Speaking to journalists about a month ago, Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, the commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, gave us some interesting numbers about the state of readiness of the missile force and about mobile missile patrol rates. (Thanks to reader R for sending me the link.)
According to Solovtsov, the Strategic Rocket Forces managed to bring the number of missiles on high alert ("ready for immediate use") to the 96% goal set by the President. It is interesting to note that last year Solovtsov reported that 97 to 98 missiles out of every hundred were in launch-ready state.
Also, Solovtsov seemed to say that 93% of road-mobile missiles were on patrol during the first half of 2008 (that probably should have been "first four months", since he was speaking in the beginning of May). The exact words that he was reported to use were "number of tactical exercises during which missile regiments were deployed on patrol routes." This choice of words leaves a possibility that some of these exercises were not combat patrols, but I think it is unlikely. In 2007 that rate was 90% and in 2006 - 78%.
This is a fairly high patrol rate. Most estimates in the open literature (including mine) assumed that missiles are normally kept in stationary shelters and rarely go on patrol.
The book
Comments
Summarizing, the strategic rocket forces showed a much higher readiness than the SSBN fleet and almost all wings of mobiles missiles have fulfilled at least one patrol. That’s impressive. It is time for the navy to up the threshold.
Kolokol
Russian made a very insightful comment recently in one of his post regarding such. To paraphrase, he lamented how far the sea arm of the Russian nuclear deterrent lagged behind the land force. His conclusion, which I completely agree, was that developing sea based systems is just very complicated and costly in comparison to land based weapons and require an even higher level of industrial technology and knowhow. I don’t know of a single international example of a nation deciding to pursue a submarine based SLBM without first having mastered a land based ICBM. (One can argue the British only used the American expertise when they first moved to Polaris) Sea launch is just too complex; too technical. The advantage of a nuclear deterrent based at sea is obvious but you must always “crawl before you walk”.
Frank Shuler
USA
> It is time for the navy to up the threshold.
- Kolokol, it seems that you was heard again (smile); today, in June 6, 2008, media report about the first onboard official exercises of 'YD' crew:
http://www.gzt.ru/print.php?p=incident/2008/06/06/121700.html
- The crew was trained as 'firefighters' in the simulated situation; I think we need to consider such an exercises as a sign of the following:
(a) 'YD' is practically completed;
(b) In the next few months (probably in July - August), we will surely see 'YD' at sea trials.
> Russian made a very insightful comment recently in one of his post regarding such. To paraphrase, he lamented how far the sea arm of the Russian nuclear deterrent lagged behind the land force. His conclusion, which I completely agree, was that developing sea based systems is just very complicated and costly in comparison to land based weapons and require an even higher level of industrial technology and knowhow.
- Correction, Frank; I need to propose a serious correction to your understanding...
I may completely agree with you in the part of conclusion that 'the sea arm of the Russian nuclear deterrent lagged behind the land force', - but I do think that you should to incorporate a small, but very important correction in understanding of the main reasons of such 'lag'; these reasons are:
(a) Neglection of the 'sea arm' state during the almost 12 years... In short, - Eltsin's government was simply don't care in what state the 'sea arm' of Russian strategic triad are... Or they simply do not have enough money for it; we all understand that 'sea arm' is the most expensive part of the triad, and require a lot of money only on logistics, everyday needs and supporting repair.
(b) Not enough coordination and unification of the efforts of numerous R&D, production and repair facilities... For the years, a faulty system exist when every subcontractor was responsible only for his 'narrow' part of work, - and there was rather poor coordination at the 'top' level, a level of the final product (i.e., - sub)... Again, Frank, - it's important: not 'higher level of industrial technology' (Russia mostly keep the good USSR traditions here), but 'business coordination' and 'efforts unification'...
It's very hard to go forward, when your left leg makes a full step forward and then your right leg makes a half of step to the right... (smile)
In fact, during the 1990s, the entire Russian shipbuilding industry was in the state of permanent 'bardak'. (I just curious how the people of West will be able to interprete this GREAT Russian jargonism... Hint: if you'll be able to understand the real meaning of this word, - you'll surely be able to understand what's happened in Russia in the last decades).
Now, thanks to God and Putin (smile), the situation had really changed, and good state control / proper top-level management were returned again to the shipbuilding industry; the first examples here, - Borey practically completed and 200-mln. dollar 'Project 20380' corvette, - a first Russian 'stealth' battleship transferred to the Navy:
Battle units
Central station
At pier
Top view
At sea
Front view
I may a lecture here about ways how Russian military industry revive itself through getting a proper level of smart market coordination and state management, but this subject will surely require a big article, not tiny post.
Russian, I knew that YD first exercises were inminent. Now you link the article that say that some exercises already had started. You make my day a happy day,...again. Thanks.
Respect to patrols, well even considering that the SSBN patrols are still scarce, it seems the the mobile ICBM wings are very active.
We can consider them as "land SSBN patrols" :)
> In 2007 that rate was 90% and in 2006 - 78%.
- And in 2005 - 60 %:
"Обеспечено поддержание полевой и маршевой выучки личного состава рд. СПУ. 93 % мероприятий тактической подготовки проведено с выводом рп. СПУ на маршруты боевого патрулирования (в 2007 году этот показатель составлял 90 %, в 2006 году, - 78 %, в 2005 году, - 60 %)". ("Новости РВСН").
- So the entire picture is:
2008 - 93 %
2007 - 90 %
2006 - 78 %
2005 - 60 %