Herein lies the problem. Unless ABM systems are completely eliminated by treaty, there will always need to be significantly more launchers and warheads than are required for effective deterrence. If the goal is to eventually eliminate nuclear weapons, then ABM systems must be eliminated first. If ABM systems were eliminated completely, it is feasible that as few as 100 launchers and 100 (low megaton-range) warheads would be needed for effective deterrence. Ballistic missile submarines-the most costly delivery system-could be eliminated completely in favor of silo-based ICBM's. I say again. If we are ever to see significant reductions and/or the elimination of nuclear weapons, ABM's have to go. Period.

Not at all. Missile defense is very much irrelevant, and probably more so at the low levels.

any prospects to see a full version, like in the good old days?

I doubt it. We'll see if the U.S. releases its more detailed report.

Full release from Sept 2011 for the US can be obtained by emailing the State Department; I received my copy the same day I sent in the Email. I wouldn’t hold my breath on getting a full data release from Moscow….

As far as ABM effecting deterrence there is no clear consensus on how many warheads it takes to "deter". I could make a very reasonable argument that you only need 5 nuclear warheads to deter another country from attacking you and I could also make a very reasonable argument as to why you need 3,000 warheads. When discussing deterrence and what deters citing actual warhead numbers is almost a bit of a red herring. Instead of focusing on the numbers focus on the mindset who you want to deter and focus on what exactly you wish to threaten in order to deter them.
The biggest obstacle I see to very low numbers is the multi-polar world we now find ourselves in. China is directly bordered by 3.5 Nuclear Weapons states (India, Pakistan, Russia and 1/2 credit for North Korea since they are a vessel of China). China has fought a war with both India and Russia, do you really think they will accept 100 warheads with 100 launchers knowing that Russia, US, and India are all armed with the same?

The other dark side of low numbers is that you can no longer target only the shooters. If all nuclear powers only have 100 weapons with 100 launchers you cannot waste any of your weapons on silos that might be empty by the time your weapons get there, instead you will need to directly target the cities and factories of your enemy. I admit that many civilians would die based on the locations of the shooters but many many more will die if the basis of our targeting changes from eliminating the threat to inflicting the maximum amount of civilian and economic damage. Very low numbers make escalation control more difficult and are inherently de-stabilizing (use it or lose it mindset). ABM has little to no effect on those factors.

Jon Grams

What is “effective deterrence”? Let’s assume for this discussion that deterrence could be maintained by holding at absolute risk 20 cities of any potential adversary. That no peer nation would begin a nuclear war by initiating an “out of the blue” first strike knowing that even in “victory” its 20 largest cities would lie in ruins. What would be gained? The question is how to hold those 20 cities at risk?

Just for argument sake, I still believe the redundancy of both land based ICBMs and sea based SLBMs are necessary to achieve that “effective deterrence” you seek. The irony is to establish deterrence, you first must present a target. In the US arsenal, Minuteman III is the target. If you want to “win” a nuclear war with America you must attack the Minuteman fleet in their silos; something that can only be done with nuclear weapons. Yet, by attacking Minuteman you invite your destruction at the hands of Trident. Nobody wins. Deterrence.

Russia understands this well. That is why Bulava is so important to the Kremlin.

However, what about the non-peer nuclear countries that may well prove to be a potential adversary? What about the nuclear power that only has a handful of nuclear ballistic missiles? What if such a nation launched a mobile ICBM at the United States with the warning if the US retaliates, four additional American cities would be destroyed? Would an American President order such a nuclear retaliation and utterly destroy this enemy while yet accepting the certain destruction of 4 additional US cities? Better still, how can you create deterrence with such a scenario?

That’s what the ABM system is good for. Any nuclear strike on the United States by Russia or China would simply overwhelm the American GBI system. However, a successful attack on the US by the above mentioned non-peer rival becomes very problematic. Attack the US with that single mobile ICBM and have that warhead intercepted totally changes the decision making dynamics. Even the threat that such a launch could be intercepted changes the situation. The American GBI system adds risk to the scenario; risk that may well be unsurmountable to any potential non-peer nuclear attacker. Deterrence.

Remember, the ABM system doesn’t have to be perfect. It doesn’t have to be 100% effective; or 50%. It only has to elevate the risk to an unacceptable level.

I think the key is to maintain a robust ABM system to protect a small ICBM fleet that is, in itself, incapable of having a first strike capability; coupled with a powerful retaliation capability in the form of Trident (and its successor). All of this could be done with 1000 nuclear warheads regardless.

Frank Shuler
USA