The Conventional Trident Missile is back and I'm afraid there is a good chance that this time STRATCOM will get the project funded - Gen. Cartwright seems to be very enthusiastic about the plan and the National Academies panel that was asked to study the idea is unlikely to disapprove it strongly enough to stop it.
On one level, STRATCOM enthusiasm is a good sign - people there seem to realize that being in the nuclear business is like not being in business at all. It's no longer cool to carry nuclear weapons around, since you cannot use them anyway. STRATCOM wants a piece of "real action", which these days means hitting "unexpected or fast-moving"targets.
This is all good, but the way STRATCOM wants this to be done - mixing conventional and nuclear missiles on operational strategic submarines - is a very bad idea, in my view. The probability of an accident that may be triggered by a Trident launch may be fairly small, but there is no evidence that it is small enough to be dismissed. Quite the contrary - what we know about operations of early-warning and command and control strongly suggests that the risk is not negligible.
Proponents of the plan try to address the concerns, but they do not sound entirely convincing. For example, here is an excerpt from the testimony of Brian R. Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities Department of Defense, at the hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 28, 2007 (emphasis added):
The most frequently cited concern is that a CTM [Conventional Trident] launch could be misinterpreted as a nuclear attack, prompting Russian retaliation. The CTM report states that the risk is extremely low and can be managed effectively. Few states have the sophisticated technology required to detect and track a ballistic missile launch. However, the Russian Federation has these detection and tracking systems and is generally able to evaluate quickly a ballistic missile’s flight path and determine within tens of miles the missile’s aimpoint. In that respect, if Russian sensors detected and tracked a CTM launch, the Russian command would quickly identify it as non-threatening. Moreover, the Russian command would readily distinguish between a CTM launch and a massive nuclear first strike.Historically, the Russian Federation has not over-reacted to an un-notified or unannounced U.S. or Chinese missile launch. Furthermore, the United States and the Russian Federation now have a more cooperative and less adversarial relationship than during the Cold War, and this new relationship provides a much-changed context in which any launch of a ballistic missile would be understood.
Nevertheless, the United States takes the possibility of misinterpretation seriously. While the risk is extremely low, DoD has developed a comprehensive assurance strategy consisting of confidence-building and operational measures, promoting a high degree of transparency into CTM operations. Engagement of Russia at senior levels is ongoing.
First, I don't like the idea of "managing" the risk of an accidental launch. I would much rather see that risk eliminated, not "managed", especially taking into account that the ideas about risk management are not particularly encouraging.
I'm glad to see that Mr. Green holds the Russian system in high regards and believes in its ability to quickly identify an attack as "non-threatening". But something tells me that this is that he wants to believe, not necessarily what the actual capability is. I don't think early-warning satellites can provide impact prediction with the "tens of miles" accuracy. I'll need to look into it, though.
On the historical record, it is, of course, true that Russia has never over-reacted to U.S. or Chinese launches. However, there were not that many of them that were "un-notified or unannounced". The United States and Russia have an agreement that requires them to notify each other of upcoming launches at least 24 hours in advance. There is no similar agreement with China, but we should note that most, if not all, U.S. and Chinese launches originate from well-established test ranges and the missiles fly along fairly well-known trajectories. The launches are rarely secret or unexpected and the Russian military normally know about the launch in advance. Even without a formal notification, range safety announcements, notices to mariners and airmen give enough advance warning in most cases. So, the historical record does not necessarily tell us how the Russian system might respond to a conventional Trident launch. Not to mention that we do not know if that record includes close calls, errors, or misinterpretations.
In any event, a launch of an operational (conventional) missile from a Trident submarine would be much different from everything that the Russian system has seen so far - it would originate from a location that has never been used before and the missile trajectory would certainly be different from anything that was observed so far. Which makes the historical record largely irrelevant - I don't believe one can point at the established procedure of dealing with routine cases and claim that that procedure would reliably deal with the cases that don't fit that routine. Exactly the opposite is true. In fact, one of the reasons the missile launch from Norway in January 1995 was noticed was that it was a very unusual launch for this site.
Finally, there is a lot of talk about confidence-building measures that are supposed to provide Russia with "assurance strategy", but nobody has seen those measures yet. In fact, the only "confidence-building measure" that has been discussed so far was how to get rid of that launch notification agreement, since the 24-hour notification of launch it requires is certainly incompatible with the idea of Prompt Global Strike. As I understand, the ideas that are circulating in the military are that that agreement does not cover "operational launches". In other words, Russia is going to be told that the agreement that was designed to prevent accidents will not cover the events that carry the biggest risk of an accident. It's a very strange idea of confidence-building.
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Comments
Pavel:
I don’t think the conventional Trident ever “went away”. As the shift in politics in America moves the country from control by the “pro-military” Republican Party to the more “liberal” Democrat’s, this program will actually grow in importance. While it may be very difficult for the Pentagon to convince a Democratic Congress in the need to build the new Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) project, they will embrace a new technology that will allow global reach, with a conventional weapon, that they can convince themselves is needed in the “Global War Against Terror”. The Democrats have no interest in being labeled “soft on defense” before the 2008 national elections. The plan is to replace two nuclear Trident missiles on each submarine with a missile so equipped with a “conventional package”. If a 24-hour warning to the Kremlin of an impending US missile launch satisfies all security concerns, perhaps a 24 minute warning is only a formality.
Frank Shuler
USA
Implementation of an offensive, "pre-emptive strike" weapon such as this is a big mistake. Unless, of course, the current US administration wants to assure the world of its imperialist intentions.
Jon:
This whole project seems to be “an answer looking for a problem”. Just because something is technically possible doesn’t mean it’s a solution. How would such a weapon be used? Against whom? Launching a submarine SLBM at a fortress redoubt on the Afghan-Pakistani border trying to kill Osama bin Laden is one thing. Would the United States launch such a strike on an al-Qaida safe-house in Karachi? Damascus? What if Osama bin Laden was in a mosque in Mecca? A hotel in Paris? A conventional Trident is just another tool for the “war planners”. It will be used no differently than conventional munitions dropped from a B-2 just with a quicker mission turn time.
I suspect American’s “imperialist intentions” are well understood at this point without the need to introduce a new conventional Trident weapon system for emphasis. By the way, one of these days someone is going to have to explain to me what “imperialist intentions” actually are.
Frank Shuler
USA
> By the way, one of these days someone is going to have to explain to me what “imperialist intentions” actually are.
To CONTROL the world, of course. Not OWN, not RULE, - but to CONTROL.
Russian:
Do you not think Russia wants to CONTROL the world? France? Albania?
Control is an illusion. “Ownership” however is real. Generally, I agree with your assessment.
Frank Shuler
USA
- Frank, the thing I mean under term 'control', has the ECONOMICAL origin.
- A good example: if some state (for example, USA), will control the oil-producing regions of the world, - this state will have a rather cheap oil and fuel for it's own needs, and will be able to supply a rather expensive oil - for it's economical competitors. Most politologists says, that the fast-growing China's economics is a serious threat to US economical leadership, and the ONLY WAY for US to diminish this threat, - is to have a cheap oil (more widely: and other resources) - for itself, and, contrary, - expensive oil & other resources, - for China. So, US economical (as well as political) leadership, - is just a question of control of the world's economical resources.
- Is this kind of control, could be considered as a 'neoimperialist intentions'? :-)
> Do you not think Russia wants to CONTROL the world?
- As to your question, - I guess the Russia, probably, the ONLY state, that NEEDS NO a control on resources from abroad. Russia have a quite of bunch resources, we have all the Periodic Table in our earth's entrails, so we do not need the economical & political reasons, to control the resources of other world.
PS Sorry for my lame English, I haven't enough language practice here, in Kazan...
Russian:
Today, the United States is a capitalist country with no capital. Our ability to influence the oil producing countries to provide our economy with oil is based on our military capability and certain shared security goals that differ from state to state. The rest is market politics. The international security needs of Saudi Arabia and Nigeria vary and United States has a different type of relationship with each. We really don’t have any political leverage in forcing countries to supply this commodity at anything other than “market rates”. China is an authoritarian governed country that has embraced “market economy” and has a ton of cash to reinvest in world ventures. Historically, this reminds me of Great Britain and the United States 100 years ago. By 1907, the economy of the United States had run past the British and the new financial center of this emerging world was moving from London to New York (Wall Street). The Americans were content in letting the British rule their Empire because the British did not exclude any nation from trade with their empire and provided “security of commerce” in the presents of the Royal Navy. Today, we are seeing the same migration as the new world financial center is moving to Shanghai. The Chinese economy, all things being equal, will blow by the United States in the next 30 years or so. However, it is Russia that may well stand in the way of China’s rise to power and not America. The “Periodic Table” of resources you have, China will need.
Good conversation.
Frank Shuler
USA
> However, it is Russia that may well stand in the way of China’s rise to power and not America. The “Periodic Table” of resources you have, China will need.
- Yeah, I remember those 'almost ritual' ;-) curses of our propaganda to 'american imperialists and chinese hegemonists' (real citation), in 1980s here, at Soviet Union...
Russian:
The long Russian border with China isn't American propaganda. (smile)
As the economic future of the world begins it migration to the East, the Pacific Rim will become important and competitive to many countries. Russia will be only one.
Frank Shuler
USA
Interestingly in the “Conventional Trident” conversations now taking place in Washington, the major group that has expressed “concern” on this strategy is the US nuclear “warfighters” themselves. The US Navy doesn’t want to give up “operational data” on a patrolling Trident submarine called on to launch a conventional mission. And, the US Strategic Command doesn’t want to give up nuclear warhead space on a Trident submarine for a conventional payload. The potential compromise from the US Congress is for a land launched version of Conventional Trident that could be used to hit targets around the world and launched from a non-nuclear US facility. (Vanderburgh Air Force Base in California?) This is the interim solution for the “Global Strike Mission” before the USAF provides a new manned solution (bomber) in 2018.
Frank Shuler
USA
Why would the Navy have to disclose any information about submarine patrols? And I'm not sure about STRATCOM's not wanting to replace nuclear warheads with conventional - as far as I can tell, it is perfectly fine with this replacement.
Pavel:
I’m assuming the US Navy doesn’t want to give up any intelligence regarding its predetermined Trident patrol areas of operation. Nor does the Navy want to give up “secured patrol areas” to roam the world’s oceans on tactical missions. Perhaps the four earlier converted Ohio-class guided missile submarines, now so configured for such a tactical (non-nuclear) mission, could be reconfigured to support a conventional Trident launch with some launch tubes not housing Tomahawks systems or SEAL SDV assets?
I think STRATCOM’s level of commitment to the project may be influenced by the ongoing suggestions that the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) be given “operational control” of all tactical missions. In a parallel development, USSOCOM is also ready to formally ask for dedicated attack (fleet) submarine assets to aid it in clandestine intelligence gathering missions. The US Navy is no more excited to give up active submarines assets to such a joint command than was the US Marine Corp when forced to contribute ground marines to USSOCOM’s “special forces”. The historical doctrine of the USMC is that every combat marine is indeed a special force and thus has never allowed such a distinction to be made in its organization; as the US Army has done with its Rangers and Green Berets. If the US Congress funds a second Virginia-class nuclear submarine in the 2008 Defense Budget this October, after the Administration only asked for one, it will be done at the Navy’s insistence the future inventory of submarines needs to be increased to address USSOCOM request.
Frank Shuler
USA
As I understand, the four converted submarines are not considered for the Conventional Trident. I must admit I don't know very much about USSOCOM and its potential role.