The U.S. Embassy in Russia announced that Russia and the United States completed the elimination of 78 SS-N-20 missiles (known as R-39 in Russia). This work was done as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program in a 12 year long project. Various reports suggest that all SLBMs of this type have been eliminated. This is probably true - there is no reason to keep these missiles around - but the numbers suggest that Russia did some of the elimination on its own.
In the initial START data exchange the Soviet Union declared that as of September 1990 it had 120 deployed SS-N-20 SLBMs on six Typhoon submarines. In addition, 31 missile was stored at the Nenoksa storage facility. That makes the total of 151 missile, although it is possible that some have been produced after September 1990. In the next START data exchange, in 1994, Russia declared the same 120 deployed SLBMs and 10 more missiles in storage - nine at the storage facility in Nenoksa and one at the Nenoksa test range. So, between 1990 and 1994 Russia eliminated 21 SLBM of this type.
The next round of elimination took place in 1996-1997 - 39 missiles were fired from Typhoon submarines in two separate salvos. Missiles had their thrust cut off at the 23rd second of the flight but the propellant would continue to burn up - it would be gone by the time the missile falls into the sea. The salvos were supposed to eliminate 40 missiles, but one SLBM refused to leave its silo. I would presume it was brought back to the base.
By 2000, when the current project began, Russia must have eliminated another 13 missiles, leaving 78 to the CTR program. But now it is all history.
The book
Comments
Rumor here is that President Obama wants to take the New START numbers down to 1100 "deployed warheads" and will propose so if re-elected. Do we think the Kremlin has any interest in taking the "number" lower? Or, is the 1550 number of New START the lowest Russia intends to go?
Frank Shuler
USA
The US Strategic forces headed for 300 warheads is a disaster. My prediction is it won't get there, despite the leftist intentions.
The Russians may fall below 1550 but not by much.
The new "heavy" ICBM won't happen in significant numbers.
Still wonder about the state of Chinese strategic forces, they have some tech hurdles to clear.
Frank: It depends. If the circumstances are right, Russia could certainly go lower than 1100. But I'm afraid that would involve some understanding regrading missile defense, so that chances are not great.
What's the tangible benefit to Russia for going to lower numbers? Because New START is so flexible on implementation, neither side is forced into physically cutting launchers or eliminating upload potential.
I think we can all agree that ABM treaty in exchange for cuts is a dead end, so the question is, what can US offer? Would they be willing to negotiate permanent disablement of inactive Ohio tubes? A cut to the Enduring stockpile? Taking B61 out of Europe?
If missile defense is off the table, then what's on the table, Frank, in your opinion?
Pavel
I’m always fascinated how policy decisions are reached when it comes to nuclear weapons. The 1500 limit (1550 as signed) on New START apparently came from the first administration of President Putin. It was the number of weapons that Russia could afford when faced with the economic decision that the entire Russian strategic nuclear arsenal would need concurrent rebuilding. The US was initially looking for a far larger number of deployed warheads but settled for the compromise. The 300 number that AWM referenced in his (her) post is also interesting. The number initially originated from the Global Zero, General James Cartwright, report that recommended the US nuclear arsenal should be cut to 900 total weapons with only 450 deployed. Global Zero recommended elimination of the Minuteman III ICBM without replacement and the remaining American deterrent weapons placed on Trident submarines; with a few B-61-12 weapons for the tactical mission. That report was a “trial balloon” to judge the political climate for deep strategic nuclear cuts; both in the United States and Russia. Today, the Obama administration is reportedly actively considering at least three post-election options for lower total numbers of deployed strategic nuclear weapons: reducing their numbers to 1,000 to 1,100; 700 to 800; or 300 to 400. The 300 warhead limit again came, indirectly, from Russia. The Kremlin policy planners told their American counterparts that their conclusion was that a first strike using only 300 warheads would totally “decapitate Russian society” [read: destroy the political, economic, and military foundations of Russia beyond repair] If the United States persisted in building a robust, comprehensive “ABM system”, the US would have to reduce its strategic nuclear inventory to only 300 deployed weapons for Russia to agree on any lower New START limits than the 1550 before agreed on. I guess the inference was the US could have 300 strategic weapons and its ABM system and Russia would have a larger number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to create “the balance”. Of course, the irony is that no one is really talking about actually eliminating nuclear weapons at all; only the number of deployed strategic warheads; systems that can be “uploaded” if needed in the future. Notice, Russia is building a significant uploaded capacity in all its new nuclear systems for such a scenario.
Always interesting to see where the “numbers” come from.
Frank Shuler
USA
artjomb
It’s difficult to see a way ahead given the present circumstances. Frankly, I don’t think the suggested permanent disablement of inactive Ohio tubes, cuts to the so-called American Enduring Stockpile, or tactical B61s in NATO influencing the Russian position in the least. These are just “talking points”.
Let me play the devil’s advocate, if the United States offered tomorrow to end the installation of the phased Aegis-Ashore System in Europe and unplug the GBI System in North America, what would Russia offer in exchange? At this point, I think that is the real question.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
looking through openly available Russian policy on tactical nukes, I honestly don't see a massive role for them, so I can envision Russian openness to cut these weapons. They just want to give them up for nothing or in exchange for something that they expect to get regardless (like strategic nuclear weapons cuts).
New tactical weapons systems are currently being developed that utilize nuclear payload as an option, so there is a future for tactical nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine, but I just don't see them requiring the same capacity as the current 2000+ tactical arsenal. So there is room for negotiated cuts.
artjomh
It is well documented here that Russia has refused to even discuss any negotiations on, so called, tactical nuclear weapons. The Obama Administration made this a priority after the 2009 Prague speech but gained no headway with the Kremlin. President Obama wanted a dialog with Moscow on including all nuclear weapons in a follow-up treaty to SORT but took the existing New START as the best political agreement he could get with Russia. You do make however a good point. This Administration sees all nuclear weapons in the same light regardless of “delivery system’. I think the United States would certainly like to negotiate the absolute number of Russian-American nuclear weapons down. The US has declared 5113 American warheads. If America cut this number in half for example, would Russia reciprocate?
Frank Shuler
USA
>>It is well documented here that Russia has refused to even discuss any negotiations on, so called, tactical nuclear weapons.
Just looking for leverage. I think they would say a clear no for cutting tactical nuclear warheads on a parity basis, but maybe a yes to bundling tactical warheads with other things they want.
>>If America cut this number in half for example, would Russia reciprocate?
If it were just a question of warheads, even if you include the non-operational stockpile, I don't think they will. If it were active+stockpile warheads bundled with real cuts to delivery vehicles, I think there might be a good chance for progress.
By the way, I've never heard of this Russian proposal you mentioned for a 300+ABM American arsenal. As opposed to what kind of Russian arsenal? I am having a hard time believing that Russia itself would ever go to 300. Maybe ABM+300 (US) 1000 (Russia)? Any more details? Also, source?
artjomh
Sorry for the confusion, the “300+ABM American arsenal” was only my conjecture. I was trying to gleam how an American reduction to the 300-400 weapons previously stated could conceivably work. If we made the offer, would Russia have a response? The Global Zero report concluded that an active arsenal of only 450 American nuclear weapons, ten submarines and 18 bombers, could provide adequate deterrence because the Kremlin “believed” a nuclear strike with as “few” as 300 warheads would “destroy” Russia. This report concluded such an American 450-operational warhead arsenal with a like number in reserved (total of 900 nuclear warheads) would be all the nuclear weapons the United States would ever need to achieve deterrence and/or deal with non-peer nuclear rivals. I believe the report, while interesting, had certain assumption flaws.
The 300-warhead threshold came from the Global Zero report. (page 9 in the footnotes)
I guess the real reason the Global Zero report was truly interesting is that the GZ think-tank has ties to the Democratic Party and the current Obama Administration. Thus, it may be an insight into current policy thinking.
Here is the pdf download site for the entire report.
GLOBAL ZERO: Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture (May 2012)
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/6395109/GZ%20US%20Nuclear%20Policy%20Commission%20Report.pdf
Frank Shuler
USA
Well, from a point of view that even a single destroyed city is an unacceptable level of damage for Russian leadership, and therefore even a handful of nuclear weapons deter Russia from a first strike, is certainly true. But you and I know perfectly well that this is not the dimension in which people in the Kremlin (or Pentagon) consider these matters...
I've watched their movie Countdown to Zero and it is certainly, how shall I put it, aspirational... But not entirely realistic, in my personal opinion.
artjomh
The cynic in me understands. Generals are programmed to defend, whether from West Point or M.V. Frunze. Then there are the academicians. The Pentagon or Kremlin “whiz kids” that have a better plan to lead us forward. It frightens us all to the “status quo”. If it “isn’t broke, don’t fix it” becomes “the plan”. Russian and American Generals have held the world in their hands since 1949. Times however are changing. I truly believe that Russia and the United States have more in common than we all know. It will be interesting to watch the “progress”.
Frank Shuler
USA
I think this discussion needs to keep in mind that not only does Russia operate a very advanced ABM system of its own, it's also in the process of developing future systems with similar capabilities. The ABM conversation needs to be held both ways.
Feanor
I agree the whole ballistic missile defense “issue” is a little disingenuous. Russia and China in particular, even India, are pouring monies into ABM technologies to see what’s possible and how/if that technology could be transformed into viable weapon systems in the future. The United States is just in the lead.
Here is a RIA Novosti article on Russian missile defense tests with the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky. Of course, this may also be an excuse to bring the remaining three mothballed Kirov-class nuclear-powered missile cruisers back to the fleet as well.
http://www.defencetalk.com/russian-warship-tests-missile-defense-capability-44678/
Frank Shuler
USA