When it came to excess and waste, the Soviet Union was hard to beat - its defense industry produced military equipment in inordinate numbers. For some reason sea-launched ballistic missiles were particularly popular. Each SLBM launcher had more than three missiles produced for it - "for tests and storage".
A note in the Kataev archive has numbers for projected production volumes for some of the systems: each R-27 launcher (SS-N-6, Project 667A/Yankee submarine) had 3.64 missiles produced, R-29 launcher (SS-N-8, Project 667B/Delta I and Project 667BD/Delta II) had 4.7, R-29R (SS-N-18, Project 667BDR/Delta III) - 4.3, R-29RM (SS-N-23, Project 667BDRM/Delta IV) - 4.0, R-39 (SS-N-20, Project 941/Typhoon) - 3.
Land based ICBMs were produced in smaller numbers - each launcher of R-36, UR-100N, and MR UR-100 was supposed to have respectively 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 missiles produced for it. As the Soviet data indicated, that was roughly on par with the numbers in the United States.
It's hard to tell why the difference is so large. Somewhere else in his notes Kataev mentioned that the Soviet Navy had a plans for their submarines to return to port after they fire their missiles for a few reloads. I would say the Rocket Forces had a more realistic view of the nuclear war business they were in.
While it may seem no more than a curiosity today, these numbers have some significance for missile proliferation. A number of recent accounts of the North Korean and Iranian missile programs indicate quite convincingly that those programs used some components of the R-27/SS-N-6 missile. The East-West Institute study and most strongly Ted Postol's technical addendum (PDF) to it indicate that Iran used the R-27 vernier engine in its Safir space launcher. North Korea also appears to have access to a number of R-27/SS-N-6 missiles and used them in its missiles (again, I rely on Ted Postol's analysis).
As far as missile proliferation is concerned, the good news is that neither North Korea nor Iran seem to have the technology to produce powerful rocket engines, so they have to rely on whatever the Soviet components they managed to get hold of. The bad news is that there are a lot of those components out there, enough to build a not-so-small missile force.
At the peak of the R-27 deployment, in mid-1970s, the Soviet Union had 544 launchers for missiles of that type. This means that almost 2000 missiles were manufactured. Of those, at least 653 missiles (492 R-27 and 161 R-27U) were used in flight tests during 1968-1988. The 544 deployed missiles were fueled, so they most likely have been liquidated after being withdrawn from service. This leaves about 800 missiles that have been produced, but never fueled. Unfortunately, it looks like some of them ended up outside of Russia. We don't know how many, of course, but given the number of missiles available, it can easily be a few dozen and could be as high as a few hundred.
UPDATE 01/17/10: As some of my colleagues pointed out, the number of "dry" missiles is probably significantly lower than 800 - most produced missiles were deployed on submarines at some point of their relatively short lives and therefore were fueled. Main engine, which was submerged in the fuel tank, would also come into contact with fuel - this would would definitely limit its lifetime. Vernier engines, however, were outside of the tank and therefore could be used again, if necessary,
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Pavel its not uncommon for Naval Staff to think of submarine getting reloaded after firing their missile during war either at port or out at sea with replenishment vessel.
Nothing wrong with that concept , at the end of the day they are not disposable weapons if they survive they will come back.
Pavel, the proliferation of R-27/SS-N-6 missile technology has long been suspected and covertly documented. However, your ratio numbers are the first I’ve seen regarding industrial production and very interesting. Such technology supplied to China filtered on to North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran. India benefited directly from Moscow. I’ve often wondered if one day the Kremlin would regret such transgressions.
I also agree with your conclusions regarding re-arming Soviet ballistic missile submarines in wartime. Seems nonsense to me. Only if a Soviet submarine launched its missiles in a first-strike against a non-peer (read USA) rival could such a scenario exist. Else, the Soviets would not have had bases that survived a nuclear counterstrike to return to. Replenishment at sea? Fantasy. Submarines can’t even load torpedos in open sea conditions much less ballistic missiles. I just don’t see it.
Frank Shuler
USA
Pavel,
Data from the Kataev archive (about misseles production volumes) correlates with real numbers for other soviet missiles.
You can see, particularly, maximum levels of deployed launchers for SS-4 or SS-12 and numbers for produced missiles.
Alexander Stukalin
Moscow
I've read somewhere that in the 60's US had considered reloading their subs at bases near Japan in wartime. So as a concept it's probably not nonsensical.
As far as Soviet bases not surviving for reloads, let's not forget about Balaclava. Plus, I don't see why they couldn't have had mobile loaders, even ship-based.
Reko
As a concept, anything is possible.
The United States developed three such forward deployed naval bases for nuclear-armed strategic submarines, the first at Holy Loch, Scotland during the Polaris days of the 1960‘s. This facility was used to support forward-based Polaris submarines on patrol and was certainly capable, and did, rearm Polaris submarines; both missiles and warheads. The dedicated submarine tender, the USS Proteus (AS-19), facilitated the construction of port infrastructure at Holy Loch necessary to support the Polaris boats. Later both Rota, Spain and Apra, USA Guam were also developed to support Polaris submarines. Perhaps the facility on Guam is the base near Japan you speculated?
By the days of Poseidon in 1972, such forward bases were deemed not necessary as the increased range of the Poseidon SLBM rendered them obsolete.
My point in a nuclear war none of these bases, or any bases for that matter, were secure from a nuclear attack. Neither the Kremlin or the Pentagon could plan on it being so. In fact, the only value of recovering and rearming returning ballistic missile submarines would be to provide deterrence from a third party nuclear power that might want to take advantage of the situation. However, with your country in nuclear ruin, it doesn’t make much military sense, does it?
I stand by my conclusions that rearming nuclear submarines in open sea is impossible. (especially liquid fueled SLBMs)
Frank Shuler
USA
This is highly interesting!
Indeed, since the closed-cycle main-engine of the R-27 was submerged in the UDMH (or whatever the exact composition of this fuel was) tank, and apparently most missiles probably were fueled at some point of their career, cannibalization of those may be difficult, but it's a completely different case with the open-cycle two-chamber vernier - that may be the explanation why we see only the vernier-part of the Isayev 4D10 in Iran (although there may be indications for indigenous production of that engine-type in Iran, too - don't know if this can be taken serious).
The same may be true with the R-29 (according to the 4.7-figure, that would be over 1300 missiles manufactured - do we yet know how many of those were used up in tests?), which in essence employs the same kind of technology than the R-27, only larger and in two-staged configuration.
I think it may be possible that the new iranian launcher 'Simorgh' uses larger vernier-engines (see: http://www.b14643.de/Spacerockets_1/Rest_World/Simorgh%20IRILV/Gallery/newengine_big.jpg) scavenged from R-29, possibly as upper-stage-engines analogous to the modified R-27-vernier-engine found on the Safir IRILV - does anybody know where i can obtain photographic material and/or verified/verifiable data on the Isayev 4D75 (R-29 lower stage) and 4D76 (R-29 upper stage) engines for comparison purposes?
By the way, i'd advise on taking Mr. Postol's analyses with a grain of salt - i for myself reconstruct the internal profiles of the 'Shahab-3M'(=Ghadr-1, maybe also Nodong-B) and Safir IRILV quite differently (Mr. Postol neglects e.g. things like minimum aerodynamic stability around Mach 1 or the possibility of a common intertank-bulkhead in my eyes), and thus estimate somewhat different numbers for these missile-types.
“Reko
As a concept, anything is possible.
The United States developed three such forward deployed naval bases for nuclear-armed strategic submarines, the first at Holy Loch, Scotland during the Polaris days of the 1960‘s. This facility was used to support forward-based Polaris submarines on patrol and was certainly capable, and did, rearm Polaris submarines; both missiles and warheads. The dedicated submarine tender, the USS Proteus (AS-19), facilitated the construction of port infrastructure at Holy Loch necessary to support the Polaris boats. Later both Rota, Spain and Apra, USA Guam were also developed to support Polaris submarines. Perhaps the facility on Guam is the base near Japan you speculated?
By the days of Poseidon in 1972, such forward bases were deemed not necessary as the increased range of the Poseidon SLBM rendered them obsolete.
My point in a nuclear war none of these bases, or any bases for that matter, were secure from a nuclear attack. Neither the Kremlin or the Pentagon could plan on it being so. In fact, the only value of recovering and rearming returning ballistic missile submarines would be to provide deterrence from a third party nuclear power that might want to take advantage of the situation. However, with your country in nuclear ruin, it doesn’t make much military sense, does it?
I stand by my conclusions that rearming nuclear submarines in open sea is impossible. (especially liquid fueled SLBMs)” – Frank Shuler
Are you familiar with the terms ”mobile basing”?
Russia launched at least one ship of SADKO class, the Aleksandr Brykin to assist Projekt 941 SSBNs.
Aleksandr Brykin ('Sadko' class) ballistic missile transport (1 ship)
(Project 11570)
Displacement: 11,440 tons full load
Dimensions: 159.07 x 23 x 5.48 meters/521.8 x 75.5 x 18 feet
Propulsion: Diesel-electric, 2 diesels, 2 shafts, 12,000 bhp, 16.5 knots
Crew: 148
Cargo: 16 SS-N-20 SLBM; 2902 cubic meters other cargo
Radar: Fregat-MA/Half Plate-A 3-D air search
EW: Bell Shroud intercept, Bell Squat jammer, 2 PK-16 decoy RL, 2 PK-10 decoy RL
Armament: 4 30 mm AA, 2 SA-N-8 SAM position, 1 MRG-14 grenade launcher
Concept/Program: Large missile transport intended to support 'Typhoon' class SSBNs. Missiles are stored vertically and lifted by a 125-ton crane.
Classification: Unknown.
Builders: United Admiralty SY, St. Petersburg
Name Year FLT Homeport Notes
Aleksandr Brykin 1987 NOR
Now, if such ships aren’t for re-supplying SSBNs with new missiles AT SEA, I don’t know what they’re for at all! Granted it implies solid-fuelled SS-N-20 Sturgeons, but nevertheless re-arming boomers they do. It's not merely a conceptual idea, is it?
At Gremikha, the Russians built facilities that include hardened submarine shelters, hacked out of granite cliffs for exact purpose of giving them protection from a first-strike, thus survivability for a second, retaliatory strike.
“…In fact, the only value of recovering and rearming returning ballistic missile submarines would be to provide deterrence from a third party nuclear power that might want to take advantage of the situation. However, with your country in nuclear ruin, it doesn’t make much military sense, does it?” – Frank Shuler
I’m not exactly sure where you go with the above statement. What third party nuclear power might want (or would be able) to take advantage of any situation after a first nuclear exchange between US and Russia expired?
971
As I’ve previously stated, the role of the “Aleksandr Brykin” was no different than the role of the USS USS Proteus (AS-19) which supported forward operations at Holy Loch, Scotland and was used to build similar bases at Rota and on Guam for the Polaris missile system. While I have no doubt dispersant bases for Soviet ballistic missile submarines were built, I suspect their role had more to do with initial survival than missile reloading after a Soviet SLBM strike. After all Russia, and of course the United States, had such plans during the Cold War to disperse their bomber fleets in the event of a political event that “could” escalate into a nuclear war. This is standard military planning. However from a military planning standpoint, one would also have to expect such forward bases would be hit in a nuclear exchange; after all, both sides had thousands of warheads to spare. In any event, the sortie of any Soviet boomer after the warheads began to fall would be subject to prosecution by American attack submarines and mining. I continue to doubt any SLBM could be loaded in “open sea” by such a support vessel as the “Aleksandr Brykin”; it's just not practical. (again my initial reference was the Soviet liquid fueled missiles)
My oblique reference to rearming submarines to stand-down any third party nuclear power was meant to illustrate how limited the role of re-arming submarines in military planning would actually be.
Just my humble opinion.
Frank Shuler
USA
“I continue to doubt any SLBM could be loaded in “open sea” by such a support vessel as the “Aleksandr Brykin”; it's just not practical. (again my initial reference was the Soviet liquid fueled missiles)
My oblique reference to rearming submarines to stand-down any third party nuclear power was meant to illustrate how limited the role of re-arming submarines in military planning would actually be.
Just my humble opinion.
Frank Shuler
USA”
Your opinion is well noted. It’s true that you referred to a nuclear war scenario and the reliability (or practicability) of boomer at sea re-arming might be in such a scenario.
Having said that you might really try reconsidering the general idea/procedure of re-arming boomers at sea. In peace time. It was, it is and it’ll be not only possible but practical too. I’ve seen it done a dozen of times
971
[Having said that you might really try reconsidering the general idea/procedure of re-arming boomers at sea. In peace time. It was, it is and it’ll be not only possible but practical too. I’ve seen it done a dozen of times.]
If you have witnessed the loading of Russian (Soviet) SLBMs in open-sea, dozens of times, I graciously concede the point. I am intrigued. Can you share the class of submarines involved? Arctic or Pacific Oceans?
Good exchange of views.
Frank Shuler
USA
No, I can't.