I always believed that progress in U.S.-Russian relations critically depends on whether the two countries could get their bureaucracies work together. The general success of the "reset" process shows that this is indeed how things work - the most successful cooperation usually takes place in those areas where people speak common language. The problem is that the bureaucracies quickly learn each other worst habits and practices (they might occasionally exchange the best practices as well, but that requires a serious effort - the worst ones, in contrast, are adopted in no time).
This is exactly what happened with the data exchange mechanism in New START - not only the United States did not insist on keeping the transparency mechanism that existed in START, it actually decided follow Russia in not releasing any data at all. Hans Kristensen tried to get the information from the U.S. administration, but received the following response from an administration official:
All exchanges are classified and will not be subject to release. [...] There may be some information on very general numbers under the Treaty that could be made public, but that is still to be determined, and will not occur for a least six months if it occurs at all.
This is an absolutely scandalous (as in disgraceful, shameful, outrageous, shocking, infamous, ignominious, flagrant) policy and I certainly hope that the arms control community will work to make the U.S. administration to rescind it.
Strictly speaking, Russia also has no basis for keeping the data secret, but nobody expects very much from the Russian bureaucracy. The current U.S. administration, on the other hand, has positioned itself as a champion of openness and nuclear disarmament. As Hans rightly noted in his post, if the United States is serious about advancing the nuclear disarmament agenda, it has to be transparent about its arsenal.
New START data exchange is in many important ways more detailed than that of the old START - the New START exchange, for example, should include the data on the number of warheads on each deployed missile, information about missile and bomber bases, and such details as individual identifiers for each strategic launcher. The data format is described in Sections III-IX of the Part Two of the Protocol to the Treaty.
Article VII of the treaty, however, specifies that there are some restrictions on releasing this data to the public - Part 5 of Article VII says that
The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on releasing to the public data and information obtained during the implementation of this Treaty. The Parties shall have the right to release to the public such data and information following agreement thereon within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
In short, if the United States wants to release the data it received as part of the data exchange it would have to ask Russia first. We know that the answer in this case will be a firm "No" - the purpose of this clause is exactly to make sure that the United States does not do that.
The treaty, however, is very clear that each side is free to publish information about its own strategic forces - with the number of warheads and all. Here is the same Section 5 of the Article VII of the treaty:
Each Party shall have the right to release to the public data related to its respective strategic offensive arms.
There is nothing in the treaty that would prevent the United States from releasing the U.S. data exchange in full. Well, almost - the treaty specifies that some categories of data are particularly sensitive and seem to require mutual agreement (Article VII.6):
Geographic coordinates [...], unique identifiers, site diagrams of facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty, as well as coastlines and waters diagrams [...] shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed [by BCC].
This is perfectly fine - there is no harm to keep this kind of information confidential. Even in the old START exchange, geographic coordinates of silos were not released.
Even though the treaty prevents the parties from releasing a detailed data exchange of their counterpart, it explicitly allows publication of aggregate data for both sides. Here is Section 7 of Article VII:
Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the aggregate numbers of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; the aggregate numbers of warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and the aggregate numbers of deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, may be released to the public by the Parties.
This is probably what the U.S. administration official meant when he spoke about "some information on very general numbers" that the administration might decide to release at some point. I think it is absolutely clear that this decision should not be left to the bureaucratic discretion. It's not "some information" - it is a very specific set of data which should be released without much delay.
Ideally, Russia and the United States would release two sets of aggregate data and their respective full data exchange sets. Russia, of course, was expected to be secretive and to withhold as much information as it could. But the fact that the United States followed the Russian lead on that is absolutely shameful and cannot be justified. There is absolutely no way anybody could argue that the aggregate numbers are classified - they are not (they are not classified even in Russia). And I am sure a good case can be made that the full data exchange is exempt from classification as well - it is sent to Russia after all.
The bottom line is that this is the information that the U.S. administration should make public on a regular basis as soon as the data exchanges with Russia take place:
- Aggregate numbers for the United States and Russia, as described in Article VII.7 of New START
- The data submitted by the United States as part of the New START data exchange, as described in Part Two of the Protocol to the Treaty, with exception of geographic coordinates and other categories of data listed in Article VII.6 of the Treaty.
Transparency is probably the most valuable element of the New START treaty and by withholding the data exchange information the United States and Russia greatly undermine the agreement and certainly complicate efforts to further reduce their nuclear arsenals. Russia is probably a lost cause as far as transparency is concerned, but the U.S. administration should not be allowed to get away with ludicrous references to classified nature of data exchange and with vague promises to maybe release something at some date.
The book
Comments
Pavel
Let me see if I understand this. The bi-annual data exchange of the New START treaty between Russia and the United States has begun but Russia doesn’t want even an “unclassified” version of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) published as has been done in the past. According to Hans Kristensen, “transparency” between the Pentagon and the Kremlin is not affected but access to this information by the citizens of both Russia and the United States is. The United States has decided, at least for now, not to unilaterally publish any disclosure documents on the American arsenal because Russia is refusing to reciprocate or approve any such disclosures.
“Working bureaucracies” aside, why?
The change seems to be on Russia’s side. Why doesn’t Moscow want this information to be published? Don’t you find this odd?
Of course, I’m still amused by your posted quote. Oh, the shame! (grin)
[Russia, of course, was expected to be secretive and to withhold as much information as it could. But the fact that the United States followed the Russian lead on that is absolutely shameful and cannot be justified.]
Frank Shuler
USA
Please note that ALL geographic coordinates of ALL launch sites (past or present) are available on-line for quite a while already. You can see them all on google earth too.
Frank: I don't think that the U.S. officials decided not to publish its own data (and the aggregate data for both countries) as a reciprocity measure. They probably believe that they could get away with this kind of thing, just as their Russian counterparts. I hope they are wrong, but to be honest I don't hold my breath.
Pavel
At this point, do we really think anyone in Washington cares? That’s exactly my point. Perhaps there are folks in the Obama Pentagon that do; doubt it. I think Hillary and the State Department is ticked because someone in the Kremlin wants to “play domestic politics” with the data. I really don’t think there a conspiracy here to mislead the masses. Or, at least the “American Masses”.
Unless, I really am missing something...
Frank Shuler
USA
The transparency you speak of is the transparency between the policy-makers on both sides, not transparency before the entire world.
Random academics, wonks and just enthusiasts do not count and neither the Russian, nor US governments have any particular obligation to be transparent about all matters or national security without limit to every Tom, Dick and Harry.
Both sides's security interests are being served when each side knowns what is in everyone's arsenal. However, there are no tangible security advantages of letting that information get into the hands of curious civilians. Besides, of course, satisfying their curiosity...
To clarify, I've nothing against the release of aggregate numbers.
However, the public at large, both in Russia and the US, does not benefit a single bit from knowing the dimensions and fuel composition of the second stage of Minuteman-3 missile. Such transparency does not further any kind of civil debate or government accountability before the citizens.
The only people who benefit are wonks, like Hans and Pavel (I say it with all respect). So the entire affair may be outrageous to them, but highly irrelevant to the rest of the civil society.
To artjomh!
"The only people who benefit are wonks, like Hans and Pavel (I say it with all respect). So the entire affair may be outrageous to them, but highly irrelevant to the rest of the civil society."
But what about "us"? Why are "we" in such forums? Of course it is our interest to get some basic and non-classified data.
Among many others I enjoy the facts Pavel and guys like Hans Kristensen are providing to an interested public and the synergy effects which many of you all are contributing in order to get a more or less clear and constant picture.
So, Bernd, does that mean that the purpose of releasing MoUs is entertainment and education for a select group of arms control enthusiasts?
I don't see a greater benefit to society at large, that much is clear, but perhaps you can explain to me why you see the general public benefiting from release of such data?
artjomh: Very briefly, it's called accountability. You wouldn't argue, I guess, that governments should be allowed to keep, say, budget data secret. Of course, only a small group of people would care to look at the number of missiles and warheads, but the information should be open.
I've been at a number of meetings where government bureaucrats argued quite seriously that the public should not be allowed to make decisions on nuclear matters. Given attitudes like that I would much rather see them kept under control.
Yes, Pavel, you are making my point for me.
A budgetary process is very similar. Most of its numbers are open to everyone. The aggregate revenue and expenditure numbers are discussed publicly. However, the defense portion of the budget is a separate issue. Most of it is open, but there are certain black portions of it that the public cannot see.
The government still HAS to be accountable for black projects. However, due to national security implications of these projects, the accountability is private and limited to a certain number of people's representatives (i.e. congressmen, Duma deputies), and not open to the public.
There is nothing outrageous about that. It does disappoint my curiosity, but doesn't hurt not my civic liberties.
artjomh:
It is not my intention to end up in another "philosophic debate" which we all had about the topic of Russian Military Budget but I have a different opinion about "government right for secrecy".
All those aspects like budgetary affairs, nuclear and energy policy, health care, defence structure and many more are indeed things for the public, because it has something to do with our taxes and our future.
The governments and in turn also the military forces have their mandate from the people. At least from theory this should be guaranteed.
Any aspects of freedom of information's are vital elements to distinguish a modern society from an empire of the 19th century.
And of course it has something to do with trust and openness to our neighbours on this planet.
The folk should decide by it's own what sort of information are of interest for them and what not.
Of course there are sensitive and classified elements. New inventions in Industry, detailed information's of weapon parameters and so on.
But here we are talking about sheer numbers of equipment and number of warheads and carriers.
You always will find those who don't care for a matter but this can not result in a blockade of information's.
At the end of your arguments we would have a policy of information's which means that only a few decide about what is of relevance for the stupid people and what not. And you should know that history shows us that such decision makers are full of mistakes and stupid arrogance in their strategic wisdom.
Regarding energy policy we are seeing that attitude in situations like Tschernobyl and Fukushima or for the future aspects of environmental pollution.
arthjomh (it's you, as I can see): Precisely because of "national security implications of these projects" key information about them should be open. There is absolutely nothing secret about the number of warheads and location of launchers - this kind of data were routinely published under START. And most of this information should not be trusted to "certain representatives" - their track record in this area is not very good (in the U.S. as well as inn Russia and elsewhere). Then, national security is much better served by openness since it helps establish a standard (we do want to know how many warheads China has, don't we?)
Gentlemen:
I have followed the non-classified version of the various Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) throughout the history of START. I find the information interesting and informative. Of course, I have never seen the actual classified MOU and therefore have no clue as to the difference; what the classified MOU actually says and the detail of its data. I do understand the demands of national security but continue to believe in the rights of citizens to this non-classified information. The thing I don’t understand is the change. Why does Russia not want at least some version of the MOU published? I’m at a loss. The American arsenal basically remains the same; just less launchers and operational warheads. President Obama has spelled out the changes to the American inventory in his Section 1251 report to Congress. The American “road map” to future nuclear weapon infrastructure and upgrades has been published and discussed at length. What would be in a New START MOU that Russia wouldn’t want published, even in a sanctified public document?
I certainly could understand an argument between the Kremlin and the Pentagon as to exactly what information should be released and made available in a “public document” but I can’t fathom a reason why Moscow would not want anything to be released.
Am I missing something here?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank: As I understand, the only difference between classified and unclassified START MOUs was that the former had silo coordinates. On New START, the U.S. administration officials I talked to said that it was mutual consent to keep the data secret. As I said, some details are not particularly important - individual IDs (although it would be nice to be able to track individual launchers and missiles), silo coordinates, plans of the facilities, etc. But the numbers are important. And certainly there is no excuse for keeping the aggregate numbers secret.
Pavel
I completely agree that there is no logical reason New START can’t provide the same type of unclassified report as was previously provided all those years in “Old” START. It appears now, Russia doesn’t want such Treaty information published. Is this correct? Did this no-publish decision come from Moscow and the US only agreed? Or, did such a decision come from Washington? And if the original decision not to publish a public document from the classified MOU did came from the Kremlin, why? Any thoughts?
Frank Shuler
USA
Perhaps I can understand the Russians dragging their feet on this one, but it is absolutely unacceptable for this level of data to not be released by US authorities.
Are they just "covering" for the lack of Russian action here? Or is there something more at hand?
Clearly, the US is headed in the wrong direction with "classification" of data.
This lack of transparency seems to be a growing trait of the US government, and not just in the military realm, and we cannot blame this entirely on the current administration.
I for one, will at least write a letter as a concerned US citizen addressing the chosen course, something that more citizens should do. If I recieve any reply, I will try to post it here.
Pavel, gentlemen, I feel like my question regarding the public need-to-know has been neglected, however that is the crux of the issue.
I understand your argument that information should be open on general democratic principles, however, I do not see why the general public has a need to know this particular set of data.
Both US and Russia are republics. People do not govern the state directly, but rather elect legitimate representatives. Whether you like or dislike the current government seems irrelevant to me, since that's how the system works. We delegate the mandate to decide policy and access to information.
For the public to make a sufficiently informed democratic choice, some general information needs to be released to the public (such as the nuclear doctrine and aggregate numbers of nuclear weapons), however, I still fail to see how the public benefits from knowing highly technical data such as missile specifications and locations of SLBM loading docks (which are present in the sanitized MoU).
On a more theoretical side of things, there is a lot to be said for strategic ambiguity. It has arguably protected Israel from a WMD attack. And it almost certainly will protect North Korea (Moammar Ghaddafi must be cursing the day he gave up his nuclear research).
On the other hand, strategic openness is also good for business. For one thing, it sheds light on the shenanigans at Minot AFB. For another, it will hopefully quash the stupid unfounded rumors about Russian "loose nukes". However, I am not hopeful about that last one. Journalists will always find a way to sensationalize things.
Surely the most transparent administration of them all. My money would be that Zero and Co. got taken to the cleaners and are embarrassed by it. What did they have to give up to get the treaty? Certainly, it hasn't slowed the Russians down one iota. New ICBMs, SSBNs, SLBMs. . .
It was in December 1987 when the U.S. Department of State released the first detailed data exchange under the INF Treaty before the treaty was ratified and before any of the U.S. and Soviet inspectors arrived in a nuclear facility of the other party. Shortly later the Soviet Union welcomed journalists in the missile base of Rechitsa and presented a SS-20 launcher for the first time in history. It was openness and glasnost of the "new political thinking" at the highest point of the Cold War. And this was the basic ground for cooperation, predictability, understanding, and trust. Once upon a time former U.S. president Ronald Reagan said: "Trust but verify." Now we have the situation of a comprehensive verification regime under the new arms control accord, but without trust in a society with responsible citizens and with a further cancellation of the public opinion. And in this connection I mean not only interested privat individuals. It is the suspension of serious arms control researchers like Mister Podvig and Mister Kristensen, of authors, journalists, politicians, military and other people.
In the seventies and eighties some Soviet diplomats and attachés searched in Western European institutes or scientific archives and libraries for military documentations. But not for information on U.S. or NATO inventories, they looked for detailed publications about Soviet military inventories, arsenal stockpiles, and locations. Now such Russian people will lost the last detailed and correct overview of its own military. It is like a "Back to the future" movie situation: welcome back in the Cold War days! This unsuitable present is a muzzle not only for all free U.S. and Russian citizens. But what is the next step of this dilemma? New Pentagon brochures like "Soviet Military Power"?
Finally it is simple to forecast a wide field of new speculations, misinterpretations, and misunderstandings. And this is the breeding ground for new mistrust, estrangement, demarcation, and suspicions. My suggestion is the completion of a gentleman´s agreement of the U.S. and Russian members of the Bilateral Consultative Commission under the New START Treaty with an announcement to publish the complete semiannual data exchange in the intended manner. If this is not the case, we only can hope that "Wikileaks" will have a solution to this problem.
It appears that some data will be released relatively soon. Don't know what exactly, but I hope we'll see more than just aggregate numbers.
"It appears that some data will be released relatively soon."
Well that was quick, Pavel, and I only just mailed the letter(s)! Perhaps Frank made a couple of calls as well? LOL, just kidding of course, but I do have one very significant contact in this arena.
Believe it or not, a sizeable number of concerned citizens expressing their opinions can make a difference in the USA. Even now.
I/We will persist in our calls for openness/transparency with follow up communications to our elected representatives.
Gentlemen,
One thing I can understand is that all of you participating in these discussions in Pavel’s blog are well educated, smart, ambitious (at least as far as “hunting” information and knowledge is concerned) and pretty well connected to the outside world. I may be wrong, but I take my chances. :)
I like to consider myself as one of such people too, as far as my spare time away from my duties allow me. But I really find it amusing at best that you seem to be so thick-headed (no offence intended) in elaborating your discussions concerning humanity’s most (in my view) sensitive and serious area, namely the national securities of each and every country (or in this case the two most armed ones).
I think artjomh has made a decent attempt in addressing this issue. I’ll try to go a little farther with it.
“The thing I don’t understand is the change. Why does Russia not want at least some version of the MOU published? I’m at a loss. …but I can’t fathom a reason why Moscow would not want anything to be released. Am I missing something here?” – Frank Shuler
You are missing the most important thing Frank. Well, at least it appears so from your question. And that thing, shortly put, is the reality of the rules set in place for “playing” this game called politics and mostly national security politics. It could be that you’re a politician yourself, that you believe to possess way much knowledge about things that others do and that – in spite of that – you still go wondering around. Well, in that case you probably are a 1 or 2 size fish in a pond that has other swimmers up to size 20. (please allow my, I think, funny way in tackling an analogy)
No matter how much you and others will ever wish, demand or try to do will ever change that. We can stay here all we want and argue the pros and cons of what’s theoretically right for us as tax payers to know, of how big that bone thrown to us has to be. In the end it won’t matter anyway. Not when governments or even factions of governments can manipulate things of baffling magnitudes to their advantage and so against every bit of mandatory moral righteousness and counter attempts of exposure (and getting away with it) by simply calling them conspiracy theories! Or the myriad of stock exchange speculators who (as a result of one of mankind’s “greatest” achievements called democracy with all its freedom subsidiaries) can cause a world-wide financial crisis that we are all paying so dearly for in one form or another! (imagine what they could do if they knew key security sensitive issues due to the transparency and the lack thereof that some so wonder about!)
Why does Russia not want at least some version of the MOU published you ask. Well, my immediate reply to that would be that that’s the Russian way of doing things. That’s something of a heritage, something that goes way back in its history. Something so well earthed that will take a radical event of some sort to change that.
Maybe Russia do have something up its sleeve that doesn’t want to show, maybe there are flip sides to the whole thing that put in Russian perspective would jeopardize a series of other things that you, me, Pavel or others wouldn’t even dream of right away. Be sure that there are people that are very well aware of such events though. There always are.
But enough of this; I believe I’m getting out of the discussed topic’s spectrum.
But maybe I arose some clues which will help you and others in saving your time of asking such questions.
“At the end of your arguments we would have a policy of information's which means that only a few decide about what is of relevance for the stupid people and what not”. - bernd reuter
Has it – at any time – being different?
971
How clever you are! I especially liked the “big fish... little pond” analogy. I must confess; I am no politician. As you seem interested in placing people who post here in categories, color me an academician; a simple man curious to complex questions and their answers. My inquiry remains, “after publishing all the previous MOUs (sanctified copies of course) from all the previous arm control agreements between Moscow and Washington, why not this one?” I am underwhelmed by the response, “it’s because we’re Russian.”
Frank Shuler
USA
post scrip - In my pond, I am a very big fish.