I have long supported straight extension of the START Treaty - mostly because it provides the transparency and verification framework that we know will not be replicated in the the follow-on agreement. But we are where we are - I think the chances of START being extended are exactly zero. Sadly, this is because Russia made very much everything it can to make sure that this option is not on the table (RS-24 was the "poison pill" that very much was designed to do that).
Now that the end of START is near, the idea of extending the treaty (or at least its verification procedures) is getting popular in Congress, with the Republicans emerging as the main proponents of the measure. One of ther main arguments is that the extension would require no legislative approval and therefore can be done very easily. While this is true on the U.S. side, in Russia the situation is not as clear (is it ever?).
The law (that would be the Federal Law on International Treaties of 2003) says that any treaty or agreement that deals with arms control or disarmament has to be ratified by the Duma (Article 15.1g). The formal purpose of ratification is to incorporate the treaty into the legal system - in Russia, international obligations supersede national laws.
A good lawyer would probably argue that a simple extension does not create any new obligations, so ratification is not necessary. I think this argument has merit, but the established practice disagrees - the Duma has been routinely ratifying all kind of protocols that extend previously signed agreements.
There is still some room for a legal argument, I believe - unlike many of those agreements, START Treaty has the procedure embedded in the treaty, so its extension may not, in fact, require a protocol. For example, I see no reason why it cannot be done by a joint presidential statement. That would certainly not require ratification.
The real problem, of course, is not in the legalities of the procedure - if there were the political will, START would have been extended without ratification or with a very quick approval by the Duma. The problem is that no one in Russia seems to favor the START extension (I may well be the only Russian who does, but I'm not there). Theoretically, President Medvedev could sign a joint statement and then push it through the political system. But in practice he doesn't seem to have the weight to do that. Besides, why would he? He would much rather make the new treaty his signature cause.
I think we should just accept that START will expire and cast our lot with the new treaty. I agree with those who believe that the verification gap that will open on December 5th is something to worry about, but we have a way of dealing with that - by provisional application of the new treaty requirements.
The book
Comments
START II was similarly "discussed". By the time the Duma passed the necessary legislation, it was long out of favor with the US Senate. I question how the "provisional application" of the new treaty will work if the ramification is "stalled".
We shall see.
Frank Shuler
USA
Yes, you are the only Russia who favors START extension. ;)
Even under the theoretical scenario that the Kremlin did agree to extend START1, there is no way that any Russian agency or individual would continue to implement START1's provisions without legal top-cover. That would be a political decision and would carry too much political risk for the implementers. It's conceivable that a presidential decree could do the trick, if Duma approval could not be obtained fast enough --- either way, some type of legal status would be required for the implementers.
It's an academic question anyway, since START1 extension has long been off the table. No one in Russia wants that, for the many reasons you state, and few in the US seriously considered it. It's a bit disingenuous now for any of the players to suggest extension --- it could have been proposed as a serious option months ago, and at least held as a backup plan. It was clear since Spring that the negotiations would not be quick and easy, and yet even then extension was not proposed as a serious option.
I agree with you --- that extension makes the most sense and would buy the extra time needed to craft a thoughtful follow-on agreement. It would be predictable, unlike some "bridging agreement" that is likely to cause confusion. It's entirely plausible that any confusions caused by a bridging agreement could even cause problems in the final START+ negotiations.
Alas, there is no political support for START1 extension and the momentum in the other direction.
No new START Treaty makes sense now because of huge disparity between both sides. It is impossible to reach "equilibrium" because US would unilaterally give huge concessions to Russia in reduction of their delivery vehicles. I do not think any American President would agree on physical destruction of several thousands warheads, several Ohio-class SSBNs or several hundred Minuteman III and Trident II missiles. Yet otherwise new START Treaty will be an empty agreement which can be described in brief as "we hide warheads to depots and you have to destroy them due to age and lack of economic resources to build new ones in significant numbers". Besides there are many unsolved questions about strategic balance I am very skeptical they can be solved in any Russo-American treaty:
- nuclear and conventional SLCMs - now only US have huge amount of these weapons abroad dozens of naval vessels
- tactical nuclear bombs based abroad - now only US have several hundred nuclear bombs in Europe and abroad CVNs. Both those weapons can be used against Russia as strategic assets.
- overwhelming American lead in C4I area - since ten years US develop highly sophisticated radar detection satellite system aimed at quickly detection and tracking mobile ground targets like Topol-M launchers in real-time with pinpoint accuracy. This was researched under projects 5009, A004 and Space Radar abroad Lacrosse and Discovery-2 satellites. Final system will consist 24 satellites capable to detect such targets in 15 minutes and guide weapons to them.
- existence of vast arsenal of long range conventional PGMs - US will be able to deploy 3000-6000 such weapons abroad strategic bombers and submarines in the next decade.
- US effort to deploy worldwide missile defense system - even wit last cancellation of ABM sites in Eastern Europe it is almost certain US will develop seaborne and airborne anti-missile systems in the next decade. I mean about 80 AEGIS ships with SM-3 (and their successors) missiles, fighters carried miniaturized anti-missiles based on AMRAAM technology and airborne laser program. All of them could be employed against Russian strategic arsenal in many circumstances.
Of course Russia cannot even dream about creation of similar systems. So as you can see there is practically impossible to reach anything more than pure cosmetic agreement serving as political tool to strengthen internal position of Russian authorities and explain Obama's Nobel Prize to the public.
Attila
While your argument has certain merits, several of your facts are wrong. For example, the US Navy does not deploy tactical nuclear weapons at sea. The surviving number of nuclear-armed Tomahawk N-SLCM are stored in two land-base arsenals in the United States and number only around 100 missiles; these are due to be pulled from reserve service shortly. The last US Navy carrier aircraft certified to drop nuclear ordinance was the old A-6 Intruders which left active service in 1997. The US nuclear arsenal in Europe can be divided into two groups. There are weapons that were stored for exclusive American use and a much smaller number of warheads retained for NATO in a war emergency. The NATO inventory has remained somewhat constant, perhaps 20 B-61 nuclear bombs each are currently based with German, Italian, British, Dutch, Belgian, and Turkish air force units but retained under American command and control. The “exclusive” American numbers have been falling rapidly. Recently, the US has removed such weapons, B-61-3 & 4s, from Germany and Great Britain. Can the American inventory in Italy and Turkey be far behind?
The US nuclear arsenal is old, heavily modernized, but certainly old in design and manufacture. The last Minuteman III went into the ground in 1973. Only Russia is building new strategic nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs. Only Russia is building new nuclear warheads to arm its new Topol-M and Bulava missiles. Only Russia has the ability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons by ballistic missile. All that being said, the United States doesn’t fear Russia and sincerely wants a strategic partnership in the future. Of course, we want that partnership on our terms; but, isn’t that to be expected?
Why would Russia not agree to limit deployed nuclear warheads to 1500 for each side? With inspections and military-to-military contacts? What would Russia have to lose?
Frank Shuler
USA
Russia would have a credible nuclear deterrent to lose with the proliferation of ABM systems.
Mr Shuler,
You should notice the following facts:
- warheads assigned to TLAM-N cruise missiles are still stored in US depots. They can be deployed atop of any Tomahawk variant easily. So once again no physical reductions take place here.
- new American multirole figher F-35 is certified to carry tactical nuclear weapons
- American FBS in Europe are still reality not depending on their actual numbers. Simply US can deploy nuclear bombs in Europe very rapidly because the key issue is these bombs will not be destroyed but relocated to CONUS at most.
- this is very widely used American disarmament trick. As I remember last time US destroyed significant numbers of their delivery vehicles under START I Treaty. Since then we can see only paper reductions on the American side.
- in contrary to your opinions US nuclear arsenal is being still heavily modernized now. For instance Trident II missiles were produced till 2008 to equip enire Ohio-class SSBN fleet. Also B-2A stealth bombers were modified to carry out very low altitude penetrations.
- Russia is not building new strategic deterrence but is trying to do that with very lamentable results. As for now Bulava program is in shambles, amount of new ICBMs produced is far too small to replace massively withrdawn old Soviet missiles, no new strategic bomber program is on the table, etc. In fact Russia has to produce new delivery vehicles becasue old ones cannot be life-extended like their American counterparts due to many reasons. However Russia is unable to do so.
- Russia has nothing to lose because Russia has already lost capability to be real nuclear counterweight to the US. Twenty years lasting lack of serious military reform and arms activity are not possible to compensate now. So no new strategic arms reduction treaty is needed from realistic point of view. Indeed I do not understand what is going on with this ridiculous START-2009 concept!
Attila
Cold War thinking. In the “old days”, if the United States had 10,000 warheads; Russia must have 20,000. If Russia had 20,000, Washington wanted 30,000. And so on...
Today, whether Russia has 10,000 warheads or 1000 makes little real difference in “World Power” politics. Russia only needs a nuclear deterrence to prevent any nation from launching a nuclear first strike. What nation would attack Russia and lose its twenty largest cities in victory? Remember, no one “wins” a nuclear war. Such a deterrence must have multiple capabilities; on land and sea. Russia has that capability today and will continue to do so in the future.
Some notes:
W-80 warheads for the Tomahawk (TLAM/Ns) are not “technically interchangeable” with the US Navy’s tactical Tomahawk cruise missiles. In fact, the Tactical Tomahawks are not even EMP hardened and would be worthless on such a battlefield.
Only the USAF version of the F-35, the A version, is envisioned to carry B-61 tactical nuclear weapons, not the US Navy’s C version. I was questioning your statement about nuclear delivery of weapons by aircraft carriers. And then, only a select few aircraft will be modified to accept tactical ordinance; certainly not the entire fleet. To be honest, its not a given even this capability will be added to the F-35.
I completely agree on your assessment regarding “paper disarmaments”. As long as delivery systems are simply downloaded and the warheads retained, little is accomplished. The key is a Russo-American verifiable nuclear agreement that covers all nuclear weapons; strategic and so-called tactical. Only with such an comprehensive agreement, will Russia and the United States have real nuclear equality.
Slightly disagree on life-extension of Russian ballistic missiles. After all, is not the Sineva project for the R-29RM (SS-N-23) such a program? Are you telling me, such a Sineva-type program could not be created for the SS-19 fleet (UR-100NUTTH)? The decision not to re-manufacture the SS-19s was a political decision, not a industrial-military one.
I disagree. Russia has much to gain by a START+ agreement; and little to lose.
Good exchange of views.
Frank Shuler
USA