The current situation with sea-launched ballistic missiles is a result of what can be described a serious mismanagement, which, unfortunately, is very typical for the Russian strategic forces these days. The lack of oversight and absence of mechanism that would be able to reconcile various institutional interests create ample opportunities for ill-considered decisions and costly mistakes.
After the Soviet Union broke up, it was clear that Russia could not possibly maintain the Soviet strategic submarine fleet, so serious reductions of the submarine force were inevitable (to be sure, there were proposals to get rid of sea-launched ballistic missiles, but it was never a realistic option). So, the question that Russia confronted in the 1990s was how to proceed with keeping its strategic fleet at sea.
In the beginning of the 1990s, Russia had two types of relatively modern submarines – Project 667BDRM/Delta IV, built in 1981-1990, and Project 941/Typhooon, built in 1977-1989. Delta IVs carried liquid-fuel R-29RM missiles, Typhoons were equipped with solid-propellant R-39 missiles. By the time the Soviet Union broke up, the lead ships of each class entered overhaul, which, among other things, included replacing the old missiles with new ones.
Both R-29RM and R-39 missiles were developed at the Makeyev Design Bureau at Miass, which was working on upgraded modifications of the missiles. The new liquid-fuel missile was known as R-29RM Variant or Sineva, while the solid-propellant follow-on to R-39 was known as Bark.
The problem with the solid-propellant R-39 and its Bark follow-on was that the first stage of the missile was manufactured at the Pavlodar plant in Ukraine (the same first stage was used in the RT-23UTTH/SS-24 missile). That meant that Russia had to transfer production of the missile to its own territory. It was not impossible (the production was reportedly taken to Perm), but it certainly increased the cost of the Bark project. Given that for most of the 1990s Russia was having serious problems with financing its military, this put Bark at serous disadvantage. But the project went ahead nonetheless, since it was the only option available at the time – the new missile was to be deployed not only on Typhoons, but also on new Project 955-class submarines (the first ship of the new class, Yuriy Dolgorukiy, was laid down in 1996). In 1996, the Makeyev Design Bureau began flight tests of the missile.
The Bark missile was to become the only sea-launched ballistic missile of the Russian strategic fleet. Development of the R-29RM upgrade was apparently discontinued at some point in the early 1990s, probably because the military could not afford supporting two missile development projects. Besides, the navy, after having the chance to work with the solid-propellant R-39, strongly objected continuing with deployment of liquid-fuel missiles. Delta IV submarines would have allowed to complete their service until the missiles reach the end of their service life (maybe with moderate extension), which meant that all this ships would have been decommissioned by 2008-2010.
These plans, however, did not materialize. After the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Igor Sergeyev, was appointed the minister of defense in May 1997, the Strategic Rocket Forces became the dominating force in the military. That, among other things, meant taking control over the resources that the government allocated for the development of the strategic forces. Shortly after the fourth test of the Bark missile in November 1997 ended in failure (as did previous three), the Bark program was cancelled in favor of the new one, proposed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) – the primary developer of the Topol-M missile system, which was to become the main missile system of the Rocket Forces. MITT proposed creating a “naval version” of Topol-M, promising significant savings, since the Topol-M missile was at the last stages of development (the first missiles were deployed in December 1997). Despite serious doubts about the technical feasibility of adapting Topol-M for sea-based deployment, the project was approved. Construction of the Yuriy Dolgorukiy submarine was suspended, since it now had to accommodate different missiles. The plan apparently called for equipping Project 941 Typhoon submarines with the new missiles as well.
The decision to cancel the Bark project created a gap in the submarine force – development of the new “naval Topol-M” missile was expected to take at least several years, while the R-39 missiles it was supposed to replace had already reached end of their service lives. Besides, it seems that at that time it become clear that some of Typhoons will have to be decommissioned in any event, and construction of new Project 955 submarines will not be able to compensate for that. To keep the number of sea-launched missiles at a reasonable level, the government decided to resume production of R-29RM liquid-fuel missiles and to keep six Delta IV submarines in service. After an overhaul and equipped with new missiles, these submarines could be kept in service for more than a decade – until 2015-2020.
Flight tests of the new R-29RM Sineva missile were completed in June 2004. At least one of the two submarines of the Project 667BDRM class that have completed overhaul already carries missiles of this type. Other submarines are expected to be equipped with these missiles in the next few years.
Development of the new solid-propellant missile, which became known as Bulava, apparently proved more difficult than it was expected. Although the decision to go ahead with the project was made in 1997, MITT did not present technical project until 2000. In 2002 the industry completed conversion of the Dmitriy Donskoy Typhoon submarine for tests of the Bulava missile, but the missile was not ready for tests of any kind. The first “pop-up” test, that included only a mockup of the missile, was conducted in December 2003, and seemed to be more of a desperate attempt to show at least some results of the development program than an actually useful test. The first flight test of the Bulava missile was scheduled to December 2004, but the development program suffered a setback in May 2004, when a prototype rocket motor exploded during a fire test in Votkinsk. As a result, the most that the developers could produce in 2004 was a second “pop-up” test in September 2004. It is possible that flight tests of the missile will begin in 2005, but it is unlikely that new submarines with Bulava missiles will become fully operational before 2008-2010.
The delay with development of Bulava missiles proved deadly for Typhoon submarines. Although the original plan was to keep at least some of them in service with Bulava missiles, it is now impossible. The Typhoon division was disbanded in April 2004 and the submarines are scheduled to be dismantled. The only exception is Dmitriy Donskoy, but it is likely to remain just a test bed for Bulava.
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I am happy that you pointed out reasons of current state of Russian SSBNs. Unfortunately such state and reasons are very pesimistic! Of course I don't think that Russia had to preserve 60 SSBNs or so. In that time US also delimited its SSBN force from 44 to 14 Ohio subs. But all of them are seaworthy! So I suppose Russia could and must possess 12-14 SSBNs and about 4-5 of which on patrol every time. This would be complete assurance of Russian deterrence. Let's count minimum amount of warheads: 4 SSBN x 16 SLBMs on each x 4 warcheads per SLBM = 256 warheads avaliable for retaliation. I don't know you read 2001 NRDC simulation of US nuclear attack on Russia. I read there that assured destruction in the "Mc Namara knee" concept numbers 300 warheads for all NATO countries. So Russia would be almost safe!
In case of SLBMs I got to know on www.nti.org that in late 1990s Makeyev Design Bureau worked at new missile for Typhoons called R-39M "Bark" but project was cancelled after decision of Security Council of Russia in 1998. That was a stupidity because this project was 73% complete and difficulties were not insurmontable! Supposedly Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) was behind this decision because it promoted its own project of SLBM called Bulava-30. But design of this missile may take ten years! Now it is hard to image what Russia could do to avoid "3 SSBN" option. Maybe solution is:
1. Rearm all overhauled 7 Delta IV with 10 warheads' Sinevas.
2. Rearm 3 newest Typhoon with Sineva also (Sineva is much smaller than SS-N-20 so it probably would be possible to mount it in Typhoon silos)
3. Withdraw all Delta III to save funds.
3. Begin production of Delta V SSBNs in the rate of 1 per 2-3 years to replace Typhoons.
4. Maybe fast resuming of 3M91 Bark final design would be possible now ?
Such moves give Russia at least 1720 warheads at sea - almost equal to US!
Yes! Why doesn't Russian MoD Mr. Ivanov read this website? He would find here many magnificent solutions of Russian nuclear forces problems like this above!
Well, I think very little can be done at this point beyond what Russia is doing already - finishing development of Bulava and completing overhaul of 667BDRM submarines. The key decisions were made in 1997-1998 and to turn back now would only make the situation worse.
On specific points:
1. There are only 6 Delta IVs left and the R-29RM (Sineva) missile carries only four warheads, not ten.
2. No, R-29RM cannot be deployed on Typhoons - there are some differences between liquid-fuel and solid-propellant missiles that would probably require redesign of the submarine (in short, solid-propellant missiles are launched from a "dry" silo, while liquid-fuel ones require filling the silo with water before launch).
3. As far as I understand, this is being done already.
4. Well, there is no Delta V. The next-generation submarine is Project 955 Borey. The lead ship, Yuriy Dolgorukiy, is expected to be launched in 2006 (see previous post for details about submarines).
5. Resuming Bark is a possibility, but at this point it's not clear why it would be better than continuing with Bulava.
Wait a moment! SS-N-23 Sineva CAN carry 10 warheads! I is necessary incerase their number from 4 to 10 per missile during overhaul and that is all! You have 960 warheads on Delta IV instead 384. And that is maybe partial solusion but solution your problem!
There were reports that the R-29RM/SS-N-23 missile was tested with ten warheads, but it has never been deployed with ten - only with four. I guess there was a reason for that - the Soviet Union certainly didn't have shortage of warheads. So, I think it is unlikely that it will be deployed with ten warheads. Besides, the START Treaty, which will stay in force until the end of 2009, prohibits that.
I think that such goods like nuclear warheads never lacks in the USSR and Russia :) I heard that USSR didn't deploy 10 warheads on SS-N-23 not because it hadn't them but such move would have complicated already negotiated START I treaty.
President Putin said in 2001: "Russia redeploys many warheads from aging missiles on its ICBMs/SLBMs if US will withdrawn from ABM treaty." Nowadays it is a reality! Besides I wouldn't afraid any treaties now. Priority is to preserve SSBN force with any accesible means!
I would doubt that the decision to deploy R-29RM with four instead of ten warheads was made to make START negotiations easier - the negotiations didn't really begin by the time the missile was accepted for service in 1986.
As for Putin's 2001 statement, I wouldn't take it seriously - he said a lot of things only to reverse his position later.
Well, I simply suggest to incerase amount of warheads on Sinevas to 10 during its ovehaul. Is it possible now ?
Technically, deployment of R-29RM Sineva with ten warheads might be possible. But it is prohibited by the START Treaty.
And after 2009? If Russia sharply reduces its SRF ICBMs it won't be any other solutions sa only large MIRV-ing of SLBMs.
I don't see how the situation with ICBMs would be much different in 2009 than it is now, so I'm not sure MIRVing SLBMs would be a solution of anything.
In 2001 ICBM force will decrease form 2500 warheads now to about 700! So, MIRV-ing of SLBMs should be taken into consideration just now!
Sorry, of course: "In 2009...."
But what's wrong with 700 warheads? And why 2500 would be any better? Just having as many warheads as possible is hardly a reasonable approach to buiding strategic forces.
I don' t understand this. Let's explain one thing. How many strategic and tactical warheads can Russia assure deterrence now in your opinion? Of course you have to take into account NMD, NATO expansion, PGM etc.
Do you know any websites about Russian conventional forces similiar to your one? Could you give me their links?
A few deliverable weapons would be more than enough for deterrence (if we assume that deterrence has a value these days).
As for a site on conventional forces, no, I don't know any, which, of course, doesn't mean that there are none.
As you mentioned "deliverable"! Well, how many warheads should Russia possess to be sure effective retaliation after preemptive US attack? I read in your past articles that when SRF had 3500 warheads only 200 could sustain US attack. Thus I think 700 warheads at start hostilities is deeply too low level! How many of them will survive? I counted it and result is 40. US NMD system will be waiting for these 40 warheads and probably destroy most of them!
So reality is as follows: Russia will face with dangeorius level of unsecurity in a short future!
Well, 40 is not a bad number for deterrence. And you may have noticed that the U.S. missile defense has serious problems intercepting just one cooperative target, not to mention 40 non-cooperative ones.
Overall, it is very simplistic to think that the nuclear warheads can provide any security these days.
Maybe US NMD don't appear as very succesfull development but it is only begining! If we take into account all NMB systems: GBI, SM-3, THAAD, ABL and their number as well as their C4I parameters, situation changes to worse! I am not sure that 40 warheads or missiles can't be destroyed by all these means.
Of course nuclear weapon can assure deterrence now! Look at Iraq and North Korea. US attacked Iraq without any reasons and sluggishness because Saddam had not nukes. But with "Kim" US are talkig for two years more and nothing indicates it will change in the future. Why? Because "Kim" probably has a nuke and US don't want to check this on their own ass...at least to the moment when NMD come to force!