On August 28, 2008 the Strategic Rocket Forces conducted a successful launch of a Topol (SS-25) missile. The launch took place at 14:36 MSK (10:36 UTC) from the Plesetsk test site. The Rocket Forces reported that the warhead successfully reached its intended target at the Kura test site in Kamchatka.
The missile that was tested had been in service for 21 years. Most likely it was deployed with the missile division in Novosibirsk - the crews of the Glukhov Guard Missile Division based in Novosibirsk were reported to be leaving for the test site earlier this week. The press-release mentioned an "experimental warhead" (which, of course, would be able to defeat all possible missile defenses). My guess would be that these might be some new decoys or penetration aids - these are normally deployed with all Russian missiles.
UPDATE 09/05/08: According to another report the launch was performed by the crews of the Yoshkar-Ola division.
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Can this new warhead be MARV ar+ctualy. On our news media it was reported that in terminal phase missile flies like cruise missile and manuevres ...
Viktor: It is safe to be skeptical about Russian media reports.
Hello Pavel - Greetings to you!
Would you consider this test more as a reliability test for the old Topol or is it to test a new warhead design in conjunction with the RS-24 philosophy?
Cheers from bernd
Advanced decoys can be extremely useful in saturating tracking radars. Do you think Pavel that some sort of this stuff was tested? Supposedly, research on this issue is quite developed in Russia.
Everything is possible, of course, but I don't think it was anything more than a test to confirm warranty.
Can someone explain what it means that the warhead reached it's intended target? How accurate are the russian warheads?
Parimal Debnath
My friend, I would tend to support Pavel’s hypothesis on the recent Topol test. I suspect it was a routine warranty test to re-certify the SS-25. Unless the launch was designed in some way to test a new warhead that might be adaptable in the future with the Topol-M SS-27 ICBM, I can draw no other conclusion. If that were the case however, why test such on a 21 year old missile?
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank
I also think this was a warranty test but if it wasn't, it makes sense to test new warhead on old missile. The reason is simple: you don't want to waste one of your new missiles because you don't have such a great number of them and anyway you would have to "throw away" your old SS-25 soon.
Ivan
Or even a more interesting conclusion is that Russia intends on keeping some SS-25 ICBMs in the active inventory long term and wants to test the Topol with the new “maneuvering” SS-27 warhead to see the results. Pure speculation on my part.
Frank Shuler
USA
Why would Russia need to scrap the relatively new SS-25's soon?
Victor,
My guess is that the MARV warhead is most likely a typical cone shaped RV but with recessed reaction control thrusters, but of course I've never seen conceptual drawings for a MARV from either US or Russian sources.
Frank & Jon:
Are there any MARVs in the US Arsenal - e.g. for Minuteman or Trident, or intended to field in the near future to enhance capabilities?
I have only heard that there were MARVs on old Pershing II.
Thanks in advance
Frank
Extremely interesting guess! Anyone else thinks this is a possibility?
Feanor
Solid fueled rockets (like SS-25 and SS-27) doesn't seem to have such a long lifespan as liquid ones. See the example of "relatevely new" and modern SS-24 having being phased out. The problem with liquid rockets is "rusting" of parts while fuel is expendable, while the solid ones, which doesn't have "suporting hardware" like pumps,etc.. have different problem: the fuel itself changes its characteristics with time so the only way to maintain them is 1)keep them in climatized storage (tubes, silos) which is being done and 2) change the whole rocket stages from time to time which is not so far away from acquiring a new rocket :)
On SS-25 (like with any other rocket) manufacturer gives a warranty time which can be prolonged based on test conducted more or less regulary with oldest speciments. So, I mean this when I say throw away but also when a time limit of service is established, as a type, SS-25 will start to be phased out.
Ivan:
That is preciselly why I advocate: keeping/re-starting production of ss-19. That is the rocket that is meant to be deployed in silos(much higher throw to weight ratio than ss-27 and with multiple warheads) Topols place even if Mirved should be in mobile units exclusivelly. In other words, both single and multiple warheads Topols should all be mobile whilst for silo based deterrence I would rely on Stiletto. Indeed I wouldn't even Mirv Topol, but that's is going against the current in Russia.
Bernd Reuter
As far as I know, there is no MARV warhead in the US arsenal. I did hear something about the Pershing II RV as well, but nothing concrete. I also agree with Boris that The SS-27 should not be mirved, but instead be equipped with the single 550kt MARV warhead and be exclusively mobile. Also, an upgraded new production SS-19 would be a good idea as well- equipped with either multiple MARV's or a single large MARV of 10-12MT or so. Additionally, for the long term, Russia ought to re-examine the FOBS concept (Fractional Orbit Bombardment System) in combination with a MARV warhead to ensure credibility of its deterrent against US-led ABM systems proliferation.
Bernd Reuter
I don’t honestly remember any payload for the Pershing II other than the standard W85 which was a variable yield tactical warhead. The W85 was an air burst weapon rated at 5 to 80 kt(s). There was to be a follow on version that was to have some “earth penetrator” capabilities but that program was cancelled long before the Pershing’s were removed from inventory in 1991.
Frank Shuler
USA
Jon Grams
The reintroduction of the Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS) would seem a most ill advised decision. This system can only be thought of as a “first strike weapon” and how wise is it to reintroduce a nuclear system to space? America’s response would only be to Russia’s greater disadvantage and what would be gained?
If there is any lesson to be learned here about American ABM systems and the panic they seem to have created, it is the growing realization that nuclear weapons have limited military worth. Today, Russia is spending billions of rubles on weapons of little value. When both sides have such nuclear systems and neither side is willing to face utter destruction in their use, conventional weapons will “rule the battlefield”. It is that lesson the Americans have mastered and the Russian have yet to learn. I suspect the Kremlin will have a great deal to evaluate from their conflict with Georgia and those “lessons learned” applied to the Russian military in the future.
Today, nuclear arms are political tools and not military weapons.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
I suppose a FOBS system could be thought of as a first strike weapon, but in todays context I see it as a way to ensure the credibility of Russia's nuclear deterrent and MAD, which in my opinion, is proven and will remain valid as long as nuclear weapons exist. Also, The "Fractional Orbit" is key here, because the weapon does not actually complete a full orbit, or remain in orbit, as in the original orbital bombing concept. Therefore I don't see this as a space-based weapon system. What the system does provide, is; global range, higher speed, and the ability to strike from any direction on the map. I remain convinced that as long as nuclear weapons exist, MAD must be maintained at all costs to avoid the use of these weapons. ABM systems will not "marginalize" nuclear weapons, they will only spur a new arms race, promote instability, and increase the chances of a nuclear weapon being used.
Jon, I think the only way the Pentagon could look at the FOB system is as a first-strike weapon. The ability to strike the United States from the equator, bypassing the bulk of American detection systems, screams at the classic “decapitating nuclear strike” scenario of the 1970’s. Today, if Russia puts her ICBM force on maximum alert or sorties her strategic submarines, a nuclear exchange in not necessarily imminent. In fact such a decision by the Kremlin might be thought of as more a political statement and posturing; not a prelude to nuclear war. However, the launch of a nuclear armed FOB system would be such a signal. It’s just a bad idea. (like launching a conventional Trident missile)
Good exchange of views.
Frank Shuler
USA