[This is my first online column in a series that will appear on the new site of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which just moved the Doomsday Clock to five minutes to midnight. I invite everyone to check out other columns as well - the contributors are Richard Garwin, Hugh Gusterson, Laura Kahn, and Dingli Shen.]
Life after START
The Bulletin Online, January 17, 2007
by Pavel Podvig
As if the nuclear arms control process didn’t have enough difficulties, in December Russia decided to deal it another blow. At the inauguration of three new Topol-M road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, the commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces announced Moscow’s plan to equip these missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Few additional details have been released, but it appears that most of Russia’s about 150 Topol-M missiles will carry three--and maybe more--nuclear warheads, something they weren’t initially designed to do.
The problem with this decision is not that it would significantly increase the size of the Russian nuclear force. The total number of warheads in the Russian strategic arsenal will decline due to the withdrawal of older missiles. The most visible effect of this move would be the almost certain death of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which regulates U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament. The treaty is set to expire in December 2009, and it looks increasingly likely that no new agreement will take over. Theoretically, it’s possible that Russia and the United States can find a way to keep some of the treaty provision in place, but it’s hard to see how this could be done in practice. Russia’s attempt this summer to start consultations on this issue was met with a cold rebuff from the U.S. administration.
As regrettable as the end of START is, if it was the only result of Russia’s decision to go with multiple warheads on its new missiles, things wouldn’t be that bad. But this decision is part of a worrisome trend, in which policy on nuclear issues is completely divorced from reality and driven by the inertia of Cold-War institutions and concepts. The placement of multiple warheads on Topol-M missiles is simply a product of the Cold War’s bean-counting mentality, which dominates the discussion of nuclear matters in Russia today. MIRVed Topol-M missiles serve absolutely no purpose other than artificially inflating the number of nuclear warheads in the Russian strategic arsenal in an attempt to make it look “presentable.” No one in Russia is seriously asking how all of these nuclear warheads could help Moscow deal with its security problems.
Russia, of course, is not the only nuclear state that does not ask questions about the real purpose of its nuclear forces. The British government just released a white paper on the future of London’s nuclear deterrent, in which it found a creative way to avoid the hard questions. Unable to come up with convincing arguments for keeping its nuclear force, the British government simply claimed that it is not its job to do so. As Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote in the white paper’s preface, “Those who question this decision [to maintain a British nuclear deterrent] need to explain why disarmament by the U.K. would help our security.” It should be the other way around--those who support nuclear weapons need to make a good case for how the weapons help security.
The U.S. nuclear policy also seems to be on autopilot, with plans to keep the capability to maintain an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads for decades to come. The discussion in the United States tends to focus on how to preserve the warhead production capability and not necessarily on why the United States would need nuclear deterrence and the nature of this deterrence. Even in their early January announcement, which was supposed to be a bold statement in support of a nuclear-weapon-free world, former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and his colleagues failed to come up with ideas that could seriously change the nature of the debate. The list of measures they suggested--from lowering alert levels of nuclear forces to halting production of fissile materials--is very good, but these have been on the table for some time, indicating that there is a reason that they haven’t materialized yet. I have a feeling that something more radical is necessary for the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free world to gain serious attention. How about former U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s old proposal--getting rid of all nuclear missiles? Could the United States do that? Unilaterally? That would send the right signal to Russia, Britain, and the other countries that are setting their nuclear policies for the coming decades.
Unfortunately, there is not much hope that the current political climate will produce proposals that could change the substance of nuclear policy discussions. Instead, we see the growing acceptance of the idea that nuclear forces should be preserved (more or less) in their current form, even if no one can clearly formulate missions for these forces. At the very least, the START process has kept some pressure on the United States and Russia (and indirectly on other countries) to think about nuclear arms reductions and has provided the framework for implementing these reductions. Now that this process is ending, there is nothing to replace it.
The book
Comments
We've commiserated the passing of START in 2009 many times. I think a priceless communication link between the Russian and American militaries will be broken and probably never repaired. With this passing, Arm's Control as we know it will all but fade into history.
By the way, the new website for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists will take some getting use to. (I hate change)
Frank Shuler
USA
I wouldn't mind passing of START if we could keep the communication links. Or build new ones.
But how can this links survive? Would they have any purspose if there would be no new agreements?
militaries don't maintain useless things, IMHO. And that's a diagnosis for all the links between the former cold-war opponents.
Well, military cooperation does not have to be about arms control. There are other things the military can do.
Nick:
Slightly disagree. Military links are not done in the abstract as would be political agreements. Military links are really people-to-people links forged by political opportunities. START, through the inspection provisions, encourages such military-to-military “friendships” and promotes a certain sense of cooperation and trust. In the last ten years, I bet we would all be surprised at the typical conversation between Russian and American military attachés at an embassy cocktail party. Without such a political agreement such opportunities are lost. As a historical rule of thumb, generals like parades and not war. But, there is always some politician that waves a piece of paper and declares, “Peace in our time!”
Frank Shuler
USA
I can’t understand the hysteria about a few MIVED Topol-m. US is plenty of MIRVed Minuteman-III and Trident-II and nobody screams. So the UK with its Trident-II and so France with its M-45.
If the SRF have decided to MIRV the mobile Topol-m, some rational conclusions may be behind such a decision. They are professionals very aware of the global situation.
I think that’s a fair question. Why is everyone “hysterical” over new land-based MIRVed Topol M ICBMs? My perception is that multiple-warhead ICBMs are designed to attack missile silos; whereby at least two warheads are needed to ensure destruction of the targeted missile site. MIRV land-based missiles are the most accurate delivery system now available to strike an opposition’s missile silos because the relative ease of point-to-point navigation. If indeed, multiple warhead land-based missiles are designed to strike silos, then they, by inference, are “first strike” weapons and server little purpose as a counter-strike weapon. If the United States were struck by, say, Russia for only an abstract example, the surviving Minuteman III fleet would have no targets to counter-strike because the Russian land-based ICBM would be gone from their silos. The temptation would to launch on warning instead of “on impact” given you would stand to lose 90% of your available ICBM force if struck. Launch on warning is inherently a dangerous business for either the United States or Russia; there is just too much risk associated with such a policy and international politics doesn’t support such a risk. Today, what situation would cause Russian and America to go to war? None I can think of. Single warhead missiles don’t have the accuracy and mass to strike a modern silo and therefore are not a “first strike’ weapon. As long as Russia continues to build and deploy MIRVed ICBMs, the United States will keep MIRVed ICBMs in inventory as a counter balance. I think “hysterical” is too dramatic a word, but I do think the United States is concerned. If the Topol-M ICBM fleet remains a single warhead weapon and in the immediate future (2015-18) evolved into Russia’s only land-based nuclear missile, I honestly believe all the existing Minuteman III force will be downloaded to a single warhead configuration and its future replacement would also be designed as a single warhead missile.
I fear for Russia, this is only a “numbers game”.
Frank Shuler
USA
I think, that the mirror argument is more correct. As far as USA have more MIRV ICBM and more MIRV SLBM, it retains a first-strike capability. Even with its maximal warheads load (6), in a post 2010 scenario, Topol-m would be unable to obliterate all Minuteman III silos because they are simply too many and Russia would be exposed to a devastating counter-strike from the sea and from remaining Minuteman III. On the contrary, in a USA first strike scenario, very few Russian ICBM would survive (perhaps less than a dozen). Therefore, the surviving ones must achieve “full potential”, namely as many warheads as possible, to retaliate and damage the aggressor. This will prevent the first strike. I think this is the rationality behind such a move. Furthermore, Russia must consider also another nuclear powers, no just USA (all-azimuth planning).
American and Russian stockpiles are dropping and this insert the minor players in the game. It will not be a 2 players game anymore. I think Americans are comfortable with his edge and they are no concerned with a few MIRVed Topol-m.
Regards
Kolokol:
I don’t think my previous post was made clear. When I spoke of land-based MIRVed missiles as “first strike” weapons I was inferring only silo-based ICBMs. I apologize for this “editorial oversight” on my part. I believe only Russian silo MIRV ICBM’s have the mass, targeting and navigation abilities to strike a Minuteman III silo. I have no issues with placing multiple warheads on mobile SS-27 Topol-M systems because I don’t think these weapons are any greater threat to the American land-based Minuteman III fleet than would be, say, submarine SLBMs. I don’t think these missiles have the accuracy to hit a Minuteman III silo and, therefore, these systems are not “first strike” weapons.
I completely agree it’s not a “two player” game anymore. The world is changing.
Frank Shuler
USA
And can't anyone intercept the 'birdies' like the Russian Topol-M new much -hyped warhead with hypesound "bus" the way the US plans to get on the incoming cruise missiles?-a tough job but doeable eventually...(Seeon the precursors of the Russian new invention to bust US ABM they fear so much :
http//www.buran.ru/htm/raks.htm
Since the START treaties have been superseeded by the SORT agreement or Moscow agreement limiting the # of warheads. I see the Russians using MIRV warheads to lower the # of launch systems they need to meet the SORT limits of 2200 to 1700 warheads. This strikes me as a cost savings measure rather than something sinister. In fact it makes the systems more vulnerable rather then less to a counterforce strike. The US with ample resources is instead choosing to place one warhead on all land based ICBM's and MIRV warheads on Trident SLBM's, within the SORT warhead ceilings. A far more expensive option that maximizes survivablity.
Our main threat is Russian MIRVed ICBMs. Russian subs with MIRVed SLBMs, pointing at scores American cities, E.U. cities and our military bases around the globe.
Various types of Russian weaponry recently supplied to Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, & North Korea, all of which Putin and his KGB thugs are using as terrorist, communist, and in the case of Iran & Venezuela, energy threats working with Russia energy Czar.
Thus far Washington seems to sleeping regarding Putin's expanding threat against the Western World.