honestly believe they'd just say "well we're out of SS-21s why don't you just shoot some of those S-300s instead" having never tested the missile in that role or trained anybody for it? That kind of thing only happens in Hollywood.
- Again, I'll repeat: technically speaking, GBIs warhead replacement could be performed at any time; and 'needs of testing', - is not a problem; such a testing could be performed very quickly when needed.
Quickly or not, a surface to surface GBI test will most CERTAINLY be noticed and bring all the trouble with it you might imagine. It would be sheer idiocy to pursue such a goal when there are more than sufficient D-5s to do the same job and better WITHOUT all the hassle.
-The brightest example here is, - confirmed in a single testing, - SM3's anti-satellite capabilities.
That's actually a pretty WEAK example. SM-3 is designed to hit targets in space. And it hit a target in space. What a surprise. What you're suggesting is akin to swapping out warheads on a Topol and then trying to use it to shoot down a cruise missile.
-The testing of 'antiground' GBI capabilities is significantly simplier thing, you may be sure.
And very easy to detect as well.
- My point you refuse to understand: modern rocket engine and onboard electronics technologies really allow to make 'universal' missiles, suitable for easy 'modular' upgrade and easy task reassignment.
It's not as easy as you seem to think. Not if you want to know the thing is going to work anyway.
-Such an 'universality' is a MAINSTREAM of modern missile and aviational technologies, and I can not see the reason why GBI should be an exclusion from this rule.
Because the "rule" doesn't exist. You have to test and testing will be noticed. You can't just swap warheads, write some code, and start WWIII with an untested weapon.
>GBI isn't a boost phase interceptor.
- Noone is able to prove this. That's why the discussion is so 'hot'.
The most obvious response to that is why are they building KEI then? The second most obvious response is "what do they think 10 missiles are going to accomplish?"
- Many people still think that GBI is capable to kill the ballistic targets at their boost phase, so look at some examples you really hate ;-):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=COks8JbDVBo
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfJtFKeI0KM
I don't hate them, I just think they're BS. :-)
- By the way, KKV (yes, the SAME KKV!) installed on air-launched missiles, has proved recently its ability to kill ballistic targets at their boost phase (F-15 was used as a launch platform).
Incorrect. The only KKV-equipped missile an F-15 has ever carried was the ASM-135 ASAT and that was cancelled 20 years ago. Not only that the ASM-135's KV had absolutley NOTHING in common with todays KKVs other than the basic mode of operation. The test you're think of was launched from an F-16 and was on the end of a Sidewinder missile. Just a bit of difference between a 190lb missile and a 30,000lb missile don't you think?
- So I think that you're wrong here, - all the facts shows the potential possibility of GBI / KKV to hit the ballistic targets at the boost phase.
Well no, your unsupported OPINONS might support it but the facts certainly don't.
-"Well Feanor, supposedly one of the main tasks that Mr Medvedev will be busy to solve is the demographic problem. As far I know, the population stabilization time will be reached around year 2010. That’s considering immigration. So Russia is currently trying to solve the demographic problem by siphoning people form the former USSR (mainly Ukraine). That’s obviously the short term solution. The long-term stable solution is (birth rate) > (death rate). Although the birth rate is growing and the death rate is slowly declining, the interception point will be reached past the 2012 timeline, more likely around 2015." - Kolokol
Those are the most optimistic numbers I've seen anywhere. The UN report recently published predicts demographic troubles as far ahead as 2025. Don't forget Russia is in the middle of one of the worlds fastest growing AIDS epidemics and with a rampant narcotics and alcoholism problem.