You can never guess what kinds of straws people would grasp when desperate. Who knew that the New START treaty would come under criticism for allegedly "fumbling" such issues as rail-mobile ICBMs and "reloads"? I'm not sure that many people even remember what "reload capability" is. Well, apparently some do.
Questions about rail-mobile missiles started to pop up a few days ago. I haven't heard about "reloads", though, until I saw a piece by Christopher Ford, currently a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Entitled "Does 'New START' Fumble Reloads and Rail-mobile ICBMs" the piece conveniently summarizes the arguments and "frets about" scenarios in which
"SS-25-style treaty-accountable deployed ICBM launcher could be accompanied by one or more nuclear-armed reload missiles and any necessary reload vehicles,"
or, even worse,
"unlimited numbers of rail-mobile launchers deployed with nuclear-armed missiles."
All this, of course, is just plain crazy.
Each of these scenarios starts with the fact that missiles are not limited by the treaty as long as they are not loaded into a launcher - Article II.1a sets a limit of 700 on deployed missiles and bombers, while Article II.1b, which deals with non-deployed systems, limits only launchers.
Here is where the "reloads" come in. Chris Ford and his colleagues conclude that since the treaty does not explicitly prohibit the practice of reloading a launcher once it fires its missile, each ICBM launcher could have a stash of missiles stored nearby or could be trailed by a truckload of missiles that would come handy in a "protracted" nuclear warfighting. And, of course, the argument goes, Russia with its mobile launchers would have an advantage over the United States that is stuck with its silos. This is presumably a scary prospect.
Should anyone think that a "protracted nuclear warfighting" is just downright crazy, Ford refers to a document that in his mind authoritatively established that it is not - "during the Cold War, Soviet strategists planned for protracted warfighting in part by preparing to decontaminate and reload such silos over the course of a few days." The document in question is the 1983 edition of Soviet Military Power. Yes, it's not a mistake - 1983. Why would anyone today believe the claims of the 1983 Soviet Military Power completely escapes me; unless, of course, that person was absent from any kind of discussions of Soviet policies during the last thirty years. We know now that key claims of that time about Soviet intentions and capabilities were very wrong. And there is no shred of evidence that would suggest that the Soviet Union ever contemplated either fighting a protracted nuclear war or decontaminating and reloading its ICBM launchers in the process. (There may have been plans, however unrealistic, to reload submarines, though.)
Of course, people who still consult the 1983 Soviet Military Power for spiritual guidance would not believe the evidence from actual Soviet documents. So, there are other considerations to take into account in considering the "reload" issue. Probably the most important one is that while non-deployed missiles are not limited by the treaty, they would have to be declared, tagged and open to inspections. Inspections would be able not only to count all non-deployed missiles, but also to track them wherever and whenever they go. Moving them covertly, even if it were possible, wouldn't help - there are inspection to prevent that. To suggest that in this situation anybody would be able to create a stash of unaccountable non-deployed missiles is simply ludicrous. Equally not serious is the claim that "reloading in wartime remains a real possibility for mobile systems, and wouldn’t take very long." Has anyone tried?
Now to the rail-mobile launchers. The argument there is that the treaty does not define these creating a loophole that allows them to escape from the treaty limits. The treaty indeed defines a "mobile launcher of ICBM" as essentially a road-mobile launcher:
45 (35.) The term "mobile launcher of ICBMs" means an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the self-propelled device on which it is mounted.
"Self-propelled" is part of the definition here and it means that a rail-mobile launcher would not be covered by it (unless one would want to define the entire train as a mobile launcher, but let's not go there). From this, Ford and his colleagues leap to a conclusion that rail-mobile launchers are not limited by the treaty, especially if they non-deployed, i.e. do not contain deployed missiles. I'd rather quote the original claim here, otherwise people would think I am making it up:
“New START” would seem to allow a party to have unlimited numbers of rail-mobile launchers deployed with nuclear-armed missiles, at least if these missiles are not actually uploaded. In such a scenario, if you gave the signal, all your rail-mobile launchers could be uploaded with MIRVed missiles in extremely short order, but prior to that point, none of these launchers or missiles or warheads would fall within treaty limits: you could have as many as you like.
This is, of course, wrong. Article II of the treaty limits all launchers, deployed and non-deployed, and does not care whether they are mobile or not:
[II.1] (c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers
As for the definition of an "ICBM launcher", the Protocol is very clear:
28. (56.) The term "ICBM launcher" means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.
There is nothing self-propelled here, so any rail-mobile launcher is an ICBM launcher and therefore would definitely be "caught" by the treaty limit of 800 non-deployed launchers. Note that the definition does not require the launcher to be actually used for a launch - it is enough that it is intended to be used in that role.
The entire Ford's argument is built on an assertion that a launcher that is mobile but not self-propelled cannot be considered a mobile launcher under the treaty definition, so it not limited by the Article II.1.c of the treaty. He goes on suggesting that even a deployed launcher of this kind would be exempt from the treaty limits, but only to prove that once you start from a false statement you can arrive to literally any conclusion, however arbitrary and false.
Speaking seriously, the treaty indeed does not define or otherwise specifically mention rail-mobile launchers. The reason is simple - there are none deployed. The last RT-23UTTH/SS-24 rail-mobile missiles had been removed from service in 2002 and the last base was liquidated in 2007. The New START treaty is fairly clear in that it deals only with those systems that exist - since all mobile launchers of ICBM are road-mobile, they are defined accordingly. The treaty does not define a number of other, more exotic systems, like air-launched ballistic missiles, for example. The reason is simple - instead of listing every possible system basing configuration one can come up with (which was more or less what the original START did), the New START has Article V.2, which leaves the issue to the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
On balance, it is clear that this kind of arguments should not have a chance of surviving an encounter with reality. However, knowing the U.S. political process, I would be more cautious. After all, I know that a few people took them fairly seriously. And it wouldn't be the first time a ridiculous issue is blown out of proportions. We will see.
The book
Comments
As an American rightwing Russophobe, I'd say that if the biggest problem with New START is the legal possibility of rail-mobile heavy ICBMs, then the treaty should be ratified tomorrow.
If Russia declares the Bulava missile operational, ready, deployed and perfected tomorrow morning, that makes 12 years that it spent in development, testing, etc. A system that is A) rail-mobile with B) 8-10 warheads and presumably C) Topol-style anti-ABM capability would be similarly slow to develop.
Dr. Christopher Ford’s bio:
http://www.hudson.org/learn/index.cfm?fuseaction=staff_bio&eid=ChrisFord
While not technically part of the Hudson Institute, the New Paradigms Forum (NPF) is a voice in the debate on nuclear arms; albeit it appears from the “political right”.
He makes a fair, if unrealistic, point on reloads.
[Stealthy uploading of empty silos would surely be very difficult, and wartime reloading highly problematic indeed. Mobile missiles, however, present quite another situation. If you can’t find them, you cannot prevent uploading, or even count on knowing when the immediate strategic balance is being shifted against you through such activity. Furthermore, reloading in wartime remains a real possibility for mobile systems, and wouldn’t take very long.]
Imagine a TEL launch system with one launcher and a ample supply of reloads not limited by missile or warhead count? Or, a rail based system where the launcher car is separated from the missile cars. I took the article as more of an academic pursuit; to define where the “loop holes” might be in New START. If there is perceived paranoia in the article, it comes because the Russian military today is building new, modern nuclear systems while the United States remains committed to it’s legacy arsenal that basically hasn’t changed since 1970. That status-quo is uncomfortable for some American; indifferent to most.
Frank Shuler
USA
Simply bizarre.
As of September 30th, the United States had 5,113 warheads in its nuclear weapons stockpile in information released yesterday. I wonder how many nuclear weapons exist in Russia's inventory? Perhaps some transparency by the Kremlin would reinforce trust between Russia and the United States. Just a thought.
Frank Shuler
USA
Pavel, do you have an opinion on the eventual size and distribution of the Russian nuclear arsenal when it achieves New START compliance? Hans M. Kristensen posted a recent opinion that the Kremlin numbers for SORT and New START don’t add up. Russia has stated it has 2000 strategic warheads deployed in compliance with SORT and will cut that number to 1550 in the New START agreement. However, Hans Kristensen also stated that it is Russian military policy not to count strategic warheads for its bombers as ever being “operationally deployed” and thus wouldn't be counted under the New START limit of 1550. I inferred that all Russian bomber based weapons are stored in off-site armories and are not “operationally” deployed on-base with the Tu-160 and -95 fleets. Thus, practically all of Russia’s strategic nuclear inventory would be based on ICBM and SLBM systems. His contention is that Russia doesn’t have the existing launchers to support such a deployment. Discounting the bomber weapons, how does Russia get to 1550 strategic deployed weapons over the seven year term of New START? Of course, we’re assuming ratification.
The 1251 document President Obama released to the Senate is also interesting. The baseline number of single warhead Minuteman IIIs fall from 450 to 420 and all 14 Trident submarines are to be retained. The Trident boats however will reduce their launch capacity from 24 launch tubes each to only 20; with a max of 240 launchers (12 boats) operational at one time. It doesn’t seem the Trident tubes need to be made inoperable, just not loaded; just as no Minuteman silos have to be destroyed. The US bomber inventory is also interesting. The number of nuclear bombers are to be reduced from 94 to 60. The US will “convert” some of these bombers to conventional-only bombers; “not accountable under the treaty”. Curious how this is to be done.
Thoughts?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank, Trident launch tubes WOULD, if fact, need to be rendered inoperable under New START guidelines, by removing their gas generators.
The difference with START is that the entire boat need not be cut up to reduce the delivery vehicle requirements.
Anonymous
Thanks for the clarification. Interesting. So can I infer that Russian inspection of a Trident boat would evolve only making sure four launch tubes were empty and that all missile launch support equipment, such as the gas generators, had been removed; all done from the desk of a Trident submarine, with the missile launch doors opened? I would also assume that the tube could be made once again “operational” if somehow needed in the future. Are my assumptions correct?
Frank Shuler
USA
Yes, Frank, that's pretty much the case.
New START Protocol really lays it out. In order to be considered "eliminated", the launch hatches, superstructure fairings and, if applicable, gas generators must be removed from the submarine.
The submarine then must remain in the open for a 60-day period during which reconnaissance satellites must be able to verify that that the above procedures have been observed, after which the submarine may move to its permanent basing area.
In case of conversion to an SSGN, the launch tubes must be made inoperable to launch the smallest SLBM in national arsenal, by reducing the volume of the launch tube and removing SLBM launch subsystems, if applicable. The submarine must then be made available for inspection for a 30-day period.
As for inspections, the Protocol is really dense in specifics, but my understanding is that inspectors may verify the number of operational launchers on each submarine as well as inspect one launcher to verify the number of re-entry vehicles.
In case of re-conversion back to operational status I am guessing that the inspectors would simply certify that an extra launcher has been added under the grand total of 800.
Anonymous
Agreed. The Protocol is indeed “dense” in certain areas. For example, the launch hatches, superstructure fairings and, if applicable, gas generators must be removed from the inspected submarine; but, I assume that is only for the inspection term. Obviously for example, the missile launch hatches would need to be fitted and secure for the operational boat to go to sea.
I’m still slightly unclear if existing Minuteman III ICBM silos, outside of those deploying operational missiles need to be “destroyed”. From my reading, it seems so. There will be some push-back from Congress if the US has to destroy silos and Russia does not.
The bomber issue is just as contrived. The United States has declared a total inventory of 94 strategic bombers of which only 60 will retain the nuclear option. This number of 60 appears to be 44 B-52s and 16 B-2s that are combat coded for the nuclear mission. The American inventory today includes 76 B-52s and 18 B-2 aircraft. (a farther 17 B-52H bombers are held in non-fly, but maintained status) The total B-2 inventory (20 aircraft) consist of 16 operational bombers, 2 “operational” aircraft always in depot maintenance and 1 training and 1 R&D aircraft. The conventional B-52Hs will lose their ability to carry ALCM externally and have their nuclear mission equipment removed and inspected. It appears the only way to tell an nuclear B-52 from a conventional bomber will be the wing cruise missile pylons. If they’re installed, it’s a nuclear B-52.
Frank Shuler
USA
>Obviously for example, the missile launch hatches would need to be fitted and secure for the operational boat to go to sea.
Are you sure about that, Frank? Part III, Section IV, Paragraph 1 seems pretty specific to me that in order for an SLBM to be eliminated, hatches must be removed. I'm no submariner, but perhaps the boat can stay pressurized for dive even with launch hatches removed? Perhaps welding the hatch shut will count as "removal"? I honestly don't know
As for ICBM silos, unfortunately Bob Gates wasn't very specific about that. In his math, US'll have "up to" 420 Minuteman III silos in some deployed/non-deployed mix, 240 deployed Trident D5 launch tubes and 60 nuclear-capable bombers.
That's 720 systems altogether, with a 97.3% readiness. Add to that another 40 launch tubes in 2 non-deployed submarines in overhaul and you have 760 overall.
This means US can have another 40 empty silos just sitting there, perhaps for future Prompt Global Strike purposes.
Anonymous
I was thinking from the perspective of “noise” on open missile door hatches. And, there are just too many hull integrity issues; it would be akin to running at sea with the torpedo doors always open & flooded. (just my opinion) I just can’t see the US Navy agreeing to that; but, welded hatches make sense.
I wonder if it would ever be possible, in a practical sense, to launch a Prompt Global Strike (PGS) mission from an existing American ICBM field? Surely such a launch would come from a location not basing nuclear ICBMs. Vandenberg, for example? Or, why silo-base such a weapon at all? Why not mobile TEL-base the PGS system and have the greatest flexibility?
But I do agree with you. The “open” 40 launcher slots in the Treaty available to the United States have PGS written all over them.
Frank Shuler
USA
I think PGS is an insane proposition in the first place.
But barring some common sense making its presence known at Pentagon, I agree that basing any conventional ICBM far far away from North Dakota to prevent any confusion in Russian ballistic missile early warning system is what I'd call A Good Idea.
Now, if only Pentagon would also establish some sort of joint data sharing and monitoring centre together with the Russians and the Chinese to ensure that nobody gets any wrong ideas, PGS might even seem viable. But I won't hold my breath.
Why not use mobile TELs for Prompt Global Strike?
I think because we (the US) have nothing "on the shelf" for a mobile ICBM.
I think that "Promptness" could be compromised and an old liquid-fueled design could be used. But, then, I'd be planning to use conventional ICBMs pretty heavily and so wear-and-tear on silos would be a problem.
(My strategic posture would subordinate nuclear ICBMs to conventional, and conventional ICBMs would be as common as Tomahawks)
Anonymous
Actually, the US has pushed for such a joint Russo-American “exchange” facility since the old START II ramification process. It just never seems to gain traction with the Kremlin. Does anyone share nuclear information with the Chinese? Does anyone really “talk” with the Chinese?
The US Prompt Global Strike project is only the next logical step in ballistic missile development; not “insane” into itself. Think of it as a 9K720 Iskander with intercontinental range; GPS accuracy and various payloads. Orbital Sciences Corporation is rumored to have a Minotaur program in development to test such a system in 2011-12. We’ll see.
Frank Shuler
USA
johnbragg
I don’t think the PGS system will be silo based in any event. All the work Orbital is doing on the Minotaur project is pad-launched; launched from an “unimproved” site at Wallops. I know Kodiak Island has also been mentioned as a potential host site. I also think the Orbital Sciences work on the PGS-Minotaur is really a big R&D project to date; to test the technology and see what’s possible.
Remember also, the Falcon Project is live and well. The Blackswift HTV-3X really wasn’t canceled back in October 2008, it just went “black”.
Frank Shuler
USA