The first draft of the New START ratification law that emerged from the Duma committees was very brief - the entire document included one paragraph:
Ratify the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, signed in Prague on April 8, 2010.
That was it - 27 words (in Russian). But that, of course, was before the Duma had a chance to listen to the discussion in the U.S. Senate or to read the Senate resolution of ratification. Even though the Senate did not change the text of the treaty, the ratification resolution includes some understanding and conditions that Russia is concerned could affect the meaning of some of the treaty provisions.
To counter that, Russia drafted its own list of understandings, which were included into the treaty during the so-called second reading of the ratification law. These were included into the text of the law as amendments (which the second reading allows), although in effect it is a completely new treaty now. With the initial 27 words, which remained unchanged, is is a 1500-word documents that includes six articles and a number of sections and subsections.
I translated the Russian text, taken from the table that summarizes the amendments on the official Duma page of the law, into English. I used Google Translate, but edited the text somewhat to make sure that the intent of the Russian document is intact. I posted the full text of the draft law as a document, but some articles are worth reproducing here.
First, Article 2 of the law describes Duma's understandings of what are the conditions under which New START implementation will take place. Most of them deal with maintaining the Russian strategic forces, but some aim directly at the U.S. resolution:
Implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is carried out under the following conditions:
[...]
extending provisions of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and its counting rules to all strategic offensive weapons, as well as to the new types of strategic offensive weapons;
the question of extending the provisions of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive weapons must be resolved within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, established in accordance with Article XII of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, before this new kind of offensive weapons is deployed;
The issue, of course, is that the Senate stated that if a non-nuclear strategic-range system does not fall under the New START definition, then it is not limited by the treaty (like the "gliders" mentioned in the context of the Global Prompt Strike or maybe space-based conventionally-armed systems). Senate said that the only way to limit systems like these would be to include them into the text of the treaty, which would require Senate's advice and consent. This procedure, of course, would not prohibit deployment of these systems unless they are negotiated away. Russia wants a different procedure - each system of this kind would have to get an approval of the Bilateral Consultative Commission before it is deployed.
There is certainly plenty of room for disagreement here, but it is wrong to say that Russia declared it would leave the treaty "if Washington prepares strategic conventional armaments without permission from a Bilateral Consultative Commission," as the NTI's Global Security Newswire reported it.
Withdrawal conditions are specified in the Article 4 of the law. Here is the relevant part of the article in its entirety:
2. The Russian Federation would exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty specified in Article XIV of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty when exceptional circumstances arise that jeopardize its supreme interests. Such circumstances may include:
material breach of United States obligations under the new treaty on strategic offensive arms, which could threaten national security of the Russian Federation;
deployment by the United States, another state or group of States, of missile defense system that could substantially reduce the effectiveness of strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation;
buildup by the United States, another state or group of States, of strategic offensive arms or their decisions in the area of military development, as well as other circumstances which may endanger the national security of the Russian Federation;
deployment of the United States, other States or groups of States, of weapons that would prevent functioning of the Russian early-warning system.
This basically boils down to the already made statement on missile defense and hints at some possible space-weapons issues (e.g. if someone would use space-based systems to attack early-warning satellites). That's about it. Of course, the language of the third paragraph is quite enigmatic and could mean very much anything (it is as opaque in Russian as it is in English), but it seems to be there in case of things like a rapid Chinese building.
The differences that the ratification process uncovered are fairly substantial, so the life of New START will not be easy. However, nothing strikes me as irreconcilable and if the United States and Russia would keep the dialogue open, they will find a way to make sure that these differences do not undermine the disarmament process.
The book
Comments
I must admit, the Bilateral Consultative Commission is confusing to me. My initial understanding was this was to be a military-to-military communication tool to resolve local issues and such. Now, this seems more like a political policy tool to define both the mutually agreed applied terms of New START and farther deal with any (and perhaps potentially all) future bi-lateral security issues. The role of treaty inspection is to ensure Russia or the United States doesn’t actively deploy over 1550 (nuclear or conventional) warheads on more than 700 launchers; with an additional 100 launcher in operational reserve. That seems clear. Given that, what exactly is the BCC’s role?
Just a scenario. What if later this decade North Korea test a rudimentary ICBM and the United States decides to deploy a third missile field of Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) in Alaska. Is the role of the Bilateral Consultative Commission to provide the Kremlin-to-Pentagon setting by which Russia announces “in response” Moscow will increase its New START inventory of deployed nuclear weapons on alert from 1550 to 1800 warheads? Basically, the Bilateral Consultative Commission would become the New START “framework” arbitrator. Or, does Russia announce to the Bilateral Consultative Commission it will walk away from New START if the 13 American GBI missiles are installed because it upsets the Russo-American strategic balance?
Any understanding is appreciated.
Frank Shuler
USA
It's in the Article V.2 of the treaty:
When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
Presumably, if the parties would want to deploy one of those "hypersonic maneuverable warheads" they should discuss why these are not limited by the treaty. Russia seems to want BCC to have an option of declaring new types of weapons "strategic" even though they are not identified as such in the treaty. The U.S. doesn't want it. In some ways it is similar to the narrow vs. wide interpretation of the ABM Treaty, so we've been there.
We should keep in mind that this debate is largely theoretical at this point - no one is deploying anything yet. And I seriously doubt there is any real military value in all those exotic systems. But the debate could heat up, precisely because it is very theoretical.
I agree with many experts assessing that the New START is more important to Russia than to U.S. That means that the amendments are made firstly to give symmetric answer to U.S. Senate (that is prestige) and secondly give some room to maneuver in future (that is flexible politics). In reality, right now, there is virtually nothing what the amendments may refer to. Which is more, during whole duration of the Treaty, there will be probably not much more.
Look shortly at the perspective of next 5 years. When 2016 comes we will be asking:
1. what PGS really means, i.e. what we can field now and what it can do? - answer: there are only just a few technology demonstrators or prototypes at best,
2. what is a number of interceptors capable to kill Russian ICBMs and SLBMs, where they are deployed and what really their effectiveness is? - answer: there are nothing more than GBIs in same number and in the same locations as in 2011, with undefined, probably low, effectiveness (MDA is set to start SM3 blockII flight test as late as in 2014).
In another five years, by the beginning of ’20, when New START is due to expire we may have (if things go well/wrong) some first, if any, fielded pieces of PGS (conventional Minuteman? conventional Trident? some other platform? spaceborne? nothing?). There may be also some first SM3s blockII deployed aboard naval combatants (maybe some on surface in Central Europe as well).
Of course things may change, but not likely, so the real use of Duma amendments will rather not occur. On the other hand they may be utilized for some other purpose, as the security environment evolves and as international relations change.
Pavel
The policy difference between Russia and the US seems to be simple. The United States wants New START to deal with nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems. In other words, a replacement treaty for START.
However, Russia views the New START agreement as a treaty defining the overall strategic military relationship between Moscow and Washington. In that regard, New START is umbilically linked to missile defense, space-based weapons, conventional precision strike weapons, etc. In fact, New START could in theory be linked to anything the Kremlin thinks might influence the, so called, strategic balance between Russia and the United States.
Is the Bilateral Consultative Commission the place where such conversations will occur or is the role of the BCC to actually do something to resolve these future “misunderstandings”?
Frank Shuler
USA
I see no major difference of the understanding of how BCC work between Russia and US.
- If Russia deployed a rail-mobile system, the US would want to raise the issue of whether this system would fall under New START. BCC is the vehicle to determine this.
- If the United States deployed various CPGS systems, Russia would want, likewise, to determine the applicability of the Treaty to the system. Does it count toward the 700 (800) limit, if the conventional warhead is mounted on an ICBM? Does it count toward the limit, if it is some other sort of system, like a Boost-Glide RV, or a X-37B type orbiter? BCC would be the final arbiter of these issues.
While the US would undoubtly not like Russia poking into some of its "black" projects, what other way is there to determine whether some new strategic delivery vehicle falls under the treaty limits or not? While both sides have their differences on which future SDV might apply and which might not (or, even, what an SDV fundamentally is), BCC seems like the only forum to determine the unified position.
Moscow can't increase it's inventory to 1800 warheads. It can't even max out its existing quota. So it really is a moot point. At least in the next decade or so.
arthjomh: Yes, BCC is the natural forum for discussing these issues. But as I understand, the U.S. doesn't want to give BCC the power to make the final decisions on whether certain systems are SDV, so they should be limited by the treaty.
For example, boost-glide vehicles or space-based systems are not explicitly covered by New START. Russia seems to want limit those and the U.S. doesn't. But it cuts both ways - if Russia starts deploying its "hypersonic maneuverable" warheads, the U.S. would definitely want to count these against the treaty limits.
By the way, rail-mobile systems are limited by the treaty - you don't need BCC to determine that.
Pavel,
Then what would be the protocol for making such a determination? If US deploys a system which Russia considers to be treaty-limited and US does not, would that not lead to a material breach of the treaty from the Russian point of view, with all of it's consequences?
If every new potential SDV requires, basically, new treaty negotiations (or lack thereof) and cannot be discussed to some conclusion within BCC, then how is such a conflict to be avoided?
And by "discussed" I don't mean the way US "discusses" missile defense, where everyone in the State Department has this notion that as long as they say "missile defense is not targeted at Russia" a million times, it will miraculously become true and make Russia shut up and stop being a nuisance.
Feanor
If New START is ratified and goes into force this year (2011), Russia and the United States will have seven years to become “treaty compliant” with the Treaty itself lasting ten years and subject to a mutually agreed on five year extension after that. Russia should have no problem reaching the 1550 warhead limit with 700 (or less) launchers given its nuclear inventory today. Don’t you agree?
I do see issues as the last of the Soviet legacy systems finally reach the end of life (EOL) in the 2020‘s. Russia will struggle to deploy New START numbers as the Delta IVs, SS-18 & 19s, and Topol SS-25s finally reach EOL. Frankly, I don’t see how these “legacy systems” can be replaced in the given time limits.
The answer may well be a New START II agreement (post-2026) that negotiates yet lower numbers on operational warheads and launchers.
What are your thoughts regarding the Russian strategic nuclear inventory, size and composition, in the 2020‘s?
Frank Shuler
USA
artjomh: There is no particular protocol and the only real recourse is withdrawal from the treaty. But it probably won't come to that - none of these systems (and missile defense in particular) are that threatening.
Pavel,
Under the Phased Adaptive Approach, in 2018, United States Navy is planning to field 25 ships certified for Aegis BMD 5.0, armed with over 250 SM-3 Block IA and Block IB interceptors. 43 ships and 436 interceptors, if you count Aegis 3.6.1 and 4.0.1 versions, which are upgradable over time to 5.0. Aegis 5.0 has limited anti-ICBM engagement capacity.
Plus two ashore sites with SM-3 Block IIB.
This is hardly what I would call not that threatening.
The SS-25 will remain in service probably longer then projected now, via life time extensions, same as the SS-18 and SS-19 have been extended past their original service life. But yes if the strategic re-armament program continues at the pace that's planned, Russia will not replace these systems on a 1-1 level. Not in the foreseeable future anyways. I don't think we need further reductions negotiated, I think Russia needs to work on maintaining its inventory numbers at sufficient levels.
artjomh: No, it is not. Missile defense has some fundamental problems, so that deployment won't change anything.
artjomh
Numbers are not everything when you consider missile defense. SM3s block I pose very limited threat to Russian ICBMs striking mainland USA. Only SM3s block II may make a difference, but as you know they are due to go flight tested in 2014. However, as it is virtually new missile, we cannot be sure when they can be fielded and what exactly is their effectiveness. And the costs! How many of them might U.S. afford to deploy and in what time?
Everything here is quite uncertain, as I have pointed out in my comment to Pavel’s January 6th entry.
m
artjomh
Just to offer my opinion.
I absolutely think the AEGIS Block IB interceptors will be operationally introduced to the US Navy and I also believe, with a high degree of confidence, the SM-3 Block IIA will test successfully and be introduced for ABM ship-based defense.
I also believe the SM-3 Project will continue with yet new systems and there will be many additional technical improvements and future capabilities.
However, I have real doubts the SM-3 will be ever be installed on land. NATO will kick this issue around for the next ten years before any decisions are made. The US will probably install the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems in Europe to provide limited ABM defense for our military bases in Germany and wait on NATO for its “Alliance ABM System”. President Obama had to “replace” the George Bush GBI system in Poland with something to justify the decision to politically terminate the “European GBI Solution” and the compromise land-based SM-3 was the result.
Again, just my opinion.
Frank Shuler
USA
Actually, I think ashore sites are fairly irrelevant here. I completely agree that they were a throw-away gesture to soothe European feelings about pulling out of GBI. And yes, I also agree that none of this is relevant today and will only become relevant somewhere at the end of this decade, when technology matures even further.
However, the fact that by the end of this decade almost half of the entire USN strike component (cruisers and destroyers) will be dedicated to anti-missile role (with an emergent anti-ICBM capability) should be worrysome. Such a potential should concern Russia, but it will probably downright scare China, as their short- and medium-range deterrent is already under threat from Aegis BMD versions 3.6.1 and 4.0.1.
The one key bottleneck is going to be number of missiles purchased for deployment (e.g. currently USN fields only ~40 SM-3 Block I, despite much larger capacity), but if the incredible breakout potential does not worry Russian and Chinese strategic planners, they aren't doing their job.
Pavel: I've read your article, but its too general, so there isn't much to comment upon. You focus too much on intentions and motives, while ignoring the sheer potential of missile defense to erode Chinese deterrent down the line.
I'm not ignoring the "sheer potential of missile defenses", I'm just saying that there is no potential there.
Pavel -- if I may, I think artjomh and you are looking at slightly different things. I, of course, agree with Pavel that anything short of a perfect missile defense will not _actually_ neutralize the threat from nuclear-tipped ICBMs since even the loss of one US city is a cost too high to bear. see eg.:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/21/what_missile_defense
But the point I believe artjomh is making is reasonable: for the bureaucratic Pentagon-hardline equivalent analysts in Russia, the mere possibility that 436 interceptors will be able to -- in their probably wrong conservative judgment -- 'neutralize' 436 Russian warheads is a concern which will likely put bureaucratic pressure to increase the Russian arsenal. Whether or not it is logical, necessary or makes sense is another matter entirely.
Yousaf: I understand this point very well - of course one could make an argument that 436 interceptors (or 43) are a threat to Russian missiles. What I am saying is that we shouldn't take this "prudent military planner" BS for face value.
Gentlemen:
If I can make a point. Geo-politically. the difference between Russia and the United States today is simple. Russia defines its very national security by its relationship with Washington; the United States does not. Moscow feels every move by Washington is at their expense. Washington feels almost ambivalent in return. The view here is Russia is an adversary but certainly no enemy. Even as an adversary, we have more in common with each other than any issue that separates us. In fact, what exactly are the issues that separate us? Honestly, none I can think of...
The United States sees a changing world, full of new risks. I don’t think Washington is prepared to negotiate away technology that might be useful in managing perhaps some of those risks even if that technology is decades away from being practical. (if it ever is indeed “practical”)
I can assure you that the “war planners” in the Pentagon tonight are far more concerned by the Pakistani nuclear inventory than Russia’s. That’s the new world we live in.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank you have to realize that Russia is still considering the near-abroad to be its exclusive sphere of influence. As long as the US tries to build bilateral ties with Central Asia, the Caucus, or Ukraine, Russia will see this as an undue expansion of US influence. For better or for worse that's the reality of modern Russian politics. Given the questionable nature of the "democratic" governments in this part of the world, no argument can be made along the lines "if the Georgians want to join NATO, Russia isn't allowed to stop them". So within that context Russia needs to have redundant credible deterrent to make sure that no matter what the situation, if push comes to shove, Russia will be (on the large scale) undisputed in its actions within at least the near abroad.
Part of the way to achieve this is of course diplomatic, hence the warming up of Russian relations with France, Germany, and other major European powers. But another part of this is making sure that the US does not advance so far with BMD technology as to potentially invalidate Russian deterrent in the future.
Pavel it's not about the real current capabilities of BMD, as it is about the general direction of military evolution to an age where ICBM arsenals are shrinking and BMD programs are multiplying. It's not about tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow. It's about some years down the line.
Feanor
Washington will never recognize a Russian “exclusive sphere of influence” anywhere in the world any more that Moscow would recognize an American one. Both sides will always attempt to posture for the advantage. That is how the “great game” is played; it is understood.
From the American perspective, I think Ukraine is slightly different from the trans-Caucus countries (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) Ukrainian democracy isn’t American democracy or even Western democracy but it seems to work for Kiev. People vote, governments fall, opposition parties contest, citizens assemble and protest, the press critiques, the army stays in the barracks, ... sounds like democracy to me. Most American’s have no clue who the opposition party is in Russia. Or, if there is an opposition party. I think the future hope is that the “Ukrainian democracy model” will spread to the trans-Caucus countries. We’ll see.
By the way, Russia has already “lost” Central Asia to China.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank for four decades the US did recognize a Soviet sphere of influence. I won't get into the Ukranian kleptocracy, which has to do with their economic weakness much more then their political freedom. The Central Asia question is an open one as it stands. Tadjikistan only exists in its current form due to decisive Russian military intervention, and continued support. Only a few short years ago Russian border guards were necessary to maintain the border.
The problem for the CARs is that they're fairly small. They can't deal with China on anything close to equal terms. And while their relationship with Russia is also far from equal, Russia is far less powerful in that region. There is also the question of inertia, both cultural, and infrastructural. Russia has a considerable chance to hold on to the CARs.
But regardless of what the situation actually is, Russian political elites believe that they can and they act accordingly.
Feanor
Of course I would respectfully argue, historically the United States never conceded any “sphere of influence” to the Soviet Union. The United States continued to probe even the very nations of the Warsaw Pact for influence during the Soviet era. Politically, the US refused to even recognize the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States going back to 1940; symbolic nevertheless. It was the Soviet decision to extend its influence by attempting to establish such a sphere of influence in Afghanistan that brought so much conflict to Russo-American relations in the 1980’s. The one caveat, Cuba. With the Kennedy-Khrushchev “agreement” of 1961, the United States agreed in exchange for Moscow removing all nuclear weapons and delivery systems from Cuba, the US pledged not to invade the island or destabilize the Cuban political leadership. De-facto a Soviet “sphere”.
One only has to see the recent Tajikistan ceding of land to China to recognize how China has ascended in Central Asia and how far Russia has to “catch up”.
Russia and the United States have much in common; many shared goals. Fighting terrorism is only one. Keeping China “honest” may be another.
Frank Shuler
USA
Tadjikistan's actions may be a recognition of Chinese power, but not of Chinese patronage. The act followed a similar border dispute resolution by Russia. The act (conceivably suggested, or inspired by Russia) if anything is an attempt to prevent further conflict. For the time being Russia retains superior positions in the CARs.
China is making inroads, especially economically, but I don't think you have the evidence to convincingly demonstrate that China holds the upper hand.
Yes keeping China in check is definitely another common policy objective.